



In Their Own Words:

Services and Arms Application in Joint Operations

Foreign Military Thought



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PROJECT EVEREST

The Department of Defense epicenter for human-centered strategic art

Project Everest is a strategy design start-up inspired by Andrew Marshall's call to cultivate comprehensive understanding of U.S. competitors in pursuit of national security. Project Everest contributes to this vision in two fundamental ways: by recurrently educating defense professionals on adversaries' ways of war and by facilitating the development of novel strategies that achieve competitive advantage over potential adversaries. Founded in 2013, Project Everest has grown its membership to hundreds, and shaped policy and education campaigns at the national level.

Project Everest tackles two significant national security problems for our nation. First, Project Everest seeks to invigorate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' 2013 charge to develop an officer cadre with deep regional expertise and to answer the 2018 National Defense Strategy's charge to "prioritize developing the intellectual firepower of our warfighters and workforce via education and training".

Second, we seek to inject creativity into stale strategy development methods for the Department of Defense, inspiring novel approaches to competition and warfighting and answering the charge of the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance to employ our "full diversity of talents [to] address today's complex challenges" and "prevail in strategic competition." Traditional approaches to strategy development overlook opportunities to understand how a potential adversary thinks about and plans for competition and war.

We bring together motivated individuals with subject-matter expertise in their primary specialty to interrogate key strategic issues throughout their careers. Over time, this develops a cadre of high-caliber officers who have a deepened appreciation of near-peers' ways of war and are experienced in thinking through the toughest operational and strategic challenges. We believe human-centered design and unconventional problem-solving methodologies enable members to assimilate new knowledge and develop novel warfighting concepts and recommendations to address strategic challenges.

Project Everest was founded by six graduates of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, who range in gender, expertise, rank, status, ethnicity, and personality, and who have a shared vision to inspire change in the way our nation prepares to compete and fight.

In Their Own Words

The “In Their Own Words” series is dedicated to translations of Chinese documents in order to help non-Mandarin speaking audiences access and understand Chinese thinking. CASI would like to thank all of those involved in this effort.

In the “In Their Own Words” series, CASI and its collaborators aim to provide Chinese texts that illustrate thoughtful, clearly articulated, authoritative foreign perspectives on approaches to warfare at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Project Everest Comments

Service and Arms Application in Joint Operations is part of the Project Everest “Foreign Military Thought” series. This particular volume was published under the auspices of Project Everest in conjunction with the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI). The text is one of the special series of reference texts written under the PLA Joint Operations Command Talent Cultivation Project of the former Shenyang Military Area Command. It discusses the roles and methods of all Services in integrated joint operations in informationized warfare.

The U.S. editors apply a stringent vetting process to select foreign texts. Selected texts will help build a deep understanding of different approaches to warfare and clarify details of foreign perspectives that may have both commonalities and asymmetries to U.S. approaches. This series will stimulate thought on both the core elements of military strategy and operational concepts for force application during war. CASI and Project Everest believe that cultivating a holistic understanding of foreign perspectives by learning from high-quality original material articulated from a foreign perspective offers an invaluable starting point for the exchange of ideas and the development of military thought.

The translation and publication of *Service and Arms Application in Joint Operations* does not constitute approval by any U.S. Government organization of the contents, inferences, findings and conclusions contained therein. Publication is solely for the exchange and stimulation of ideas.

Translators' Notes

This translation of the original text aims to accurately capture the technical meanings, in both English and Chinese. This will ensure that the reader will not inadvertently draw the wrong substantive understanding based on inaccurate translations.

Note on Trouble Terms:

Throughout the text are certain terms that are translated with the Chinese pinyin modifying the terms. This convention allows the reader to distinguish nuances that exist in the Chinese terms.

Jihua and *guihua* plans. The *jihua* plan is a more specific plan, a plan that is meant to be carried out to the letter, whereas the *guihua* plan is a more general plan that is macroscopically focused. In order to retain the intended Chinese distinction, plans will be rendered as *jihua* plan and *guihua* plan.

Bushi and *bushu* dispositions. *Bushi* disposition is the *mission differentiation, organized grouping, and positioning* [deployment] accomplished for strengths within the campaign task-based organization. *Bushi* denotes the relationship between one's own military forces, the opponent's military forces, and the combat environment (e.g., terrain). *Bushu* disposition is the positioning of participating force-strengths for a fixed time and space on the basis of *mission differentiation* and the *organized grouping of campaign* and in accordance with operational conditions and the enemy's possible activities.

Xitong, *tixi*, *tizhi*, and *zhidu* systems. The *xitong* system is an elemental system, one that can operate on its own. The *tixi* system is similar conceptually to a *System of Systems* as often seen in systems engineering; in Chinese, a *tixi* system is understood to be composed of elemental *xitong* systems acting together as a larger whole. The *tizhi* system is a large-scale system, typically a national-scale system and understood to be formalized embodiment of a *zhidu* system. The *zhidu* system describes a conformance system, one where all elements of that system conform to how that system is defined.

Note on Table of Contents:

The double pagination shown in the Table of Contents represents: 1) the original page numbers from *Service and Arms Application in Joint Operations* followed by 2) the actual page number of this translation. Additionally, the headings throughout the document also reference original page numbers from the original-language text.

Services and Arms Application in Joint Operations

联合作战中军兵种运用

{lianhe zuozhan zhong junbingzhong yunyong}

Editor: Ji Rongren {纪荣仁}

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Joint Operations Command Talent Cultivation Strategic Project Library Catalogue

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The Strategic Project to Rapidly Push Forward Joint Operations Command Talent Cultivation

— Preface for Shenyang Military Area Command “Joint Operations Command
Talent Cultivation Strategic Project Library”

Shenyang MAC Commander Zhang Youxia {张又侠}, Political Commissar Huang
Xianzhong {黄献中}

As the world’s new military transformation continuously moves forward, tremendous changes are occurring in the organizing form, command *tizhi* system and operational patterns of the armed forces; while integrated joint operations are increasingly becoming the basic pattern and basic form-state of military strengths application. In integrated operations under informationized conditions, the joint operations command talent has from start to finish occupied a dominant position, being the nucleus and soul of the joint operations *tixi* system and a critical essential factor for grasping the overall situation of operations, for the direction of the war and deciding victory or defeat in a war. Chairman Hu and the Central Military Committee stand at the height of world military transformation, following closely the era’s developmental tide; they have accomplished a strategic decision-making to strengthen joint operations command talent cultivation, which has major significance and profound effect on our full-scale improvement of the core PLA military capability of winning a local war under informationized conditions and the capability for dealing with a variety of security threats and accomplishing diverse military missions.

In recent years, the MAC Party committee earnestly carried out the dispositioning of Chairman Hu’s and the CMC’s strategic decision-making, and they focused on effectively carrying out the PLA’s new historic mission; under the tow of implementing the talent strategic project, they conducted a thorough practice and exploration [**end of page 001**] of the joint operations command talent cultivation work, and they actively integrated together cultivation resources, effectively expanded cultivation channels and continuously enlarged the strength of cultivation so as to allow this work to present a outstanding development posture. In particular, at the 2008 PLA-Wide Joint Operations Command Talent Cultivation Symposium, our MAC Party committee, through the combination of deepening theoretical research and pushing forward practical work, through the combination of school training with duty position drilling, through a combination of universal cultivation with key-point improvements and through a combination of successfully accomplishing specific cultivation work with improving the *tizhi* system’s mechanisms, we put forth the research paper *An Idea on Further Strengthening Joint Operations Command Talent Cultivation Work*; it strongly pushes forward and vigorously unfolds the joint operations command talent cultivation work such as training that relies on school and academy cultivation and cross multi-service intersecting duty positions and forging that relies on major military activity. The General Political Dept. convened a PLA-Wide Joint Operations Knowledge Network Training

Symposium on-site at the 40th Group Army to study our results; GPD Director Li Jinai { 李继耐 } gave high approval for our MAC's methods.

The ways for cultivating joint operations command talent are varied and diverse, but one must start out from learning. The foundation project for joint operations command talent cultivation is to have a grasp of joint operations command basic theory, successfully learn joint operations specialized knowledge and comprehend foreign military joint operations fighting methods. The organizing and operations research-based planning of Shenyang MAC's "Joint Operations Command Talent Cultivation Strategic Project Library" is performed by the MAC Political Cadre Department, it is jointly written by high level command academy noted experts and scholars in the armed forces such from the National Defense University and Shijiazhuang Army Command Academy and from MAC organs and unit leadership, and it is published by Baishan Press; in order to popularize the basic knowledge of joint operations, firm up the joint operations command quality foundation of command and staff officers at each level, provide valuable study and teaching materials, this [library] fills a void in MAC unit joint operations command talent cultivation theory books. This "Library" conducts a systematic study and thorough elaboration for the associated theories of joint operations in four content areas of basic theory, special topic study, qualitative cultivation and training guide. Command and staff officers at the three levels of strategic, campaign and tactical, and personnel in military affairs, political, logistics and equipment positions **[end of page 002]** can all find reading units in this "library;" it is good reading material with deep theoretical study level, broad in reader scope coverage and large in practical guidance value. It plays a tremendous moving forward role for improving the joint operations command accomplishment for the mass of cadres and for popularizing joint operations theory knowledge.

It's theoretical and knowledge value completely lies in its guidance practice. After the "Library" was published and issued, it is hoped that each unit will earnestly open up for the mass of cadres the activity of "successfully reading this set of books and cultivate a batch of talent," and quickly start a surge to study joint operations theory and master joint operations knowledge. Moreover, they will combine the preparations and practice of military struggle and push forward for innovative developments in the MAC's joint operations command talent cultivation work! **[End of page 003]**

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Preface...001

Joint operations are the operations conducted together under a unified command by multiple services and arms in order to achieve a unified goal and in accordance with unified intention and plans. Its essence is, based on the principle of mutual complementation of superiorities, to scientifically combine together the different capabilities of services and arms such as reconnaissance, intelligence, information, maneuver, firepower, etc. and form an integrated-whole composite strength superior to the enemy's and seize victory of operations. The strengths of each service and arm are the material basis of joint operations, and their mutual relationships are equal; a unified operational goal is the soul of joint operations, and it is the valuable orientation for ensuring consistent adjusting-coordination of the operations of each service and arm; unified intention and plans are the specific requirement for ensuring consistent adjusting-coordination of the operations of each service and arm; and unified command is the regulating-controlling means for ensuring consistent adjusting-coordination of the operations of each service and arm.

The services and arms are the basic differentiations conducted for the compositional types of the armed forces, based on the differences of the main operational domain and missions. The services and arms of the PLA normally refer to the Army, navy, Air Force, Second Artillery as well as the Armed Police units. Every service and arm is also composed of a number of arms (armed types {警种 *jingzhong*}) and specialized arms {*zhuan ye bing*}.

The application of joint operational services and arms is the operations research-based planning and guidance of applying service and arm operations from the perspective of the overall situation of joint operations, and it is an important topic of PLA joint operations theoretical research under informationized conditions.

In entering the 21st Century, under the powerful push of the new military transformation, military domains are in the midst of undergoing profound changes; the form-state of warfare is in the midst of striding from mechanized war towards informationized war; joint operations have become a basic operational form of future operations; and in areas such as operational thought, task-organizational structure of the *tizhi* system, operational missions, operational patterns, operational methods, etc., are pushing out the old for the new. **[End of page 001]** Services and arms are not only the most invigorated domain in this new military transformation and its practice of activities, but it is also the main vehicle and beneficiary of the results of transformation. Several recent localized wars and non-war military activities in the world have demonstrated that the application of each service and arm in joint operations under informationized conditions has had some new characteristics as well as historical quality changes to its position. Earnestly studying the problem of application of service and arm operations in joint operations under informationized conditions, the exploring the train of thinking and approaches of each service and arm responding to changes of warfare form-states and carrying out the historical mission of the new phase of the new century have major significance for our

building a modernized services and arms strength suitable to the requirements of the features of the era and position of the nation, [have major significance] for successfully accomplishing military struggle preparations, for safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and for safeguarding national security and even better and faster development of the people's economy.

This book is guided by Mao Zedong's military thought, Deng Xiaoping's thought on armed forces building in the new era, Jiang Zemin's thought on national defense and armed forces building, and Hu Jintao's series of important instructions concerning military struggle and armed forces building in the new phase of the new century. The book relies on the military strategic concept of the new era; its objective is to win localized war under informationized conditions; it has a footing in currently existing equipment and focuses on possible developments in the recent period; on the basis of fully drawing from newest research achievements on the associated problems of joint operations services and arms application by recent Army, navy, Air Force, Second Artillery and Armed Police Force organs, schools-academies and units, this book studies with key points contents such as the characteristics, operational task-organization, operations missions, basic thoughts and principles of operational guidance, establishment of the command institutions, main patterns of operational applications and operational support, etc. of each service and arm operations in joint operations of the new phase of the new century; and through a period of research, this book provides experiences to borrow from for successfully employing the strengths of services and arms in future joint operations.

For this book, Ji Rongren {纪荣仁} was the chief editor, Yuan Jingwei {袁静伟} was the assistant editor, and the following participated in writing: Li Mingliang {李明亮}, Wang Xuejin {王学进}, Zhou Guiliang {周桂良}, Gao Xufeng {高旭峰}, Zheng Jiansheng {郑健生}, Chen Huaihe {陈怀河}, Zhou Xiangyang {周向阳}, Dong Yanshuang {董延双}, Zhang Zhonghai {张忠海}, Zhou Laikang {周来康}, Zhou Jiangdong {周江东}, Huang Jie {黄杰}, Wang Xiaojian {王晓剑}, Liu Dehan {刘德涵}. During the course of writing, we consulted and borrowed from the experiences associated academic achievements such as relevant works, teaching materials and discourses of recent years within and outside the PLA. We gained the warm support and assistance of many relevant organizational entities and experts within and outside of the schools, and for this we wish to express sincere appreciation to all!

Editor

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[End of page 002]

Part I

Army Operations Application in Joint Operations...1

An army operation in joint operations is the army operational strength in the task organization of joint operations. It is also a general designation of all kinds of operational activities conducted in space and time of joint operations under the assistance and cooperation of other services and arms, armed police units, and militia. It is also an important part in joint operations.

The future joint operations are local wars that our armed forces safeguard national unification, territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests, and defend important targets, and main activities that our armed forces destroy the enemy's effective strength, occupy the enemy's occupied territory, and achieve war goals. Most of the activities are implemented by multiple services and arms and achieved by the Army at last. Whether the army operation is smooth plays a decisive role in the entire joint operational activity and the final victory in joint operations.

The main characteristics of army operations in joint operations are: 1) obey and serve the overall situations in joint operations, which will have a decisive influence on the last victory in joint operations; 2) the battlefield has become "transparent", making it difficult for suddenness; 3) being threatened by the enemy's firepower, battlefield survival is prominent; 4) operational forms change frequently, and command coordination is very demanding; 5) operational activities are influenced by geographical environments; and 6. support tasks are arduous.

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Chapter 1

Main Battlefields of Ground Forces' Operations in Joint Operations...2

[The term] battlefield for ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan zhanchang*} in joint operations refers to the place where the ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} of the two hostile sides engage in a contest under unified intentions and command and using various forms of operations and means and methods of operations, in order to achieve their individual operational goals. Because the main space for this place is the land, it is usually also called the land battlefield {*lu zhanchang*}.

Section 1: The Effects of the Land Battlefield Environment on Ground Forces Operations {*lu zhanchang huanjing dui lujun zuozhan de yingxiang*}...2

The battlefield environments for ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan zhanchang huanjing*} primarily include the natural environment {*ziran huanjing*}, the social environment {*shehui huanjing*}, and the electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*}. These have differing effects upon the ground forces' operational actions, from differing angles.

I. The effects of the natural environment on ground forces' operations {*ziran huanjing dui lujun zuozhan de yingxiang*}...2

The natural environment {*ziran huanjing*} of the land battlefield primarily includes landforms, hydrology, and meteorology {*qixiang*}.

Landforms on the land primarily consist of mountainous country, hilly country, plains, and deserts. Mountainous country has marked undulations on the surface, with differences in altitude generally of more than 200 meters, and with areas where groups of mountains continuously intersect. The terrain of mountainous country is complex, with few roads, few inhabitants, and a lack of materials. Units' {*budui*} actions are limited; in particular, movement is not easy, nor is command and cooperation. Defense is easy in mountainous country, while offense is difficult; it is easy to hole up in a strategic place and hold it, to block entrances and control valleys, and to build positions, and it is possible to resist attacks by superior enemies using fairly small numbers of troop strengths {*bingli*}. Mountainous country is a natural obstacle against an attacker, it is possible to split up attacking formations and force them to attack along limited channels. However, the role of mountainous country as a shield also helps the attacker to conceal his staging and his approach to the enemy, it is easy to insert [troops] and divide them up and to make detours for attacks, and it is easy to lay ambushes.

Hilly country has continuous chains of low-lying hills with relatively gentle slopes, with differences in altitude of 100 to 200 meters. Most of it is linked to low-lying mountains, and it is the area where most of the fighting takes place on land battlefields. The hilly country in China's north is mostly wasteland that has been reclaimed as dry farmland;

forests are relatively few, and they have fairly small effect on units' *{budui}* actions. The hilly country to the south has more clumps of forest and shrub, and there are a number of streams in gullies; this restricts the military's actions to a certain extent. Hilly country terrain, with its uneven undulations, can become an effective support to defense, and it is possible to set up relatively firm positions. But because the undulations are not high, [you] cannot rely too much on the terrain, and [your] flanks often lack shielding by favorable terrain during defense. Therefore, mobile attack and defense seem to be especially important in hilly country. During attacks in hilly country, it is easy to attack and outflank [the enemy] along many routes and along many directions, it is easy to select places where defenses are weak and to carry out a concentrated assault, quickly surrounding the defenders, but it is easy for the enemy to discover you too early and it is not easy to conceal [your] actions in operations.

Plains are level, open areas with an altitude of 200 meters or less above sea level, where it is easy to look into the distance, traffic flourishes, there are many inhabited places, population is dense, supplies are convenient, and it is easy to move, but where it is not easy to conceal things. For defense in plains regions, it is difficult to find terrain that you can rely upon for a firm defense, and it is not easy to select and build various types of positions. Cities and towns, river banks, inhabited areas, and prominent hills have an important role in the overall defensive system. It is usually necessary to increase the depth of defenses, to carry out large-scale construction of positions, and to form defensive systems with multiple points or many routes and that can hold fast on their own or be closely connected with one another. There are prominent problems [involving] defense against tank [assaults] and defense against firepower assaults. For attacks in plains regions, it is easy to move quickly and to concentrate troop strengths *{bingli}*, and to carry out continuous assaults along many roads, along many directions, and with many echelons. It is [also] easy to outflanking [the enemy] and to envelop [him] on a broad scale, so that operations are developed simultaneously along the front, the flanks, and the entire depths of the rear area. [Plains] make command and control easy, and they [make it] easy to pursue and attack.

Desert is the general term for sandy deserts and gobi.¹ It refers to regions where the weather is dry, precipitation is small, vegetation is lacking, and the terrain is relatively flat and open. Sandstorms are common in desert regions, inhabitants are few, natural resources are lacking, and there is a lack of water resources. In places with water resources, there are oases. In China, most of the deserts are places where minority nationalities live, and inhabited places are scattered. The terrain in desert places makes it easy to observe things and to shoot, but it is not easy to judge positions and to conceal intentions, and it is not easy to build fortifications; because weather is abnormal, people's physical strength is used up quite a bit *{renyuan tili xiaohao da}*, there are many mechanical breakdowns, and rear area support is very difficult. In sandy deserts, it is

¹ Translator's note: Gobi refers to deserts covered by small gravel.

difficult for mechanized units {*jixiehua budui*} to move if they leave the road. Speaking in general, it is easy to attack but difficult to defend [in desert regions].

The hydrology on the land battlefield primarily refers to river hydrology. This includes the direction of flow and length of rivers in the area of operations, the width of rivers, their depth, their speed of flow, the nature of their water, fords, bridges, the nature of riverbeds, and various parameters of change {*bianhua canshu*}. River hydrology has a great influence on movement in operations. Rivers with deep waters and a rapid flow are a natural screen for defenders; not only is it possible to hold up attacks, so that the other side has to force a river crossing, but it is easy to cause heavy casualties among the attackers. When rivers have shallow waters and a gentle flow and have hard sediments, units {*budui*} can wade across, but this can greatly reduce mobility and the speed of attack. Some rivers normally do not form barriers, but heavy rains can cause the water level to rise rapidly; then, it is also necessary to build bridges and prepare tools for fording the rivers. In wintertime, rivers freeze up in severely cold regions, and heavy equipment can cross unhindered. When longitudinal rivers {*zongxiang jianghe*} have the same direction as operations, it is easy to move units {*budui*} and transport materials, but it is [also] easy for formations in operations to get broken up, and it is difficult to coordinate among friendly neighbors. The use of aviation troops and large numbers of amphibious rapid landing tools have reduced the effects of rivers on operations, but in operations on land, the effects of rivers still cannot be underestimated.

Meteorology {*qixiang*} is the physical quantity and physical phenomena that express the state of the weather {*tianqi*}. [Meteorology] that has a major effect on ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} primarily consists of air temperature, clouds and fog, precipitation, and wind.

Air temperature {*qiwen*}. If the air temperature is too high, and [things are] extremely hot and hard to endure, this will reduce people's physical strength, they will feel fidgety, their amount of sleep will go down, and it will be easy for them to get sick and to spread sickness; this will reduce personnel even without fighting. If the air temperature is too low, the severe cold will give people frostbite, adding to the load that people bear {*shi renyuan fuhe jiazhong*}; it will not be easy to move, and this will reduce units' {*budui*} combat capabilities. The abnormalities of the air temperature affect weapons and vehicles, reducing their effectiveness, and it is easy to have breakdowns; extreme cold in particular has heavy effects. The higher the air temperature is, the faster the vaporization of chemical toxins {*huaxue duji qihua*} will be, and the greater the harm there will be to people. Conversely, the lower the air temperature is, [the less] easy it will be for toxins to vaporize, to the point where they lose the ability to harm [people].

Clouds and fog {*yunwu*}. Clouds and fog lower visibility, and it is not easy to observe [things] and to shoot. They can reduce the accuracy in aiming lasers and other guided munitions, and they can limit the various reconnaissance devices, create difficulties in communications, and make coordination difficult between command and the various units {*budui*}. But clouds and fog help to conceal units' {*budui*} actions and intentions

and make it easy to launch surprise attacks against the enemy; it is possible to use clouds and fog to carry out close-in reconnaissance against the enemy, while at the same time it is also possible to move and to transfer [troops] under the cover of clouds and fog. Clouds and fog have the greatest effects on aviation troops' takeoffs, landings, and carrying out various kinds of operations; dense will greatly restrict aviation troops' support to ground operations.

Precipitation {*jiangshui*}. Precipitation makes open country muddy, which limits units' {*budui*} movements; heavy rain or cloudbursts cause rivers to rise suddenly and rapidly. Mountain valleys and gullies flood, cutting off traffic and blocking actions. Precipitation lowers visibility, affecting weapons' firing, and it will be easy for machines to break down; in particular, [precipitation] causes problems for logistics support and other kinds of support to operations. Precipitation affects the aerial flight of aircraft as well as their safe takeoffs and landings. Although precipitation has an unfavorable effect on the military's actions, if [the military] is skilled at using [precipitation], [precipitation] can also bring advantages into play, [so that we] can defeat the enemy by a surprise move. Under modern conditions, the development of artificial precipitation technology has turned precipitation into an important meteorological weapon in the fight against the enemy.

Wind {*feng*}. Wind affects personnel's actions and weapons' firing. In particular, windstorms blow up dust, which not only reduces visibility, but also hurts personnel's eyes and skin. Windblown sand seriously harms weapons and equipment, reduces the speed of units' {*budui*} movement, and makes it difficult for units {*budui*} to distinguish directions and to find the target of attack. Heavy winds affect aircraft takeoff and make command and coordination hard. Windstorms are disastrous weather, and all operational actions are severely restricted. But windstorms help in surprise attacks and in covering transfers [of troops] and withdrawals. At the same time, wind direction determines the direction in which nuclear clouds and chemical agents are spread. Having a favorable wind [when] carrying out a live fire attack can get twice the result for half the effort.

II. The effects of the social environment on ground forces' operations {*shehui huanjing dui lujun zuozhan de yingxiang*}...5

The social environment {*shehui huanjing*} primarily includes such infrastructure as population resources, economic conditions, and traffic, transportation, and communications.

Population resources have a great effect on ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*}. A large population density means that the strengths {*liliang*} that can be used are large; a small population density means that the strengths {*liliang*} that can be used are limited. Population resources not only are determined by quantity but even more, they are determined by quality. Quality includes political qualities, military qualities, cultural qualities, and physiques. A fairly high political consciousness, a patriotic spirit, and an indomitable will, along with undergoing strict training in military technology and tactics

and [having] a fairly high cultural level, various special skills, and an excellent physical condition, will produce major, positive effects on ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*}. People live within a social organization and structure; bringing their abilities into play is closely related to this organization and structure, and it is necessary to pay attention to bringing into play the roles of the various social organizations, to mobilize the masses of the people in the theater of war as much as possible, and to engage in people's warfare.

The battlefield's economic conditions primarily refer to the natural resources, industrial and agricultural production capabilities, and stockpiles of various materials, which can be used for operations.

Ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} in joint operations use up a great deal of materials, and logistics support not only supplies various kinds of ready-made equipment and materials, but it often also needs to produce and supply [things] on the spot and to transform various kinds of ordinary and civilian materials into materials for operations. The timber and fuels in the battlefield that are directly related to military supplies, as well as water power resources and mining production, are raw materials that are indispensable for supporting military-industrial production. Industrial production can provide units {*budui*} with various types of weapons and ammunition, vehicles, communications devices, medical treatment devices, foodstuffs, clothing, and equipment. Agricultural production not only provides raw materials for military industry, but it can also directly provide units {*budui*} with grain and various kinds of non-staple foodstuffs. The conditions of stockpiles of materials in the theater of war directly affect the ground forces' ability for sustained operations.

Traffic and transportation include traffic and transportation tools, routes, and various kinds of facilities (like train stations, ports, airfields, and bridges), as well as the traffic and transportation networks that are composed of these. The number and quality of key factors that make up traffic and transportation are important symbols that measure the conditions of battlefield traffic and transportation. Ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} in joint operations rely heavily on transportation lines. In wartime, it is necessary to requisition large numbers of civilian transportation tools and facilities; therefore, it is also necessary to have an accurate grasp on the various transportation capabilities within the scope of the battlefield. Railway transportation has a heavy freight volume and is fast; it is a primary means of transporting units {*budui*} and materials prior to a battle. In operations, railways frequently become important targets for attacks by enemy aviation troops and missiles; under conditions where there is no reliable shielding, their status and role could possibly decline. The status and role of highway transportation is becoming increasingly enhanced in ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*}, and artillery and many other transportation tools are inseparable from the highways. Tanks and tracked vehicles can increase their speeds by moving on highways. How good or bad rear area transportation is also is determined primarily by highways. Water route transportation includes internal river [transportation] and sea transportation. Internal river shipping not only can transport materials but can also deliver units {*budui*}, and

transportation over river crossings {*jianghe du yun*} is an important means for ensuring that the military overcomes obstacles and achieves freedom of action on the water. Traffic and transportation by sea can vigorously support ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} in coastal areas. Air transportation is fast and flexible and is not affected by terrain obstacles; it makes it easy to carry out rapid long-distance movement, it makes it easy to carry out surprise attacks against the enemy, and it can also carry out long-distance transportation, so it has a special role in ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*}. Under conditions where traffic on the ground has been destroyed, air transportation often becomes an important means for transporting materials and troops. Pipeline transportation has the characteristics of being highly efficient, economical, concealed, and hard to destroy; it utilizes the various pipelines that have already been laid on the battlefield, and it is an important direction of development for the transportation of materials in the rear area.

Battlefield communications primarily include the distribution, numbers, and quality of various kinds of communications nodes, communications stations, and major communications facilities; the secure support functions of wired and wireless communications networks and their survival ability and ability to be restored in wartime; and the factories that produce communications devices and their production capabilities. It is not enough for communications in operations to rely merely upon the equipment of large formations themselves; [the military] should also fully utilize the various kinds of communications facilities that have already been set up, including civilian communications facilities; increase the channels and means of communications; and ensure that the needs of communications in operations [are met].

III. The effects of the electromagnetic environment on ground forces' operations {*dianci huanjing dui lujun zuozhan de yingxiang*}...6

The electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*} primarily includes the electromagnetic signals in confrontations between the enemy and ourselves as well as the electromagnetic radiation signals of our own side's various pieces of equipment that use frequencies {*yong pin*}.

The electromagnetic signals in confrontations between the enemy and ourselves primarily include the intensive pileups {*jiaodie*} of the two sides' various electromagnetic signals, centered on communications confrontations, radar confrontations, and optoelectronic confrontations. They affect to varying degrees the ground forces' intelligence reconnaissance, command and control,² precision strikes by weapons and equipment, and the actions of units {*budui*}.

² Translator's note: based on the normal structure of Chinese sentences using this pattern, apparently a comma was left out in this place.

Ground forces' means of intelligence reconnaissance primarily include such means and methods as unmanned aerial reconnaissance, helicopter reconnaissance, radar reconnaissance, sensor reconnaissance, and special reconnaissance in the enemy's rear area; getting assistance from various kinds of reconnaissance technical equipment to obtain intelligence information is a major means for ground forces' intelligence reconnaissance. But after technical equipment is electromechanically jammed by the opponent, the scope, accuracy, and speed of reconnaissance is reduced to varying degrees; if the problems of "being able to see" {*kan de jian*}, "being able to see clearly" {*kan de qing*}, and "being able to see accurately" {*kan de zhun*} are not thoroughly resolved, transparency on the battlefield will drop, affecting how effectively ground forces' combat capabilities are brought into play.

Ground forces' command and control primarily include the use of command communications devices and network systems to transmit various kinds of command information; this is manifested in the timely effectiveness, accuracy, and stability of command. In ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} where communications confrontations are the primary sphere of confrontation and where the main action in confrontations, this directly affects the rapid and effective transmission of the ground forces' command and control information, resulting in command information not being smooth, and affecting the unity and speed of units' {*budui*} actions. In an on-again, off-again communications flow and with interference from various kinds of deceptive information, the accuracy of command and control information should be taken with a great deal of salt {*da da zhekou*}; any erroneous information or errors in using information will have disastrous consequences for operational actions. And with command organizations as an important target for enemy information soft and hard attacks, this will increase the fluctuations in command organizations, and even destroy or annihilate them; this kind of instability in the same way has fatal effects on the effectiveness and smoothness of command and control information.

The continual increase in the ground forces' means and abilities for precision strikes, at the same time, has placed even greater demands on obtaining and using various kinds of information in an accurate manner. When this information is jammed by [our] opponents and is not smooth, it will have an unfavorable effect on a series of links in the ground forces' precision strike actions; [these links are] precisely locating the target, controlling the weapons for precision strikes, and evaluating the effects of the strikes.

The complex electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*} will affect all operational actions; when planning and carrying out ground forces' operational actions, it is necessary to take into consideration the effects and restrictions of the electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*}. For example, in selecting the main target for assault, it is not only necessary to select attacks against the enemy's groups heavy troops and his main weapons, but it is also necessary to keep an eye on attacking the various types of enemy equipment that use frequencies {*yong pin zhuanbei*} and that play an important support role in the enemy's system of operations, such as electronic warfare systems and command communications systems. When deploying and using strengths {*liliang*}, it is

not only necessary to consider the offensive (or defensive) strengths {*liliang*}, firepower attack strengths {*huoli daji liliang*}, and various kinds of assistance and support strengths {*zhiyuan baozhang liliang*} for troop strengths {*bingli*} that are needed for ordinary offense and defense, but it is also necessary to consider the organizational grouping and the use of information warfare strengths {*xinxi duikang liliang*}, in order to ensure {*quebao*} [that] the struggle with the enemy over command of information on the battlefield [goes well]. In the process of operational actions, it is not only necessary to fully consider troop strengths' {*bingli*} offensive and defensive actions and firepower attack actions, but it is also necessary to meticulously organize information warfare actions, including information offense and defense, and to carefully coordinate the operational actions of the various kinds of information strengths {*xinxi liliang*} within [our] own service. At the same time, it is also necessary to carefully coordinate information warfare actions that are jointly undertaken with such services and service arms as the air force, the navy, and the Second Artillery.

Section 2: Battlefield Preparations for Ground Forces' Operations {*lujun zuozhan zhanchang zhunbei*}...8

Battlefield preparations {*zhanchang zhunbei*} for ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} are the various preparations for operations that are done in a given space for carrying out ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*}. They include becoming familiar with the battlefield environment {*shuxi zhanchang huanjing*}, selecting favorable battlefields {*xuanze youli zhanchang*}, and constructing the battlefield {*jinxing zhanchang jianshe*}.

I. Familiarity with the battlefield environment {*shuxi zhanchang huanjing*}...8

Being familiar with the battlefield environment {*shuxi zhanchang huanjing*} is a basic task in battlefield preparations {*zhanchang zhunbei*}; its goal is prepare for making decisions about operations, for fully utilizing terrain in wartime, and for constructing the battlefield {*jinxing zhanchang jianshe*}. To be familiar with the battlefield environment {*shuxi zhanchang huanjing*}, it is usually possible to first do things on the map, and to combine military geography with the topology needed for war {*bing yao dizhi*} in the area of operations; after getting a macroscopic grasp of the characteristics of the geographical environment in the area of operations, [we] then carry out on-site reconnaissance. In looking over the battlefield, [we] should pay attention to ascertaining the capacity of the battlefield; the basic features of the terrain and the relationships among the various parts of the terrain, as well as key terrain that plays a supporting role for the entire area; positions, defensive fortifications, connecting roads, bridges, and fords that have already been set up as well as the conditions of various traffic and communications facilities; and the conditions of manpower, materiel, mobilization capabilities, hydrology, and meteorology {*qixiang*} in the theater of war. For landing [operations] and operations in coastal regions, [we] should also ascertain the conditions of the coastal terrain, of areas where it is easy to land, of harbors, of terminals, of islands, and of maritime hydrology.

II. Selecting favorable battlefields {*xuanze youli zhanchang*}...8

Future battlefields for ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} will have a great deal of uncertainty. First, there will be few terrain restrictions on informationized weapons and equipment, and any space could become a battlefield. Second, the battlefield will be determined not just by our side, but at the same time will also be restricted by the enemy side. But basically speaking, geographical environmental conditions will still be the basis for the two hostile sides' operations, and it will still be impossible to get away from and completely transcend these conditions. One condition that is very important in joint operations is to force the enemy and lure the enemy into operations [that have] unfavorable conditions [for him]. Therefore, selecting favorable battlefields {*xuanze youli zhanchang*} is still an important factor in winning victory in operations under modern conditions.

The main bases for selecting battlefields are [as follows]. First are the intentions of strategy. It is necessary to proceed from the overall strategic situation and to select spaces along specified directions and in [specified] areas, where operations can be conducted that will help in achieving strategic goals. Second is the geographical environment. Differing types of operations have differing requirements for the battlefield geographical environment. The overall principles are: [to have] an important position, [to have] favorable terrain, to easily [provide] supplies, and [to have] reliable public sentiment. Third is the enemy situation. In accordance with the characteristics of enemy operations and with the enemy's probable major direction of operations, determine the main battlefield and secondary battlefield. Fourth is our situation. Select a battlefield that is within our power {*lisuonengji de*}, where it is easy to bring our characteristics into play, and that makes it easy to cooperate and coordinate with other services and service arms.

III. Constructing the battlefield {*jinxing zhanchang jianshe*}...9

Battlefield construction {*zhanchang jianshe*} includes the construction of military fortresses, stockpiling materials, working with the masses, and preparing various kinds of battlefield materials.

The construction of military fortresses includes constructing systems of positions; systems of posts {*zhutun*} for personnel, weapons, and equipment; traffic networks as well as the train stations, harbors, terminals, airfields, and various kinds of command facilities that correspond [to the traffic networks]; and rear area supply installations. The construction of military fortifications should abide by the principles of doing what is urgent first and what is not so urgent later {*xian ji hou huan*}, of doing what is important first and what is not so important later {*xian zhong hou qing*}, and of combining peace and war; [the construction] should proceed in a planned and focused manner. At the same time, [we] should also pay attention to terrain features, combine forms of operations that could be executed in the future, and strengthen the focused nature {*zhenduixing*} of construction.

Stockpiling of battlefield materials usually is aimed at wars that could break out, and the stockpiling is done before the war. This [stockpiling] primarily consists of ammunition, various types of equipment, fuels, medicines, and foodstuffs. Stockpiling materials must correspond to the forms of the ground forces' operations and to the scale of operations. In holding fast to defense, [we] should increase stockpiling, and the main directions and areas with key points must focus on support. The materials that are stockpiled must be fully ready; not only can they support the needs of operations, but they can also guarantee the needs for basic living; in particular, [we] must prepare to support ourselves in terms of water and power. It is necessary to combine the use of centralized stockpiling with stockpiling [that is done] by stages, and it is not only necessary to fully utilize the various types of warehouses and installations for stockpiling, but it is also necessary to mobilize the masses of the people in the theater of war to carry out stockpiling.

Whether the work of the masses in the theater of war is done well or not is very much related to victory or defeat in operations. It is necessary to strengthen contacts with the masses of the people, on the basis of fully comprehending the numbers, composition, and political attitudes of the military and the people on the battlefield, and to assist the masses in carrying out production and construction. It is necessary to propagandize the masses, to stimulate the patriotic fervor and feeling of righteousness of the broad masses of the people. Helping local governments to do a good job of building up the militia and carrying out military training in a focused manner will tap the potential of people's warfare to the maximum extent possible.

Preparing battlefield data is an important task in battlefield preparations. The strengths of ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} must collect and prepare [data for] the entire area of operations and the various data that are relevant to operations. They should mainly collect meteorological {*qixiang*} data, geodetic data, electromagnetic communications data, and traffic and transportation data. They must continually supplement and improve the various types of data, on the basis of what they already have {*zai yuan you jichu shang*}, in order to ensure that [they meet] the needs for making command of operations, units' {*budui*} actions, and weapons systems be as effective as possible {*fahui zuijia xiaoneng*}.

Chapter 2

Task Organizations and Missions of Ground Forces' Strengths in Joint Operations...10

The task organizations of ground forces' strengths {*lujun liliang*} in joint operations usually are determined based on the scale of the joint operations, the goal and mission of the ground forces' operations, the level of threat from enemy ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*}, the military geographical environment of the ground battlefield, and the capacity of the battlefield.

Section 1: Task Organizations of Strengths {*liliang biancheng*}...10

The task organizations of ground forces operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} usually are determined based on the needs of the joint operations and based on the joint operations' mission and nature, on enemy conditions, on the characteristics of the area of operations, and on the form of operations. They are specifically carried out by the supreme command organization for the ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*}.

I. Requirements of task organizations {*biancheng yaoqiu*}...10

(1) The types and missions of task organizations correspond to one another {*biancheng leixing yu renwu xiang shiying*}

The types of task organizations of ground forces differ in differing forms of joint operations and with differing missions; this includes the scale and the form of organizational grouping {*bianzu*} [in the task organizations]. For example, in landing operations, the scale of joint operations is relatively big, the ground forces are primarily responsible for the missions of assault and landing and of building landing sites; the scale of the ground forces' task organization is relatively big, consisting of several ground forces' group armies, and the organizational grouping {*bianzu*} usually is the main landing and assault strengths {*liliang*} and auxiliary landing and assault strengths {*liliang*}. But in border operations on land, the joint operations are medium in scale, and the ground forces are primarily responsible the missions of offensive and defensive operations on land; the scale of the ground forces' task organization is not big, and usually the organizational groupings {*bianzu*} are ground defensive strengths {*fangyu liliang*} and counterattack strengths {*fanji liliang*}.

(2) With a focus on enemy conditions, the terrain, and the realities of our military, form a numerical superiority over the enemy, strive to have elite troops, and enhance the levels

of quality {zhendui di qing, dixing he wo jun shiji, zai shuliang shang dui di xingcheng youshi, liqiu jingbing hecheng, tigao zhiliang shuiping}

Following several decades of development, the PRC military has greatly enhanced its operational capabilities, but there is still a gap between them and the ground forces of the world military powers. At the same time, in ground operations in modern joint operations, winning victory through quality is an inevitable trend. In joint operations, having the PRC military's ground forces form a numerical superiority in terms of ground strengths {dimian liliang} over the enemy, with a focus on differing targets and the actual situation on the battlefield, is still a basic condition for winning victory on ground battlefields. But it is necessary to squarely face the decisive role that superiority in quality has in victory or defeat in operations. Under the premise of ensuring a certain numerical superiority, establishing and forming superiority in quality over the enemy's ground strengths {dimian liliang} is something that we must basically keep our eyes fixed on in order to be victorious in ground operations.

(3) The proportions of the various service arms' strengths are appropriate, with a stress on relevance {ge bingzhong liliang bili shidang, tuchu zhenduixing}

Based on the differing forms and needs of joint operations, [we] should rationally organize and use corresponding service arm strengths {bingzhong liliang}, with a stress on relevance. For example, in the form of joint operations where firepower attacks predominate, the task organization of the ground forces' strengths {lujun de liliang} should lay a particular emphasis on the organizational grouping {bianzu} and use of artillery troops, ground forces' aviation troops, and special operations strengths {tezhong zuozhan liliang}. When the form of operations is joint air defense, the task organization of the ground forces' strengths {lujun de liliang} should lay particular emphasis on the organizational grouping {bianzu} and use of air defense troops.

(4) Have fairly strong firepower, assault power, and mobility {juyou jiao qiang de huoli, tuji li he jidongli}

In joint operations, the task organization of ground forces' strengths {lujun liliang} must keep its eye on having elite troops {jingbing hecheng}, use elite strengths {jingrui liliang} to carry out ground operations, ensure that actions in ground operations within joint operations will be victorious, and use victory in ground operational actions to assist and support the other services and other operational actions in the joint operations. To do this, the task organization of the ground forces' strengths {lujun liliang} must have fairly strong firepower, assault power, and mobility.

(5) Have the ability for independent operations and the ability for independent support {jubei duli zuozhan nengli he duli baozhang nengli}

In joint operations, although the ground operations of ground forces are carried out under the framework of the joint operations, [although] it is necessary to closely coordinate

with other services' and service arms' strengths {*liliang*} in carrying [the operations] out, and [although] it is even more necessary to get support and cooperation from other spaces and other operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}, [the ground forces] must be based on their own operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} and capabilities, they must be based on their own various support resources, and they must be based on their own independent capabilities for operations, in order to complete their missions in the joint operations.

II. Forms of task organizations {*biancheng fangshi*}...11

(1) Task organizations in accordance with the scale of the joint operations {*an lianhe zuozhan guimo biancheng*}

Task organizations in accordance with the scale of the joint operations are a basic form of task organization for ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*}. Based on the size of the joint operations, the ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} can be organized into ground forces' high-level operational groups {*gaoji zuozhan jituan*}, basic operational groups {*jiben zuozhan jituan*}, and tactical corps {*zhanshu bingtuan*}.

High-level operational groups {*gaoji zuozhan jituan*} are the ground forces' task organization units in large-scale joint operations. They are made up of two or more basic operational large formations – that is, two or more ground forces group armies (or provincial military area commands) – and troop strengths {*bingli*} that reinforce these [formations]. High-level operational groups {*gaoji zuozhan jituan*} are not a first-level organizational system in the ground forces; they usually are temporarily organized based on the needs of the joint operations. They normally consist of two (or include two) or more ground forces group armies and other operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} that reinforce or assist [these group armies], as well as support strengths {*baozhang liliang*}. They usually are group-style {*jituan shi*} allocated operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} that are centered on the main mission, the main direction of operations, and important operational actions.

Basic operational groups {*jiben zuozhan jituan*} are the ground forces' task organization units in medium-sized joint operations. They usually are made up of one group army from the ground forces and troop strengths {*bingli*} that reinforce [this group army]. Group armies are a first-level organizational system in the ground forces, and they have the characteristic of combining peace and war; therefore, the organizational groupings {*bianzu*} of the ground forces' basic operational group {*jiben zuozhan jituan*} are relatively stable. They usually are group-style {*jituan shi*} allocated operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} that are centered on the main mission and the main direction of operations.

There are some provincial military area commands with attached units {*dai budui*}, that come under the organizational task of the basic operational groups {*jiben zuozhan jituan*}; they usually are composed of subordinate coastal defense, border defense, and

reserve units {*budui*}, as well as militia that reinforce [these units]. Provincial military area commands are a special type of ground forces' operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}; there is a fairly large difference between the missions that they undertake in peacetime and in wartime and the conditions of their organizational structure. Therefore, their task organization for operations is random {*dai you sui jixing*}. They are usually centered on the main mission of operations; it is only after receiving fairly large reinforcements that they can gain the capability [to carry out] operations.

Tactical corps {*zhanshu bingtuan*} are the ground forces' task organization units in small-scale joint operations. They usually consist of ground forces' divisions (or brigades) and troop strengths {*bingli*} that reinforce [these]. Ground forces divisions and brigades include motorized infantry divisions (or brigades), mechanized infantry divisions (or brigades), mountain infantry divisions (or brigades), armored divisions (or brigades), coastal defense divisions (or brigades), and artillery divisions (or brigades). The divisions (or brigades) in the ground forces also are a first-level organizational system in the ground forces, and they are characterized by combining peace and war. They usually are [small] group {*qun*} (or team)-style allocated operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} that are centered on the main mission of the joint operations.

(2) Task organizations that are carried out in accordance with the form of operations {*an zuozhan yangshi jinxing biancheng*}

Ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} can be organized into task organizations for offensive operational groups and task organizations for defensive operational groups, in accordance with the differing forms of joint operations.

Task organizations for offensive operational groups usually are made up primarily of service arms whose attack capabilities are fairly strong. Centered on the needs of joint offensive operations, and combined with the scale of the joint operations, they rationally allocate operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}.

Task organizations for defensive operational groups usually are made up primarily of service arms whose defensive capabilities are fairly strong. Centered on the needs of joint defensive operations, and combined with the scale of the joint operations, they rationally allocate operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}.

(3) Task organizations that are carried out in accordance with the scale of operations and combined forms of operations {*an zuozhan guimo jiehe zuozhan yangshi jinxing biancheng*}

Task organizations [that are organized] in accordance with the scale of joint operations and that combine forms of joint operations are an important form of task organization for future ground forces' operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}. They usually are formed by combining the needs of differing scales and differing forms of joint operations. For example, ground forces' high-level landing operations groups are organized in landing

operations, ground forces' high-level or basic-level operational groups are organized in operations to counter landings, and defensive operations groups and counterattack operations groups are organized in border area joint counterattack operations.

Section 2: Main Missions {zhuyao renwu}...13

The main missions {zhuyao renwu} of ground forces' strengths {lujun liliang} in joint operations usually are determined based on such factors as the goals of the operations, the enemy situation that [the joint operations] face, and our operational capabilities.

I. Basic missions undertaken by ground forces' strengths {lujun liliang} in joint operations {lianhe zuozhan lujun liliang danfu de jiben renwu}...13

Ground forces' strengths {lujun liliang} usually carry out operational missions within the task organization of the joint operations' large formation or corps. Based on the differing forms of joint operations, the basic missions that the ground forces' strengths {lujun liliang} take on also have some differences.

(1) Participating in large-scale island blockades and island offensive operations {canjia daxing daoyu fengsuo he daoyu jin'gong zuozhan}

In large-scale island blockade operations, the basic missions of ground forces' strengths {lujun liliang} are to use firepower and landing actions to blockade or occupy off-shore islands, to resist enemy counter-operations {fanzhi zuozhan} actions against our coasts, and to assist and cooperate with the navy's, the air force's, and the Second Artillery's operational actions. In large-scale island offensive operations, the basic missions of the ground forces' strengths {lujun liliang} are to carry out landing operations; to establish landing sites; to carry out such operational actions as attacks against cities on the islands, attacks in mountain areas, and attacks against a mobile defending enemy; and with the cooperation of other services, to occupy enemy-held islands.

(2) Participating in border defense and counterattack operations {canjia bianjing fangyu he fanji zuozhan}

Defensive and counterattack operations in border areas are joint actions by the PRC military that are jointly carried out by the ground forces, the air force, and the Second Artillery, against the background of local wars to uphold [China's] territorial sovereignty in border regions. In joint operations on the border, the basic missions of ground forces' strengths {lujun liliang} are to organize defenses on the ground and counterattack missions in the border area, [to organize] joint actions with air force air attack operations and Second Artillery firepower assault operations, to annihilate and expel the invading enemy, and to recover occupied territories.

(3) Participating in operations to repel air attacks and landings {*canjia fan kongxi he kang denglu zuozhan*}

Operations to repel air attacks {*fan kongxi*} and landings {*kang denglu zuozhan*} are joint operations that are jointly carried out by the PRC military where the ground forces, the navy, the air force, and the Second Artillery, in cooperation with local units {*budui*} and against the background of resisting an air attack carried out by a powerful enemy and his allies against the PRC's strategic areas or [or resisting] landing operations of a certain scale that [the enemy] carries out in coastal areas. In operations to resist air attacks {*fan kongxi zuozhan*}, the basic missions of the ground forces' strengths {*lujun liliang*} are to resist an enemy that is attacking by air, to defend important targets, to cooperate with other services in carrying out counterattacks, and to annihilate enemy air attack weapons on the ground and at sea, as well as to organize defense and eliminate the aftereffects of the air attack. In operations to resist landings {*kang denglu zuozhan*}, the basic missions of the ground forces' strengths {*lujun liliang*} are to resolutely defend coastal and island positions, contain and use up the enemy who has landed, and subdue landing sites that the enemy has occupied and that he is linking up; to base themselves on cities as they carry out defense, pulverize enemy attacks, and defend important targets; to carry out counterattacks and annihilate and expel enemies who have penetrated our forward depths; to carry out operations to counter air landings and eliminate enemies who have landed by air; and to cooperate with other services and service arms in carrying out such operations as island defense.

(4) Carrying out cooperative operations {*shishi peihexing zuozhan*}

Against a background of local wars to uphold [PRC] rights and interests in offshore coral islands and reefs and their waters, offensive and defensive operations for coral islands and reefs and their sea areas that are organized with an emphasis on the navy and the air force will be a major form of joint operations. Ground forces usually do not participate in offensive and defensive operations on coral islands and reefs and their sea areas. However, in operations to support the main strategic direction, ground forces may undertake missions for operations to contain the enemy along other strategic directions, such as organizing small- and medium-scale border counterattack operations in corresponding land border regions.

II. Specific missions of the various service arms of ground forces' strengths in joint operations {*lianhe zuozhan lujun liliang ge bingzhong juti renwu*}...14

The various service arms' units {*budui*} within the task organization of ground forces' strengths {*lujun liliang*} can take on differing operational missions, based on their main equipment and their task organization.

(1) The main missions of motorized infantry {*motuohua bubing de zhuyao renwu*}

Motorized infantry is infantry that moves using wheeled {*luntai*} vehicles within the organizational system. It can carry out offensive and defensive operations over relatively complex terrain, and it is primarily responsible for such missions as annihilating the enemy's effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*} and seizing or holding important areas and targets.

(2) The main missions of mechanized infantry {*jixiehua bubing de zhuyao renwu*}

Mechanized infantry is infantry that moves and fights using armored transport vehicles or infantry combat vehicles within the organizational system. It usually quickly launches attacks on fairly flat terrain against the enemy's depths, and it can also carry out ordinary offensive and defensive operations. It is primarily responsible for such missions as annihilating the enemy's effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*} and seizing or holding important areas and targets.

(3) The main missions of armored infantry {*zhuangjia bing de zhuyao renwu*}

Armored infantry is a service arm that primarily carries out ground assault missions, using tanks as its basic equipment. The main missions of armored infantry are to use violent assault actions to annihilate the enemy and occupy important areas and targets; to launch attacks against the enemy's depths, exploit the results of combat, and pursue and annihilate a retreating enemy; to use counterattacks and counterassaults to annihilate an enemy who has suddenly broken in and to block off the enemy's breakthrough points; and to annihilate enemies who have landed by air or to cooperate with our airborne troops' operations.

(4) The main missions of artillery troops {*paobing de zhuyao renwu*}

Artillery troops are a service arm that uses various types of artillery as its basic equipment and that uses firepower to carry out operational missions. They can carry out firepower support at all depths and throughout the entire course {*quancheng*} [of the operation], and they can also fight independently with their firepower {*duli jinxing huoli zhan*}. They are primarily responsible for such missions as suppressing and annihilating enemy firepower systems, command systems, groups of heavy troops, and support systems, and for blocking and destroying important targets like enemy traffic nodes and engineering facilities.

(5) The main missions of air defense troops {*fangkong bing de zhuyao renwu*}

Air defense troops are a service arm within the ground forces' organizational system that uses surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft artillery, and antiaircraft machineguns as its basic equipment, and that primarily carries out ground air defense operational missions. They are mainly responsible for such missions as reconnaissance against the air and for

notifications [involving] air intelligence, for preventing reconnaissance by enemy aviation troops, for annihilating and intercepting enemy air attack weapons, and for shielding major positions, important targets, and major operational actions.

(6) The main missions of ground forces' aviation troops {*lujun hangkongbing de zhuyao renwu*}

Ground forces' aviation troops are a service arm within the ground forces that is equipped with helicopters and light aircraft, and that directly supports the operations of ground units {*dimian budui*}. Their primary missions are to carry out direct air support to ground combat, with a focus on assaulting enemy tanks and other armored targets; to carry out and support air mobile operations; to engage in direct combat with enemy helicopters; to be responsible for aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare, aerial minelaying, battlefield supply, and aid and rescue {*jiuyuan jiuwu*}; and to guard broad areas and exposed flanks from the air.

(7) The main missions of special forces {*tezhong bing de zhuyao renwu*}

Special forces are a service arm in the ground forces that is responsible for special operational missions. They are primarily responsible for special reconnaissance, sabotage, harassment, and seizing key points.

(8) The main missions of communications troops {*tongxin bing de zhuyao renwu*}

Communications troops are a service arm that is responsible for military communications missions and for supporting the military's command and coordination. They are primarily responsible for such missions as setting up communications nodes and maintaining communications contact, establishing automated systems for command, and supporting command of operations.

(9) The main missions of electronic warfare troops {*dianzi duikang bing de zhuyao renwu*}

Electronic warfare troops are a service arm that engages in electronic warfare with the enemy during ground forces operations. They are primarily responsible for such missions as collecting enemy military electronic intelligence, throwing enemy electronic equipment into disorder and confusing and destroying it, annihilating enemy electromagnetic targets, and ensuring that their own side's electronic equipment works effectively.

(10) The main missions of engineering troops {*gongcheng bing de zhuyao renwu*}

Engineering troops are a service arm that carries out combat missions through engineering means. They are primarily responsible for such missions as engineering

reconnaissance; constructing fortifications; building roads, bridges, fords, harbors, and airfields; setting up and removing obstacles; ensuring units' *{budui}* movements while delaying the enemy's actions; and assignments for destruction, engineering camouflage, and other engineering assignments.

(11) The main missions of chemical defense troops *{fanghuabing de zhuyao renwu}*

Chemical defense troops are a service arm in the ground forces that defends against enemy nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or against secondary nuclear, chemical, and biological dangers. Their primary missions are nuclear, chemical, and biological observations; carrying out reconnaissance against chemical and biological [contamination] and nuclear radiation, inspecting contamination, and controlling dosages; disinfecting and eliminating contamination; shooting flames and setting things on fire, and organizing the release of smokescreens; and organizing and guiding units *{budui}*, leadership organs in the area of operations, and the masses of the people in specialized defense against nuclear, chemical, biological, and other special lethal and destructive weapons.

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Chapter 3

Guiding Thought and Basic Principles of Ground Forces' Operations in Joint Operations...17

The guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} and basic principles {jiben yuanze} of ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan} in joint operations are a concentrated reflection of the guiding laws for ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan}, greatly generalized, as well as a rational understanding of the networked nature that guides ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan} in general. There is a clear differentiation [between the guiding thought and basic principles] as to which of them is primary and which of them is secondary, and they complement each other. The former proposes top-level designs and general reflection, while the latter generalizes things in a specific manner, and it classifies and guides [things].

Section 1: Guiding Thought for Operations {zuozhan zhidao sixiang}...17

Guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} for ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan} is a concentrated generalization of the laws that guide ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan}, and it is a general program that guides the practices of ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan}. The guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} for ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan} has an important role in standardizing and guiding the implementation and execution of military strategic programs, and the organization and execution of ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan}, as well as for developing the theory of ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan lilun} and for the buildup of the ground forces' operational strengths {lujun zuozhan liliang}. In future joint operations, ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan} should implement the guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} of “integrated operations and focused attacks” {zhengti zuozhan, zhongdian daji}.

I. The connotations of the guiding thought of “integrated operations” and the key points in carrying it out {“zhengti zuozhan” zhidao sixiang de neihan ji luoshi yaodian}...17

Integrated operations {zhengti zuozhan} combine in an integrated manner such factors for getting the upper hand as the ground forces' operational strengths {lujun zuozhan liliang}, space, times, and means, through comprehensive strategizing and meticulous deployment. This forms a combined power for integrated operations and, commencing with destroying the integrated structure of the enemy's system of operation, it enhances our strong points {yang wo zhi chang}, attacks the enemy's shortcomings {ji di zhi duan}, and joins forces to subdue the enemy {heli zhi di}.

In implementing and carrying out the thinking of “integrated operations” {zhengti zuozhan}, it is necessary to proceed from two aspects: forming [our] own side's

integrated combined strength {zhengti heli} and destroying the enemy's integrated structures {zhengti jiegou}.

What forming [our] own side's integrated combined strength {zhengti heli} primarily refers to is keeping an eye on bringing systematic and integrated functions into overall play, and releasing [our] own side's operational energy to the greatest extent [possible], in order to strengthen the effectiveness of the ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan}. First, comprehensively utilize the various strengths {liliang}. This includes close coordination between the ground forces' operational strengths {lujun zuozhan liliang} and the various services' and services arms' strengths {liliang} that support operations, cooperation between field warfare army groups and local armed strengths {wuzhuang liliang}, an integrated combination of high-tech equipment and ordinary technical equipment, the fusion of the military and governments in the theater of war and between military and civilian strengths {jun min liliang}, forming a structural system of strengths {liliang} for integrated operations and fully bringing into play each of their superiorities, and using integrated combined strengths {heli} to get the upper hand. Second, comprehensively utilize the spaces of the battlefield. At the same time that [you] attack the enemy's front lines {yi xian}, pay attention to attacking the enemy's depths and his rear area, while at the same time protecting [your] own depths and rear area from coming under enemy attack; at the same time [that you conduct] frontal operations, actively attack the enemy's flanks and the rear of his flanks, while at the same time protecting [your] own side's flanks and the rear of [your] flanks from coming under enemy attack; and at the same time that [you engage in] ground operations, pay attention to operations in the naval, air, and electromagnetic spheres and to preventing threats from space, so as to combine in an integrated manner the various battlefields and the various spheres, forming a system of battlefields that is a multidimensional whole. Third, comprehensively utilize multiple forms of operations and methods of combat. While keeping mobile warfare as the main form, supplement it with necessary positional warfare, while at the same time carrying out electronic warfare, network warfare, firepower warfare, psychological warfare, special operations, and guerilla warfare on a widespread basis, fully utilizing new technical weapons and means to attack the enemy. Combine tangible attacks with intangible attacks, hard attacks with soft attacks, and regular warfare with irregular warfare, in an integrated manner. Apply multiple combat methods and means, simultaneously or alternatively. [Do all this] to subdue the enemy in a comprehensive manner. Fourth, make overall plans and arrangements for each stage of operations. Centered on the goals of operations, make comprehensive plans for the entire process of operations, for the entire situation, and for each aspect. Carry out scientific and rational planning and arrangements for the sequence of operations or for the primary and secondary targets, for how strengths {liliang} are used, for the methods of operations, for the timing and locations of actions, for differentiating the steps of operations, for the major combat actions and for each stage [of operations]; and for transforming {zhuanhuan} and linking actions, so as to bring into play the maximum effectiveness of ground forces' strengths {lujun liliang} and to seize victory in operations.

The goal of destroying the enemy's integrated structure is to weaken the enemy's capabilities for integrated operations. The enemy's system of operations is a large system

made up of certain subsystems; although the system's structure is highly effective, it also has its fatal weak points, and once one of these is destroyed, the entire system will become inflexible and even become paralyzed. The main ways to destroy the enemy's entire structure are [as follows]. First, destroy the enemy's command system. The enemy's command system is the "brains" {*tounao*} and "central nervous system" {*zhongshu*} for carrying out operations, and annihilating or destroying the enemy's command system can paralyze the enemy's entire system of operations. Previous ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} were like this, and it is even more this way under high-tech conditions. The more modernized that weapons and equipment are, and the more complex the system's structure is, the more each part will rely upon each other, and the more obvious the fragility of their structure will be. Add to this the thousands of changes that take place on the modern battlefield in the twinkling of an eye, and the greater the demands will be on the command system. Destroying the command system will become a primary and crucial detail in ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*}. Second, annihilate the enemy's high-tech weapons systems. The status and role of high-tech weapons systems are becoming increasingly important, and they have become a pillar of support that the entire system of operations relies on. Annihilating or destroying any important link in the enemy's high-tech weapons systems can not only lead to the weapons systems themselves becoming imbalanced, but it can also basically eliminate the enemy's weapons, depriving the enemy of the ability to strike back. Third, destroy the enemy's support systems. Under high-tech conditions, consumption in operations has increased to an unprecedented degree, and reliance on logistics and equipment support has further increased; actively destroying the support systems in the enemy's rear area undoubtedly will bring into play an important link for suppressing the enemy's overall superiority. Fourth, lower {*huansan*} the enemy's morale {*junxin shiqi*} and throw his command into confusion. By launching a political offensive, [we] lower {*huansan*} the enemy's morale and break down his will to fight; by adopting such deceptive actions as camouflage, feints, and sowing discord, and interfering with the enemy military's command, [we] deceive and fool him, so that he makes errors in his judgments and decisions.

II. The connotations of the guiding thought of "focused attacks," and the key points in carrying this out {"zhongdian daji" zhidao sixiang de neihan ji luoshi yaodian}...19

Focused attacks {*zhongdian daji*} means having an accurate grasp of such key issues as the targets, timing, strengths {*liliang*}, command, and coordination for ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*}, using an awareness of active offense and taking the initiative to create situations in order to emphasize attacking the key targets in the enemy's systems of operations, and quickly paralyzing the enemy's system of operations.

In implementing and carrying out the guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} of "focused attacks" {*zhongdian daji*}, it is necessary to proceed from the following several aspects.

Correctly select the key targets for attack. The core of this is to emphasize carrying out a decisive attack against the key targets in the enemy's system of operations that hold

together and support [this system], throwing the enemy's operations out of balance and even paralyzing them. [We] should base ourselves on the overall situation of operations, and based on the differing situations in operations, accurately select key targets to attack. Judging by the strengths {*liliang*} of the objective, [we] usually treat weak but vital enemies {*di*} as the key targets of attack, in order to achieve the effect where an attack against one point or one part will affect and shake the rest. Looking at the spaces that targets occupy, [we] usually treat the enemy's flank, the rear of his flank, and his rear area as places for key attacks. In cooperation with the front, [we] have the enemy's front and back come under attack, making it hard for him to take care of both the front and the back. Looking at the systems structure of the targets, [we] usually make the enemy's command system, major deployments, and crucial points of his high-tech weapons systems into the key targets of attack, in order to get the effect of paralyzing his entire situation by attacking one of his points. Looking at the level of threat that the target poses to [our own] side, [we] usually give priority to attacking targets that pose the greatest threat to us.

Use strengths {*liliang*} in a focused manner. This is a basic requirement in the thought of "focused attacks" {*zhongdian daji*}, for the use of strengths {*liliang*}. Only by forming heavy-hammer [type] violent attacks against key targets is it possible to quickly achieve the goals of the key attacks and to push forward developments in the battle situation. To do this, it is necessary to concentrate on one route or one part where we are superior to multiple enemies {*jizhong youshi yu duoge diren zhong de yilu huo yibu*}. [It is necessary] to concentrate main strengths {*zhuyao liliang*} along a major direction and in a major area (or target), and at a crucial opportunity. [It is necessary] to correctly handle the relationship between the quantity and quality of the strengths {*liliang*} being concentrated, and to establish the concept that quality takes priority; it is especially necessary to pay attention to the use of elite troops and good weapons. [Finally, it is necessary] to seek to concentrate strengths' {*liliang*} "degrees" {*du*} and to have a firm grasp on the unity of strengths {*liliang*}, space, and time.

Having a grasp on the focus of command means having a grasp on the main contradictions in operations. Only by continually finding and grasping the main contradictions in operations and then resolving these in a timely manner, is it possible to push operations to develop in directions that favor [us] and do not favor the enemy. To do this, it is necessary to always put the focus of command on major issues or actions that relate to the overall situation of operations, and to pay attention to changing things as the focus of the operations changes.

"Integrated operations" {*zhengti zuozhan*} and "focused attacks" {*zhongdian daji*} are an integrated unity. Integrated operations {*zhengti zuozhan*} stress the scientific combination of each key factor in operations and the establishment of optimal mechanisms for operations, forming an integrated combined force; it is the main idea for achieving focused attacks {*zhongdian daji*} and the way to do [focused attacks]. The two have an organic relationship and complement each other, and they reflect the essential characteristics and basic rules of ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} under high-

tech conditions. They are the guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} that must be abided by in ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan}.

Section 2: Basic Principles of Operations {zuozhan jiben yuanze}...20

The basic principles {jiben yuanze} of ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan} are a highly summarized [form] of the characteristics and objective laws of ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan}; they are the criteria and guide for organizing and carrying out actions in ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan}. They are the concrete manifestation of the guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} for ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan} as well as an important component part in the theoretical system that guides ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan}.

I. Know the enemy and know yourself, and strive to have subjective guidance correspond to objective reality {zhibizhiji, liqiu zhuguan zhidao fuhe keguan shiji}...20

On a certain material basis, whether subjective guidance is correct or not is a decisive factor for victory or defeat in operations. Practices in warfare have proven that knowing the enemy and knowing yourself, and striving to have subjective guidance correspond to objective reality, are not only general rules that guide all operational actions, but are also basic principles that ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan} must abide by in joint operations. Ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan} in joint operations, as modern technology and especially advanced technology become widely used, have seen a series of marked changes take place in the areas of information and decision-making. First, the means for obtaining and concealing information have increased, the struggle between reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance has become more intense, and information warfare permeates operations from start to finish; this has a decisive influence on the process and outcome of operations. Second, the battlefield situation changes abruptly, and the need for accuracy in getting battlefield information and in making decisions about operations within a certain amount of time {shixian xing} is even greater. Whoever gets accurate information before his enemy does, and who then proceeds from reality, so that subjective guidance corresponds with objective reality, that person will hold the initiative; otherwise, that person will be put on the defensive. In the face of these new conditions, the difficulty of knowing the enemy and knowing yourself {zhibizhiji} and of carrying out accurate guidance for operations, and the effects of these on operations, have increased manifold.

Commanders must have a correct understanding of the upper echelon's intentions, comprehend the overall situation of the joint operations, and have a deep understanding of the mission of the ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan}. [They must] comprehensively utilize various means and methods, carry out careful and continuous reconnaissance against the enemy that they are facing, and strive to have a complete and accurate grasp of the enemy situation. [They must] be very familiar with the characteristics and operational capabilities of the various units {budui} and service arms

within their own side's task organization for operations and [be familiar] with the basic functions of the principle high-tech weapons. [They must] be familiar with the battlefield environment and with the effects that this has on operational actions. [Finally, they must] know very well the basic laws of operations for local wars in the Information Age. On this basis, they compare and study the situations of the two hostile sides, they find out each one's advantages and disadvantages and their strong points and shortcomings, and they make judgments that correspond to the conditions of objective reality, make correct decisions about operations, and draft [correct] plans of operations.

During the process of carrying out operations, [we] should also continually have a comprehensive grasp of the battlefield situation, scientifically foresee developmental trends in the war situation, guide [our] actions according to circumstances, make correct decisions in a timely manner that correspond to developments and changes in the battlefield situation, supplement or revise decisions about operations, flexibly {*linghuo jidong di*} command the actions of the various units {*budui*} and various service arms, and seize victory in operations in a dynamic manner.

II. Annihilate the enemy and preserve yourself {*xiaomie diren*, *baocun ziji*}...21

Annihilating the enemy {*xiaomie diren*} and preserving yourself {*baocun ziji*} are basic goals in the ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} in joint operations; they are also a basic foundation for organizing and carrying out ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*}. Annihilating the enemy {*xiaomie diren*} holds first place; preserving yourself {*baocun ziji*} holds second place.

In ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} in joint operations, as weapons and equipment have continually developed, the connotation of annihilating the enemy {*xiaomie diren*} has expanded anew over what it was in the past; no longer is it merely limited to annihilating the enemy's effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*}, but it pays more attention to attacking the enemy's weapons and equipment and to destroying the enemy's entire system of operations. In informationized warfare, the operations of the enemy, and especially of an enemy who has superiority in equipment, are very reliant on his weapons systems, and advanced military technology whose core is information technology has become a supporting pillar for his operational capabilities. Ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} can annihilate the enemy {*xiaomie diren*} not only through eliminating his military equipment and annihilating his effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*}, but also by destroying his weapons systems and paralyzing his operations system. Looking at things from the perspective of development, it would be easier to achieve the goals in operations of annihilating the enemy {*xiaomie diren*} and preserving oneself {*baocun ziji*} by doing the latter. Therefore, in future ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*}, it will be necessary to treat the enemy's ground operations groups, command and control systems, weapons and equipment systems, electronic communications systems, and assistance and support systems as primary targets of attack; operational actions to seize cities and seize territory and to defend cities and defend territory also should be carried out, centered on these objectives.

To achieve the basic goals of ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*}, it is necessary to firmly implement the ideal of active offense, to take the initiative to carry out offensive operations, to combine offense with defense, and to do a thorough job of handling the relationship between offense and defense. During offensives, with an emphasis on a war of annihilation, [we] should correctly determine the scale of annihilating the enemy and correctly select the opportunity and location of operations and the form of operations. [We should] actively create favorable conditions for annihilating the enemy, seize opportunities for battle, and quickly and completely annihilate the enemy. At the same time, [we should] pay attention to threats from the enemy's high-tech weapons and equipment against our ground operations strengths {*dimian zuozhan liliang*}, fully utilize natural conditions, adopt effective technical means and various measures for feints, strictly guard against the enemy's attacks and destructions, and enhance [our] units' {*budui*} survival capabilities. During defense, [we] should carry out an active defense, using effective defense and resistance as well as active actions for offense to defeat the enemy's attacks.

III. Concentrate strengths, and annihilate the enemy one by one {*jizhong liliang, gege jian di*}...22

Concentrating superior strengths {*liliang*} and annihilating the enemy one by one {*gege jianmie diren*} are the material basis and basic methods for seizing victory in ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*}.

In local wars under informationized conditions, the connotation of concentrated strengths {*jizhong liliang*} has undergone fairly major changes; the concentration of numbers of troop strengths {*bingli*} is no longer the entire meaning of concentrating strengths {*jizhong liliang*}; concentration in terms of quality has risen to a more important position. Therefore, in ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} in future joint operations, [we] should pay attention to the concentrated use of elite troops and good weapons, pay attention to concentrations of attack effectiveness, and have a correct grasp on the relationship between concentrations of numbers and concentrations of quality, in order to supplement our insufficiencies and to reduce the gap between us and the enemy [as regards] what is good and what is bad.

In concentrating strengths {*jizhong liliang*}, it is necessary to have a grasp on such links as quality, space, time, and forms. As regards quality, [we must] concentrate and use elite units {*jingrui budui*} and high-tech weapons and equipment, based on the needs of the mission, and form an optimal combination of many types of operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} and many types of weapons, with elite troops and good weapons as the main body, and strengthen [our] ability to resist the enemy and [our] integrated power in operations as much as possible. In terms of space, [we must] concentrate and use [our] main strengths {*zhuyao liliang*} along main directions and in important regions, forming a fairly large superiority over the enemy and establishing an in-depth, three dimensional deployment for operations; and while conserving troop strengths {*bingli*} as much as possible along secondary directions, [we must] ensure that the needs of operations along

major directions and in important regions [are met]. In terms of time, [we must] treat key moments that affect the overall situation of operations as optimal opportunities for concentrating and using troops; as soon as an opportunity for battle appears, [we must] quickly assemble strengths {*liliang*} and form a local superiority over the enemy. In terms of forms, [we must] combine assembling and positioning that is done in advance with mobile concentrations that are done just before the battle, [combine] concentrated troops strengths {*bingli*} with concentrated firepower, and fully utilize such favorable conditions as the weather, the terrain, and errors by the enemy; [we must] use such means as aerial shielding and counter-reconnaissance operations; and [we must] disperse and conceal deployments, disperse and [use] rapid movements, and conceal concentrations at the proper time.

To annihilate the enemy one by one {*gege jian di*}, it is necessary to pay attention to the overall situation of operations, to correctly differentiate between primary objectives and secondary objectives, to clarify the sequence and opportunities for attack, to concentrate strengths {*liliang*} that have absolute superiority, and to first annihilate one part of the enemy and then quickly transfer troop strengths {*bingli*} against the remaining parts [of the enemy] {*zai ji qiyu*}, annihilating the enemy one by one {*gege jianmie diren*}.

IV. Be fully prepared and react rapidly {*chongfen zhunbei, kuaisu fanying*}...23

Being fully prepared {*chongfen zhunbei*}, centered on the needs of the mission, and reacting rapidly {*kuaisu fanying*}, [all] in accordance with the needs of actions, are the premise for ensuring that ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} are smoothly carried out during joint operations.

Ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} under informationized conditions place even greater demands on preparations for operations. First, there has been an increase in the factors that [can] lead to operations suddenly being launched, and this means that ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} must remain at a high state of readiness for war and be in a state where they are waiting for battle. Second, reconnaissance capabilities have been improved, and [so] the battlefield environment has become more transparent; this requires that preparations by ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} must be done even more covertly. Third, the systems for operations are even more complex and there are a large number of key factors; this means that ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} must strengthen their planning and use various effective forms and that they [must be] more carefully and fully prepared for operations.

Commanders should proceed from the most difficult and most complex of circumstances, make meticulous plans, quickly made decisions for operations, carefully draft a number of plans, and make many preparations. [They should] [carry out] meticulous calculations and make use of time, and be skilled at using automated means of command, stress key points, simplify procedures, enhance the efficiency of command, and leave the various subordinate echelons with the time that they need to prepare for operations. [They

should] organically combine peacetime preparations with preparations just before battle, and comprehensively carry out each item of preparations for operations as regards ideology, materials, and organization, ensuring that units {*budui*} will immediately start out as soon as they receive their orders. When the situation is urgent, [they should] be skilled at fighting on the one hand while preparing on the other, seize opportunities for battle, and flexibly organize and command units {*budui*} as these react rapidly. [Finally, they should] actively combat the enemy's various actions to counter preparations, ensuring through all means possible that preparations for operations are kept secret, while [also ensuring] that they proceed smoothly.

V. Concealment and surprise, and catching the enemy unawares {*yincang turan, chudibuyi*}...24

Attacking the enemy by surprise at a time and place that the enemy has not thought of can win a fairly large victory at a rather small cost.

With increased transparency on the future land battlefield, the enemy's advanced reconnaissance systems will have the ability for accurate, rapid, and all-weather collection, observation, and control, and it will be more difficult [for us] to conceal operational actions. Under these circumstances, the principle of maintaining secrecy and surprise {*yincang turan*} and of catching the enemy unawares {*chudibuyi*} will become more obviously important. Any advanced technical devices and means have their own drawbacks and weak points. By fully utilizing the complicated battlefield environment and by utilizing manufactured and makeshift camouflage devices, along with flexible and mobile tactics, it will not only be possible to weaken the enemy's reconnaissance capabilities in an effective manner, but it will also be possible to induce errors in the enemy's judgments. Therefore, as long as the PRC military has effective measures {*cuoshi de li*} and has correct methods, it is entirely possible that [the PRC military] will achieve surprise in its operations under informationized conditions and will attack the enemy where he does not expect it.

To catch the enemy unawares {*chudibuyi*}, it is necessary to fully utilize the darkness of night, poor weather, and favorable terrain, hiding the PRC military's actions and intentions. [It is necessary] to adopt such means as camouflage, deception, and feints, creating misconceptions within the enemy military. [It is necessary] to combine the use of conventional military operations and unconventional military operations, to combine regular operations with irregular operations, and to flexibly use strengths {*liliang*}, so that the enemy has no way to grasp patterns in our operational actions. [Finally, it is necessary] to have a strict grasp of tendencies in the enemy military, to be skilled at using high-tech weapons and new combat methods at crucial moments in operations, and to suddenly attack the enemy at times and places where the enemy does not expect it.

VI. Flexible movements and struggling for the initiative {*linghuo jidong, lizheng zhudong*}...24

Seizing and holding the initiative is the key to winning victory in the ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} in joint operations.

In ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} in future joint operations, high-tech weapons and equipment will have an increased effect on operational actions. Usually, the side that has an advantage in weapons and equipment can fairly easily grasp the initiative, while the side that is inferior finds it fairly difficult to get out from being on the defensive. However, practices in war have proven that the superiority or inferiority of operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} cannot entirely determine success or failure in operations. In the same way, the side that is inferior can change its inferiority into superiority through its subjective efforts and [through] its flexible and mobile use of troop strengths and its changes in combat methods, and win the initiative.

In ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} under informationized conditions, the commander must, on the basis of establishing the superiority of his strengths {*liliang*}, study and weigh the situation and exercise correct guidance over operational actions in a flexible and mobile way. [He must] fully bring into play his subjective dynamism, use stratagems, expand on the enemy's weak points, and create errors by the enemy. [He must] correctly foresee developmental trends on the battlefield, and react before the enemy does. [He must] flexibly use his troop strengths {*bingli*}, carry out movements on a broad scale, and form a battlefield situation that is advantageous. [He must] grasp crucial links in operations, initiate battle in a prudent manner, and strive to initiate battle and inevitably win {*chuzhan bi sheng*}. [Finally, he must] be skilled at innovating combat methods based on changes in the battlefield situation, at destroying the enemy's system of operations, and at cutting off contacts between the enemy's front and rear, among his services and service arms, and among his operations groups.

In ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} under informationized conditions, the struggle to seize the battlefield initiative is extraordinarily intense. When [we] hold the initiative, [we] should not slacken at all, [we should] do all we can to solidify and develop favorable situations, and [we should] take advantage of the situation to expand the results of battle. When [we] are on the defensive, [we] should be firm and cool-headed, resolutely adopt measures, and quickly get out from being on the defensive.

VII. In-depth operations and attacking the enemy's key points {*zongshen zuozhan, da di yaohai*}...25

In ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} under informationized conditions, [we should] persist in [our] in-depth, three-dimensional operations, pay attention to attacking the enemy's key points, destroy the enemy's entire structure of operations in an effective manner, and quickly paralyze the enemy's systems of operations; this has an important significance for quickly annihilating the enemy, and it is also a requirement that local

wars under informationized conditions place on ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} in joint operations. In ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} in modern joint operations, the arms {*shoubei*} of the strengths engaged in operations {*canzhan liliang*} are greatly lengthened, the dividing line between the front and the rear area has been destroyed, and pushing combat methods forward level by level is outmoded. Effective attacks against the enemy's entire depths and from all directions in a focused manner can make it hard for the enemy to pay attention to both his front and his rear {*shou wei nan gu*}; both his forward [lines] and his rear area will be tense {*qian hou chijin*}, his actions will become imbalanced, and his system will be paralyzed. At the same time, it will also be possible to strongly shock the enemy, interfere with and destroy the enemy's resolve for operations, lead to unfavorable changes in the enemy's campaigns and tactics, cause the war situation to develop in a direction that is favorable to us, and even cause the enemy to completely change his resolve for operations or abandoning his military intentions.

In in-depth operations {*zongshen zuozhan*}, [we] should fully bring into play the roles of [our] long-distance firepower, special operations, and aviation troops. [We should] flexibly utilize such means as insertions and outflankings and airdrops, in order to carry out three-dimensional attacks at all depths against the enemy, and to force the enemy to have too many things to handle at the same time.

In attacking the enemy's key points {*da di yaohai*}, [we] should pay attention to the overall situation of operations; select key targets that play a supporting role, such as command and control systems, important weapons systems, heavy infantry groups and assistance and support systems in the enemy's systems of operations; concentrate superior strengths {*liliang*}; adopt [methods of] firepower attacks, of troop strengths {*bingli*} assaults, and of electromagnetic suppression, and methods that combine conventional operations with non-conventional operations, to annihilate the heart of the enemy's operations, and to violently expand on the results of operations and quickly annihilate the enemy.

VIII. Unified command and close coordination {*tongyi zhihui, miqie xietong*}...26

In modern operations, a series of new situations has appeared in the area of command of operations; these are primarily shown as: there has been an increase in technical service arms, and the composition of strengths {*liliang goucheng*} is complex; there has been an increase in the scientific and technical contents of command systems, with a stronger reliance on technology; and confrontation [between] command has become increasingly intense. Therefore, the difficulty of unified command {*tongyi zhihui*} and close cooperation {*miqie xietong*} has become ever greater.

In carrying out unified command {*tongyi zhihui*}, it is necessary to have unified thinking for operations and to resolutely execute the orders and instructions of the upper echelon; to establish a unified and highly effective command organization, and clarify command relationships; to carefully and meticulously draft unified plans of operations, and carry

out unified control and coordination during the process of carrying out operations; to look after the overall situation, have a grasp of the core [of the situation], and strengthen command of the main operations groups and main operational actions; to flexibly utilize forms of command, fully bring into play the subjective dynamism of lower-echelon commanders, and give them authority to act promptly on their own judgment in urgent situations; and to strengthen support for command and maintain the stability, reliability, and continuity of unified command {*tongyi zhihui*}.

In close cooperation and joining forces {*heli*} to annihilate the enemy, it is necessary to maintain unity politically; to rationally differentiate among the operational missions of the various units {*budui*}, based on the conditions of operations and on the realities of the strengths involved in combat {*canzhan liliang*}; and to combine planned coordination with coordination as the situation requires, seize key links, stress key points, and clarify the relationships in coordination and the methods of coordination. The coordination of operations usually centers on the basic missions of the operations, and it organizes things with an emphasis on the main groups in operations and the main actions in operations, in order to keep operational actions coordinated. During assaults, the various units {*budui*} should take the initiative to coordinate with the units {*budui*} that are proceeding {*fazhan*} smoothly along a direction that has decisive significance; during defense, the various units {*budui*} should actively assist units {*budui*} located along a main direction that are having difficulties. As soon as [our] coordination is destroyed, [we] should quickly take effective measures to restore it.

IX. Comprehensive support and a stress on focal points {*quanmian baozhang, tuchu zhongdian*}...26

The integrated use of operations and logistics and of equipment and strengths {*liliang*} to carry out comprehensive support that has focal points is an important condition for smoothly carrying out ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} in joint operations.

In ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} under informationized conditions, battlefield confrontation is more intense, consumption in operations is much greater, the needs for various kinds of support is greater, and there is a stronger reliance upon things; speaking in a certain sense, how good or bad support is, directly affects success or failure in operations.

It is necessary to use the various kinds of support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} in a unified and planned manner, and to set up flexible and reliable support systems and support deployments. [It is necessary] to organize the various kinds of support actions in a unified manner, and to ensure that support corresponds to operational actions. At the same time that [there is] comprehensive support, [it is necessary] to focus on supporting the main direction of operations, the main operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}, the main operational actions, and special technical equipment. [Finally, it is necessary] to fully mobilize and use local strengths {*liliang*} that [provide] assistance and support, to

combine the military and civilians, and to ensure that operations proceed smoothly and [ensure] security in the rear area.

X. Bring into play political superiority and make the most of an excellent work style {*fahui zhengzhi youshi, fayang youliang zuofeng*}...27

In ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} under informationized conditions, even though the effects of informationized weapons and equipment on the process and outcome of operations have further expanded, people still are the main actors in operations for both combatants; therefore, the basic factor that determines victory or defeat is still people, rather than things. The PRC military's powerful political work and its excellent work style {*youliang zuofeng*}, which dares to fight and which will inevitably win {*gan da bi sheng*}, will play an even greater role on the highly informationized modern battlefield.

It is necessary to energetically stimulate the enthusiasm of the vast numbers of PLA officers and men for participating in combat and, based on their belief in daring to fight and in their inevitable win {*gan da bi sheng*}, to form a unified and integrated superiority that is all-conquering. [It is necessary] to uphold the [Chinese Communist] Party [Central] Committee's unified leadership over operations, to resolutely carry out the orders of the upper echelon, and to be based on the concept of the overall situation and the thought of integrated operations. [It is necessary] to develop widespread education in patriotism, revolutionary heroism, and collectivism, and to develop an excellent work style {*youliang zuofeng*} that is heroic and indomitable and that operates continuously, and to enhance the psychological qualities of PLA officers and men. [It is necessary] to do a good job with the masses who are involved in the fighting, and to mobilize the fervor of the masses of the people to participate in fighting and support the front. [Finally, it is necessary] to launch psychological warfare on a widespread basis, and to actively smash the enemy troops.

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Chapter 4

Command Organizations for Ground Forces' Operations in Joint Operations...27

Command organizations {*zhihui jigou*} for ground forces' operations are organizations for executing command functions, which have ground forces' commanders and command organs as their principle part. Ground forces' operations in joint operations must establish a command organization {*zhihui jigou*} whose organization is sound, whose relations are smooth, whose functions are complete, and whose responsibilities are standard.

Section 1: Establish a Command System and Command Organization {*jianli zhihui tixi he zhihui jigou*}...27

In organizing and carrying out ground forces' operations in joint operations, [you] should establish a command system based on the operational mission and actual conditions, in accordance with the principles of unified command, of [having] echelons that are simple and clear, of [being] highly effective and stable, and of making it easy to coordinate [operations]. The basic operational group {*jiben zuozhan jituan*} of the ground forces usually depends on the group army in establishing a two-level command organization {*zhihui jigou*} consisting of the group army and divisions (or brigades); the high-level operational group {*gaoji zuozhan jituan*} of the ground forces usually sets up a two-level command system for operations, involving the ground forces' command organization {*zhihui jigou*} and the group army.

Command organization {*zhihui jigou*} of the ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} should proceed from the needs for commanding operations; it should correspond with the mission and support capabilities of command. The need to be elite and highly effective determines the task organization and organizational grouping. Usually, a basic command post, a reserve command post, and a rear area command post are set up. When necessary, a forward (or direction) command post and a special direction {*zhuan xiang*} (or auxiliary) command post are established.

The basic command post is the basic command organization {*jiben zhihui jigou*} for ground forces' operations in joint operations. It usually consists of the supreme commander of the ground forces' combatant strengths {*canzhan liliang*} and of the major personnel in his command organ, as well as operational teams that other services' units send.

The reserve command post is a reserve command organization {*beiyong zhihui jigou*} that is established based on the needs of operations, in order to ensure the stability and continuity of command of operations. It usually consists of necessary and relevant personnel led by the supreme deputy commander in the ground forces' combatant strengths {*canzhan liliang*}.

The rear area command post is a command organization {*zhihui jigou*} for unified command of logistics and equipment support and rear area defense. It usually consists of a deputy commander with the highest rank in the ground forces who is also the rear area commander; with an emphasis on logistics and equipment departments, it also includes relevant personnel from other, relevant departments and local organizations that support the front.

The makeup of other command posts is determined by the supreme commander, based on the operational mission and on the actual situation. The command organization {*zhihui jigou*} of operations groups {*zuozhan jituan*} that are temporarily organized can be dispatched and temporarily organized by the upper echelon or can have a certain command organization {*zhihui jigou*} for organizational structures as its basic component.

The deployment areas for the various command posts of the ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} should be determined based on such factors as the form of operations, the deployment of operations, the terrain conditions, and information support capabilities. Under ordinary conditions, the basic command post should be deployed on favorable terrain that makes command, concealment, and movement easy. During offensives, it usually is deployed behind the operations group {*zuozhan jituan*} for the major direction or behind the first echelon; when defending, it usually is deployed behind the major defense area or zone. The rear area command post usually is deployed on favorable terrain in the rear area of operations that facilitates the comprehensive organization of specialized service support and the command of defensive operations in the operations' rear area.

Section 2: Jurisdiction of Command {*zhihui quanxian*}...28

The command organization {*zhihui jigou*} of the ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} in joint operations is primarily responsible for unified command of the various operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} in the task organization, for the unified guidance of the ground forces' rear area work, and for the unified organization and execution of management and control over the battlefield. Based on the orders and instructions of the upper echelon, it guides and coordinates other units that are acting within the area of operations. [Finally,] it makes requests for coordination from other services' units {*budui*} that are cooperating in operations, and it actively organizes and coordinates cooperative actions with other services' units {*budui*}. The commander of ground forces' operations should give lower-echelon commanders the necessary authority to temporarily handle things, based on his authority to make decisions about major issues in joint operations and [on the basis of] ensuring a unified will {*tongyi yizhi*} and uniform actions.

Section 3: Establish automated communications and command systems for operations {jianli zuozhan tongxin he zhihui zidonghua xitong}...29

The command organization {zhihui jigou} for ground forces' operations in joint operations should be planned in a uniform manner and carefully organized, based on the task organization, organizational grouping, and operational deployment of the command system and command organization {zhihui jigou} for joint operations, as well as on such conditions as communications troop strengths {tongxin bingli} and on communications structures that have already been set up in the area of operations. [It should] adopt methods that combine field warfare communications with fixed facilities, utilize the various means of communications in an integrated manner, and establish a transversely linked {zongheng guantong} communications system for operations with multiple circuitous lines that relies on the joint operations' communications network that has integrated trunk lines, that has the command organization for operations {zuozhan zhihui jigou} at its center, and that is connected to other services' and civilian communications networks.

The command organization {zhihui jigou} for ground forces' operations in joint operations should organize and establish an integrated automated system of command, based on the needs of operations and on existing conditions, that has a rational structure, that is used flexibly, and that has strong survivability, in order to ensure the execution of highly effective command. The automated command system for ground forces' operations must correspond to the command system for joint operations and to the task organization and organizational grouping of the command organization {zhihui jigou}; in accordance with the need for centralization and unity, for being top-down {zi shang er xia}, for being divided according to echelon and type {fen ji fen lei}, for stressing key points, and for planning that considers all factors, [it must] fully utilize the effects of the various types of equipment {zhuangbei qicai}, with the automated command system of the area of operations as its support and with the automated command systems of the various combatant units {canzhan budui} as its backbone. [Finally, it must] carry out a systematic grouping {zuhe} and integration, and [must] organize rigorous concealment and defense, ensuring that this operates in a highly effective, stable, and reliable manner.

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Chapter 5

Main Operational Actions of Ground Forces in Joint Operations...29

In joint operations, the main operational actions {zhuyao zuozhan xingdong} of the ground forces' strengths that are involved in combat {canzhan liliang} consist of: landing operations {denglu zuozhan}, mobile offensive operations {jidong jin'gong zuozhan}, positional offensive operations {zhendi jin'gong zuozhan}, counterattack operations in border regions {bianjing diqu fanji zuozhan}, mobile defensive operations {jidong fangyu zuozhan}, positional defensive operations {zhendi fangyu zuozhan}, information warfare {xinxi zuozhan}, air defense operations {fangkong zuozhan}, and special operations {tezhong zuozhan}.

Section 1: Landing Operations {denglu zuozhan}...30

The ground forces' landing operations {denglu zuozhan} are sea-crossing and offensive operational actions {zuozhan xingdong} that ground forces' operational strengths {lujun zuozhan liliang} carry out against an enemy entrenched on islands or the seacoast, as part of the task organization of joint operations. In ground forces' landing operations {denglu zuozhan}, it is easy for the enemy to menace preparations for operations; the geographical environment of the battlefield is special; there is heavy reliance on advance operations; the offensive mission, with its back to the water, is arduous; the organization of command and coordination is complex; and the amphibious support mission is strenuous. It requires that the commander and his command organ must make meticulous plans and be fully prepared; [it requires] correct selection of the landing opportunity and direction, and striving to achieve surprise in actions; [it requires] establishing a three-dimensional landing deployment that has powerful initial and follow-up assault capabilities; [it requires] centralized and unified command, strict organization of coordination, and bringing the integrated power of operations into play; and [finally, it requires] developing a brave, fierce, and indomitable [spirit], a spirit of independent operations, and strengthening overall support.

I. Assembling strengths {liliang jijie}...30

Assembling strengths {liliang jijie} is the action where landing units {denglu budui} and landing transport tools move from the assembly area or the place where they were originally stationed to a predetermined place for boarding ships. After the commander determines the time for landing, he should organize units {budui} to use the dark of night and bad weather to covertly and quickly move to each of their standby land (or sea) areas in their landing zones (or areas), flexibly adopting railroad transportation, air transportation, motorized transportation, or other forms, based on the distance from the boarding zone (or area), the deadline for completing the assembling, the ability of the units {budui} to travel, and the conditions for transportation. After entering the boarding area, [the commander] should employ strict camouflage, block news, rigorously control radio [broadcasts] and the sending of letters, and quickly make all preparations for boarding ships. After the transportation formation for the landing has arrived at the

boarding area, [its commander] should disperse his formation and have it stand by, defend the mooring area, and contact the commander of the boarding area and the commander of the landing units {*denglu budui*}, paying close attention to preparations for loading [weapons and equipment].

II. Loading and embarking {*zhuangzai shangchuan*}...30

Loading and embarking {*zhuangzai shangchuan*} are actions whereby landing units {*denglu budui*} embark and load equipment and materials in proper order. During the loading and embarking stage {*zhuangzai shangchuan jieduan*}, defense is comparatively weak, while organization and command are complex, and it is necessary to have unified command and careful organization. First, [it is necessary] to establish a command organization for the embarkation zone (or area). This usually consists primarily of the ground forces' commander, with personnel from other services attached. Second, [it is necessary] to correctly choose the moment to embark and the methods for loading. Use the darkness of night and conditions where there are poor visibility, and adopt methods that combine loading at ports and terminals with loading directly from beachheads, to carry out loading at many points. Third, [it is necessary] to carefully organize defense for the embarkation area.

III. Crossing at sea {*haishang hangdu*}...31

Crossing at sea {*haishang hangdu*} is the action whereby landing formations sail from each of their meeting areas to the lines where they each spread out. Crossing at sea {*haishang hangdu*} should be done under the unified command of the landing operations commander, and it should have the landing and transportation group's and formation's commanders adopt forms in which the ground forces' and the navy's senior officers [are] shipmates and strengthen command. Its primary actions include meeting at sea, forming columns, and crossing.

Meeting at sea is the action whereby the various landing formations enter a specified meeting area. When the landing formations meet, their ships are concentrated, crowded together, and confused; this is a good opportunity for the enemy to focus on attacks. For this reason, it is first necessary to make a good selection of the meeting area; second, it is necessary to clarify the methods [that the ships use] to meet; and third, it is necessary to carefully organize defense of the meeting area.

Forming columns is the action whereby, after the various ships that are subordinate to the landing formations enter the meeting area, they are organized into a proper sailing sequence. The sailing sequence usually is formed in accordance with this sequence: minesweepers, firepower support ships, units [that provide] direct cover, and the first and second landing transportation units.

After the formations set off and begin their crossing, they should cross in strict accordance with a predetermined sailing sequence and formation, [they should] adopt

forms of crossing that combine concentration and dispersion, [they should] form a number of columns, and [they should] select differing sailing routes, entering simultaneously from multiple routes to attack the enemy island.

IV. Assault and landing {*tuji shanglu*}...31

Assault and landing {*tuji shanglu*} are actions that have the most decisive significance for the ground forces' landing operations. They usually include direct firepower barrages and joint destruction of obstacles, deployment by the landing formations, assault and landing {*tuji shanglu*} by the landing troops, and carrying out airlanding operations and establishing landing bases.

Direct firepower barrages and joint destruction of obstacles usually is carried out prior to the various landing formations' deployments, closely following an advance firepower barrage. Based on differences among the combat troop strengths {*canzhan bingli*} and forms of assaults, direct firepower barrages can be divided into direct aviation firepower barrages and direct ship firepower barrages. The length of time that a firepower barrage lasts usually is determined based on the sailing distance and time from the tactical deployment line of each landing formation to the enemy coast, on the time needed to destroy obstacles, and on the effectiveness of the assault. The joint destruction of obstacles is where, prior to the assault and landing {*tuji shanglu*}, the various types of strengths for removing obstacles {*po zhang liliang*} within the task organization [that is under] unified command adopt methods that combine what is specialized with what is not specialized, [that combine] troop strengths {*bingli*} with firepower, and [that combine] things that are manufactured with things that are not manufactured, to jointly eliminate the various types of obstacles that are left over in offshore areas and on the beaches.

Deployment of the landing formations {*denglu biandui zhankai*}. After the various landing formations arrive at the deployment line, they should switch from a sailing array to a combat array, under the shielding of direct firepower barrages. First, the minesweeper units {*saolei jianting dui*} enter the sea area of the landing area to inspect and sweep mines. Then, the units that provide direct shielding {*zhijie yanhu dui*} and the firepower support units {*huoli zhiyuan dui*} enter each of their positions to shield the landing and transportation units {*denglu shusong dui*} as these deploy. Finally, the landing and transportation units {*denglu shusong dui*} form their landing arrays and formations one after the other, from the deployment line to the line where they will launch their assaults, according to the needs of the landing operations.

The landing units' {*denglu budui*} assault and landing {*tuji shanglu*} is an action in ground forces' landing operations that has a decisive significance. It usually should be a three-dimensional landing assault that takes place along a selected direction and in a [selected] place, and [it should] combine focused assaults with landings along multiple directions, landings on beaches with landings that occupy ports, landings at sea with vertical landings, landing assaults with attacks by task [forces], and troop strengths {*bingli*} assaults with firepower that cuts [the enemy] off.

Carry out airlandings {*shishi kongjiang*}. In order to coordinate the operational actions of the first echelon of landing troops in an effective manner, the commander should command an airlanding group to carry out airlanding operations behind the enemy's lines, simultaneous with the landing or at about the same time. After the airlanding group touches down, it must quickly complete its operational deployment on the ground, prevent enemy reserve forces from moving, and attack the enemy's in-depth defensive positions from the flank and from the rear, actively {*yi jiji de xingdong*} supporting and cooperating with the landing troops' operations.

Establish landing bases {*jianli denglu jidi*}. Landing bases are temporary bases that landing troops establish at landing sites once these have been occupied. After the first echelon of landing troops lands, the commander should at an appropriate time command landing base units {*denglu jidi budui*} to enter a predetermined land (or sea) area and quickly set up landing bases. The scope [of these bases] includes two parts, a land area and a sea area; their size should be determined based on the enemy situation, the mission, the sea area, the port, and the terrain conditions of the shore.

V. Solidifying and expanding the landing site {*gonggu he kuoda dengluchang*}...32

After our first echelon of landing troops lands and destroys the enemy's first line of defensive positions, the enemy usually will want to carry out continuous counterattacks against us by many routes, along many directions, and in a focused manner, using his reserves. He also will want to blockade and isolate our landing sites and to cut off contact between our landing units {*denglu budui*} and the sea, by using a combination of reverse {*ni*} landings and airlandings, in a pincer attack against our landing units {*denglu budui*}. For this reason, the commander should find evidence as soon as possible of an enemy counterattack, judge the enemy's intentions to counterattack and his possible actions, and adopt combat methods that combine troop strengths {*bingli*} for blocking [the counterattack] and firepower assaults and [that combine] frontal resistance and assaults from the flanks, and setting up obstacles to delay [the enemy counterattack] and threats from the rear of [the enemy's] flanks, resolutely smashing the enemy's counterattack. During the process of operations to resist the enemy's counterattack, the commander should organize a follow-up echelon; fully utilize favorable terrain and facilities such as the beaches, ports, terminals, and coastal airfields that the first echelon of troops stormed and captured; and [have his troops] land (or touch down) in turn, along many directions and at many points, quickly changing the ratio of the enemy's and our strengths {*liliang*} on the landing site. [These should] flexibly adopt such combat methods as in-depth assaults; seizing and controlling key points; splitting up, surrounding, and annihilating [the enemy]; and surprise attacks using airlandings, and resolutely expanding the landing site.

Section 2: Mobile Offensive Operations {*jidong jin'gong zuozhan*}...33

Ground forces' mobile offensive operations {*jidong jin'gong zuozhan*} are mobile and rapid offensive operations that ground forces' operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}

carry out against a moving enemy, an enemy whose footing is not yet stable, and an enemy with mobile defense. In ground forces' mobile offensive operations {*jidong jin'gong zuozhan*}, the targets of operations are complicated and variable, the battlefield situation changes sharply, and it is difficult to conceal operational actions. This requires that the commander must be full of foresight {*chongfen yujian*}, that he must be greatly prepared {*duo shou zhunbei*}, and that he must strive to decisively dominate the enemy {*xianji zhi di*}. [He must employ] stringent camouflage, cleverly use stratagems, and realistically conceal the intent of operations. [He must] create momentum in his movements {*dong zhong zao shi*}, and actively create and seize opportunities for battle. [Finally, he must] correctly select targets to be attacked, and flexibly utilize methods of combat.

I. Creating and seizing opportunities for battle {*chuangzao he buzhuo zhanji*}...33

Creating and seizing opportunities for battle are actions by the commander where he uses various strengths {*liliang*} and means to force the enemy into an unfavorable position and where he finds and seizes opportunities for battle in a timely manner. In operations, the commander must dynamically utilize various strengths {*liliang*} and means, on the basis of objective conditions, to force the enemy [into a situation] where his strengths {*liliang*} go from being strong to being weak, where his command goes from being clear to being murky, where his [mental] state goes from being calm to being agitated, and where his deployments go from being concentrated to being dispersed.

When undertaking a mobile counterattack mission during defensive operations, [the commander] should be proficient at selecting an enemy who is quite {*tuchu*} isolated, who lacks good follow-up, and who is easily attacked, to be the target of annihilation, in defensive actions for the upper echelon {*cong shangji*} and friendly neighbors.

When undertaking a mobile offensive mission, [the commander] should stress using the operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} of his own echelon, of the upper echelon, and of friendly neighbors to engage in actions at the proper time to block and split up [the enemy], to cut off contact between the target who has been [selected] in advance for annihilation and other enemies, to prevent the enemy from fleeing, to lure the enemy's mobile strengths {*jidong liliang*} who are behind the lines into coming out, and to create a favorable situation for annihilating the enemy while on the move.

II. Moving toward the enemy in a surprising, rapid, and concealed manner {*turan kuaisu, yinbi xiang diren jidong*}...33

After the commander of ground forces' operations makes the decision for a mobile offensive, he should immediately organize his units {*budui*} to advance and deploy from the assembly area to the area of operations. In order to ensure that the units {*budui*} move in a rapid, concealed, and smooth manner, the commander should determine the zone (or route), opportunity, deployments, and timing for the advance; the area in which to deploy and the deadlines for arriving there; communications contacts; and the command

organization when advancing and the various measures for support, all based on the decision to attack and the deployments [for this attack].

III. Quickly split up and surround the target that is to be attacked and annihilated {*xunsu dui gongjian mubiao dacheng gelie yu hewei*}...34

After completing his deployments, the commander should use various means to realistically get a grasp on the battlefield situation and to command the attack group at the proper time to launch a surprise attack against the enemy. He usually first carries out a firepower assault, and subsequently uses the effects of the firepower assault to quickly split up and surround the target that is to be annihilated. The first [method that can be used] is a rapid attack, that is, to attack the enemy using a sudden, violent operational action that rushes to seize him {*ji zhuo*}. The second is ambush, that is, to deploy troop strengths {*bingli*} in advance close to a path that the enemy must follow, and to then wait for the enemy or lure the enemy into entering the ambush area in order to suddenly attack him. The third is to advance separately and attack together, that is, to launch an attack from differing directions toward the same, single target.

IV. Annihilating an enemy who has been surrounded {*jianmie bei wei zhi di*}...34

The annihilation of an enemy who has been surrounded is the ultimate objective of ground forces' mobile offensive operations {*jidong jin'gong zuozhan*}; it is also an important action that has a decisive nature. During the process of surrounding the enemy, the enemy will do his utmost to adopt actions to resist this; or he will go on the defensive on the spot, defending tenaciously while waiting for relief; or he will break through the ring of encirclement, forcing his way out of the surrounding [forces]. At the same time, neighboring [enemies] or follow-up enemy [forces] will also actively get close to him and assist him. Therefore, as soon as the ground forces' operations groups surround the enemy, they should have quick annihilation of the enemy as their first requirement. They should carry out a sudden, violent assault without losing any opportunity; they should combine and use actions to cut [the enemy] up, surround him, and expel him, with each direction of operations closely cooperating, and striving to annihilate the enemy with one blow.

V. Continuous operations, and exploiting victory {*lianxu zuozhan, fazhan shengli*}...34

Ground forces' mobile offensive operations {*jidong jin'gong zuozhan*} must be completed by going through a series of movements and numerous operations; they continue for a fairly long period of time, there must be continuous operations, and they cannot give the enemy a chance to rest. Victory in the initial battle will often lead to intense changes in the war situation, and new opportunities for battle will quickly evolve. The commander should fully utilize the favorable situation formed by victory in the initial battle to quickly transfer {*zhuanyong*} his troop strengths {*bingli*}, to continue operations, to expand the results of battle, and to exploit victory.

Section 3: Positional Offensive Operations {zhendi jin'gong zuozhan}...34

Ground forces' positional offensive operations {zhendi jin'gong zuozhan} are offensive operations that the ground forces' operational strengths {zuozhan liliang} carry out against an enemy who is depending upon his positions to carry out defense. In ground forces' positional offensive operations {zhendi jin'gong zuozhan}, the mission of storming fortifications is arduous, preparations for operations are complex, and a great many [materials] are consumed in operations. This means that the commander must carefully plan and [make] complete preparations, and actively launch operations in advance. [He must] correctly select the targets to be attacked and annihilated as well as the main direction of attack. [He must] flexibly use combat methods, and establish in-depth and three-dimensional deployments for attack that have multiple directions and key points. [He must] concentrate troop strengths {bingli} that have absolute superiority, to carry out in-depth, three-dimensional breakthroughs. [Finally, he must] quickly paralyze the enemy's operational system, striving to quickly and decisively annihilate the enemy.

I. Carry out operations in advance and complete the movement forward {shishi xianqi zuozhan, wancheng kaijin zhankai}...35

Operations in advance are early operational actions for attacks, assaults, and raids that ground forces' operational strengths {zuozhan liliang} carry out against the enemy during the stage when they are preparing for an attack, using some of the strengths {liliang}. In order to shield preparations prior to battle and to weaken the capability that a defending enemy has for operations, and to create a favorable situation and conditions for an attack, [the commander] should, under the premise of not revealing his intentions for operations, organize ground, air, and technical reconnaissance, and extensively collect intelligence materials; send out advance detachments to annihilate or expel the troop strengths {bingli} that shield and guard the defending enemy, trying to arrive at the enemy's forward positions in advance and to establish contact with the enemy; use aviation troops, campaign and tactical missiles, and long-range artillery troops, and select a favorable opportunity to carry out firepower attacks against important enemy targets; send out special operational elements to launch raids and sabotage operations behind enemy [lines]; and organize information warfare strengths {xinxi zhan liliang} to launch electronic warfare and network warfare against the enemy.

The launching and exploiting [of attacks] are important actions in which ground forces' operational strengths {zuozhan liliang} launch attacks from positions that they are occupying for launching attacks or while they are on the march, under conditions where they do not have direct contact with the enemy. The launching and exploiting [of attacks] are carried out under close enemy reconnaissance and surveillance and under the threat of long-range attack firepower; therefore, the commander must have a correct grasp of the opportunities for and forms of launching and exploiting [attacks], and use many routes and many directions as he launches and exploits [attacks]. [He must] adopt camouflage and deceptive measures, stringently organize defense, strengthen support of movement, and strive for concealed and surprise attacks where the enemy does not expect them.

II. Concentrate superior strengths, with in-depth, three-dimensional breakthroughs {jizhong youshi liliang, zongshen liti tupo}...35

Breakthroughs are actions that open up gaps in the enemy's defensive positions. They are actions that are extremely decisive in ground forces' ground offensive actions.

Firepower barrages are an important means for breaking through the enemy's defenses. They usually include ground artillery barrages, aviation troops' firepower barrages, and campaign and tactical missile assaults, and they are carried out in tight cooperation and coordination with information warfare strengths {xinxi zhan liliang}. Firepower barrages should focus on annihilating important targets like the enemy's fixed fortifications and obstacles, his artillery troops and missile sites, his command and control systems, and his field warfare battlefields; [they should] suppress [the enemy's] reserve forces and create conditions for assault units {tuji budui} to break through the enemy's defenses and to launch attacks against his depths.

Following firepower barrages, the first echelon of troops and the various operations groups should launch attacks at appropriate times. The various assault groups of the first-echelon troops must quickly break into the enemy's defensive positions, using resolute, brave, and fierce actions; annihilate defending enemies within the breakthrough point; and break up the enemy's dispositions. At the appropriate time, artillery troops and aviation troops [must] switch over to firepower support and firepower escort; at the same time, [the commander] [must] command airlanding operations groups, special operations groups, and units {budui} [that are used] to penetrate {chuancha} and outflank [the enemy], and to occupy and raid important targets behind the enemy's lines in a timely manner, setting up a situation of simultaneous attacks against the enemy at all depths.

III. Split up enemy defensive dispositions, and surround and annihilate targets {gelie di fangyu buzhi, hewei gongjian mubiao}...36

Splitting up enemy defensive dispositions and surrounding and annihilating targets are effective measures and actions for achieving rapid and decisive annihilation of the enemy. The various attack groups should fully utilize the effects of breakthroughs and firepower assaults, and continue to push the attack into [the enemy's] depths, flexibly using many means such as pressing forward by force to split up [the enemy], concealed penetration to split up [the enemy], vertical landings to split up [the enemy], firepower blockades to split up [the enemy], and information interdictions {zheduan} to split up [the enemy], quickly breaking up the enemy's defensive deployments, and surrounding and annihilating the target.

IV. Flexibly use combat methods, and smash the enemy's counterattack {linghuo yunyong zhanfa, fensui diren fanji}...36

When we push forward into the enemy's defensive depths and break up his defensive positions, the enemy usually will want to carry out a counterattack against us. The

commander should have a timely grasp on trends among the enemy's reserve forces, judge the enemy's intentions for a counterattack and his possible actions, and flexibly adopt combat methods such as firepower assaults, the rapid erection of obstacles, blocking by using troop strengths {*bingli*}, electromagnetic suppression, and flank attacks, using resolute actions to pulverize the enemy's counterattack.

V. Carry out three-dimensional blockades, and attack and destroy an enemy who has been surrounded {*shishi liti fengsuo, gongjian bei wei zhi di*}...36

In carrying out a three-dimensional blockade, the following measures are usually adopted: send units {*budui*} for delaying [enemy] reinforcements to the direction that the enemy might reinforce or by which he might break out of the encirclements, and set up obstacles and firepower blockade areas; deploy air defense weapons at key points along the line of encirclement; carry out electronic jamming of the enemy's command and communications facilities; and use aviation troops to carry out an air blockade of the directions by which enemy aircraft and helicopters could enter or by which the beleaguered enemy could take off, resolutely blocking enemy reinforcements by land or air or [the enemy's] fleeing.

Splitting up and surrounding and annihilating are the main methods for attacking and destroying an enemy who has been surrounded. The focal points here are on keeping the enemy from reinforcing his defenses, from staunchly defending [his positions] while waiting for reinforcements, or from seizing a chance to break through the encirclement; on speeding up the process of encircling and destroying him; and on avoiding a long and indecisive battle. First, conduct a short but violent assault, using integrated firepower; try to use such combat methods as a pincer attack, a two-pronged attack from opposite directions, or a converging attack to split up the enemy who has been surrounded into several pieces, and then separately using the method of attacking and annihilating him on the spot or first destroying one of these pieces and then the other pieces, to annihilate the enemy who is surrounded.

Section 4: Counterattack Operations in Border Regions {*bianjing diqu fanji zuozhan*}...37

Ground forces' counterattack operations in border regions {*bianjing diqu fanji zuozhan*} are offensive operational actions that ground forces' operational strengths {*zuozhan lilian*} engage in against enemies who have carried out local invasions in the border regions. In counterattack operations in border regions {*bianjing diqu fanji zuozhan*}, preparations before battle are difficult, and they must be very time-effective; the goals of operations, whose emphasis is on counterattacks and annihilating the enemy, are resolute; in struggles centered on passageways, operations [should be] relatively independent; attack and defense have a close relationship, and switches [between them] are rapid and frequent; and the battlefield environment is special, and the support mission is arduous. This means that the commander must be prepared in advance, react rapidly, and seize and hold the battlefield initiative, and he must be aware that whoever reacts first will

inevitably win, and correctly select targets and opportunities for counterattacks. Centered on counterattacks and destroying the enemy, [he must] rationally determine deployments for operations, [he must] organize reliable support and a stable rear area, and [he must] hold to the principle of the “three haves” {*san you*},³ and conclude operational actions at a suitable time.

I. Defensive operations {*fangyu zuozhan*}...37

(1) Give tit for tat, and resist the enemy’s nibbling away and invading {*zhenfangxiangdui, fan di canshi ruqin*}

When the enemy is nibbling away at China’s territory, we should launch a fight to counter this nibbling, giving tit for tat, and [we should] control the border situation and restrain the enemy’s intentions to invade. First, [we should] occupy or control favorable terrain before the enemy does, and set up checkpoints to block the enemy from nibbling away at roads. Second, [we should] use an advance to counter an advance, and force the rear of the enemy’s flanks. That is, [we should use] part of [our] troop strengths {*bingli*} to advance to the flanks and the rear of the flanks of an enemy stronghold, cut off contact with the enemy stronghold, and dominate {*weibi*} the routes for the enemy rear area’s supplies and reinforcements. Third, [we should] be resolute in defending positions, engage in armed confrontation, and refuse to retreat.

(2) Use many methods simultaneously, and resist the enemy’s information paralysis {*duo fa bingyong, fan di xinxi tanhuan*}

In operations, the enemy will make use of his superiority in information operations to carry out information paralysis of our command, communications, intelligence, and early warning systems. The commander should organize units {*budui*} to fully utilize many methods and means of communications confrontation, in order to resist the enemy’s information paralysis. First is electromagnetic “evasion” {*guibi*}. By using multiple means, such as controlling electromagnetism and radiation, quickly changing frequencies, setting up multiple positions, and quickly changing the positions, [units] evade the enemy’s jamming and annihilation. The second is electromagnetic camouflage. That is, setting up fake positions, emitting fake signals, using manufactured materials, and setting up screens to counter electronic reconnaissance of important targets. The third is electronic feints. By using part of the troop strengths {*bingli*} and materials, by simulating the main forces along a secondary direction, and by drawing the attention of enemy information reconnaissance, [we] reduce pressure on our information defense along the primary direction of operations. The fourth is deceptive attacks. [This means] paralyzing and annihilating enemy jamming sources by fully utilizing destruction by

³ Translator’s note: the text does not specify what these three things are; they presumably are three things that must be achieved, such as stability.

artillery, precision attacks by anti-radiation missiles, aerial bombing, penetration attacks, electromagnetic jamming, and computer network attacks.

(3) Combine defense and offense, and resist enemy air raids {*feng da jiehe, fan di kongzhong xiji*}

When the enemy carries out air and ground long-distance firepower assaults against our border regions, intending to destroy our defensive systems, we should combine stringent defense and active offense in order to resolutely defeat the enemy's air raid actions. First, fully utilize terrain and fortifications for protection. Second, concentrate our electronic warfare troop strengths {*dianzi zhan bingli*} and weapons to electronically jam the enemy's radio communications, fire control radar, and airborne electronic equipment. Third, organize fighter aviation troops and ground air defense forces to intercept an incoming enemy, level by level. Fourth, use aviation troops, campaign and tactical missiles, and long-range artillery troops to carry out a local firepower counterattack against the enemy's airfields and his campaign and tactical missile sites. Fifth, use special operations groups to penetrate the enemy's rear, in order to sabotage such key targets as enemy airfields, support bases, and air defense missile systems.

(4) Integrate resistance, and resist the enemy's three-dimensional assaults {*zhengti kangji, fan di liti tupo*}

In order to weaken the enemy's capabilities for offensive operations, to throw into confusion the rhythm and coordination of his operations, and to be on guard against enemy surprise attacks and destruction against us, the commander should utilize his various troop strengths {*bingli*} and firepower in a concentrated manner, just before the enemy launches a ground attack, in order to take the initiative to attack the enemy and destroy the enemy's preparations for attack, creating [favorable] conditions for subsequent operations. When the enemy invades by land, [the commander] should command his defensive troops to rely upon favorable terrain and positions and fully bring into play the integrated effects of troop strengths' {*bingli*} resistance, fortifications defense, firepower attacks, and blocking using obstacles, in order to kill, consume, and delay the enemy in large numbers. [He should also command them] to use active offensive actions to repeatedly fight with the enemy. When the enemy suddenly attacks comparatively weak flanks in the defenses that we have set up or gaps [in the defenses], or when he breaks through some of our defensive positions, [the commander] should command mobile strengths {*jidong liliang*} behind our lines to occupy positions that have already been set up as well as favorable terrain, to organize a mobile defense, and to resolutely block the enemy from dashing forward and passing through to behind our lines. When the enemy carries out airlanding operations behind our lines, we should seize such favorable opportunities as the enemy's assembly and embarkation, movement through the air, and airlanding and touching down; we should first use aviation troops, assault helicopters, and long-distance artillery troops to carry out rapid attacks against the airlanding enemy; and then anti-airlanding units {*budui*} must use the effects of

firepower assaults and utilize the forms of sudden ground attacks and airlanding attacks to launch violent attacks against the enemy who has landed.

(5) Flexibly set up situations and create opportunities for counterattacks {*linghuo zaoshi, chuangzao fanji zhanji*}

The goal of defensive operations is to create opportunities for counterattack operations. To do this, it is possible, based on differing conditions, to adopt such methods as “combining pushing and releasing, deliberately displaying weakness, concealing what is real and displaying what is false, and resisting and intercepting by force” {*ding fang jiehe, guyi shi ruo, yin shen shi jia, qiangxing kang lan*} to flexibly set up situations and create opportunities for counterattack operations.

(6) Putting down rebellions and quelling disorder, and stabilizing the rear area {*pingbao zhi luan, wending houfang*}

When splittist forces’ activities are rampant among the border region’s nationalities and they intend to take advantage of a foreign enemy’s invasion, collaborating with the foreign forces and engaging in rebellion and riot, we should resolutely put down the rebellions and quell disorder, and maintain social stability. We should first strengthen our guard, and adopt methods that combine the military, the police, and the people to establish a comprehensive and focused integrated system for guarding important targets that the splittist elements would intend to destroy, such as command organs, major traffic lines, airfields, oil pipelines, and strategic and campaign warehouses. As soon as rebellions and riots occur, we should quickly use strengths {*liliang*} and adopt methods that combine dividing up zones (or slicing [rebels] up {*pian*}) and isolating them, controlling the situation, smashing them politically, and military attacks, in order to carry out focused encirclement and suppression and to quickly pacify the rebellions and disorder.

II. Counterattack operations {*fanji zuozhan*}...39

(1) Carefully organize a firepower assault {*zhoumi zuzhi huoli tuji*}

Firepower assaults refer to the comprehensive use of ground forces’, air force, and Second Artillery firepower prior to the start of a counterattack action, in order to carry out firepower attacks against the enemy’s entire system of operations. Firepower assaults should rationally differentiate among targets of attack, under unified planning and command; they should flexibly utilize such methods of firepower combat as firepower that hits at lethal points {*huoli dianxue*}, annihilation by firepower {*huoli huijian*}, firepower that chooses points {*huoli ba dian*}, interdiction firepower {*huoli zheduan*}, and firepower that sabotages things {*huoli poxi*}, in order to annihilate and destroy key enemy targets that play a supporting role, to paralyze the enemy’s system of operations, to weaken the enemy’s capabilities for operations, and to seal off local airports, so as to create conditions for speeding up the process of operations.

(2) Select key points to use troops, and have focused counterattacks {*ze yao yongbing, zhongdian fanji*}

When counterattack operations take place along several directions, [the commander] should select a single direction – where it is easy to concentrate troop strengths {*bingli*}, where it is easy to annihilate the enemy in large numbers, where it is easy to shock the overall situation, and where it is easy to subsequently exploit [the situation] – to carry out a focused counterattack. When the enemy is invading along a number of routes, when there are fairly large gaps among his deployments, and when the terrain can be used, it is possible to use the main counterattack group, to select one of the enemy's routes to carry out an attack against his flanks and rear, to use all of [your] strength to annihilate that one route of the enemy, and to attack and destroy the attacking enemy one by one. When attacking and annihilating an enemy who is defending along a route, [we] usually use some of [our] strengths {*liliang*} to cut off the enemy by means of troop strengths {*bingli*} and firepower, from the ground and from the air, simultaneously with a frontal attack; this isolates his head or some part of him, and it destroys the enemy section by section. When a target that has been chosen in advance {*yu jian*} target rashly advances in an isolated manner, and when the situation is urgent, it is possible to use the combat method of a rapid attack, in order to attack the target that has been chosen in advance {*yu jian*} through sudden, short, and violent operational actions.

(3) Switch at an appropriate moment to an all-out counterattack {*shishi zhuanru quanmian fanji*}

An all-out counterattack is the continuation and development of a focused counterattack, and the commander should adopt operational actions that correspond to changes in the enemy situation and to the strengths and weaknesses of his own strengths {*liliang*}, and should resolutely fulfill the mission of an all-out counterattack. The first is to assault, split up, and surround [the enemy], to attack and annihilate him area by area, and to quickly and resolutely annihilate him along the main direction. The second is to select key points for an attack {*ze yao daji*}, to expel the enemy over a broad area, and to flexibly expel the enemy along secondary directions. The third is to flexibly use troops, to set up situations while moving, and to annihilate and expel the invading enemy by having the main and secondary directions cooperate [with one another] and switch back and forth.

(4) Exploiting the results of battle, and track down, exterminate, pursue, and attack [the enemy] {*kuoda zhanguo, soujiao zhui ji*}

Pursuing and attacking and tracking down and exterminating are important operational actions for solidifying victory in border counterattack operations and for exploiting the results of battle. China's border regions are for the most part mountainous country with complicated terrain; as soon as the enemy's defenses have been broken through or his command center has come under attack, he will quite probably use the mountainous terrain to split into parts in order to stubbornly resist us, or will seek opportunities to

disperse and slip away. Therefore, the commander should be skilled at judging and getting a grasp on the enemy's intentions for actions, and in a timely manner command the operations groups along each direction to organize and carry out operations to track down, exterminate, pursue, and attack [the enemy].

Section 5: Mobile Defensive Operations {jidong fangyu zuozhan}...40

Ground forces' mobile defensive operations {jidong fangyu zuozhan} are defensive operations where ground forces' operational strengths {zuozhan liliang} use part of their troop strengths {bingli} to tenaciously resist attacks and block attacks step by step, and where they use their main troop strengths {bingli} to carry out mobile attacks in order to defeat the enemy's attacks, in a region that is determined just before battle or in [a region] that was selected in advance. Ground forces' mobile defensive operations {jidong fangyu zuozhan} are set up {bufang} as the situation requires, and there is little time for preparations; they move frequently, and there is an intense struggle over taking the initiative in moving; the emphasis is on offensive fighting, [but] this is closely combined with defensive actions; and they are highly flexible, and command and control [over them] is very difficult. This therefore requires that the commander must: deploy [things] flexibly, and quickly react to changes; combine delaying [the enemy] with using him up, where using [the enemy up] helps in his destruction; both resist and block him, with mobile counterattacks; and strengthen command and carefully coordinate [actions].

I. Occupy the defensive area, and resist the enemy's firepower barrages {zhanling fangyu diqu, kang di huoli zhunbei}...40

Once the decision for mobile defensive operations {jidong fangyu zuozhan} has been made, the commander should organize units {budui} to utilize cover from the darkness of night or from bad weather as they quickly occupy the defensive area, in a concealed manner. After entering the defensive area, he should quickly deploy, construct fortifications, stringently [carry out] camouflage, and make thorough preparations for air defense, while at the same time using the time to organize preparations for operations and being prepared at any time to resist an enemy attack. When organizing the occupation of the defensive area, in order to ensure that the main forces securely and quickly occupy this, [the commander] should establish a reliable deployment for shielding [this movement]. Under informationized conditions, the enemy's attack will first involve a large-scale, highly precise integrated firepower attack that combines hard [attacks] with soft [attacks], primarily using precision guided munitions. For this reason, the ground forces' operational strengths {zuozhan liliang} should combine stringent defense with active attacks, reducing the effectiveness of the enemy's firepower assaults and information attacks as much as possible, while preserving effective strengths {yousheng liliang}.

II. Delays and harassment, and subduing the enemy's advance and deployment {chizhi xirao, zhi di kaijin zhankai}...41

Delaying and harassment operations are operational actions that actively take the initiative to attack the enemy, using favorable terrain in front of [our] positions and using harassment operations strengths {*xirao zuozhan liliang*}, special operations strengths {*tezhong zuozhan liliang*}, firepower assault strengths {*huoli tuji liliang*}, and the militia within the area of operations, and by such means as special operations warfare, raids, firepower operations, blocking operations, and guerilla operations. First, they use reconnaissance strengths {*zhencha liliang*}, special operations strengths {*tezhong zuozhan liliang*}, and strengths behind the enemy's lines {*di hou liliang*} to courageously penetrate behind the enemy's lines, to actively launch special operations, to focus on raiding sensitive key targets in the enemy's attack positions, to throw the enemy's preparations for attack into confusion, to destroy his integrated coordination, and to weaken the enemy's capabilities for attack. Second, they use aviation troops and campaign and tactical missile units {*budui*} in a concentrated manner to carry out precise assaults against important targets like command and control systems, reconnaissance and surveillance systems, long-range firepower attack systems, assembly areas for heavy troops, and logistics support facilities. Third, they command harassment operations groups to flexibly utilize such combat methods as raids, blocking, ambushes, and sabotage, in order to prevent enemy reconnaissance, to wear out the enemy's strengths {*liliang*}, to delay the enemy's advance, and to force the enemy to deploy too early.

III. Resisting and isolating [the enemy], and creating conditions for a counterattack {kangji zuge, chuangzao fanji tiaojian}...41

Operations to resist and isolate [the enemy] are operational actions that comprehensively use many means, such as resisting, luring and threatening, and isolating [the enemy], and wearing out the enemy's effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*} in large numbers, in order to create a favorable situation and conditions for counterattacking and annihilating the enemy.

(1) Resolutely defend key points, and tenaciously resist the enemy's attacks {*jianshou yaodian, wanqiang kangji diren jin'gong*}

The resolute defense of key points is a primary way to stabilize the entire defensive system, to wear out large numbers of the enemy, and to create conditions for a counterattack. Therefore, for key points of defense that are located along the axis of the enemy's attack, it is necessary to concentrate troop strengths {*bingli*}, firepower, and weapons to carry out focused defense, and to keep the enemy from easily passing through. It is necessary to fully bring into play the integrated effects of positions, firepower, and obstacles, in order to tenaciously resist [the enemy] and actively counterattack him, killing and wearing out large numbers of the enemy's effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*}, slowing down the enemy's attack, and throwing into confusion the rhythm of the enemy's attack, thus forcing the enemy to split up his forces

and make detours, and luring the enemy into going away from the routes that have been put in reserve among our key points and entering our predetermined area for counterattack operations.

(2) Combining luring and threatening, and forcing the enemy to enter our predetermined area for counterattack operations {*youbi bingju, po di jinru wo yuding fanji zuozhan qu*}

In order to lure and threaten the enemy into entering a predetermined area for counterattack operations, [we] should employ differing methods, based on differing circumstances. The first is combining pushing and releasing {*ding fang jiehe*}, and letting {*zong*} the enemy enter. That is, at the same time that [we] resolutely defend key points, [we should] leave a gap that is deliberately exposed in areas among the key points, and use the enemy's mindset of evading things that are strong and seeking gaps and of being anxious to penetrate his adversary's depths, [so that we can] lure one part of him (or one route) into a predetermined area for counterattack. The second is to resist step by step, luring the enemy in. That is, to use a small part of the troop strengths {*bingli*} that are highly mobile and to utilize positions that have been set up in advance to block attacks as well as favorable terrain to carry out mobile defense, and to use actions such as resisting on the one hand while withdrawing on the other, and deliberately displaying weakness, to lure the enemy into entering a predetermined area for counterattack. The third is to combine fighting with resistance {*da zu jiehe*}, [thereby] threatening the enemy into entering. That is, to quickly set up new key points on the direction along which the enemy is pressing forward and to adopt such methods as blocking through the use of firepower, blocking through the use of troop strengths {*bingli*}, and stopping things up through the use of obstacles, to force the enemy into changing the direction of his attack and entering our predetermined area for operations.

IV. Mobile counterattacks and annihilating an enemy who is deep behind [our] lines {*jidong fanji, jianmie shenru zhi di*}...42

The best opportunity for a counterattack in mobile defensive operations is when an attacking enemy has entered into our predetermined area for counterattack operations. To deal with an enemy who has entered into our predetermined area for counterattack operations, we should fully utilize favorable terrain and flexibly utilize such combat methods as ambushes, sudden raids, approaching separately but attacking together, and taking him by storm, striving to annihilate the enemy while he is moving or while he is not yet stabilized. To deal with an enemy who has touched down by airlanding, [we] should take advantage of him not yet being stable, using the combat method of sudden raids to annihilate him. To deal with an enemy who has penetrated our defensive area using multiple routes, [we] should select key points for a counterattack {*ze yao fanji*}, and combine resistance with attack {*zu da bingju*}. In order to ensure that the goal of annihilating the enemy is achieved, when the commander makes the decision for a counterattack operation and sets up deployments for annihilating the enemy, he must keep an eye on the needs for counterattacking and annihilating the enemy; carry out unified deployment for the overall operation as regards such aspects as strengths

{*liliang*}, spaces, timing, and actions; have overall coordination; and combine strengths to subdue the enemy.

Section 6: Positional Defensive Operations {*zhendi fangyu zuozhan*}...42

Ground forces' positional defensive operations {*zhendi fangyu zuozhan*} are defensive operations that ground forces' operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} carry out relying upon fixed positions that have been constructed in advance or on field warfare positions that have been temporarily built. In ground forces' positional defensive operations {*zhendi fangyu zuozhan*}, the area of operations is relatively fixed, and it is very difficult to conceal intentions. Their nature involves dogged defensive operations, and setting up the positions involves heavy requirements. Battlefield conditions are complex and changeable, and the struggle over the "three counters" {*san fan*} (countering breakthroughs, countering being split up, and countering being surrounded) is quite intense. This therefore requires that the commander must be fully prepared and must struggle for the initiative; [he must] establish a defensive system that has key points, that covers all directions, and that is in-depth and three-dimensional; and [he must] strengthen the construction of positions and rely upon these positions to tenaciously resist attack.

I. Active attack, and destroy the enemy's preparations for attack {*jiji daji, pohuai di jin'gong zhunbei*}...42

The destruction of the enemy's preparations for attack involves an attack of [our own] that has been planned in advance and that is carried out against the enemy prior to him launching his attack. It is aimed at destroying his preparations for attack and weakening his capabilities for operations. Prior to the enemy launching his attack, operational units {*budui*} (or elements) in the enemy's rear are used to secretly keep a watch on the enemy's actions, to actively launch sabotage operations, and to sabotage the enemy's communications lines, airfields, harbors, oil pipelines, missile and artillery sites, and rear area facilities. After the enemy launches his attack against us, [we] should organize some of the aviation troops and campaign and tactical missile units {*budui*} in order to carry out sudden and violent attacks against such important targets as the enemy's airfields, missile sites, command and control systems, heavy infantry groups, and rear area supply bases, in cooperation with operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} behind the enemy's lines, in order to annihilate the enemy's high-tech weapons, to kill his effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*}, to throw his attack dispositions into disorder, and to destroy the enemy's preparations for attack.

II. Combine defense with offense, to resist the enemy's integrated firepower assaults {*fang da jiehe, kang di zonghe huoli tuji*}...43

Active resistance to the enemy's integrated firepower assaults is a key link in preserving troops in an effective manner and in seizing the battlefield initiative. Ground forces' operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} must rigorously organize defense and active offense, using various means to resist the enemy's integrated firepower assaults. First is

to combine many methods and [have] rigorous defense. When the enemy is carrying out an integrated firepower assault, [we] should fully utilize favorable terrain and shielding fortifications to carry out defense, and to do a thorough job of camouflage. [We should] actively launch electronic feints, electronic deception, and conceal what is real and display what is false, in order to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's firepower assault. [Finally,] [we should] at an appropriate time organize units {*budui*} to move, in order to avoid the cutting edge of the enemy's firepower assault. Second is to combine the ground and the air in an active attack. At the same time that defense is being rigorously organized, ground forces' operational strengths {*zuo-zhan liliang*} should also fully bring into play the power of the aviation troops, campaign and tactical missiles, air defense troops, information warfare strengths {*xin-xi dui-kang liliang*}, and special operations strengths {*te-zhong zuo-zhan liliang*}, as well as such combat methods as interception from as great a distance as possible, mobile ambushes, firepower assaults, sabotage behind the [enemy] lines, and electronic attacks, in order to actively strike the attacking enemy.

III. Tenacious defense and preventing a three-dimensional breakthrough by the enemy {*wan-qiang jian-shou, zhishi di liti tupo*}...43

In order to break through our defenses at a single blow, the enemy will usually carry out a three-dimensional assault along many routes and along many directions. The commander must ascertain in a timely manner the enemy's main direction of attack and his intentions for actions, and at an appropriate time order the defending units {*fang-shou budui*} to closely combine tenacious resistance to attacks with active offensive actions, resolutely preventing the enemy from breaking through. First is to block entrances {*ka kou*} and defend points, and to wear out the enemy along the front lines. When enemy mechanized units {*jixie-hua budui*} carry out their main assault along routes, ground forces' operational strengths {*zuo-zhan liliang*} must defend key points along both sides of the routes, adopting such methods as firepower attack, positional resistance, fortifications that are concealed, blocking from obstacles, and counterattacks {*fan*} by troop strengths {*bing-li*}, to kill and wear out the enemy in large numbers. Second is to move at appropriate times and to resist the enemy in-depth. When the enemy breaks through our tactical area and launches an attack against our campaign depths, ground forces' operational strengths {*zuo-zhan liliang*} should concentrate firepower to block important sections and quickly set up obstacles and destroy roads and bridges; mobile troop strengths {*bing-li*} and weapons [should] reinforce defensive strengths, and occupy favorable terrain to quickly form new positions, using offensive actions to annihilate the enemy who has broken through [our lines], and resolutely blocking the enemy from launching attacks against our depths. Third is to focus on using troops and destroying the enemy one by one. In dealing with an enemy who is attacking by many routes and along many directions, [we] should first concentrate strengths {*liliang*} to attack the enemy who poses the greatest threat against us, based on the size of the enemy's troop strengths {*bing-li*}, the strength of his offensive momentum, and the speed of his advance; [we] would subsequently [deal with] the rest [of his forces].

IV. Carrying out counterattacks and annihilating an enemy who has broken through [our lines] {shishi fanji, jianmie turu zhi di}...44

Counterattack is the most important offensive action in positional defense operations {zhendi fangyu zuozhan}. First, in organizing and carrying out a counterattack action, it is necessary to correctly select the opportunity for a counterattack. Generally, this is when one route {yi lu} or one part {yi bu} of the enemy breaks into an area that we have determined in advance will be used for annihilating the enemy; when the enemy who is breaking in has rashly broken through and advanced, and is dispersed and isolated; when the enemy has broken through our main defensive zone, endangering the overall stability of our defenses; and when the enemy has encircled our main disposition or key points, and the defending units {fangshou budui} are seriously endangered. Second, correctly determine the objectives and area of the counterattack. The target that is selected for the counterattack should be the enemy who poses the greatest threat to our defenses, and [we] should do everything possible to force the enemy into an unfavorable position. The best selection for the counterattack area should be an area that [we] have determined in advance for annihilating the enemy; the direction for the counterattack should be aimed at a place [along] the flanks or the rear of the flanks of the target to be annihilated, and that can cut off contacts around the target that has been chosen in advance {yu jian}. Third, flexibly utilize combat methods for counterattacks. The combat method that is usually used is to resist [the enemy] in the front and attack along his flanks. That is, have defense groups occupy favorable terrain, resist [the enemy's] attacks along his front, and block the enemy who has broken in. Concentrate campaign and tactical missiles, aviation troops, and ground artillery troops' firepower to suddenly and violently assault the enemy who has broken in, and impede the enemy's follow-up echelons. Use mobile operations groups to move quickly by multiple routes and to launch [attacks] against one or both of the enemy's flanks, launching surprise attacks against the enemy. Use operations groups in the enemy's rear to actively raid targets like the enemy's reserve forces, rear-area supply bases, missile launch sites, command and control systems, and groups of heavy troops, in order to delay the enemy's movements, to destroy the enemy's coordination, and to prevent the enemy from breaking further in and expanding.

Section 7: Information Warfare {xinxi zuozhan}...44

Ground forces' information warfare {xinxi zuozhan} is integrated measures and actions that ground forces' operational strengths {zuozhan liliang} adopt in order to weaken and destroy the use and effectiveness of the enemy's information systems and equipment, and to ensure that their own side's information systems and equipment operate normally {zhengchang fahui xiaoneng}. In ground forces' information warfare {xinxi zuozhan}, the make up of the strengths {liliang} is diverse, while the scope of resistance is broad; actions are fast and variable, while the battlefield conditions are complex; and information warfare {xinxi duikang} permeates operations from start to finish, and its missions are arduous. For this reason, organizing and carrying out information warfare {xinxi zuozhan} must be centered on the goals of the campaign, and [it must] be organized and planned in a unified manner. [It is necessary] to comprehensively utilize

information warfare strengths {*xinxi zhan liliang*}, to use these in a focused manner, and to form local superiority. [It is necessary] to have a comprehensive grasp of the situation, with integrated defense and focused offense. [Finally, it is necessary] to have close coordination and cooperation and to have effective support in a timely manner.

I. Intelligence warfare {*qingbao zhan*}...45

Intelligence warfare is activities that the enemy and we carry out to obtain and use military intelligence and to keep the other side from obtaining and using military intelligence.

Intelligence support is activities where ground forces operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} use reconnaissance strengths {*zhencha liliang*} to obtain intelligence relevant to ground forces' operations. Its basic tasks are to obtain in a timely and accurate manner intelligence that ground forces' operations need about the enemy situation, terrain, meteorology, hydrology, politics, and economics, and to support command over operations and operational actions. The methods of obtaining intelligence consist of analyzing and utilizing strategic intelligence as well as intelligence provided by the upper echelon and by friendly neighbors, and collecting materials on a broad scale; organizing reconnaissance; and analyzing and utilizing intelligence from other services.

Operations counterintelligence is the activities that are undertaken by ground forces' operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} in order to guard against and destroy enemy intelligence activities. Counterintelligence is centered on counter-reconnaissance, and it focuses on methods of resisting the enemy military's methods of obtaining, transmitting, and processing intelligence. It primarily includes concealment and camouflage, advisories, keeping secrets and protecting against spies, deception, technical opposition, and eliminating enemy intelligence strengths {*qingbao liliang*}. Its focus is on guarding against and destroying enemy reconnaissance and especially information technical reconnaissance. Its basic missions are to conceal the intentions of our operations and the conditions of our deployments for operations, our important targets, and our operational actions; to reduce the level of the enemy military's understanding of the battlefield environment; to weaken the effectiveness of the enemy military's intelligence support as much as possible; to leave the enemy with no way to find out about the conditions of our military and the battlefield situation, or to make it so that the information he gets is false; to throw the enemy military's command into disorder; to reduce the operational effectiveness of his information technology and weapons systems; and to create conditions for gaining victory in operations.

II. Electronic warfare {*dianzi zhan*}...45

Electronic warfare is a struggle that the two hostile sides engage in within the electromagnetic sphere, using electronic equipment and other measures. Its goal is to ensure that [our] own side can fully utilize the electromagnetic spectrum, while at the same time preventing the enemy military from utilizing the electromagnetic spectrum in

an effective manner. It primarily includes electronic reconnaissance, electronic attack, and electronic defense. The primary means of electronic reconnaissance are: using electronic reconnaissance satellites to carry out reconnaissance in space; using electronic reconnaissance aircraft to carry out aerial reconnaissance; using electronic reconnaissance ships, submarines, and underwater acoustic equipment to carry out reconnaissance at sea (or underwater); using ground electronic reconnaissance stations to carry out ground reconnaissance; and using portable electronic reconnaissance equipment, special units {*tezhong budui*}, and other covert means to carry out special reconnaissance behind enemy lines. The principle means of electronic attack are electronic jamming, electronic deception, and [electronic] annihilation and destruction. The primary means of electronic defense are controlling electromagnetic emissions, maintaining radio silence when necessary, and preventing enemy detection; controlling electromagnetic radiation and using manufactured and makeshift devices to shield radiation; using concealed frequencies {*yinbi pinlyu*} and changing frequencies at appropriate times; moving electronic equipment at appropriate times; and setting up fake targets in order to screen real targets.

III. Psychological warfare {*xinli zhan*}...46

[The term] psychological warfare refers to a struggle where the two hostile sides use psychology and adopt various special methods and means that are not armed force [in nature] in order to use the effects of psychological factors to influence, restrain, and change the thinking, feelings, and acts of their opponent's personnel, while at the same time strengthening and solidifying the mindset of their own side's personnel. It primarily includes psychological attacks and psychological defense. The primary means of psychological attacks include breaking through the enemy's psychological lines of defense using various forms and means, shaking his soldiers' morale, cooperating with the political and diplomatic struggle to break up the enemy military, and deceiving and confusing the enemy military through psychological means, [thus] creating errors in his judgments, decisions, and actions. The primary means of psychological defense include encouraging and enhancing the morale of our soldiers through effective propaganda, while strengthening their will to fight, and enhancing the psychological quality of our military's officers and men, building and firming up [their] psychological lines of defense, guarding in an effective way against the enemy military's psychological attacks, and keeping units {*budui*} very stable and cohesive.

IV. Hard kill warfare {*ying cuihui zhan*}...46

Hard kill warfare is also called warfare that annihilates substance {*shiti cuihui zhan*}; it refers to the use of troop strengths {*bingli*}, firepower, and other means to annihilate or destroy enemy information systems and related facilities; to eliminate relevant enemy command, communications, and intelligence personnel; and at the same time to protect [our] own side's information systems, relevant facilities, and personnel from coming under attack from the enemy's troop strengths {*bingli*} and firepower. It primarily includes details in two aspects: operations to annihilate [things] and operations to counter

annihilation. The primary methods in operations to annihilate [things] include conventional firepower attacks, troop strengths' *{bingli}* attacks, sabotage behind the enemy's lines, and the use of other means of attacks. The primary methods in operations to counter annihilation include resisting anti-radiation attacks, countering air raids, and countering destruction by special forces *{te zhong}*. The primary measures consist of including [this type of warfare] within the unified planning for the air defense and missile defense systems, the anti-airlanding system, and the rear area defensive operations system; using appropriate special troop strengths *{bingli}* to defend important infrastructure and important information targets and personnel; and strengthening the defensive capabilities that information elements themselves have.

V. Computer network warfare *{jisuanji wangluo zhan}*...46

[The term] computer network warfare refers to the use of various technical means to carry out network offensive and defensive actions in the information network, centered on computers. They primarily include two aspects: network attack and network defense. The means of network attack consist of attacks against computer programs, attacks against computer chips, and hacker attacks. The means of network defense consist of severing contact between the central system and the outside, carrying out electromagnetic shielding of information equipment and physically isolating it; using information equipment, electronic components, and software systems that are domestically produced *{guo chan}* or whose sourcing is reliable; [having] a strict network security system and preventing invasions by viruses; and finding and killing viruses in a timely manner, and preventing hacker attacks.

Section 8: Air Defense Operations *{fangkong zuozhan}*...47

Ground forces' air defense operations *{fangkong zuozhan}* are operational actions where ground forces' operational strengths *{zuozhan liliang}* engage in combat against air raid weapons. Because air defense operations *{fangkong zuozhan}* have little advance warning, and actions are sudden; [because] measures for air defense and resistance are limited, and survival issues in field warfare are prominent; and [because] battlefield conditions change suddenly, and command and coordination are complicated, it is necessary to be fully prepared when organizing and carrying out air defense operations *{fangkong zuozhan}* and to respond rapidly, to have comprehensive protection and active resistance, to assault key points and concentrate the use of troops, and to have unified command and close coordination.

I. Draft a plan of operations for air defense, and determine the deployment of air defense *{zhiding fangkong zuozhan jihua, queding fangkong bushu}*...47

Command organs for ground forces' operations should draft plans of operations for ground forces' air defense, based on the ground forces' action plans for operations and the upper echelon's anti-air raid plans. The key points [should] clarify the intentions, scale, and main direction of enemy air raids, as well as the weapons and means that they

will probably use, and the tasks of air defense operations {*fangkong zuozhan*}; the main direction of operations, the main targets to be defended, and the missions, deployment, and methods of actions for air defense units {*fangkong bing budui*}; ground forces' units' {*lujun budui*} plans of action for defending against, resisting, and eliminating the aftereffects of enemy air raids; the organization of air reconnaissance and reporting services; and the deadlines for completing preparations for air defense operations {*fangkong zuozhan*}.

At the same time that the commander of ground forces' operations makes decisions about ground forces' operations and determines the deployment of operations, he should determine the deployment of the ground forces' air defense operations {*fangkong bushu*}. Based on the enemy's situation, the intentions of operations, the distribution for protecting targets, the air defense operations {*fangkong zuozhan*} capabilities of the ground forces' operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}, and battlefield conditions, and in accordance with the principles of concentrating troop strengths {*bingli*} and shielding key points, [the commander should] form an air defense deployment for all directions, with key points and with multiple levels, that combines shielding for an [entire] area with direct shielding [or targets] and that combines fixed-point shielding with mobile shielding. He usually has most of the troop strengths {*bingli*} in the air defense units {*fangkong bing budui*} under his direct control, with part of the troop strengths {*bufen bingli*} being allocated to the main operations groups. The air defense troop strengths {*fangkong bingli*} that are under his direct control are organized as an air defense group for shielding an [entire] area, an air defense group for direct shielding, and the like. The air defense group for shielding the area, with air defense missiles and medium-caliber antiaircraft artillery units {*budui*} as its backbone and mixed in with small-caliber antiaircraft artillery units {*budui*}, is located in areas with major operations groups and where major targets are fairly concentrated, with a focus on shielding the security of the groups {*ji qun*}. The air defense group for direct shielding, with its task organization of air defense missiles and small-caliber antiaircraft artillery units {*budui*}, is placed close to important targets like command posts, reserve forces, and artillery positions, to shield the security of important targets.

II. Organizing coordination for air defense {*zuzhi fangkong xietong*}...48

At the same time that the command organ for ground forces' operations is organizing coordination for the operations, it should organize coordination for air defense operations. Cooperation between the air defense units {*fangkong bing budui*} and aviation troops units {*hangkongbing budui*} is organized with an emphasis on the actions of the aviation troops units {*hangkongbing budui*}. This primarily clarifies the airspace of the various units' {*budui*} operations, the altitudes of the targets and the methods of contact between the ground and the air, and the signals for identifying the enemy and ourselves. Cooperation between the air defense units {*fangkong bing budui*} and the units {*budui*} being shielded is organized with an emphasis on the actions of the units {*budui*} being shielded. This primarily clarifies the missions, areas of deployment, and main actions of the units {*budui*} being shielded at each stage, as well as the opportunities that

the air defense units {*fangkong bing budui*} have for shielding [these units], the key targets being shielded, the main areas being shielded, and the principal actions for the shielding. [It also includes] the support [these units] give each other during enemy air raids and ground raids, the main actions of shielding, and the methods of coordination. Coordination among the various air defense troops {*fangkong bing*} is organized with an emphasis on the actions of the air defense units {*fangkong bing budui*} that undertake the main missions. This primarily clarifies the scope of shielding by the various air defense units {*fangkong bing budui*}, the forms that the shielding [takes], the main targets being shielded, the main actions in the support that [these units] give one another, and the methods of coordination.

III. Organizing actions for defense and resistance {*zuzhi fanghu he kangji xingdong*}...48

The commander of ground forces' operations and his command organ must carefully organize reconnaissance against the air, and they must have a timely, accurate, and continuous grasp of intelligence about enemy air raids. [They must] use such measures as dispersion and concealment, camouflage and deception, fortified protection, mobile protection, and feints, and [they must] stringently organize air defense protection for major deployments, important targets, and important operational actions.

When ground forces' operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} are assembling or standing by, the various operations groups must build necessary defensive fortifications, and deploy troop strengths {*bingli*} in a dispersed and concealed manner. [They must] use such measures as camouflage and changing the locations of troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons in a timely manner, to deceive and confuse the enemy. [Finally, they must] command the air defense units {*fangkong bing budui*} to carry out area shielding or direct shielding. Units {*budui*} should use dark nights or poor weather as much as possible when they move, and they should fully utilize favorable terrain, acting in a dispersed and concealed manner. Prior to moving large-scale equipment, [units] should survey and build positions in advance, carry out necessary camouflage, and have a rigorous grasp of the opportunities for moving. [Also, they should] organize air defense units {*fangkong bing budui*} as these carry out air defense using such forms as shielding key points and shielding that follows along [with units' movement], or establish aerial corridors that are shielded against air [attacks]. During the process of carrying out operations, they should organize in a unified manner air defense strengths {*fangkong bing liliang*} that combine their operational actions, use air defense units {*fangkong bing budui*} in a concentrated manner, monitor aerial conditions in a strict manner, find signs of enemy air raids in a timely manner, comprehensively utilize the various forms and methods of defense, and shield units {*budui*} as these deploy troop strengths {*bingli*} at the proper time. During attacks, they should organize units {*budui*} to courageously insert themselves into [the enemy] and outflank him, quickly draw close to the enemy, and carry out close-in fighting and night operations, so that it will not be easy for the enemy to carry out air raids. During defense, [they should] organize units {*budui*} to fully utilize the terrain and fortifications to carry out concealment and defense, pay close

attention to adjusting troop strengths' {bingli} positions during gaps in operations, and reinforce and repair air defense fortifications; when conditions permit, [they should] use manufactured or makeshift devices to carry out camouflage or to set up aerial shelters {kongzhong zhezhang}.

The commander of ground forces' operations should correctly handle the relationship between attack and defense. At the same time that he does a thorough job of defense, he should not lose any opportunity to concentrate the main air defense troop strengths {fangkong bingli} and weapons along the main direction, for important targets, and at important occasions, to attack in a focused manner the enemy air raid weapons that pose the greatest threat to us and to pulverize [the enemy's] intentions for air raids.

When the enemy launches assaults [using] missiles and aviation troops' firepower, the commander of ground forces' operations should ascertain in a timely manner the main direction and targets of the enemy air raids, and command air defense units {fangkong bing budui} to use methods to attack the enemy [who is conducting] air raids, such as resistance by echelon, attacks [using] concentrated firepower {ji huo}, and luring [the enemy] into ambushes. [He should] command the various operations groups to set up aerial obstacles close to air routes that the enemy must follow and over targets that are being shielded, to block enemy assaults against important targets. [Finally, he should] bring into play the effects of units {budui} as well as of militia's light weapons, and actively attack enemy aircraft [flying] at minimum altitudes.

IV. Eliminating the aftereffects of air raids {xiaochu kongxi houguo}...49

During gaps in enemy air raids or after the air raids have ended, [commanders] should ascertain in a timely manner what damage units {budui} have suffered, and command the various operations groups to eliminate the aftereffects of the air raids. [He should] concentrate strengths {liliang} to quickly restore important targets that affect the overall situation of operations, to rush to save wounded personnel, to do emergency repairs to weapons and equipment, and to do rush deliveries of equipment for operations. [He should order forces] to restore roads, bridges, positions, and important engineering facilities that have been damaged. [Finally, he should order them] to eliminate collapsed buildings and explosive-type obstacles that block operational actions, in order to restore units' {budui} operational capabilities as quickly as possible. During the process of eliminating the aftereffects of air raids, [commanders] should strengthen air defenses and battlefield alerts, and continue to thoroughly prepare defenses and resistance to attacks.

Section 9: Special Operations {tezhong zuozhan}...49

Ground forces' special operations {tezhong zuozhan} are irregular operations that are carried out by special units or by units {budui} that have temporarily been given special missions, in order to achieve specific operational goals. Ground forces' special operations {tezhong zuozhan} have a great effect on the overall situation of operations; in operations behind enemy lines, the environment is dangerous and missions are arduous; and actions

are covert and secret, combat methods are flexible, and there is a great need for command and coordination. [These special operations] are far from the main strengths, they operate independently, and support is difficult. For these reasons, [special operations] must be based on the overall situation and be carefully planned; [it is necessary] to meticulously select the targets of operations and to be flexible in using combat methods; [it is necessary] to be rational in determining the deployment for special operations; and [it is necessary] to carefully organize and coordinate [these actions] and to strengthen support and assistance.

I. Entry into the area of operations {jinru zuozhan diyu}...50

The commander of ground forces' operations and his command organ should command special units {tezhong budui} to enter into the area of operations at the appropriate time and in a secure and covert manner. As needed, it is possible to organize relevant units {budui} to carry out feints and to provide advisories and shielding, to continually coordinate actions between the special units {tezhong budui} and the strengths {liliang} that are assisting and supporting them, and to pay close attention to changes in the enemy situation and to promptly overcome enemy obstacles and [his] actions to destroy the special units {tezhong budui}. After the special units {tezhong budui} enter the area of operations, they should quickly find out about conditions and complete their preparations for action.

II. Carrying out special reconnaissance {shishi tezhong zhencha}...50

Special reconnaissance focuses on getting intelligence that would be of concern to the commander of the ground forces operations as he plans and commands operations. Prior to launching operations, [this special reconnaissance] ascertains the conditions of the enemy's important targets and his intentions for operations; after the operations have been launched, it primarily ascertains adjustments to the enemy's deployments, changes in his strong and weak points, and the effects of our military's attacks. In organizing reconnaissance, [we] should deploy troop strengths {bingli} as early as possible, use various forms and means of reconnaissance, and closely coordinate with other reconnaissance strengths {zhencha liliang}; concentrate the major reconnaissance strengths {zhencha liliang} along major directions and at important targets; maintain smooth communications contacts; and conceal [our] actions and avoid exposing [our] intentions.

III. Carrying out special sabotage {shishi tezhong poxi}...50

Special sabotage {tezhong poxi} focuses on destroying important targets or key positions in the enemy's systems of operations. The targets for sabotage are primarily enemy command centers, communications nodes, radar stations, technical weapons sites, electronic warfare installations, oil pipelines, warehouses in the rear area, airfields, and ports. In organizing sabotage operations, [we] should correctly choose opportunities for attacking the enemy's key positions, and closely coordinate with frontal operational

actions, firepower assaults, electronic attacks, and other operational actions behind the enemy's lines.

IV. Carrying out special harassment {*shishi tezhong xirao*}...50

Special harassment {*tezhong xirao*}, with its focus on throwing into confusion the enemy military's command, his actions, and his military morale, is launched with its focus on such operational goals as concealing our military's intentions; using up, wearing out, and containing the enemy; and creating confusion in his rear area and instability in his military's morale. The targets of harassment are primarily enemy command, control, communications, and intelligence systems; his rear area traffic lines; and his follow-up echelons and reserves. Harassment operations should be widely carried out through all the depths of the battlefield, and [should be] coordinated with guerilla warfare behind the enemy's lines and with a political offensive.

V. Seizing key strongpoints {*duozhan yaodian*}...51

Seizing key strongpoints {*duozhan yaodian*} focuses on racing to control and on attacking key strongpoints or important targets with fairly high value within the area of operations. Its main goal is to split up enemy deployments; delay the departure forward of enemy follow-up echelons and reserves; block the enemy's withdrawal; coordinate with, support with coordinated actions, and shield the actions of the main units {*zhuli budui*}; and seize operational materials that have an important effect on operations. The targets that are to be seized primarily consist of bridges, fords, airfields, ports, and traffic nodes; [other targets are] the control of favorable terrain along major passages and of water sources in areas that lack water. In seizing key strongpoints {*duozhan yaodian*}, [we] should be cautious in selecting targets, according to our abilities; [we should] correctly select opportunities and be flexible in our use of combat methods; and [we should] provide the special units {*tezhong budui*} with reliable intelligence and firepower support. When seizing fairly large targets, this should be done in cooperation with part of the main units {*zhuli budui*}, airlanding troop strengths {*kongjiang bingli*}, and strengths {*liliang*} operating behind the enemy lines.

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Chapter 6

Support to Ground Forces' Operations in Joint Operations...51

[The term] support to ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan baozhang*} refers to the general term for the various support measures and their corresponding activities that are adopted to support ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} in smoothly carrying out their operational missions. The basic missions [of this support] are to support the timely and effective command by the command organizations of ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*}, and to support ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} in preparing for operations and in carrying out operational missions, in a concealed, secure, and smooth manner. Support to ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan baozhang*} is an important component part of units' {*budui*} combat capabilities, and it has an extremely important role in fully bringing into play the combat capabilities of ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} and in their completing their operational missions in a secure and smooth manner.

Section 1: Basic Requirements {*jiben yaoqiu*}...52

I. Establish a system of support to operations where the masses and specialists are combined and where the military and the people are integrated {*jianli qun zhuan jiehe, bing min yiti de zuozhan baozhang tixi*}...52

Combining the masses with specialists {*qun zhuan jiehe*} and integrating the military and civilians {*bing min yiti*} are a concrete manifestation of the idea of people's warfare within support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang*}, as well as an important guarantee for completing the mission of support to ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan baozhang*}. In ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*}, the specialized units {*budui*} (or elements) that undertake the mission of support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang*} are the backbone strengths {*gugan liliang*} for completing the mission of support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang*}, but because there are numerous tasks in supporting operations {*zuozhan baozhang*}, [because] these have a great deal of timely effectiveness, and [because] they are very random, it would be hard to complete each task of support in a timely, effective, and comprehensive manner relying solely upon specialist support strengths {*baozhang liliang*}. Therefore, when organizing and carrying out support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang*}, it is not only necessary to fully bring into play the role of specialized support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} as the main body, but it is also necessary to mobilize the support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} of the various services and the local masses, forming a system of support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang tixi*} that has the specialized support strengths {*zhuanye baozhang liliang*} as its backbone, the units' support strengths {*budui baozhang liliang*} as its foundation, and civilian support strengths {*minyong baozhang liliang*} as a supplement, in order to fully bring into play the power of integrated support.

II. Use support strengths in a concentrated manner, and carry out support that is comprehensive but is focused {jizhong shiyong baozhang liliang, shishi quanmian er you zhongdian de baozhang}...52

In future joint operations, there will be a pronounced contradiction between a relative lack of strengths to support ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan baozhang liliang} and strenuous support missions. Therefore, it will be necessary to concentrate the main support strengths {baozhang liliang} and focus on supporting the main operational strengths {zuozhan liliang}, the main directions of operations, the main operational actions, and the main command organizations, [in order to] ensure that key missions will be completed. In concentrating support strengths {baozhang liliang}, it is not only necessary to concentrate these in terms of numbers, but it is even more necessary to concentrate them in terms of quality and support capabilities. It is necessary to use the strongest support strengths {baozhang liliang} for opportunities and places that have a major effect on the overall situation. At the same time, in accordance with the principle of stressing key points but also paying attention to ordinary things, it is necessary to pay attention to the comprehensive nature of support to operations {zuozhan baozhang} and to make overall plans that also pay attention to supporting secondary aspects.

III. Flexibly utilize multiple means and enhance the efficiency of support {linghuo yunyong duozhong shouduan, tigao baozhang xiaolyu}...52

The means and forms of support to ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan baozhang} are many and diverse. In dividing them up overall, there is support in accordance with echelon, support by region, and support that combines these two. Dividing them by the form of support, there is fixed-point support, support that accompanies [troops], mobile support, and self-support. Dividing them by the form in which support strengths {baozhang liliang} are deployed, there is two-dimensional support and three-dimensional support. When organizing and carrying out support to operations {zuozhan baozhang}, it is necessary to pay attention to flexibly selecting suitable means and forms of support, based on the enemy's situation, the terrain, the mission of the operations, and operational capabilities, [in order to] achieve the expected goals of the operations. It is especially necessary to pay attention to using high-tech means of support, so as to achieve effects in support that are flexible and highly effective.

IV. Keep control over reserve strengths and carry out continuous support {zhangwo yubei liliang, shishi bujianduan de baozhang}...53

In ground forces' operations, the battlefield is broad, there are many directions for operations, battlefield conditions are complex, and there are many factors that affect actions to support operations {zuozhan baozhang xingdong}. In order to adapt to battlefield conditions that make a thousand changes in the twinkling of an eye, [we] should strengthen support strengths {baozhang liliang} along the main directions at an appropriate time, in order to deal with support missions for operations {zuozhan baozhang renwu} that suddenly emerge, and replace in a timely manner support strengths

for operations {*zuozhan baozhang liliang*} that have been hurt; [to do this,] it is necessary to keep control over a certain number of troop strengths and equipment for supporting operations {*zuozhan baozhang bingli*}, which will serve as reserve strengths {*yubei liliang*} for use at any time, in order to strengthen the ability for continued support and ensure the ability to carry out continuous support to ground forces' operational actions. When determining the reserve strengths {*yubei liliang*} for supporting operations {*zuozhan baozhang*}, [we] should have a rational and firm grasp of scale, based on actual conditions, so that these will have fairly strong integrated support capabilities and the ability to move rapidly, and [so that they] can be quickly used at moments and along directions that have a decisive significance. Once reserve strengths {*yubei liliang*} have been employed, it is necessary to quickly organize supplements and to restore [the reserves], and to establish new reserve strengths {*yubei liliang*}.

Section 2: Main Details {*zhuyao neirong*}...53

I. Reconnaissance intelligence support {*zhencha qingbao baozhang*}...53

The mission of reconnaissance intelligence support {*zhencha qingbao baozhang*} to ground forces' operations is to provide comprehensive, timely, and accurate intelligence for command of operations and for operational actions. The main measures [are as follows].

(1) Establish a uniform reconnaissance intelligence system {*jianli tongyi de zhencha qingbao tixi*}. The various reconnaissance strengths {*zhencha liliang*} within a task organization that are deployed in a uniform manner fully bring into play the respective special characteristics of technical reconnaissance, armed reconnaissance, and secret reconnaissance strengths {*liliang*}, establishing an integrated reconnaissance intelligence system within the area of operations.

(2) Utilize multiple means of reconnaissance to get intelligence {*yunyong duozhong zhencha shouduan huoqu qingbao*}. Focusing on reconnaissance targets that are [located] in differing depths and that have differing natures, adopt many technical and tactical means to obtain intelligence, and establish a close reconnaissance intelligence working relationship with the upper echelon's reconnaissance system, and with the services, friendly neighbors, and relevant local departments that are cooperating in operations, and broadly open up intelligence sources. For major reconnaissance targets, usually adopt two or more means of reconnaissance, and concentrate strengths {*liliang*} to carry out focused reconnaissance; [we] should verify and confirm important intelligence, ensuring the accuracy and timeliness of the intelligence. Support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} for reconnaissance intelligence should pay attention to both [of these] during the process of executing their missions, or especially organize checks on the results of operations.

(3) Modify reconnaissance strengths and the focus of reconnaissance at appropriate times, based on the needs of developments in operations {*genju zuozhan fazhan de xuyao, shishi diaocha zhencha liliang he zhencha zhongdian*}. Reconnaissance intelligence support

{*zhencha qingbao baozhang*} should permeate the entire process of ground forces' operations, and based on the characteristics of the various stages of operations, [commanders] should modify strengths {*liliang*} at suitable times, and form differing focuses of reconnaissance. When necessary, request reconnaissance support from upper-echelon command organs, in order to ensure that intelligence is obtained in a timely, accurate, and continuous way.

(4) Process and transmit intelligence in a highly effective manner {*gaoxiao chuli he chuandi qingbao*}. Process intelligence from various channels in a uniform way, and channel it to the proper authorities. Differentiate and analyze it in a rapid and accurate manner, and organize evaluations of the results of operations at proper times; report it to superiors and distribute it to subordinates in a timely manner, and report to friendly neighbors, based on the situation. If the intelligence is important {*zhongyao qingbao*}, report it while you are collecting it {*sui huo sui bao*}, and quickly circulate it to relevant units {*budui*}.

II. Communications support {*tongxin baozhang*}...54

The mission of communications support {*tongxin baozhang*} to ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} is to transmit information that supports the command, coordination, intelligence notifications, and rear area communications of ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} in a rapid, accurate, encrypted, and continuous manner. The main measures [for doing this are as follows].

(1) Establish a communications system for ground forces' operations {*jianli lujun zuozhan tongxin xitong*}. This usually fully uses the ground forces' and civilian communications facilities that have already been set up in the area of operations, with an emphasis on field warfare communications equipment; it comprehensively utilizes a number of means of communications, establishes a communication system that covers the entire area of operations, and carries out support to ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*}. Ground forces' units {*lujun budui*} that are equipped with integrated communications systems for field warfare should use these systems to organize and carry out communications support {*tongxin baozhang*}.

(2) Establish reserve forces for communications {*jianli tongxin yubei dui*}. Based on the needs of operations, organize and establish reserve forces for communications {*tongxin yubei dui*}, made up of various types of communications elements; covertly deploy these in places that are convenient for moving and for carrying out communications support; and restore at appropriate times communications networks that have been destroyed or establish new communications networks [to replace these destroyed networks]. After reserve forces for communications {*tongxin yubei dui*} have been used or when they have suffered serious damage, [you] should set them up again.

(3) Strengthen protection for communications systems {*jiaqiang tongxin xitong de fanghu*}. Rigorously organize communications counter-reconnaissance, counter-

jamming, and counter-annihilation, with a focus on the characteristics of information attacks and firepower attacks by the target of operations. Rationally determine the distribution and structure of the communications network, set up communications stations in a dispersed and concealed manner, and strengthen the camouflage and protection of communication facilities.

III. Protection against nuclear, chemical, and biological [weapons] {*he hua sheng fanghu*}...54

The missions to protect against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are to ascertain the enemy's intentions to use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; to find and report on enemy attacks in a timely manner; to organize protection for units {*budui*}; to eliminate the aftereffects of an attack; and to support units {*budui*} in smoothly carrying out their operational missions. The main measures [for doing this are as follows].

(1) Establish a reconnaissance and reporting system {*jianli zhencha baozhi xitong*}. Plan and use specialized support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} in a uniform manner, and establish a reconnaissance and reporting system. Use specialized strengths {*zhuanye liliang*} to carry out focused reconnaissance, while at the same time organizing non-specialized strengths {*fei zhuanye liliang*} to obtain intelligence in many ways. Organize technical strengths to carry out technical detection of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that are of an unknown sort; analyze and appraise these; and quickly adopt corresponding countermeasures. Collect and process [information] about conditions in every aspect, in a timely manner, and inform units {*budui*} and the masses of the people in a timely way about relevant situations.

(2) Strengthen preparations for protection {*jiaqiang fanghu zhunbei*}. Based on relevant intelligence, appraise the possibility that the enemy will use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Carefully draft plans for protection and issue instructions about protection in a timely manner. Prepare protective materials in a relevant manner and give guidance about protective technology. Strengthen the organization of protection, and train backbone [forces] that protect things.

(3) Protect key points {*shishi zhongdian fanghu*}. With the command organs of ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} and the main operational groups as the key points, organize protection against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in a uniform manner. Bring into play the special characteristics of chemical defense troops and carry out specialized or general protection in a focused manner. Organize units {*budui*} to carry out protection of the masses using manufactured or simple protective devices.

(4) Organize the elimination of aftereffects {*zuzhi xiaochu houguo*}. After coming under attack from nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, [you] should quickly come to the rescue of the units {*budui*} that were attacked, send specialized strengths {*zhuanye liliang*} to mark and seal off the contaminated area, and prevent recurring damage. Using

the specialized strengths {*zhuanye liliang*} as a backbone, organize units {*budui*} and the masses of the people to quickly eliminate aftereffects.

IV. Engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*}...55

The missions of engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*} to ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} are to support ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} as these move and operate in a covert, secure, and smooth manner; to enhance their survival capability and the effectiveness of their use of weapons and equipment; and to destroy and limit the enemy's movements. The main measures [for doing these are as follows].

(1) Organize engineering reconnaissance, and collect relevant information {*zuzhi gongcheng zhencha, shouji youguan qingkuang*}. Focus on ascertaining the situations of landforms, roads, bridges, and fords (or harbors), and the value of their use; [on ascertaining] the situations of the existing engineering installations that [your] own side has and on the support capabilities of local governments; and [on ascertaining] the conditions of the enemy's system of positions, [his] system of obstacles, and of other engineering facilities.

(2) Concentrate strengths, and build and maintain important fortifications {*jizhong liliang, gouzhu he weihu zhongyao gongshi*}. Concentrate and use specialized support strengths {*zhuanye baozhang liliang*} and mobilize the masses of the people to build and maintain the ground forces' command posts; the fortifications, artillery, and air defense firearms in staging areas; and key fortifications in major areas of deployment and areas for launching [attacks].

(3) Build, do emergency repairs to, and maintain roads, bridges, and helicopter pads in the area of operations; set up crossing sites; eliminate obstacles; and support units {*budui*} in smoothly carrying out operational actions.

(4) Construct and set up obstacles, carry out tasks of destruction, and block and limit enemy actions.

(5) Reconnoiter water sources, construct and maintain water stations, and support units {*budui*} in the use of water.

V. Camouflage for operations {*zuozhan weizhuang*}...56

The missions of camouflage for ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan weizhuang*} are to conceal oneself, to deceive the enemy, and to create conditions for achieving surprise in operations and for completing operational missions. The main measures [consist of the following].

(1) Strictly carry out concealment and camouflage {*yanmi jinxing yinbi weizhuang*}. Based on the plans of the upper echelon, fully utilize such natural conditions as the terrain, vegetation and weather as well as concealment and camouflage like fortifications and civilian buildings. Cleverly utilize screening technology, fused technology {*ronghe jishu*}, and anti-guided [weapons] {*fang zhidao*} camouflage technology to carry out technological camouflage in a focused manner of such important targets as command organizations, communications nodes, major positions, staging areas, and support facilities.

(2) Organize feints {*zuzhi yangdong*}. Based on the needs of operations, actively organize troop strengths {*bingli*} [feints], firepower [feints], and electromagnetic feints to confuse the enemy.

(3) Set up fake targets and manufacture fake intelligence {*shezhi jia mubiao, zhizao jia qingbao*}. With a focus on the functions of the enemy's reconnaissance devices and the characteristics of his reconnaissance, use specialized and non-specialized strengths {*fei zhuanye liliang*} to manufacture and set up fake command posts, fake launch sites, and the like, to deceive the enemy and to cover deployments and actions in operations. Transmit fake intelligence to the enemy using many means, so that he will make errors in judgment.

(4) Carry out smokescreen support {*shishi yanmu baozhang*}. Releasing large-scale smokescreens covers up our military's objectives, blinds the enemy, and interferes with his guided weapons.

VI. Meteorological and hydrological support {*qixiang, shuiwen baozhang*}...56

The missions of meteorological and hydrological support {*qixiang, shuiwen baozhang*} for ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} are to provide meteorological and hydrological forecasts and materials for the area of operations, accurately and in a timely manner; to support the ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} in accurately using meteorological and hydrological conditions; and to guard against and reduce harm to operational actions from disastrous weather and nasty hydrological environments. The main measures [to do this are as follows].

(1) Establish a meteorological and hydrological support system {*jianli qixiang, shuiwen baozhang tixi*}. Based on the needs of operational missions and on operational actions, organize and deploy meteorological and hydrological support strengths {*qixiang, shuiwen baozhang liliang*}, and rationally differentiate among support missions, and take the lead to establish close cooperative relations with the upper echelon, the various services and service arms, and local meteorological and hydrological support strengths {*qixiang, shuiwen baozhang liliang*}. Under a unified plan, divide up tasks and cooperate, share intelligence, strengthen consultations, and carry out support in a way that is coordinated together.

(2) Collect and analyze meteorological and hydrological intelligence materials, and provide forecasts and proposals in a timely manner {*souji he fenxi qixiang, shuiwen qingbao ziliao, jishi tigong yubao he jianyi*}. Organize support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} to use many means for collecting relevant intelligence materials, and pay attention to using meteorological and hydrological intelligence shared by the upper echelon and friendly neighbors. Concentrate major strengths {*zhuyao liliang*} to obtain meteorological and hydrological intelligence materials about important regions, major directions, and crucial moments. Analyze the effects that the meteorological and hydrological environments have on the operational actions of both the enemy and ourselves, and especially on our major operational units {*zuozhan budui*} and important actions. Propose at an appropriate time that [we] make use of meteorological and hydrological conditions and that [we] adopt preventive measures against disastrous meteorological and hydrological conditions.

(3) Organize meteorological and hydrological resistance {*zuzhi qixiang, shuiwen duikang*}. Take the initiative to cooperate with reconnaissance departments, find out in a timely manner the dynamic state that the enemy will adopt as regards artificially affecting the local meteorological and hydrological environment, and strengthen defensive measures. When necessary, manufacture a meteorological and hydrological environment that is unfavorable to the enemy, with the assistance of local meteorological and hydrological support strengths {*baozhang liliang*}.

VII. Surveying and mapping support {*cehui baozhang*}...57

The missions of surveying and mapping support {*cehui baozhang*} to ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} are to collect and provide geographic information and the results of surveying and mapping, to carry out technical support for rapid surveying and mapping for field operations, provide real-time positioning systems, and support the needs of ground forces' operational command {*lujun zuozhan zhihui*} and operational actions. The main measures [consist of the following.]

(1) Establish a surveying and mapping support system {*jianli cehui baozhang tixi*}. Based on the mission of the operations and on the plans of the upper echelon, propose a surveying and mapping support {*cehui baozhang*} plan as early as possible, and based on need, concentrate surveying and mapping support strengths {*cehui baozhang liliang*} in a timely manner, deploy these in a uniform manner, coordinate closely, and form a focused support system.

(2) Fully bring into play high-tech means {*chongfen fahui gaojishu shouduan*}. Based on needs, use the various kinds of high-tech means to collect and process surveying and mapping information, and provide the results of the surveying and mapping in a diversified and systematized way. Utilize technologies such as automatic map displays {*ditu zidong xianshi*} and regular positioning {*dingshi dingwei*} to provide surveying and mapping support {*cehui baozhang*}. Guide units {*budui*} in correctly using surveying

and mapping technology devices, and bring into play the effectiveness that these should have.

(3) Organize quick surveys and mapping for field operations at appropriate times {*shishi zuzhi yezhan kuaisu cehui*}. Carry out rapid surveying and mapping for field operations, such as detailed characteristics of special landforms, surface features, and important targets of operations of terrain that you are not familiar with in the predetermined area of operations. Process and create these in a highly effective manner, and meet the urgent needs of units' {*budui*} operations.

VIII. Support to traffic {*jiaotong baozhang*}...57

The missions of support to traffic in ground forces' operations {*lujun zuozhan*} are to manage and support and carry out emergency repairs and construction of traffic routes and their installations, and support the movement of ground forces' operational strengths {*lujun zuozhan liliang*} and the transport of materials. The main measures [for doing these are as follows].

(1) Establish a uniform traffic management system {*jianli tongyi de jiaotong guanli tixi*}. Based on instructions from the upper echelon, manage and control in a uniform manner the traffic network in the area of operations. Focus on deploying strengths {*liliang*} for guarding, adjust {*tiaozheng*} air defense, and maintain and do emergency repairs to traffic. Fully bring into play the role of such support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} as local highways, railroads, and air and water traffic. Plan traffic routes, facilities, devices, and technical equipment in a uniform manner and use these in a centralized manner. Carry out support area by area {*fen quyue*} and road section by road section {*fen luduan*}, in order to ensure that the various groups for operations can move along the main directions, while at the same time reserving necessary support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} for movement.

(2) Carefully organize and adjust assignments {*zhoumi zuzhi tiaozheng qinwu*}. With specialized strengths {*liliang*} whose assignments are adjusted {*tiaozheng qinwu*} as the backbone, bring into play the roles of other strengths {*liliang*} for support and coordination, and adopt automated technology measures {*jiaotong zidonghua jishu*} for traffic, in order to enhance the efficiency of traffic assignments that are adjusted {*jiaotong tiaozheng qinwu*}.

(3) Strengthen emergency repairs and maintenance {*jiaqiang cangxiu he weihu*}. Adopt forms that combine support district by district {*fen qu*} with mobile support; in accordance with the need to repair things as they break down {*sui huai sui xiu*}, carry out emergency repairs in a timely manner and maintain traffic lines. In key sections of operations, concentrate support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} to restore in a timely manner main traffic lines that have been blocked. Based on the needs of operations, do a crash job of emergency repairs to some traffic connecting lines, special lines, detour

lines, and traffic nodes, and improve the transport capabilities of the traffic network and its ability to resist destruction by the enemy.

IX. Battlefield management and control {zhanchang guanzhi}...58

The missions of battlefield management and control {zhanchang guanzhi} for ground forces' operations {lujun zuozhan} are to carefully organize management and control of positions, management and control of personnel, management and control of weapons and equipment, management and control of ammunition, and management and control of captives; to maintain order on the battlefield; to conceal the intentions of operations; to reduce non-combat casualties to personnel and damage to weapons and equipment as much as possible; and to create excellent conditions for smoothly carrying out operational missions. The main measures [for doing these are as follows].

(1) Establish a battlefield management and control organization {jianli zhanchang guanzhi jigou}. Based on the needs of operations and on the instructions from the upper echelon for battlefield management and control, have the basic command post do the actual organization, and establish an elite battlefield management and control organization {zhanchang guanzhi jigou} to rigorously carry out battlefield management and control in keeping with uniform stipulations and specifications. The battlefield management and control organization {zhanchang guanzhi jigou} should adopt such measures as special {zhuan xiang} guidance; notifying, supervising, and urging [troops]; and strengthening management and control strengths {guanzhi liliang}, supervising and urging the various relevant departments and related strengths {liliang} to carry out their duties of battlefield management and control, and achieving the goal of comprehensive management and control.

(2) With a focus on differing targets, flexibly utilize management and control measures {zhendui butong duixiang, linghuo yunyong guanzhi shouduan}. Strengthen education in battlefield discipline, adopt such means as fixed-point inspections {dingdian jiancha} and roving inspections {xunhui jiancha}, establishing systems to identify battlefields {zhanchang shibie xitong} and setting up pickets, and adjusting and guiding strengths {liliang}, to maintain order in battlefield actions, supervise and encourage concealment and camouflage, remove obstructions for personnel and vehicles, and protect the security of important targets. Cleaning up the battlefield usually is organized in a uniform manner by the basic command post, with relevant strengths {liliang} participating, and cover is organized based on the situation. The housing of prisoners of war usually is organized and carried out by rear area commanders and their command organs, who set up management organizations for housing [the prisoners]; strengthen policy, propaganda, and management and control; rigorously [enforce] discipline in the management of prisoners of war; organize living and medical treatment support; and based on instructions from the upper echelons, organize evacuation or transfers in a timely manner.

(3) Strengthen on-site management and control in key areas and at important moments {jiaqiang guanjian quyue he zhongyao shijie de xianchang guanzhi}. Concentrate the

main management and control strengths {*guan zhi liliang*} and strengthen on-site management and control, for areas where ground forces' main strengths stage, for areas where they launch [operations] along the main directions of operations, for areas where mobile lines converge, and major train stations, airfields, and terminals, as well as areas where units {*budui*} movement has passed through dangers, in loading and unloading {*shangxia*} transport tools, prior to launching operational actions, and when operational actions are being switched.

(4) Prevent accidental injuries {*fangzhi wushang*}. Adopt corresponding management and control and technical measures, strengthen the planned nature and orderly nature of the various units' {*budui*} actions and the actions of local strengths {*liliang*} that support the front, and prevent confusion. Guide units {*budui*} in becoming proficient at using manufactured and simple identification devices, enhance the reliability of identification on the battlefield, and take strict precautions against accidental injuries.

X. Management of the electromagnetic spectrum {*dianci pinpu guanli*}...59

The missions in managing the electromagnetic spectrum {*dianci pinpu guanli*} are to draft regulations for using the electromagnetic spectrum, to make overall plans for and manage equipment and facilities that use the spectrum {*yong pin*}, and to monitor and coordinate the transmission and use of various kinds of electromagnetic information.

Prior to war, plan the deployment and allotment of the various units' {*budui*} main equipment that uses the spectrum {*yong pin*}; make plans for operations, for equipment's technical performance, and for the scope of frequencies {*pinlyu fanwei*}, taking all factors into account; make uniform regulations and divisions for opportunities to use the equipment, for working methods {*gongzuo fangshi*}, for frequencies, for frequency bands, and for working hours {*gongzuo shiduan*}, and strictly monitor the implementation of these.

In war, adjust in a timely manner the frequency use {*pinlyue shiyong*} among the various types of stations (or positions) that use frequencies {*yong pin*}, and among the various kinds of operational actions; prevent violations of regulations in a timely manner, and avoid jamming ourselves and jamming one another {*zi rao hu rao*}. Based on changes in the situation, supplement in a timely manner the regulations on the use of frequencies {*yong pin guiding*}, coordinate activities that use frequencies {*yong pin huodong*}, and ensure that communications equipment, electronic reconnaissance equipment, guided weapons and equipment, and electronic warfare equipment for the main directions, important occasions, and the main operational actions work in a coordinated and orderly manner.

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Part II

Naval Operations Application in Joint Operations...60

A naval operation in the joint operation is a general designation of each operational activity conducted by participating naval strength in given time and space with the assisting cooperation of other services and arms and naval militia. It is an important component of joint operations.

The naval operation in joint operations has the following characteristics: 1) the naval operation is closely related to the overall situation in joint operations; 2) the naval operational space extends to multiple spheres, and the battlefield is widespread and complex; and 3) the naval operation is more complex and changing, and command and adjusting-coordination tasks are unprecedentedly arduous and difficult.

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Chapter 1

The Major Battlefields for Naval Operations in Joint Operations...60

[The term] major battlefields for naval operations in joint operations {*lianhe zuozhan zhong haijun zuozhan de zhuyao zhanchang*} refers to the places where naval strengths {*haijun lilian*} within the operational task organizations of two hostile sides use various forms of operations, various means of operations, and various methods of operations within a certain period of time in order to achieve the individual goals of their operations, under the unified intentions and commands of [the task formations]. The battlefields for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan zhanchang*} are one of the major objective conditions that determine victory or defeat in naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*}, and the various key factors on the battlefield of naval operations {*haijun zuozhan zhanchang*} inevitably must have a number of effects upon the operational actions of naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*}. Therefore, commanders of joint operations and commanders of naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*} must conscientiously analyze and study battlefields for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan zhanchang*} in order to guide naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*}.

Section 1: Characteristics of Battlefields {*zhanchang tedian*}...61

Battlefields for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan zhanchang*} primarily consist of sea battlefields {*haiyang zhanchang*}, coastal land battlefields {*binhai ludi zhanchang*}, and electromagnetic battlefields {*dianci zhanchang*}. Sea battlefields {*haiyang zhanchang*} are places for naval aviation troops, surface ships, and submarines to carry out naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*} activities; they are the main battlefields for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*} in joint operations; coastal land battlefields {*binhai ludi zhanchang*} are places where naval coastal defense troops {*haijun anfang bing budui*} and others engage in operations, as well as the places for naval troop strengths' {*haijun bingli*} everyday anchorages, provisioning, training, and maintenance; they are major places of support and "regeneration" {*zaisheng*} for naval troop strengths' {*haijun bingli*} activities. Electromagnetic battlefields {*dianci zhanchang*} cover the entire battlefield spaces for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*}, and play a supporting role for the sea battlefield {*haiyang zhanchang*} and coastal land battlefield {*binhai ludi zhanchang*}.

Battlefields for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan zhanchang*} are an important component part of the key factors for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*}, and compared to the battlefields of other services and service arms, they have the following characteristics.

I. There are many spaces and domains {*kongjian lingyu duo*}...61

Looking at the forms of spaces, battlefields for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan zhanchang*} consist of differing spaces: coastal lands {*haibin ludi*}, the water's surface, the water, the seabed, and the air above the sea. Compared to battlefields for ground

forces' operations and battlefields for air force operations, there are more spaces and domains. The first is coasts and islands. China's coastline is very long, and it has a large number of islands; this is conducive to setting up a command system, a system of anchorages, a logistics system, and a defense system for the navy, which provides support for launching activities by naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*}. The second is waters {*shuiti*}. Waters {*shuiti*} are the main part of the battlefield for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan zhanchang*}; the broad oceans are the main places where naval ships' troop strengths {*bingli*} sail, train, and carry out operational missions. The depth, temperature, density, salinity, and transparency of the seas, as well as the tides, tidal flows {*chaoliu*}, waves, and currents {*hailiu*} that they bring about have important effects on the operational actions of naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*}. The third is the airspace of the naval battlefield. The airspace of the naval battlefield is the major place where naval aviation troops fly, train, and conduct operational missions, and the key factors in the airspaces of the naval battlefield such as air temperature, air pressure, wind, clouds, rain, and fog have important effects on the actions of naval aviation troops. The fourth is the seabed. The seabed is an important place for engineering constructions for the battlefield for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan zhanchang*} and for placing listening and obstacle systems; key factors on the seabed, such as terrain, geology, and slope, have important effects on such actions as submarines' movement, the placing of naval mine obstacles, the construction of seabed engineering projects, and the anchoring of ships. The fifth is space. Space is an important place for deploying naval warfare weather satellites, early warning reconnaissance satellites, navigational satellites, and other weapons for space operations, and it has an important effect on the information warfare capabilities, battlefield observation and control capabilities, command and control capabilities, mobile warfare capabilities, and firepower attack capabilities of naval operational strengths {*haijun zuozhan lilang*}.

II. Great variability {*bianhuaxing da*}...62

Most of the spaces on battlefields for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan zhanchang*} are composed of such fluids as seawater and air. These fluids continually move and change under the effects of external forces. First, the atmosphere is changeable. The atmosphere covers the surface of the entire globe, with a depth of up to several dozen kilometers. As a medium, the atmosphere's temperature, density, and humidity continually undergo changes as the seasons change; this will bring about differing effects upon the lifestyles, training, movement, and technical equipment of naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} in differing areas of the sea. Although atmospheric changes have certain laws that they can follow, these are often unpredictable, given the effects of many factors, and it is still difficult for the current accuracy of forecasts to meet the needs of operations. Second, seawater is quite variable. Under the combined effects of the moon's and the sun's gravitational fields, seawater undergoes such phenomena of movement and change as rising, flowing, and wave motion. As the seasons change, the temperature, density, salinity, and transparency of seawater will undergo fairly large changes. Most sea areas will have temperature, density, and salinity thermoclines; the surface of some sea areas will freeze. Under the effects of tidal forces and other external forces, seawater will have such phenomena as tides, currents, waves, and tsunamis; this will greatly affect how the

use of naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} and the functions of technical equipment are brought into play.

III. Little plasticity {*kesuxing xiao*}...62

The chief materials that make up battlefields for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan zhanchang*} are the atmosphere and the seas; they make up the vast majority of the entire naval battlefield space. The atmosphere and the seas are primarily in gaseous and liquid states, with very little plasticity {*kesuxing xiao*}; even with the most advanced science and technology, it is still difficult to make wide-ranging, fairly long-term changes in the naval battlefield environment. On land battlefields, it is fairly easy to use modernized science and technology and tools to create engineering facilities, but on the naval battlefield, it is almost impossible to think of changing the shape of the naval battlefield on a wide scale. Compared to land battlefields, the naval battlefield is basically boundless, with no terrain features that can be used and no places that are strategically located and hard to access and that can be defended {*wu xian ke shou*}. On the broad naval battlefield, it is easy to radiate and broadcast electromagnetic waves and sound waves; and it is easy to bring superiorities in equipment and technology into play.

Section 2: The Effects of the Battlefield Environment on Naval Operations {*zhanchang huanjing dui haijun zuozhan de yingxiang*}...63

The diversity of key factors on the battlefield for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan zhanchang*} has determined that the environment of the battlefield for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan zhanchang*} has multifaceted effects on naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*}. The battlefield environments that affect naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*} primarily include the natural environment {*ziran huanjing*}, the social environment {*shehui huanjing*}, and the electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*}.

I. The effects of the natural environment on naval operations {*ziran huanjing dui haijun zuozhan de yingxiang*}...63

(1) The natural environment affects actions in naval operations {*ziran huanjing yingxiang haijun zuozhan xingdong*}

The natural key elements of the battlefield that have a fairly great effect on actions in naval operations {*haijun zuozhan xingdong*} are wind, sea fog, tides, and water depth. High winds can cause ships to diverge from their predetermined shipping routes and change the direction and speed of navigation, so that it is impossible to arrive at a predetermined sea area on time. It affects the accuracy of naval guns and missile weapons attacks. It tires crews out and affects their fighting ability. Heavy winds and waves that accompany typhoons and the poor visibility caused by rainstorms can seriously threaten the security of ships' voyages and of aircraft. Sea fogs will complicate the conditions of ships' voyages and of aircraft's flying; mobility is difficult, it is hard to find targets, and weapons' use will be affected to a certain degree. Sea fogs are also favorable conditions

for lightweight ships {*qingxing jianting*} to carry out operational missions; under conditions where lightweight ships {*qingxing jianting*} have undergone excellent training and are familiar with the sea area, they can use sea fogs for cover and engage in close combat with the enemy. Tides are closely tied to such operational actions as minelaying and minesweeping. The reason is that the effects of tides will directly affect the accuracy of minelaying and create excessive deviance in the positions of mines; they will affect the sensitivity of naval mines, resulting in delayed detonation of the naval mines; and they will increase acoustical interference with naval mines, which can lead to strong actions {*qiang dongzuo*} by detonators. Water depth directly affects the ability of ships to pass through. Submarines are unable to sail submerged in shallow seas, and large-scale submarines and strategic missile nuclear submarines require sea regions with more favorable hydrographic conditions before they are able to act and to use their weapons.

(2) The natural environment affects command of naval operations {*ziran huanjing ying xiang haijun zuozhan zhihui*}

First, the three-dimensional nature {*liti hua*} and multi-layered nature {*duo cengci hua*} of naval battlefield spaces requires the navy to integrate and coordinate operations. The three-dimensional nature {*liti hua*} and multi-layered nature {*duo cengci hua*} of the naval battlefield means that on the naval battlefield, the independent use of any single service or service arm and of any one weapons system to engage in combat, no matter in what individual space, will be greatly limited, and it will be hard for it to determine the outcome of the entire naval battlefield. This requires that when planning naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*}, the commander of joint operations must fully bring into play the integrated power of the whole of the various services and service arms and of their coordinated operations, and to fully utilize the various spaces and the various weapons systems and combat methods on the naval battlefield, to increase the density of troop strengths {*bingli midu*} and the density of firepower, to create conditions for these [to help] one another, and to launch simultaneous or consecutive attacks against the enemy from each of these differing spaces. This will form an integrated system of operations where the various services' and service arms' operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} will support one another, where the various battlefield spaces will be linked to one another, where the various operational actions will be coordinated with one another, and where the various means of operations will cooperate with one another. At the same time, they will stress concentrating strengths {*liliang*} to attack the key points and weak links in the enemy's systems of operations, destroy the integrated structure of the enemy's operations, and try to get better effects in attack and optimal military and economic benefits.

Second, [the fact that] key factors on the naval battlefield have little plasticity {*kesuxing xiao*} and that the spaces are boundless requires that naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*} must be mobile and offensive {*yaoqiu haijun bixu jidong zuozhan, gongshi zuozhan*}. Compared to land battlefields, the sea battlefield is clearly hard to mold. This means that it is difficult to improve the naval battlefield, and that there basically are no means or capabilities [to improve] the main bodies of the naval battlefield – the water and air

regions. The main bodies on the naval battlefield stretch to the horizon and are boundless; they have no terrain features that can be used, nor do they have areas that are strategically located and difficult of access that they can defend. Therefore, offense is easy while defense is difficult. This characteristic requires that the navy must have very strong capabilities for mobile operations; regardless of whether it is offense or defense, naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*} must be accomplished through mobility. Since [China] is inferior as regards technical equipment, and it cannot be constrained by winning and losing “single cities and single places” {*yi cheng yi di*}, it must have what is unusual and what is normal complement each other {*qi zheng xiangfu*} and [must] widely apply strategy {*guang shi moulyue*}, commanding naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} to frequently move on the broad naval battlefield, creating and finding “chinks” {*fengxi*} and weak points in the enemy’s defense; [it must] get a grasp on favorable battlefield situations and opportunities for battle and actively engage in offensive operations and mobile operations, using our strengths and attacking the enemy’s weaknesses, and having a quick fight and a quick resolution.

Third, the great fluidity and variability {*bianhuaxing da*} of key factors on the naval battlefield requires that the navy must establish support systems and measures that correspond to these. The fluidity and variability {*bianhuaxing*} of the naval battlefields’ key factors have a great effect on the movement and positioning of naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} and on the use of weapons and equipment. This not only requires that the navy have the ability to survive in the complex sea environment, but even more, that it have support capabilities and means that correspond to the operational missions that are being carried out. Only in this way is it possible to ensure that naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} have powerful capabilities to meet contingencies and the ability to respond rapidly, and [only in this way] is it possible for it to gain the freedom of movement at sea.

II. The effects of the social environment on naval operations {*shehui huanjing dui haijun zuozhan de yingxiang*}...64

The battlefield for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan zhanchang*} exists within a certain social environment {*shehui huanjing*}; the level of economic and technological development and the political situation in the area of operations are objective factors on the battlefield, and they have an important effect on naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*}.

Sudden outbreaks and very short times for preparations are marked characteristics of modern warfare, which requires mobilizing people, finances, and materiel in a rapid and highly effective manner. The quality of the nation’s people, and especially the quality of its young people, affects the sources of personnel for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*}; the local strengths for material support {*wuzi baozhang liliang*}, traffic and communications strengths {*jiaotong tongxin liliang*}, emergency rescue and emergency repair strengths {*qiangxian qiangxiu liliang*}, and strengths for defending targets {*mubiao fanghu liliang*} affect the ability for rapid support for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*} and the ability for protection and defense.

III. The effects of the electromagnetic environment on the naval battlefield {*dianci huanjing dui haijun zuozhan de yingxiang*}...65

The naval battlefield's electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*} is becoming increasingly complex, and it has become a distinctive symbol and the most outstanding characteristic that distinguishes the informationized battlefield from the mechanized battlefield. It inevitably will have a fairly major effect on naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*}.

(1) The electromagnetic environment affects the use of weapons and equipment {*dianci huanjing yingxiang wuqi zhuangbei shiyong*}

Equipment that perceives things {*ganzhi zhuangbei*} on the naval battlefield is the basic information "tentacle" {*chujiao*} that connects systems for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*} with the outside, and it is most easily affected by the electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*}. First, [the electromagnetic environment] affects radar probes. Radar is a primary source of intelligence against the sea and against the air. When it is jammed electromagnetically, its ability to probe is greatly reduced, even to the point where it loses ability to grasp real-time intelligence. Second, it affects electronic reconnaissance. Electronic reconnaissance has long-distance effects, it works passively and in a concealed manner, it has rich intelligence contents, and it is an important means of intelligence reconnaissance in modern naval warfare. The complex electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*} increases the possibility that signals will leak and be detected {*lou zhen*}, it increases deviations of positioning {*weizhi piancha*} in locating sources of target radiation, and it affects the timeliness and validity of intelligence. Third, it affects identification of friend and foe. The use of radio technical means and the verification of one another through specific signal codes have become major means for identifying friend and foe in modern warfare. When the devices for identifying friend and foe are severely jammed, this will impair the evaluations and decisions of personnel who operate weapons and of the commanders of operations, because of delays, and it will thus have serious consequences.

Naval communications equipment is a major channel for transmitting information about the naval battlefield, and the electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*} will affect the reliability and accuracy on communications. First, it affects the communications of naval ships. In addition to communications equipment, naval ships have large amounts of equipment that uses frequencies {*yong pin*}, such as radars and navigation, installed and used in a narrow space. In addition, the powerful electromagnetic jamming that the enemy carries out sharply worsens the conditions of the electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*} where ships are, seriously affecting the reliability of information exchanges on the naval battlefield and markedly lowering the effectiveness of ships' communications equipment. Second, it affects the navy's coastal-based communications. In the complex electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*}, noises in the navy's coastal-based radio stations' electromagnetic background become unbearably noisy, and

the distance at which long-range means of communications are effective is markedly reduced. The reliability of communications is also clearly reduced.

Over-the-horizon long-distance precision attacks have become an important means in modern naval warfare. A complex electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*} will affect the long-range precision attack capabilities of the navy's main battle weapons. When they are jammed and suppressed electromagnetically, first, it will be difficult to indicate the target for the attack troop strengths {*gongji bingli*} in a timely and accurate manner, and they will lose favorable opportunities for battle. Second, it will markedly reduce the ability of the missile guidance system to find and acquire targets, the missile's flight control system will become erratic, and this will reduce the missile's firing precision, inhibiting the effectiveness of the missile's operations.

(2) The electromagnetic environment affects command and control {*dianci huanjing yingxiang zhihui kongzhi*}

In naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*}, the various operational platforms must rely upon radio communications to transmit intelligence data and orders for operations, and to coordinate information among the platforms and between the operational platforms and the command organization. Radio communications have become a major item {*chengzai zhe*} for bearing the weight of stability in command and control. If communications systems are affected by the electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*}, this inevitably will affect the stability of command and control activities. First, transmission of data will be interrupted. In future operations, shortwave and super-shortwave networking communications {*zuwang tongxin*} will still be the basic form of applications; when they are jammed electromagnetically, this will paralyze the information transmission system, interrupting the transmission of information. Second, the error rate will rise. If radio communications are affected by the electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*}, the rate of error will markedly increase, thus leading to distortion in transmitting information and severely affecting the stability of command and control.

(3) The electromagnetic environment affects the coordination of operations {*dianci huanjing yingxiang zuozhan xietong*}

The value of operational actions under informationized conditions lies in the high degree of coordination among a number of operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}, so that systematic operational capabilities will take shape in the middle of dynamic changes and will be brought into play, in order to try to have the various types of weapons achieve the greatest effects {*shixian xiaoneng zui da hua*} during operational movements. In coordinating troop strengths {*bingli*} on the naval battlefield, data chain network systems {*shuju lian wangluo*} are the most important, but it is very easy for a complex electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*} to cause problems in certain links of the data chain {*shuju lian*}; if it comes under powerful electromagnetic jamming by the enemy, creating instability in the work of the data chain network {*shuju lian wangluo*}

and even paralyzing it, then the entire coordinated relationship in operations will face the danger of collapse.

Chapter 2

Task Organization and Missions of the Navy in Joint Operations...67

Section 1: Task Organization of Strengths {*liliang biancheng*}...67

The task organization of the navy in joint operations usually is determined based on such factors as the scale of the joint operations, the goals and missions of the navy's operations, the level of threat from the enemy military at sea, and the military geographical environment and contents of the naval battlefield.

I. Requirements for the task organization {*biancheng yaoqiu*}...67

(1) Operational capabilities must correspond with the operational mission {*zuo zhan nengli yao yu zuo zhan renwu xiang shiying*}

The only criterion determining the scale of the task organization of the navy's operational strengths {*zuo zhan liliang*} and the operational capabilities that these have is that they be able to complete the naval operational missions that are assigned to them in the joint operations.

After the operational mission has been determined, it is necessary to determine the scale of the task organization of the naval operational strengths {*zuo zhan liliang*} and the type of the task organization, based on the number of missions and on the nature of the missions, so that their operational capabilities and the missions that they are assigned correspond to one another. Operational capabilities are a concept within a dynamic environment; they generally are determined by the number and quality of the weapons and technical equipment that are borne by the operational strengths {*zuo zhan liliang*}, by the level of the personnel's training and the conditions of [the personnel's] political ideology, and by the support conditions of materials and devices, as well as by the environmental conditions for operations and the command skills of commanders. Therefore, when evaluating the size of the naval operational strengths {*zuo zhan liliang*}, it is impossible to simply judge this by their numbers and by the size of their tonnage; it is necessary to use systems analysis methods to separately compare the various key factors that affect operational capabilities, using quantitative or qualitative analysis, and to determine [the size of naval operational strengths] through integrated analysis. The indicators that are used to evaluate the operational capabilities of naval operational strengths {*zuo zhan liliang*} primarily consist of the following.

Anti-ship capabilities {*fan jian nengli*}. These primarily include the number of the various types of anti-ship missile launchers and the number of missiles that the naval operational strengths {*zuo zhan liliang*} are carrying; the number of platforms carrying various types of anti-ship missiles and the rate at which [these platforms] are sent out {*chudong*}; the average launch rate of missiles and how they resist jamming; the number

of medium- and large-caliber artillery and the rate at which these fire; and the maximum effective distance of anti-ship [operations].

Air defense capabilities *{fangkong nengli}*. These primarily include the numbers and functions of the various types of air defense troop strengths *{fangkong bingli}* and weapons that the naval operational strengths *{zuo-zhan liliang}* have; the probability that air defense firepower can hit and destroy targets in a single salvo; and the effective scope of control over air defense firepower.

Anti-submarine capabilities *{fan-qian nengli}*. These primarily include the numbers and quality of the various anti-submarine troop strengths *{bingli}* and weapons that naval operational strengths *{zuo-zhan liliang}* have; the size of the anti-submarine area; and the probability that the anti-submarine troop strengths *{bingli}* will attack and destroy targets at a single time.

Reconnaissance and early warning capabilities *{zhen-cha yu-jing nengli}*. These primarily include the number and functions of the various reconnaissance and early warning troop strengths *{bingli}* and weapons that the naval operational strengths *{zuo-zhan liliang}* have, and the capability of the intelligence system to handle targets.

Mobile capabilities *{ji-dong nengli}*. These primarily include the speed of movement by the various troop strengths *{bingli}*, the overall radius of operations for the naval operational strengths *{zuo-zhan liliang}*, and the ability of the various troops strengths *{bingli}* to withstand storms.

Electronic warfare capabilities *{dian-zi zhan nengli}*. These primarily include the number and functions of electronic warfare platforms; the types, numbers, and functions of electronic warfare equipment; and the scope of effective control in electronic warfare.

Command and control capabilities *{zhi-hui kong-zhi nengli}*. These primarily include the reaction time in operations for the command and control system and the scope of the effective space of command and control.

Logistics and equipment support capabilities *{hou-qin, zhuang-bei bao-zhang nengli}*. These primarily include the number and functions of the various types of support troop strengths *{bao-zhang liliang}*; the number of the various types of materials, equipment, and personnel for delivering [things], doing emergency repairs, and [carrying out] rescues within a unit of time; and the survival capabilities of support troop strengths *{bao-zhang bingli}*.

Overall operations capabilities *{zong-he zuo-zhan nengli}*. These primarily include the ability of naval operational strengths *{zuo-zhan liliang}* to control a sea area, the abilities of the various services and service arms for coordinated operations, and the ability to adapt to various situations at sea.

(2) The ability to form integrated power in operations {*nenggou xingcheng zhengti zuozhan weili*}

When determining the task organization of naval operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}, [the task organization] should help in forming integrated power for operations {*zhengti zuozhan weili*}. It is primarily manifested in [the following].

First, it should have the ability for operations in all spaces. When determining the task organization of naval operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}, [we] should, based on the threat conditions from the enemy, do our best to make selections so that differing means are used to engage with the enemy operations' troop strengths {*bingli*} at differing spaces, differing levels, and differing sea areas of the naval battlefield; so that the operational actions of [our] various troop strengths {*bingli*} draw on each other's strong points to offset their own weak points; and so that they form optimal combinations, getting the best integrated benefits.

Second, equipment [should be] excellent, and training [should] have a solid foundation. When selecting combatant troop strengths {*canzhan bingli*}, [we] should do our best to select troop strengths {*bingli*} whose equipment is relatively new, who are for the most part in fairly good condition {*wanhao lyu jiao gao*}, whose achievements in academic training are excellent, and who have undergone tactical and academic training, so that naval operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} can have the ability to carry out joint operations using differing forms and means of operations {*butong zuozhan xingzhi he shouduan*}, within differing forms of operations {*zai butong de zuozhan yangshi zhong*}.

(3) Support capabilities must correspond with operational capabilities {*baozhang nengli you yu zuozhan nengli xiang shiying*}

In naval operations, the widespread use of large numbers of high-tech weapons has made actions to seize local command of the air, command of the sea, and command of electromagnetics more complex and difficult. Consumption of materials and technical equipment has increased to an unprecedented degree, and this has placed even greater demands on support to naval operations. Naval operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} not only should have operational capabilities that match their missions, but they also need to have overall support capabilities that correspond with their operational capabilities, so that these complement each other and achieve optimal economic benefits and military benefits.

The first is that support troop strengths {*baozhang bingli*} must make up a suitable proportion of naval operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}. When determining the task organization of naval operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}, it is necessary to maintain a suitable ratio of support troop strengths {*baozhang bingli*} to assault troop strengths {*tuji bingli*}, so that these form an optimal combination. The experiences of modern local wars have proven that naval operations rely very heavily on various types of support; without support troop strengths {*baozhang bingli*} that complement {*xiang peitao*}

assault troop strengths {*tuji bingli*}, it would be difficult to truly bring into play the role of the assault troop strengths {*tuji bingli*}. The ratio of support troop strengths {*baozhang bingli*} to assault troop strengths {*tuji bingli*} is not invariable; it is related to such factors as the functions of the troop strengths {*bingli*}, whether the sea area of operations is near or far, and the asymmetry of the forms of operations. Usually, the types and numbers of support troop strengths {*baozhang bingli*} should be determined centered on the needs of the missions that the assault troop strengths {*tuji bingli*} are carrying out, so that these maintain balance in their dynamic situation.

The second is the need for various types of support troop strengths {*baozhang bingli*} and fairly advanced means of support. In naval operations, support troop strengths {*baozhang liliang*} carry out support missions under complex and variable battlefield conditions; support missions are strenuous and arduous, very strongly time-effective, with a great deal of fluidity, and with low survival capabilities. Under these conditions, it is difficult for a single support strength {*baozhang liliang*} and for backwards means of support to complete missions. Therefore, when determining maritime support strengths {*haishang baozhang liliang*}, the support troop strengths {*baozhang bingli*} that [we] select for combat should have a fairly large number of support means and have relatively advanced functions, in order to meet the needs that the main direction of operations at sea and important stages or occasions have for support troop strengths {*baozhang bingli*}. [We] should [also] select some support troop strengths {*baozhang bingli*} with strong mobility to participate in combat, in order to meet the needs of operations.

II. Forms of task organization {*biancheng fangshi*}...69

Naval campaign groups are the basic form of task organization for naval strengths {*haijun liliang*} in joint operations. They primarily include naval fleets and naval campaign joint formations.

(1) Naval fleets {*haijun jiandui*}

Naval fleets are a high-level campaign large formation of the navy, and they come under the dual command of the theater of war and of the Central Military Commission and the navy. Naval fleets are responsible for mobile operations at sea, coastal defense operations, and everyday combat activities along a given strategic direction. They have the ability to complete important campaign missions, independently or in cooperation with other services and service arms. The task organizations of naval fleets are not fixed; in wartime, they can be appropriately modified by the Central Military Commission and the navy based on such factors as the operational mission, the strategic status of the sea area where they are located, and the natural geographical conditions of the sea area. But their task organizations generally include a number of support bases, a number of submarine detachments, a number of destroyer detachments, and a number of escort groups {*huweijian dadui*}; a number of aviation troops divisions (or regiments), and coastal defense troops units {*an fang bing budui*} and various specialized service units

{*budui*} (or elements). In addition, the fleets along certain directions also have a number of marine brigades.

(2) Naval campaign joint formations {*haijun zhanyi lianhe biandui*}

Naval campaign joint formations are the basic campaign large formation of the navy; they are campaign units that are temporarily decided on and organized by the upper echelon in order to complete a given campaign mission. Naval campaign joint formations usually are organized using troop strengths {*bingli*} transferred from a naval fleet and that complete a campaign mission along a campaign direction within the area under the fleet's jurisdiction, either independently or with the support of other services and service arms. The task organizations of naval campaign joint formations usually are determined specifically in accordance with differences in the enemy situation, the mission, and the direction of operations; they normally can be divided into two types: mobile operations and coastal operations.

Campaign joint formations of the mobile operations type usually are primarily made up of the naval fleet's mobile operations troop strengths {*jidong zuozhan bingli*}; they are responsible for mobile operational missions in fairly distant sea areas.

Campaign joint formations of the coastal operations type normally emphasize coastal defense strengths {*jin'an fangyu liliang*}; they are reinforced by appropriate mobile troop strengths {*jidong bingli*} sent out by the naval fleet, and they are responsible for operational missions in coastal sea areas.

Section 2: Primary Missions {*zhuyao renwu*}...70

I. Basic missions that naval strengths in joint operations undertake {*lianhe zuozhan haijun liliang danfu de jiben renwu*}...70

The missions of the navy in joint operations usually are determined by the joint operations' command organization, based on the needs of the overall mission of the joint operations and on the operational characteristics and capabilities of the naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*}. The forms of joint operations differ, and the missions that the navy undertakes also have some differences; under normal conditions, naval troop strengths can take on the following basic missions in joint operations.

(1) Carrying out reconnaissance at sea {*shishi haishang zhencha*}

[The term] reconnaissance at sea refers to various measures that are taken to obtain intelligence needed for naval operations. Its goal is ascertain enemy conditions, the battlefield situation, and the results of operations along naval direction, in order to provide a basis for the commander to make timely and accurate decisions and to command operations.

(2) Seizing and holding command of the sea {*duoqu he baochi zhihaiquan*}

Seizing and holding command of the sea is control over the entire sea area of operations or over the main sea area of operations that the naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} who are participating in the joint operations [exercise] during a certain period of time, with the assistance and cooperation of other service and service arm units {*budui*}. Its goal is to ensure that [our] own side's naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} have freedom of action in operations, while depriving enemy naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} of freedom of action in operations; to ensure that [our] own side's traffic lines at sea are unimpeded, while preventing enemy traffic and transportation at sea; and to create favorable conditions for the security of ground forces' coastal flanks and for the movement of troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons at sea.

(3) Carrying out naval blockade operations {*shishi haishang fengsuo zuozhan*}

[The term] naval blockades refers to offensive operational actions by naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*}, based on the intentions of the commander of joint operations, where they flexibly utilize many forms of blockade to control specific sea areas or routes at sea, and to sever military and economic contacts between the outside world and the enemy's coasts and islands. Their goal is to isolate a given enemy sea area or island, to cut off his traffic and transportation at sea, and to deprive him of materials, weaken his actual strength, and shake his will, in order to force the enemy to submit.

(4) Protecting traffic and transportation at sea {*baohu haishang jiaotong yunshu*}

[The term] protecting traffic and transportation at sea refers to operational actions that naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} carry out with the support and cooperation of other services and service arms within a limited space, in order to ensure the security of traffic and transportation at sea that have strategic and campaign significance; they are aimed at the enemy's destructive {*po jiao*} action. Their goal is to ensure the security of ships as they sail, transporting [goods and troops] at specific times within the sea area.

(5) Participating in operations to seize command of information {*canjia duoqu zhi xinxi quan zuozhan*}

[The term] participating in operations to seize command of information refers to operations by naval information warfare strengths {*xinxi zuozhan liliang*} to seize command of information on the naval battlefield or coastal land battlefield, under the unified planning and command of the joint operations command organization. Their goal is to degrade the ability of the enemy to collect, transmit, process, and utilize information in an effective manner within the scope of time and space of the operations, while simultaneously ensuring that [our] own side possesses these capabilities.

(6) Participating in operations to seize command of the air {*canjia duoqu zhi kongquan zuozhan*}

[The term] participating in operations to seize command of the air refers to naval troop strengths' {*haijun bingli*} seizing control of a certain airspace during a given period of time, in active cooperation with air force aviation troops and using naval aviation troops, under the unified intentions of the joint operations commander. Their goal is to restrict the operational actions of enemy aviation troops in an effective manner, to ensure the freedom of action of [our] own aviation troops, and to provide effective aerial shielding for operational actions at sea or on land.

(7) Participating in joint firepower assaults against coasts {*canjia dui an lianhe huoli tuji*}

[The term] participating in joint firepower assaults against coasts refers to naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} using the integrated firepower of the navy to actively cooperate with the assault strengths of other services and service arms, under the unified intentions of the commander of joint operations, to assault important enemy coastal targets. Their goal is to destroy enemy naval bases, ports, and important targets on land that have strategic or campaign significance.

(8) Participating in landing operations {*canjia denglu zuozhan*}

[The term] participating in landing operations refers to offensive operations that naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} carry out using naval transportation strengths {*haishang yunshu liliang*} and naval operations formations, in coordination with other service and service arm units {*budui*}, under the unified intentions of the commander of joint island-landing operations, against an enemy who is defending the island coasts. Their goal is to transport, support, and shield landing forces as these [carry out] assaults and landings.

(9) Participating in defensive operations for coastal key areas {*canjia yanhai yaodi fangwei zuozhan*}

[The term] participating in defensive operations for coastal key areas refers to defensive operations that integrate defense and counterattack and that naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} carry out in cooperation with other services' and service arms' strengths {*liliang*}, under the unified intentions of the joint operations commander, as they use naval transportation strengths {*haishang yunshu liliang*} and naval operations formations in order to destroy assaults or blockades that the enemy is carrying out against our important coastal targets. Their goal is to defeat enemy intentions to annihilate or blockade our coastal key areas and to defend the security of important targets in our coastal key areas.

II. Specific missions of the various service arms of naval strengths in joint operations {*lianhe zuozhan haijun liliang ge bingzhong juti renwu*}...72

Naval combatant strengths {*haijun canzhan liliang*} in joint operations usually consist of units {*budui*} from the various service arms of the navy and of specialized service units {*zhuan ye qinwu budui*}. The navy's service arms are basically differentiated based on the spaces and environments of the various troops strengths' {*bingli*} operational activities and on the characteristics of their use in combat; [these arms] include surface ship units {*shuimian jianting budui*}, submarine units {*qianting budui*}, aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*}, coastal defense units {*anfang bing budui*}, and marines. The navy's specialized service units {*zhuan ye qinwu budui*} are units {*budui*} that are used in carrying out specialized missions that support the navy's operational actions and everyday combat activities; they include units {*budui*} (or elements) for reconnaissance, observation, communications, engineering, logistics, repairs, chemical defense, electronic warfare, navigational surveys, preventing risk {*fang xian*} and rescuing, and hydrology and meteorology. The navy's various service arms have a certain amount of operations capabilities, but it is hard for most of them to independently carry out the naval missions that are assigned to them by the command organization of joint operations; the various service arms must cooperate with one another and jointly carry [these missions] out. Consequently, they should be given appropriate missions, based on the functions and characteristics of the various service arms of the navy, in order to bring into play their maximum operational effectiveness.

(1) Missions for surface ship units {*shuimian jianting budui de renwu*}

There are many types of surface ships, they are very capable of continuing combat activities, and they have fairly strong assault power. Their main missions are to assault enemy combat ships (or formations), to assault enemy landing ships (or formations) and transport vessels (or formations), to support submarines as these enter and leave bases and deploy, to search for and attack enemy submarines, to transport and shield landing troops as these cross and land, to support and shield ground forces' units {*lujun budui*} along coastal directions, to lay mines and sweep mines, and to patrol and [give] warnings. In addition, they also can carry out such missions as reconnaissance, saving lives, and transporting personnel and materials.

(2) Missions for submarine units {*qianting budui de renwu*}

Submarines have excellent concealment, and their radius of operations and their assault power are relatively great. However, observation and communications are not easy for them. They usually can undertake the following missions: carrying out reconnaissance, attacking enemy transport vessels (or formations) and landing formations, attacking medium and large-scale enemy surface ships (or formations), attacking enemy submarines, and destroying enemy bases, ports, and important coastal targets. In addition, they also can carry out such missions as minelaying, patrols, transporting personnel and materials, and rescuing pilots who have ditched over water.

(3) Missions for aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui de renwu*}

Naval aviation troops have excellent mobile capabilities and fierce assault power, and they have varied means of operations. Their principal missions are to assault enemy surface ships (or formations); to assault enemy bases, ports, and important coastal targets; to support and shield the combat actions of other naval service arms; to search for and attack enemy submarines; to shield naval bases and ports; to lay naval mine obstacles; and to carry out campaign and tactical reconnaissance and to guide troop strengths {*bingli*} as these make assaults. In addition, they can also carry out such missions as early warning, patrols, minesweeping, transportation, rescue at sea, electronic warfare, and delivering landing troops as these land.

(4) Missions for coastal defense troops {*anfang bing de renwu*}

Coastal defense troops consist of coastal missile units {*hai'an daodan budui*} and coastal artillery units {*hai'an paobing budui*}. They have fairly great assault power and a fairly strong ability to keep on fighting. Their defensive fortifications are solid but their locations are relatively fixed, so it is easy for the enemy to attack their positions. Their principal missions are to protect naval bases and important coastal targets, to shield coastal traffic lanes at sea, to assist ships [engaged] in coastal activities, to seal off off-shore channels, and to support the operations of units {*budui*} defending islands and coasts.

(5) Missions for the marines corps {*luzhandui de renwu*}

The marine corps consists of various troop strengths, such as marines infantry, armored troops, artillery troops, engineering troops, communications troops, chemical defense troops, missile troops, and amphibious reconnaissance troops, as well as specialized service elements such as hovercraft and helicopters. They have a fairly strong composite nature, [fairly strong] mobility, and [a fairly strong] amphibious nature. Their principal missions are to carry out landing [operations] and anti-landing operations on islands and reefs that are distant from continental shores, in a relatively independent manner [but] with the assistance of other service arms; in landing operations, they act as advance elements for assaulting the land; they participate in defending naval bases and important sections of the coast; and they carry out special operational missions.

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Chapter 3

The Guiding Thought and Basic Principles of Naval Operations in Joint Operations...74

Section 1: The Guiding Thought for Operations {*zuozhan zhidao sixiang*}...74

The guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} for naval operations in joint operations is a consummate summary of the laws that guide naval operations in joint operations as well as the basic foundation for organizing and carrying out naval operations in joint operations. Therefore, establishing correct guiding thought for operations {*zuozhan zhidao sixiang*} has very important significance.

In accordance with the program of military strategy in the new period and with the basic thought for the PRC military's joint operations, with an eye on the objective realities of the PRC's navy, and focused on the characteristics of naval operations in joint operations and on the new issues that [these operations] face, [we] should abide by the guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} of “integrated mobile operations” {*zhengti jidong zuozhan*} as regards guidance for operations, in order to win victory in naval operations. This guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} includes two basic key points, which are “integrated operations” {*zhengti zuozhan*} and “mobile operations” {*jidong zuozhan*}.

I. The connotations of “integrated operations” guiding thought and the key points for carrying it out {“*zhengti zuozhan*” *zhidao sixiang de neihan ji luoshi yaodian*}...74

[The term] integrated operations {*zhengti zuozhan*} refers to the need to be skilled at being closely centered on strategic intentions and the goals of the joint operations when organizing and carrying out naval operations in joint operations, to combining the various key factors of the operation in an integrated manner, to fusing these into a closely combined whole, and to winning victory through bringing integrated power into play.

In implementing and carrying out the guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} of “integrated operations” {*zhengti zuozhan*}, [we] should be skilled at organizing operations where naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} are closely coordinated with the troop strengths {*bingli*} of other services and service arms and with naval militia that support and cooperate with the operations. Moreover, [we should] form a system of integrated strengths {*yitihua liliang*} that can supplement each other's superiorities and that can bring optimal benefits into play, through scientifically organizing the various types of troop strengths {*bingli*}. [We should] closely combine the naval battlefield with the land battlefield and the air battlefield; [we should] carry out a rational distribution on the naval battlefield longitudinally – coastal, white water, and blue water; horizontally – the main direction and the secondary directions; and vertically – the surface, underwater, the seabed, and the air - forming an integrated battlefield structure [whose elements] can cooperate with one another and support one another. [We should] combine and use in an integrated manner mobile warfare at sea {*haishang jidong zhan*} with guerilla warfare at

sea {*haishang youji zhan*} and positional warfare in offshore sea areas {*jin'an haiyu zhendi zhan*}, [as regards] forms of operations at sea; [we should combine] offensive operations at sea with defensive operations at sea, [as regards] the types of operations; and [we should combine] hard kill (missile warfare, torpedo warfare, and naval mines warfare) with soft kill (electronic warfare, information warfare, and psychological warfare), as regards means of operations, to form integrated operational actions and integrated attack power.

II. The connotations of “mobile operations” guiding thought and the key points for carrying it out {“*jidong zuozhan*” *zhidao sixiang de neihan ji luoshi yaodian*}...75

[The term] mobile warfare {*jidong zuozhan*} refers to the need to correctly understand the objective conditions of the enemy and of ourselves when organizing and carrying out naval operations in joint operations, and engage in combat with the enemy using the strategy and tactics of flexible operations, proceeding from bringing into play our advantages and containing the enemy while not being contained by him.

In implementing and carrying out the “mobile operations” {*jidong zuozhan*} guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*}, it is necessary to be skilled at going after what helps while avoiding what harms, by means of wide-ranging movements, and using mobile naval warfare {*haishang jidong zhan*} as the main form of operations. [It is necessary] to move superior troop strengths {*bingli*} forward to the outer lines of campaign combat in order to engage in rapid offensive warfare against the enemy. [Finally,] it is necessary to flexibly but cleverly utilize stratagems; so be skilled at using feints, camouflage, and other measures to confuse the enemy and throw him into disorder; and to seize opportunities that the enemy is not aware of or where actions are out of balance to launch surprise attacks against him.

The above two points reflect from differing aspects the essence of the guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} of naval operations in joint operations. They are a closely connected, unified body. What “integrated operations” {*zhengti zuozhan*} stresses is the rational combination of the various key factors in operations, forming an integrated pool of efforts; what “mobile operations” {*jidong zuozhan*} stresses is bringing the energy of operations fully into play through the cleverly combined use of mobile warfare and stratagems.

Section 2: The Basic Principles of Operations {*zuozhan jiben yuanze*}...76

[The term] basic principles {*jiben yuanze*} of naval operations {*haijun zuozhan*} in combined operations refers to the criteria that guide preparations for and operational actions in naval operations in joint operations. They are the action criteria and general requirements for the naval commander as he correctly executes operational command and battlefield control and as he holds the battlefield initiative. Because the battlefield conditions of future joint operations will be complex and variable, the process of operations may exhibit many possibilities, due to many random factors; thus, it is

necessary to have a correct grasp of principles and to be flexible in utilizing those principles.

Based on the overall needs of joint operations, and combining the characteristics of naval operations with the realities of China's navy, naval operations in joint operations should determine {*ying queding*} the following basic principles.

I. Active offense {*jiji jin'gong*}...76

Given the characteristics that naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} have of mobility and offense, and given the battlefield environment of the naval battlefield, which is boundless and which has no place that is hard to access and that can be defended {*wu xian ke shou*}, the goals of naval operations often must be achieved through offensive measures, in order to destroy enemy ships and other campaign and tactical targets. In naval operations in joint operations, actively carrying out offensive actions is not only required in order to bring the characteristics of naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} into play, but it is also necessary to order to gain the initiative in operations. Even in defensive operations, the navy also needs to proceed using the form of active offense.

The basic form of operations by which the PRC naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} use offensive operations to achieve the goals of the operations is attacks by concentrated troop strengths {*jizhong bingli*} and sabotage by small groups of troop strengths {*xiao bingli qun*}. Concentrated attacks at sea means concentrating superior troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons under favorable conditions to carry out rapid offensive warfare against the outer lines of the enemy. Carrying out these kinds of operations generally requires selecting favorable opportunities, sea regions, and objectives; under the premise of being fully prepared, [it involves] wide-ranging mobility, appearing where the enemy does not expect it, and quick decisions and the destruction of the enemy. Sabotage by small groups of troop strengths {*xiao bingli qun*} is a form of operations that uses small groups of troop strengths {*xiao bingli qun*} with the goal of harassing, destroying, and consuming the enemy over broad sea areas. They have fairly large flexibility and initiative, and they are a form of naval operations under conditions where the enemy is strong and we are weak. Although concentrated attacks and widespread sabotage have differing statuses and roles in naval operations, they are identical in that they manifest an offensive nature. In naval operations in joint operations, [we] should flexibly determine which of them is primary and which is secondary, based on the actual conditions of the battlefield and on the needs of the operational process, and closely combine the two forms, have them create [the proper] conditions for each other, and switch [from one to the other] at the proper time, so that the naval operations in joint operations will always maintain the sharp potential {*rui shi*} for an offensive that they should have and so that they always hold the battlefield initiative.

II. Taking the initiative to cooperate {zhudong peihe}...77

Taking the initiative to cooperate {zhudong peihe} is the soul of joint operations. The various services and service arms that are involved in joint operations each have their own specialties and advantages; only by basing themselves on an awareness of cooperating to actively take the initiative is it possible to bring the superiority of joint operations into play. Based on the needs of developments in joint operations, at a stage in the joint operations where other battlefields are the main [battlefields], naval troop strengths {haijun bingli} should actively take the initiative to cooperate through forceful operational actions and [providing] support by troop strengths {bingli zhiyuan}; when the joint operations are at a stage where the naval battlefield is the main [battlefield], the navy should actively take the initiative to get support and cooperation from the other services and service arms. Only in this way is it possible to truly bring into play the power of joint operations by the various services and service arms and to seize victory in joint operations. In operations, the various services and service arms should share battlefield intelligence information resources among themselves, and within the navy, the various groups of troop strengths {bingli jiguan} should also do this. The various operational actions and firepower assaults at sea should support and cooperate with one another. [Finally,] the various support capabilities should support one another.

III. Integrated coordination {zhengti xietiao}...77

Integrated coordination {zhengti xietiao} is the concrete manifestation of the idea of “integrated operations” {zhengti zuozhan} in joint operations. In naval operations in future joint operations, under conditions where the enemy is superior to us in the overall technological levels of his weapons and equipment, we will only be able to overcome each problem, expand the enemy’s weak points, and attack the enemy in an effective manner by closely combining the various strengths {liliang} that are involved in naval operations, by comprehensively utilizing the various forms of operations and means of operations, and by fully bringing into play the integrated power of joint operations.

The principle of integrated coordination {zhengti xietiao} is not only widely used in the operational and support actions of the various naval service arms that participate in combat, but it is also suitable for use in operational and support actions by the navy and by the other services and service arms that are involved in joint operations. To achieve integrated coordination {zhengti xietiao} in naval operations in joint operations, it is first necessary to scientifically organize troop strengths {bingli}. Scientifically organize the various kinds of troop strengths {bingli} that are participating in naval operations, based on the needs of the operational mission and on the characteristics of the various troop strengths {bingli}, and seek the maximum operational effectiveness of all of the naval operations’ troop strengths {bingli}. Second, it is necessary to establish an integrated battlefield structure, and to rationally assign missions to the various groups of troop strengths {bingli jituan}. Do a thorough job of handling the relationships between the main mission and the secondary mission, between troop strengths on the water’s surface {shuimian bingli} and air troop strengths {kongzhong bingli}, between assault troops

strengths {*tuji bingli*} and support troop strengths {*baozhang bingli*}, between naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} and sea militia, and among the differing sea areas of operations and the main and secondary directions of operations, so as to bring into play the overall superiorities of naval operations' strengths {*liliang*} as much as possible. Third, it is necessary to adopt operational actions that are coordinated together. At the same time that coordination is being organized, it is necessary to correctly understand the operational capabilities of the troop strengths involved in combat {*canzhan bingli*}, to correctly evaluate the various objective conditions that affect operational actions, and to clearly specify the sequence of actions by the various troop strengths {*bingli*} and the methods by which they cooperate with one another. When cooperation becomes imbalanced or is destroyed, [you] should quickly adjust and restore it. Fourth, it is necessary to comprehensively utilize the various forms of operations and means of operations. Throughout the entire process of naval operations, [you] should closely combine concentrated attacks with broad-ranging sabotage, under favorable conditions, and [you should] comprehensively utilize means of hard and soft kills, such as missile warfare, electronic warfare, artillery warfare, naval mine warfare, aviation raid warfare, weather warfare, and psychological warfare, based on differing conditions on the battlefield, forming comprehensive attack power.

IV. Concealment and surprise {*yinbi turan*}...78

Achieving surprise is an important means for naval operations in joint operations to use what is inferior to defeat what is superior. Through taking actions where [our troops] appear where the enemy does not expect it and where they are hidden and a surprise, they can cause disarray among the enemy, so that he does not know what to do and loses the ability to organize resistance and [so that he] cannot bring into play the effectiveness of his technical equipment. This will create a situation where we have local superiority and initiative, and we will gain a major victory at a small cost. In naval operations under modern conditions, the rhythm of assault is extremely fast, and the side that comes under a sudden attack will very rarely have time to recover his equilibrium and to organize a counterattack. This makes the role of surprise even more prominent in naval operations.

In naval operations in future joint operations, modern naval troop strengths' {*haijun bingli*} ability to move at high speeds and their ability for long-range attacks will on the one hand provide operations with favorable conditions for achieving surprise; on the other hand, the use of various kinds of advanced reconnaissance technologies will make it more difficult for naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} to carry out concealed movements. The technological conditions for achieving surprise and for curtailing surprise are developing almost simultaneously in naval operations, so that struggling for and creating surprise in naval operations is determined more and more by command skills. Achieving surprise requires careful planning and complete preparations; [it requires] adopting various means, concealing intentions, and confusion and deception; and [it requires] being skilled at creating and seizing opportunities for battle.

V. Complete preparations {*chongfen zhunbei*}...78

Complete preparations {*chongfen zhunbei*} are an important condition by which naval operations in joint operations get the initiative and victory. Someone who is superior but is not prepared and who hastily meets an enemy attack when that [attack] happens will inevitably be trapped on the defensive and will lose his superiority. Someone who is inferior but is prepared often can defeat an enemy who is superior but is not prepared. In naval operations in joint operations under informationized conditions, the situation is complex and variable, there is increased surprise and destructiveness, and in order to subdue the enemy, it is more necessary to be completely prepared and to have comprehensive support. Therefore, naval operations in joint operations must carefully organize preparations, have thorough and comprehensive support, and must try to have a greater mastery of victory given the actual conditions of the ratio between the enemy's and our strengths {*liliang*}. To do this, [we] must continually reconnoiter and collect intelligence, correctly analyze and evaluate the situation, and meticulously plan and organize naval operations. Taking into consideration the most complex and most difficult situations, [we must] draft many scenarios and be greatly prepared in advance. [We must] concentrate troop strengths {*bingli*} in a concealed manner and prepare the battlefield. [We must] carry out political mobilization and training on the verge of war, in a highly effective way. [Finally, we must] comprehensively organize support to operations and [must] stockpile materials.

VI. Be flexible and resourceful {*linghuo duomou*}...79

Flexibility and resourcefulness {*linghuo duomou*} are the concentrated manifestation of command skills, as well as a core requirement for command in naval operations in joint operations. Someone who is resourceful {*duomou*} but arbitrary will win, while someone who is courageous but has no stratagems will lose; this had been repeatedly proven in the practice of warfare. In operations, the more that an army has troop strengths {*bingli*} that are weak and has equipment that is poor, the more it needs to bring into play as much as possible the intelligence of commanders at each echelon, so that non-material factors will be transformed into material strengths {*wuzhi liliang*}, creating the conditions [necessary] for victory in operations. In naval operations in future joint operations, we may have operations against a powerful enemy; conditions where the enemy is strong and we are weak, along with naval battlefield conditions that are complex and variable, will require the commander to bring into play exceptional command skills, to widely apply military strategy, and [to have] clever tactics.

Flexibility {*linghuo*} is the need to flexibly use troop strengths {*bingli*}, to flexibly change combat methods, to flexibly utilize firepower, and to flexibly change plans. Resourcefulness {*duomou*} is the need to be discerning, to have keen insight, to be resourceful {*cuzhiduomou*}, to have courage and knowledge, and to make prompt decisions. Flexibility and resourcefulness {*linghuo duomou*} are established on the basis of a comprehensive grasp of the situation, an understanding of the enemy's and our characteristics, and [an understanding] of the natural geographical conditions of the

operational sea area. They require the commander to have excellent thinking qualities and fairly high campaign and tactical accomplishments. Commanders at each echelon must strengthen their training and fostering of stratagems in peacetime and must have a comprehensive grasp of the situation in wartime, so that they know themselves and know the enemy, and so that they adapt their stratagems to the enemy {*yin di shi mou*}.

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Chapter 4

Command Organizations for Naval Operations in Joint Operations...79

A headquarters for the naval operations group is usually set up for naval operations in joint operations. The headquarters of the naval operations group is the core organization for carrying out comprehensive command and control over naval operations. Based on the scale of operations and the mission of operations, it can be established by forward command sent by the Central Military Commission and the navy, but it can also be established based on a naval fleet. The headquarters of the naval operations group is composed of the commander and his command organ. The primary commander is named or assigned by the upper echelon, and the command organ is established on the principles of it being elite and highly effective. The function of the headquarters of the naval operations group is based on the intentions of the joint operations headquarters; it is specifically responsible for organizing and carrying out naval operations. [These responsibilities] primarily include: making decisions about naval operations, drafting a naval plan of operations, organizing naval units {*haijun budui*} to carry out training prior to war, and controlling and coordinating naval operations.

In order to facilitate command and maintain the stability of command, the headquarters of the naval operations group usually sets up a basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*}, a reserve command post {*yubei zhihuisuo*}, and a rear area command post {*houfang zhihuisuo*}. When necessary, it can also establish a command post for the direction {*fangxiang zhihuisuo*} and a special command post {*zhuanxiang zhihuisuo*}.

Section 1: Basic Command Post {*jiben zhihuisuo*}...80

The basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} is the command center for naval operations; it consists of the commander and the political commissar as well as the relevant leaders and relevant personnel of the headquarters, political department, logistics department, and equipment department, in addition to commanders or representatives of the other services and service arms that are allocated to them and that support them.

The basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} exercises comprehensive command over naval operations; its primary duties are to keep abreast of and report on conditions in the theater of war, to control the actions of the various troop strength groups {*bingli jituan*} of the navy, to guide the various troop strength groups {*bingli jituan*} in entering the area of operations, to order reserve forces to enter combat at the appropriate time, to determine the actions of the various troop strength groups {*bingli jituan*} after they complete their predetermined missions, and to organize the shielding of operations and the support of operations.

Section 2: Reserve Command Post {yubei zhihuisuo}...80

The reserve command post {yubei zhihuisuo} is a reserve command organization that is set up in advance to replace the command mission of the basic command post {jiben zhihuisuo} when the situation requires it. It usually consists of the naval deputy commander and necessary staff, workers {ganshi}, and service and support personnel. When the basic command post {jiben zhihuisuo} has been destroyed and loses its command function, or when the basic command post {jiben zhihuisuo} is being shifted, command should be switched to the reserve command post {yubei zhihuisuo}, in order to ensure stable and continuous command. The reserve command post {yubei zhihuisuo} should be set up at the same time as the basic command post {jiben zhihuisuo}, and they should establish constant communications contact. Prior to it receiving an order to take over the command mission, it does not exercise actual command over units {budui}; it only receives situation reports. It launches necessary tasks that are synchronized with those of the basic command post {jiben zhihuisuo}, in order to be prepared to take over command at anytime. Based on the needs of the situation, prior to replacing the basic command post {jiben zhihuisuo} in carrying out overall command, the reserve command post {yubei zhihuisuo} also can assume certain local command missions, based on instructions from the basic command post {jiben zhihuisuo}.

Section 3: Rear Area Command Post {houfang zhihuisuo}...80

The rear area command post {houfang zhihuisuo} is a command organization that is set up to organize and carry out the various items of rear area work for naval operations. It usually is the responsibility of a naval deputy commander who is in charge of rear area work, and it is jointly organized with the participation of relevant personnel from the command and political organs as well as local organizations that support the front, with an emphasis on naval logistics and equipment organs. Its command activities primarily include logistics support, technical support, traffic and transportation, equipment repair, rear area defense, and the unified coordination of these various tasks.

Section 4: Command Posts for the Direction {fangxiang zhihuisuo}...81

Command posts for directions {fangxiang zhihuisuo} are established as the situation [requires]; when necessary, they are used to reinforce command along the primary direction. They are an organization that is sent by the basic command post {jiben zhihuisuo} to a given direction. They usually consist of a deputy naval commander with a small number of elite personnel. Sometimes, it is also possible to assign the commander of a given troop strength group {bingli jituan} to be responsible [for this command post].

Section 5: Special Command Posts {zhuanxiang zhihuisuo}...81

The special command post {zhuanxiang zhihuisuo} is established for service arm units {bingzhong budui} or troop strength groups {bingli jituan} who have special needs and

command systems. For example, it is necessary to carry out special command and support for aviation troops and submarines that are used in a concentrated manner, adopting special means of command and control means. Special command posts {*zhuanxiang zhihuisuo*} generally are set up [in areas] where the troop strengths {*bingli*} under its command are stationed or in areas where they are concentrated. [The posts] come under the direct command of the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*}, and they usually consist of the commander of this unit {*budui*} or troop strength group {*bingli jituan*} and his organ. When the troop strengths {*bingli*} that require specialized command are few, and the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} can command two or more things, it is also possible to set up a relevant specialized command position within the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*}, in order to reduce the levels of command.

In order to make command easier and to complete various differing operational missions, several command posts for naval troop strength groups {*haijun bingli jiqun*} are set up based on deployments in operations, under the headquarters of the naval operation group. These send naval operations teams or representatives to the ground forces, the air force, and the Second Artillery [units] at corresponding levels of operations. [They also] send naval teams for guiding targets to ground forces' units {*lujun budui*} that receive direct support from naval aviation and shipborne firepower, in order to strengthen the command and regulation and control of intermediate links.

Command posts of naval operations groups can be differentiated into coastal command posts and command posts at sea, in accordance with the location where they are set up. Under current conditions, basic command posts {*jiben zhihuisuo*}, reserve command posts {*yubei zhihuisuo*}, rear area command posts {*houfang zhihuisuo*}, command posts for directions {*fangxiang zhihuisuo*}, and special command posts {*zhuanxiang zhihuisuo*} generally are set up in coastal areas that are convenient for exercising overall command and for defense; they have their operational positions all in readiness as well as all the means of command [that are necessary]. Command posts at sea are set up so that the commander has a timely grasp of the naval battlefield situation and [can] exercise direct command over operations at sea. They usually are set up on surface ships that are very seaworthy, that have complete equipment for observation and communications, and that have strong defensive capabilities. Given their limitations because of equipment's technical conditions, command posts at sea currently are usually used as auxiliary command organizations for coastal command posts, and they primarily consist of a deputy senior naval officer and a small number of personnel from organs. It is also possible to appoint the commander of the main operations troop strength group {*bingli jiqun*} to be in charge.

Of these various command posts, only the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} and the reserve command post {*yubei zhihuisuo*}, which [can] replace the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} in exercising command, can exercise overall command of naval operations. The various command posts should all designate acting commanders for special situations.

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Chapter 5

The Major Operational Actions of the Navy in Joint Operations...82

In joint operations, combatant naval troop strengths {*haijun liliang*} will carry out many kinds of operational actions {*zuo-zhan xingdong*} in order to complete the operational missions that they take on. Their main operational actions {*zuo-zhan xingdong*} will consist of: information warfare {*xinxi zuozhan*}, operations to attack groups of enemy troop strengths at sea {*jin'gong di haishang bingli jituan zuozhan*}, operations for blockades at sea {*haishang fengsuo zuozhan*}, offensive operations in coral reef regions {*shanhu dao-jiao qu jin'gong zuozhan*}, operations to defend naval bases {*haijun jidi fangyu zuozhan*}, and operations to protect traffic lanes at sea {*baohu haishang jiaotong xian zuozhan*}.

Section 1: Information Warfare {*xinxi zuozhan*}...82

Information warfare {*xinxi zuozhan*} is a series of interrelated information offensive {*xinxi jin'gong*} [actions], information defensive {*xinxi fangyu*} [actions], and information support {*xinxi zhiyuan*} actions that information warfare strengths {*xinxi zuozhan liliang*} that are subordinate to and reinforced by naval operational strengths {*haijun zuozhan liliang*} carry out in order to seize and hold information superiority at sea. Its primary missions are to organize and carry out early warnings at sea, reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance at sea, and jamming and counter-jamming; to organize and carry out focused attacks against important information targets like enemy early warning aircraft; and to organize and carry out various types of information support {*xinxi baozhang*}. The essence of naval information warfare {*haijun xinxi zuozhan*} is to achieve command of information for naval operations, in order to ensure that naval operations are smoothly carried out.

I. Organizing and carrying out information reconnaissance {*zuzhi shishi xinxi zhencha*}...82

[The term] information reconnaissance refers to the use of various probes, sensors, computer networks, and other means on land, at sea, underwater, in the air, and in space to obtain various types of information related to the battlefield, to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance against operational spaces, to carry out precision measurements and positioning of various targets that [we] intend to attack, and to surveil enemy deployments and activities, in order to provide information support {*xinxi baozhang*} for information offensives, operational command, weapons control, and other operational actions. Information reconnaissance begins in the preparations stage for operations, and it permeates the entire process of carrying out all operations. In organizing and carrying out information reconnaissance, it is necessary to make widespread use of various means and methods of reconnaissance, collecting information and intelligence in a comprehensive, timely, and accurate manner, in order to provide information support for our preparations for and execution of information operations.

The primary means of naval operations information reconnaissance consist of fully utilizing various types of reconnaissance satellites and space systems, such as radar imaging reconnaissance satellites, digital image transmission reconnaissance satellites, and weather satellites and ocean observation satellites, to carry out wide-ranging reconnaissance, to intercept various types of radio signals, and to reconnoiter enemy radio communications and radar facilities, in order to derive the various parameters of their radio signals as well as the accurate positions of their radio stations and radar stations. [It also consists of] carefully organizing the various types of reconnaissance aircraft to carry out battlefield reconnaissance and surveil the various operational activities of the enemy within the zone of operations, and of fully bringing into play the roles of the various electronic monitoring stations on land, at sea, and in the air, and of collecting relevant enemy intelligence.

II. Organizing and carrying out information offensives {*zuzhi shishi xinxi jin'gong*}...83

Information offensives {*xinxi jin'gong*} are a series of actions that are taken in accordance with unified intentions and plans, in order to weaken and destroy enemy information warfare capabilities {*xinxi zuozhan nengli*}. The primary methods of information offensives {*xinxi jin'gong*} consist of the following several types.

(1) Physical annihilation {*shiti cuihui*}

Concentrate elite air and sea assault strengths {*tuji liliang*} of a naval operations group to carry out precision attacks in a concealed and surprise manner against such important targets as enemy command and control systems, early warning probe systems, and communications nodes, in order to paralyze the enemy's command, early warning, and communications systems and weaken his information warfare capabilities {*xinxi zuozhan nengli*} to a maximum extent.

(2) Jamming and suppression {*ganrao yazhi*}

Comprehensively use electronic offensive strengths {*dianzi jin'gong liliang*} to carry out powerful active electronic suppression and jamming against such important electronic targets as the enemy's early warning aircraft, radar systems, communications systems, and weapons guidance systems, so that enemy communications are interrupted, command malfunctions, and control over weapons is lost.

(3) Network paralysis {*wangluo tanhuan*}

Comprehensively utilize the various means of network attacks to attack enemy computer networks, in order to paralyze them and destroy the normal operations of the enemy's command and operations systems.

III. Organizing and carrying out information defense {*zuzhi shishi xinxi fangyu*}...83

Information defense {*xinxi fangyu*} is comprehensive measures that are taken, under a unified plan of organization, to defend against enemy jamming and destruction of our information system, and to ensure that [our] own side uses information systems in an effective manner. The primary methods of information defense {*xinxi fangyu*} consist of the following several types.

(1) Countering enemy reconnaissance {*fan di zhencha*}

To control the emissions of electromagnetic waves, maintain radio silence when necessary, and protect against enemy detection; to control electromagnetic radiation, and use the terrain as well as manufactured and makeshift materials to cover up radiation; to use a concealed frequency {*yinbi pinlyu*} and change the frequency at the proper time and in an irregular manner; to move electronic equipment at the proper time; and to set up fake targets in order to cover up the real targets.

(2) Resisting enemy jamming {*kang di ganrao*}

Resisting enemy jamming includes technical resistance to jamming and tactical resistance to jamming. Technical resistance to jamming requires an optimized electronic system design, to enhance the reliability of the entire system under conditions of electronic jamming; [it requires] the use of new mechanisms and new designs to improve electronic equipment, and to enhance the ability of individual pieces of equipment to resist jamming; [it requires] strengthening work power {*gongzuo gonglyu*}; and [it requires] the use of new working frequency bands. Tactical resistance to jamming is the comprehensive use and changing of working frequencies, using many means of reconnaissance and communications in tandem, setting up covert radio stations and starting up the use of their equipment at the proper time, and enhancing the skills of the personnel operating the electronic equipment.

(3) Preventing enemy attacks {*fang di gongji*}

Use various technical and tactical means to prevent attacks against our electronic systems and equipment by enemy firepower and troop strengths, especially attacks by enemy anti-radiation weapons.

(4) Preventing enemy theft of secrets {*fang di qiemi*}

It is necessary to strengthen the protection of network systems, to assign specialists to take care of operational data, and to keep the enemy from intruding on, changing, or damaging [the data]; it is necessary to regularly check for viruses in information systems software and to adopt relevant security measures; and it is necessary to strictly control the scope and time limits for knowing secrets.

IV. Organizing and carrying out psychological warfare {*zuzhi shishi xinlizhan*}...84

[The term] psychological warfare {*xinlizhan*} refers to the struggle by both sides in the operation as they use psychological principles and adopt various special methods and means that do not [involve] armed force, in order to influence, restrain, and change the thinking, emotions, and acts of the enemy's military personnel through the effects of psychological factors, while at the same time strengthening and solidifying the mindset of [their] own side's personnel. Its goal is to weaken the enemy and strengthen ourselves psychologically, in order to create [favorable] conditions for seizing victory in operations.

Naval operations under modern information conditions are intense and brutal, and the combatant personnel undergo extreme psychological pressure. Psychological warfare {*xinlizhan*} has a great deal of influence on the operational decisions and the soldiers' morale {*junxin shiqi*} of both sides; its effects are increasing daily, its status is even more important, and it is an important form of operations in information warfare {*xinxi zuozhan*}.

Psychological warfare {*xinlizhan*} under modern conditions uses a great deal of high-tech means, and especially of advanced information technology. Its details and methods have been greatly enriched and developed. Psychological warfare {*xinlizhan*} is even more closely combined with political, diplomatic, and other operational actions; the subjects and objects of psychological warfare {*xinlizhan*} are diverse; and organizing and carrying [this warfare] out is more complex. For this reason, organizing and carrying out psychological warfare {*xinlizhan*} must keep an eye on the overall situation of the naval battlefield, be focused on the peculiarities and actual circumstances of the naval battlefield, and be planned in a unified manner.

(1) Carrying out psychological propaganda {*jinxing xinli xuanchuan*}

Fully bring into play the roles of the various modern media, launch a powerful public opinion offensive, exert influence upon the enemy intangibly through the various kinds of information dissemination, and use methods like emotional stimulation and psychological inducement to affect the enemy's emotions and acts, putting powerful psychological pressure upon the enemy and smashing the enemy's psychological defensive lines to the maximum extent [possible].

(2) Carrying out psychological swindles {*jinxing xinli qizha*}

Use the psychological weak points of the enemy's military and especially of his commander, as well as the weak points of his thinking and habits to deceive and confuse the enemy and to cause him to make errors in his judgments, decision, and actions.

(3) Carrying out psychological deterrence {*jinxing xinli weishe*}

Comprehensively use political, military, technological, and tactical means to intimidate the enemy. Increase psychological pressure on him, and create a psychology of dread in the enemy and even a collapse of his spirit, reducing his combat capabilities or [making him] lose these.

Section 2: Operations for Attacking Groups of Enemy Troop Strengths at Sea {*jin'gong di haishang bingli jituan zuozhan*}...85

Operations for attacking groups of enemy troop strengths at sea {*di haishang bingli jituan*} are mobile offensive operations that naval operational strengths {*haijun zuozhan liliang*} in joint operations carry out on the naval battlefield in order to achieve certain strategic and campaign goals, against groups of enemy troop strengths at sea {*haishang bingli jituan*} whose core is large- and medium-sized surface ships. Their primary missions are to concentrate main troop strengths {*bingli*} to attack groups of enemy troop strengths at sea {*di haishang bingli jituan*}, to quickly destroy or weaken the enemy's main operational strengths {*zhuyao zuozhan liliang*} at sea, and the change the state of the battlefield.

In operations to attack groups of enemy troop strengths at sea {*di haishang bingli jituan*}, we hold the initiative in starting the operation, but the enemy has strong mobility and it is fairly difficult to seize opportunities for battle; the process of assault actions is very short, and confrontation is intense; the sea area of operations is fairly far from our coast, and command, coordination, and support is very difficult; and the battlefield is very transparent, with a heavy threat from the enemy. Therefore, in organizing and carrying out operations to attack groups of enemy troop strengths at sea {*di haishang bingli jituan*}, it is necessary to carefully plan things, scientifically foresee developments in the situation, and make full preparations; to strengthen support for reconnaissance intelligence and keep abreast of battlefield conditions in real time; to actively create and seize opportunities for battle, strive to be concealed and sudden, and take the initiative to contain the enemy {*xianji zhi di*}; to correctly choose targets for attack, concentrate and use elite troop strengths {*bingli*}, and focus on attacks; and to combine active attacks with rigorous defense, using defense to assist in offense.

I. Organizing and carrying out intelligence reconnaissance {*zuzhi shishi qingbao zhencha*}...86

Naval operational strengths' {*zuozhan liliang*} operations to attack groups of enemy troop strengths at sea {*di haishang bingli jituan*} should carefully organize intelligence reconnaissance, and ascertain in a timely manner the key factors of task organization, deployments, and movement of the groups of enemy troop strengths at sea {*di haishang bingli jituan*}, as well as their patterns of activities. The intelligence reconnaissance for organizing attacks against groups of enemy troop strengths at sea {*di haishang bingli jituan*} should comprehensively utilize the various reconnaissance troop strengths

{*zhencha bingli*} and means of reconnaissance, carefully organize reconnaissance cooperation, carry out constant reconnaissance, and obtain in a timely and accurate fashion the intelligence needed for the operation.

II. Organizing and carrying out troop strength movements {*zuzhi shishi bingli jidong*}...86

Troop strength movements {*bingli jidong*} for attacking groups of enemy troop strengths at sea {*di haishang bingli jituan*} ordinarily include deploying for the movement and feigning movements. Deploying for the movement usually is done at the proper moment, based on the mission to be carried out, the direction of actions, the timing of the operational action, and the sea (or air) area, in order to ensure that the various combatant troop strengths {*canzhan bingli*} smoothly deploy and take positions for the attack. Feigned movements usually are done in a lifelike manner, based on the needs of the basic assault troop strengths' {*bingli*} operational actions, in order to create a battlefield fog and to maneuver and confuse the enemy, so that the enemy makes errors in his judgments and actions. During the course of movement, [we] should organize reliable cover and support, ensuring the security of the deployment action, and [we should] carry out continual command and control, staying abreast in real time of the positions and actions of troop strengths {*bingli*}. When discovering that there have been changes in the enemy situation, [we] should report this in a timely manner to the combatant troop strengths {*canzhan bingli*} and adjust the deployments of troop strengths {*bingli*} in a timely manner.

III. Organizing and carrying out troop strength assaults {*zuzhi shishi bingli tuji*}...86

In operations to attack groups of enemy troop strengths at sea {*di haishang bingli jituan*}, the commander and his [command] organ should keep a grasp on favorable opportunities for battle, concentrate strengths {*liliang*}, and launch a sudden and violent assault against the enemy, [all] based on the plan of operations.

Assaults on troop strengths {*bingli*} usually should be pressed from multiple directions and at multiple levels, carrying out a concentrated assault against predetermined targets. During the course of the assault, the commander and his [command] organ should have a comprehensive grasp of the process of operations, carefully coordinate the actions of the various troop strengths {*bingli*}, and handle battlefield situations in a timely manner; [they should] organize reliable cover and effective subsidiary assaults, blocking the enemy's possible reinforcements; based on the situation, [they should] use reserve forces, and actively expand on {*fazhan*} victory. When the offensive and defensive capabilities of the group of enemy troop strengths at sea {*di haishang bingli jituan*} are fairly strong, it is possible, based on the situation, to use various harassment activities and feints to wear out, consume, and disperse the enemy's troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons, throwing his defensive positions in to confusion and weakening his operational capabilities, and creating favorable conditions for a concentrated assault.

IV. Organizing and carrying out the dismantling of troop strengths {*zuzhi shishi bingli cheshou*}...87

After the mission of attacking the groups of enemy troop strengths at sea {*di haishang bingli jituan*} has been completed, the commander should firmly grasp the opportunity and command the various troop strengths {*bingli*} to withdraw from the battlefield in an orderly and rapid manner. During the course of dismantling [the troop strengths], he should organize reliable cover as well as support that protects against danger and saves lives {*fang xian jiusheng baozhang*}, thoroughly coordinating the actions of relevant troop strengths {*bingli*}.

Section 3: Blockade Operations at Sea {*haishang fengsuo zuozhan*}...87

Blockade operations at sea {*haishang fengsuo zuozhan*} are offensive operations undertaken by naval operational strengths {*haijun zuozhan liliang*} during joint operations in order to sever enemy coastal sea contacts with the outside world. Their main tasks are to control specified sea regions or passages at sea, to cut off enemy traffic lanes at sea, to weaken his operational capabilities and war potential, to force the enemy to submit, or to create [favorable] conditions for other operations.

Blockade operations at sea {*haishang fengsuo zuozhan*} are restrained by such factors as politics, diplomacy, and international law, and they very much [involve] the nature of policy. The length of time that blockades last is fairly long, and troop strengths {*bingli*} are used in a very intensive manner. The struggle to seize and hold control over the blockade area is intense. There are many types of combatant troop strengths {*canzhan bingli*}; their operational actions are varied; and command, coordination, and support is complex. [Finally,] the possibility exists that third-party forces could intervene militarily. For these reasons, it is necessary, when organizing and carrying out blockade operations at sea {*haishang fengsuo zuozhan*}, to be subordinate to the overall situation of politics, diplomacy, and joint operations; to rigorously implement policies; and to flexibly use stratagems for the struggle. [It is also necessary] to actively seek out and destroy enemy naval and air mobile troop strengths {*bingli*}, and to seize and hold command of the air and command of the sea in the sea regions being blockaded. [In addition, it is necessary] to create intimidation on a widespread basis, and to concentrate troop strengths {*bingli*} and blockade the enemy's important harbors and shipping routes in a focused manner. [It is necessary] to rationally control the intensity with which troop strengths {*bingli*} are used and to maintain their capability for sustained operations. [Also, it is necessary] to tightly organize defense, to actively resist the enemy's preemptive and counter [operations], and to ensure the security of operational positions. [Finally, it is necessary] to fully make preparations for combat military intervention by third-party forces.

I. Establishing a system of blockades at sea {*jianli haishang fengsuo tixi*}...87

Establishing a system of blockades at sea {*haishang fengsuo*} is actions that combatant blockade strengths {*canzhan fengsuo liliang*} [take], on the basis of troop strengths'

{*bingli*} deployments, where they move and deploy from the area where they have been standing by to a predetermined area of operations and set up a system of blockades. The main actions are [as follows]. First, they comprehensively utilize space, maritime, air, and electromagnetic means of reconnaissance to rigorously inspect and control relevant conditions in the air, on the sea's surface, underwater, coastal, and in the electromagnetic sphere, in order to create [favorable] conditions for the blockade operations. Second, using a form that combines submarines' covertly laying mines in advance with subsequent large-scale forceful {*qiangxing*} minelaying, they lay certain naval minefields in the water areas of major enemy coastal harbors and close to offshore shipping lanes, forming a system of obstacles for the blockade. Third, using intermediate and long-range coast-to-ship missile units {*an dui jian daodan budui*} as well as conventional ballistic missile units {*budui*} that support operations, they surround the anchorages outside the enemy's major harbors, establishing certain firepower blockade zones and forming a system of firepower blockades. Fourth, using submarine units {*qianting budui*} in sea regions outside the enemy's key anti-submarine zones, they surround the enemy's main sailing routes and set up certain submarine ambush positions and hunting zones in an in-depth and phased [manner], forming a submarine blockade system. Fifth, using surface ship troop strengths {*shuimian jianting bingli*} in sea regions beyond the submarine blockade system, and centered on the enemy's main shipping lanes, they establish certain surface ship patrol lanes, forming a system of surface ship blockades. Sixth, using aviation troops, surface ships, coast-to-ship missiles, and submarine troop strengths {*bingli*}, they establish a system of support and cover {*zhiyuan yanhu peixi*} along the flanks of directions that the enemy could raid along or in positions that are conducive to mobility.

II. Organizing and carrying out operations to seize command of the air and command of the sea {*zuzhi shishi duoqu zhikong, zhihaiquan zuozhan*}...88

Operations to seize command of the air and command of the sea primarily are made up of such operational actions as attacks against enemy mobile troop strengths {*jidong bingli*} that are deploying at sea and in the air and assaults against enemy coastal targets.

(1) Attacks against enemy air and sea mobile troop strengths {*daji di hai kong jidong bingli*}

Actions to attack the enemy's mobile naval and air troop strengths {*bingli*} usually permeate blockade operations at sea {*haishang fengsuo zuozhan*} from start to finish. [We] should use the various means of reconnaissance in an integrated manner, and keep abreast at suitable times of the activities of enemy mobile troop strengths at sea and in the air. [We should] make widespread use of many measures and actively create and seize opportunities for battle. [We should] meticulously choose targets for attack and scientifically deploy operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}. [We should] carefully organize guidance at sea and in the air, and strive to be concealed and sudden, taking the initiative to contain the enemy. [Finally, we should] concentrate strengths {*liliang*} and carry out continuous attacks against enemy mobile troop strengths {*jidong bingli*} at sea

and in the air, from many directions and at many stages. During the course of operations, [we] should organize reliable air cover and electronic warfare support, and do a thorough job of coordinating among the various assault strengths {*tuji lilian*} and assault actions.

(2) Assault enemy coastal targets {*tuji di anshang mubiao*}

Assaults on enemy coastal targets are usually carried out by adopting the form of “missiles take the initiative for suppression, with follow-up assaults by air” {*daodan xianji yazhi, kongzhong genjin tuji*}, based on the upper echelon’s intentions and on the enemy’s operational deployments and defense situation, using naval ship-to-coast cruise missiles and aviation troops as well as conventional ballistic missiles and air force aviation troops that support operations, and with enemy bases, harbors, airfields, and radar stations as the main targets of assault. During the course of operations, [we] should carefully organize the various types of support and cover, to ensure that [we] can press forward and attack accurately.

III. Organize and carry out sustained blockade operations {*zuzhi shishi chixu fengsuo zuozhan*}...89

Sustained blockade operations {*chixu fengsuo zuozhan*} primarily are made up of such actions as inspections and seizures {*nabu*} at sea, countering the enemy’s naval assaults, and supplemental minelaying.

(1) Inspections and seizures at sea {*haishang linjian, nabu*}

Troop strengths {*bingli*} that carry out inspections and seizures {*nabu*} at sea usually consist of surface ships and shipborne helicopters. The targets of inspection and seizure {*nabu*} mainly are vessels that are sailing into sea areas close to the blockade zone or suspicious vessels. Under ordinary conditions, [we] first question, interrogate and examine, or board and inspect [the ships]. When ascertaining that vessels are violating the interdiction {*shu wei jin*}, [we] can, based on the situation, expel or seize them. When necessary, we can fire warning shots or attack them with direct firepower. [We] should organize troop strengths {*bingli*} to send ships that have already been seized to designated sea areas or ports, under escort.

(2) Opposing enemy breakouts by sea {*fan di haishang tupo*}

Countering enemy breakouts by sea is an attack action that is taken against breakouts by enemy cargo ships; it usually is jointly carried out by submarine [troop strengths], surface ship [troop strengths], or aviation troops troop strengths {*bingli*}. In attacking enemy cargo ships that are breaking out, [we] should strengthen reconnaissance and judgments based on information about the enemy’s troop strengths activities {*bingli huodong*} and transport cycles, stay abreast in a timely manner of the transport actions of enemy cargo ships, and attack these at the proper time. [We should] carry out attacks primarily with submarine troop strengths {*qianting bingli*} within blockade zones at sea {*haishang*}

fengsuo qu}, while simultaneously [having these] cooperate with aviation troops and conventional ballistic missile units {*budui*}. In sea areas outside the blockade zone at sea {*haishang fengsuo qu*}, [we] usually use naval and air mobile troop strengths {*jidong bingli*} such as aviation troops and surface ships as the main actors in carrying out attacks. During the course of attacks, [we] should strengthen reconnaissance and guidance support to the troop strengths {*bingli*} [carrying out] the assault, and based on the situation, [we should] organize troop strengths {*bingli*} to attack enemy troop strengths {*bingli*} that are escorting ships and organize cooperation among [our] various troop strengths {*bingli*}.

(3) Supplemental minelaying {*buchong bulei*}

Supplemental minelaying {*buchong bulei*} is minelaying actions that are carried out when naval mine obstacles have been destroyed, in order to maintain and solidify the naval mine blockade system. It usually is done by aviation troops. Under ordinary conditions, supplemental minelaying actions should be carried out at the same time that attacks are executed against enemy coastal and naval targets, in order to make it easier to fully utilize the effectiveness of other operational actions.

IV. Organizing and carrying out the dismantling of blockade troop strengths {*zuzhi shishi fengsuo bingli cheshou*}...89

When the goal of blockade operations at sea {*haishang fengsuo zuozhan*} has been achieved or when it is necessary to switch to other forms of operations, the commander of naval operational strengths {*haijun zuozhan liliang*} should in a timely manner organize the dismantling of blockade troop strengths {*fengsuo bingli cheshou*}. During the course of dismantling these, he should thoroughly coordinate with the actions of relevant troop strengths {*bingli*} and ensure that the blockade troop strengths {*fengsuo bingli*} depart the battlefield in a rapid and orderly manner.

Section 4: Offensive Operations in Coral Reef Regions {*shanhu daojiao qu jin'gong zuozhan*}...90

Offensive operations in coral reef regions {*shanhu daojiao qu jin'gong zuozhan*} are operational actions in coral reef regions that are distant from the shore and that are undertaken to recover enemy-occupied reefs. Their main missions are to recover enemy-occupied reefs and improve the military situation in coral reef regions, in order to create favorable conditions for the overall situation of joint operations.

In offensive operations in coral reef regions {*shanhu daojiao qu jin'gong zuozhan*}, the operational environment is complex, and there is a strong strategic nature to the struggle {*douzheng celyue xing qiang*}; the reef area is distant from the mainland, the natural conditions are poor, and command and support are difficult; the status and role of the reefs are prominent, and the operational actions center on launching a struggle for the reefs; and the reef area is small, the topography is low, [the reefs] are widely scattered,

they are easy to attack but hard to defend, and operational actions rely very much upon command of the sea. For this reason, in organizing and carrying out offensive operations in coral island regions {*shanhu daojiao qu jin'gong zuozhan*}, it is necessary to have a grasp on policies and to be subservient to the needs of the political and diplomatic struggle; to fully prepare, to stress key points, and to carefully plan and organize the operations; to have a grasp on the focus of the operations, to be centered on operations to seize and occupy the reefs, to seize control at sea {*duoqu haishang kongzhiquan*}, and to eliminate the enemy's major naval and air operational troop strengths {*zuozhan bingli*}; and to strengthen mobile and support strengths {*liliang*} at sea, to utilize the various forms of support in an integrated manner, and to carry out reliable support.

I. Seizing control at sea {*duoqu haishang kongzhiquan*}...90

Seizing control at sea {*duoqu haishang kongzhiquan*} primarily consists of [actions] that isolate, [actions that] search and destroy, and actions that make surprise attacks on the reefs.

(1) Severing the contacts between the enemy homeland and the reef area {*gejue di bentu yu daojiao qu lianxi*}

Isolating the contacts between the enemy's homeland and the reef region usually is carried out using the form of a submarine blockade. The key point is controlling the enemy's main shipping lanes going to the reef region, intercepting enemy reinforcement and supply troop strengths {*bingli*}, and cutting off enemy traffic lanes at sea. When necessary, in sea regions where submarines find it difficult to act, it is possible to carry out naval mine blockades and to organize surface ships and aviation troops to support submarine operations.

(2) Raids on enemy reconnaissance and early warning facilities on the reefs {*xiji di daojiao zhencha yujing sheshi*}

Raids on enemy reconnaissance and early warning facilities on the reefs usually are carried out by aviation troops and surface ship troop strengths {*bingli*}. The primary targets of assault are radar stations and other reconnaissance and early warning facilities on the reefs, and the goals are to knock out the enemy's ears and eyes and to seize information superiority in the reef region.

(3) Searching for and destroying enemy mobile naval and air troop strengths in the reef region {*xun jian daojiao qu di hai kong jidong bingli*}

In operations to attack coral reef regions {*shanhu daojiao qu jin'gong zuozhan*}, searching for and destroying enemy mobile naval and air troop strengths {*bingli*} in the reef region usually is carried out using such forms as mobile search and destroy and rounding up and annihilating [the enemy] in anchorages. Mobile search and destroy involves organizing surface ships and aviation troops to carry out broad-ranging

movements, creating and seizing advantageous opportunities for battle, and attacking enemy mobile naval and air troop strengths {*bingli*}. Rounding up and annihilating [the enemy] in anchorages involves using opportunities when enemy ship troop strengths {*jianting bingli*} are anchored in the reef region, and concentrating and using strengths {*liliang*} to make surprise attacks against them. Operations to search for and destroy enemy mobile naval and air troop strengths {*bingli*} should strive for concealment and surprise, for taking the initiative to control the enemy, and for a quick fight and a quick resolution.

II. Seizing enemy-occupied reefs {*duoqu di zhan daojiao*}...91

We usually seize enemy-occupied reefs by adopting the method of “first paralyzing and then landing” {*xian tan hou deng*}.

(1) Paralyzing the enemy’s reef defense system {*tanhuan di daojiao fangyu tixi*}

In seizing enemy-occupied reefs, [we] usually utilize aviation troops and surface ship troop strengths {*bingli*} in an integrated manner to continually attack the enemy-occupied reefs, annihilating and suppressing enemy artillery troop fronts and defensive fortifications in a focused manner, in order to create [favorable] conditions for the landing troops to launch an amphibious attack.

(2) Delivering and shielding the landing troops as they sail and land {*shusong, yanhu denglu bing hangdu he shanglu*}

The landing troops for offensive operations in coral reef areas {*shanhu daojiao qu jin’gong zuozhan*} usually load and board ship in rear area bases and harbors, and they use forms that combine shielding for regions {*quyu yanhu*} with shielding that accompanies [the fleet] {*bansui yanhu*} to sail to the region of enemy-occupied reefs. They deploy in a sea area twenty to thirty nautical miles away from the reefs that have been occupied {*yu duo*}, where they board rapid landing tools like helicopters and hovercraft in order to surround the reefs and carry out surprise attacks and landings, and rapidly occupy the reefs.

III. Defensive operations for the coral reef area {*shanhu daojiao qu fangyu zuozhan*}...91

After occupying the reefs, [we] should immediately organize troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons and establish a corresponding defensive system. [We should] establish firepower fronts, defensive fortifications, and observation systems on the reefs, and establish a warning system at sea, to discover incoming enemies in a timely manner; organize mobile operational troop strengths {*zuozhan bingli*} at sea to intercept and eliminate incoming enemies; and coordinate with troop strengths {*bingli*} that are protecting the reefs, in order to support the stability of a reef defensive system.

Section 5: Operations to Defend Naval Bases {*haijun jidi fangyu zuozhan*}...91

Operations to defend naval bases *haijun {jidi fangyu zuozhan}* are defensive actions that are taken to defeat enemy air raids, naval blockades, and seizing of bases. Their main missions are to resist enemy air and sea assaults and uphold the security of the troop strengths {*bingli*} stationed at the bases and of important facilities, and to break through enemy sea blockades, support the freedom of action of ship troop strengths {*jianting bingli*} as these enter and exit the bases, and the unimpeded passage of off-shore traffic lanes.

In operations to defend naval bases {*haijun jidi fangyu zuozhan*}, enemy attacks involve a great deal of surprise, the means [of these attacks] are varied, and countering air raids and countering naval mines hold a prominent position; it is difficult to keep targets relatively dispersed and regular, [to keep] defensive depths narrow and shallow, and to organize defenses; it is possible to rely upon island coasts and upon airfields that have been set up in advance, and it is possible to get support and cooperation from various strengths {*liliang*}, which helps to sustain operations; and the makeup of strengths {*liliang*} is varied, while the organization of command is complex. For these reasons, the organization and execution of operations to defend naval bases {*haijun jidi fangyu zuozhan*} requires integration of the military and civilians and the integration of the various services and service arms, close coordination, and bringing into play the advantage of integrated operations; [it requires] fully utilizing airfields that have been set up in advance and establishing a rigorous defense system; [it requires] deploying troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons in a focused manner, attacking enemies [that pose] a major threat, and protecting major targets; and [it requires] using various means in an integrated manner as well as rigorous defense, active resistance, and counterattacks at the proper time.

I. Resisting enemy firepower raids {*kang di huoli xiji*}...92

Enemy firepower attack operations under informationized conditions usually attack our naval bases with the cooperation of powerful electronic warfare, using combined air and sea troop strengths {*bingli*}, and have air-to-surface, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground missiles and torpedoes as the main weapons. The commander of naval operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} should study and weigh the situation in accordance with the intentions of the upper echelon, look at the overall situation from all sides, study and weigh the situation, and resourcefully and resolutely handle the situation. [He should] firmly and flexibly command his subordinate troop strengths {*bingli*} to organize troop strengths {*bingli*} at appropriate times in such actions as deploying, defending [against the enemy], resisting [the enemy], and laying obstacles in the water.

(1) Organizing and carrying out the deployment of troop strengths {*zuzhi shishi bingli zhankai*}

When signs are found of an enemy attack against our naval bases, the commander should at the appropriate time organize combatant units {*canzhan budui*} to quickly deploy in accordance with a plan of operations. Reconnaissance, patrol, and warning troop strengths {*bingli*} are to quickly enter predetermined areas; troop strengths {*bingli*} that are responsible for resisting [the enemy] are to quickly enter the forward airfields and positions that have been set up in advance, and to resist enemy attacks at all times; and mobile operational troop strengths {*jidong zuozhan bingli*} at sea are to enter predetermined standby areas to stand by covertly.

(2) Organizing and carrying out protective operations {*zuzhi shishi fanghu zuozhan*}

In operations to defend bases, [we] should rigorously organize protection. Surface ship troop strengths {*shuimian jianting bingli*} should adopt the form of “mostly dispersed, with just a few concentrated together” {*da fensan, xiao jizhong*} as they deploy, and [they should] use various regulation materials and non-regulation materials, to camouflage and conceal [themselves along] estuaries and precipitous seacoasts; submarines can disperse in advance out to sea to stand by; and some aviation troops can transition to second-line airfields or in-depth airfields. For important targets inside the bases that are to be protected, [we] should fully utilize manufactured or makeshift materials for camouflage, and utilize such devices as corner reflectors to change the terrain and landforms and to set up fake targets. [Also,] the commander and the personnel of relevant organs should quickly move to an underground command post.

(3) Organizing and carrying out resistance operations {*suzhi shishi kangji zuozhan*}

When the enemy launches air raids, [we] should concentrate superior troop strengths {*bingli*} and firepower to carry out resistance at multiple levels along the main directions and at important moments, as early and as far away as possible, trying to eliminate enemy air raid troop strengths {*kongxi bingli*} prior to their using air-to-surface weapons or outside the security range of the targets being protected; [we should] focus on air raid troop strengths {*kongxi bingli*} that pose the greatest threat to [our] bases, and particularly [against] enemy missile-carrying aircraft {*daodan zai ji*} and ultra-low-flying aircraft that carry high-precision, powerful weapons and [against] incoming missiles. At the same time, [we] should organize some of the troop strengths to eliminate the enemy’s various kinds of combat support strengths {*zhandou baozhang liliang*}, such as early warning and command aircraft, electronic jamming aircraft, and radar sentry ships {*shao jian*}. Ship troop strengths {*jianting bingli*} moored in the harbors and anchorages of bases should continually collect and analyze [information on] the enemy situation, organize rigorous reconnaissance against the air and against the sea, raise the levels of war-readiness, strengthen the system of shifts, and launch self-protection attacks at appropriate times. As soon as the targets on the bases come under enemy attack, [we] should ascertain damage conditions in a timely manner, and actively adopt various

measures to quickly eliminate the aftereffects of the attacks and to quickly restore combat capabilities.

(4) Lay water obstacles {*bushe shui zhong zhang'ai*}

The goal of laying water obstacles {*bushe shui zhong zhang'ai*} is to prevent or limit enemy submarines and surface ships from carrying out attacks close to our naval bases, harbors, and anchorages. Laying water obstacles {*bushe shui zhong zhang'ai*} usually should be based on the sea area's natural conditions, with exit and entry channels of the bases and harbors as key points. Anti-submarine naval mine obstacles, anti-submarine grid obstacles, and anti-surface ship naval mine obstacles are laid. Water obstacles should have a certain depth, breadth, and density, as well as fairly high efficiency and resistance to destruction, in order to keep the enemy from using torpedoes and ship-borne close-in and medium-range firepower to attack the base targets from close to our bases.

II. Operations against enemy blockades {*fan di fengsuo zuozhan*}...93

Operations against enemy blockades {*fan di fengsuo zuozhan*} primarily include [operations] against enemy naval mine blockades {*fan di shuilei fengsuo*} and against enemy troop strengths blockades {*fan di bingli fengsuo*}.

(1) [Operations] against enemy naval mine blockades {*fan di shuilei fengsuo*}

The primary means of [operations] against enemy naval mine blockades {*fan di shuilei fengsuo*} consist of [the following].

The first is to eliminate the enemy's minelaying troop strengths {*bulei bingli*}. Organizing the various types of troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons to find enemy minelaying troop strengths {*bulei bingli*} in a timely manner and to actively eliminate them is the most active and effective means for countering naval mine blockades. Enemy minelaying troop strengths {*bulei bingli*} primarily come from the air and the sea, and [we] should organize sea and air strengths {*liliang*} at the proper time to attack enemy minelaying troop strengths {*bulei bingli*}, and strive to eliminate them prior to their laying mines or while they are laying mines.

The second is to clear out naval mine obstacles. When clearing out naval mine obstacles, [we] should use such means as "sweeping" {*sao*}, "hunting" {*lie*}, "destroying" {*po*}, and "blowing up" {*zha*} in an integrated manner. [We should] first clear out naval mine obstacles that most impede our key sea areas, harbors, and channels, and then, based on the situation, gradually enlarge this to comprehensively mop things up. Because actions to sweep mines usually are carried out under enemy naval and aerial threats, [we] should conceal our intentions when organizing minesweeping, strengthen camouflage, and adopt various defensive measures, in order to ensure that the minesweeping troop strengths {*saolei bingli*} complete their tasks according to plan.

The third is to forcefully pass through the naval mine obstacles. Forcing a passage through naval mine obstacles is an emergency measure that is adopted when time is pressing, when the mission is urgent, and when it is impossible to dredge the channel and when there are no prepared channels that can be used. Ship formations can force their way through naval mine obstacles under the direct guidance of minesweepers and mine-destroying ships {*po lei jian*}. There is a certain amount of danger in forcing a passage through minefields; when passing, [we must] do [our] best to select a navigational route for passing where the minefield is relatively short {*zongshen jiao duan*}, or pass through a zone where we have found that the naval mines are scarce. At the same time, [we must] do all we can to select deepwater channels to pass through, or channels that are within the range of our coastal observation and shielding.

(2) Countering enemy troop strength blockades {*fan di bingli fengsuo*}

[The term] countering enemy troop strength blockades {*fan di bingli fengsuo*} refers to actions to counter enemy submarine and surface ship blockades against our naval bases. Their goal is to destroy the enemy's troop strength {*bingli*} blockade system at sea and to support the movements and deployments of our bases' troop strengths {*bingli*}.

Countering enemy troop strength blockades {*fan di bingli fengsuo*} is primarily undertaken by aviation troops, surface operations ships, coastal missile troop strengths {*bingli*}, and submarines. When attacking enemy surface ship formations that are carrying out the blockade, [we] usually combine many types of troop strengths {*bingli*}, forming local superiority, and use the combat method of sudden attacks to suddenly carry out an attack in a concealed manner. Attacks against enemy submarines usually use joint air and sea anti-submarine forms, first using anti-submarine aircraft and surface ships to search for [submarines], and after finding the targets, quickly carrying out an integrated air and sea attack.

III. Organizing and carrying out counterattack operations {*zuzhi shishi fanji zuozhan*}...94

Operations to defend naval bases {*haijun jidi fangyu zuozhan*} must implement the operational thinking of active defense and take active offensive operational actions, using offense to assist defense. During the operations, the commander should create and seize favorable opportunities for battle and [should] concentrate and use sea and air assault strengths {*tuji liliang*}, based on the intentions of the upper echelon, the enemy situation, and the actual conditions of our troop strengths {*bingli*}. [He should] carry out counterattack operations that take the initiative in order to subdue the enemy, against enemy operational platforms at sea that are responsible for attack and blockade missions. Counterattack operations should be decided upon prudently, there [should] be complete preparations [for them], [we should] launch them suddenly and in a concealed manner, and [we should] strive to be quick and intense, with a quick fight and a quick resolution.

Section 6: Operations to Protect Traffic Lanes at Sea {*baohu haishang jiaotong xian zuozhan*}...94

Operations to protect traffic lanes at sea {*baohu haishang jiaotong xian zuozhan*} are defensive operations that are undertaken to ensure the security and smoothness of traffic lanes at sea that have strategic and campaign significance. Their major missions are to support the security of [our] loading and unloading ports, [our] sailing routes at sea, and [our] transportation actions, and to ensure that traffic lanes at sea are unimpeded.

Operations to protect traffic lanes at sea {*baohu haishang jiaotong xian zuozhan*} [cover] broad spaces, [last] a long time, and [have] many targets; we have a grasp on a certain amount of initiative; the operations are fairly intense; and the actions of troop strengths {*bingli*} in the operations are greatly restricted by transportation actions. For these reasons, organizing and carrying out operations to protect traffic lanes at sea {*baohu haishang jiaotong xian zuozhan*} must actively combat the enemy's reconnaissance; strive [to have] schemes and actions [resulting in] covert transportation, and select favorable opportunities to carry out transportation; use in a focused manner troop strengths that support transportation {*bao jiao bingli*}, and concentrate troop strengths {*bingli*} for use in key periods of time and sea areas, for dealing with main enemy threats, and for protecting our important targets; and actively organize and execute actions, and attack enemy troop strengths that are destroying traffic {*po jiao bingli*} in a way that takes the initiative in order to subdue the enemy, in order to struggle for the initiative and to better achieve the goals of defense.

I. Organizing and covering the loading of cargo ships and their departure from port {*zuzhi he yanhu yunshu jianchuan zhuangzai he chu gang*}...95

After determining that there have been no major changes in the situation, the commander should issue a command at the appropriate time to commence loading. After receiving the order, the port commander for loading {*zhuangzai gang zhihuiyuan*} should immediately assemble materials (or personnel) and cargo ships, in accordance with plans for loading that have been thoroughly drafted in advance, and quickly organize loading at various predetermined points in accordance with the principles of concealment and dispersion. When using a form that delivers in batches {*fenpi shusong*} to organize transportation, [we] should change the loading points at irregular periods, to avoid the enemy finding out about the patterns in our loading actions. The loading should be done at night as much as possible. Cargo ships in which the loading has been completed should sail away from the loading zone to a designated estuary anchorage and stand by. When all materials (or personnel) have been fully loaded onto the ship, they should gather into formation in accordance with a plan, forming a transport fleet {*yunshu chuandui*} or convoyed transport group {*huhang yunshudui*}, forming {*bian wei*} a certain sailing sequence.

In order to ensure the security of the cargo ships when loading and of the formations that are leaving port, [we] should adopt various camouflage measures, deceive the enemy and get him to loosen his vigilance, and try to keep the enemy from discovering the loading

of our cargo ships, and the formations as they leave port and assemble. [We] should strength our precautions, deploy troop strengths {bingli} at the proper time to protect the loading port, strive to discover incoming raiding enemies as early as possible, and eliminate these outside the port area. If [we] come under enemy attack, [we] should actively organize various protective actions and should do emergency repairs to and replace damaged cargo ships and loading facilities, and [we] should organize minesweeping troop strengths {saolei bingli} in a timely manner to sweep channels that have been blockaded by enemy naval mines, or start using reserve channels, to ensure that the cargo ships sail out on time.

When a loading part has been seriously damaged or has been blockaded by the enemy and there is no way to use it, [we] should use reserve loading parts in a timely manner, and make necessary adjustments to the entire transportation action.

II. Organizing and covering cargo ships as they cross at sea {zuzhi he yanhu yunshu jianchuan zai haishang hangdu}...95

After cargo ships get into formation, they should cross the sea at a time, along sailing routes, at sailing speeds, in formations, and in sailing sequences that have been specified by plans. During the crossing, they should [maintain] strict camouflage discipline and should strengthen their observations against the air and against the sea. When enemies come in to raid, they should carry out resistance and evasion in an organized manner. When evading enemy attack, they should pay attention to maintaining formation and avoid creating confusion. During the crossing, the troop strengths {bingli} responsible for the task of direct warnings should deploy in accordance with specified locations and in accordance with the differing levels of enemy threat, maintaining a corresponding level of war readiness; covering forces that accompany [the formation] {bansui yanhu dui} should deploy along the direction where the cargo ships are threatened by the enemy and conduct searches; and troop strengths [engaged in] regional cover {quyu yanhu bingli} should strengthen their patrols and warnings at sea against key directions, while still maintaining control over the sea area that [the formation] is sailing in. Upon discovering the enemy, the various covering troop strengths {yanhu bingli} should immediately carry out an attack; when necessary, they can call upon one another and jointly engage in operations.

Because the convoyed transport group {huhang yunshudui} can come under continuous assault from the enemy [using] a number of forms, the commander must immediately find out about the situation at sea and promptly send out support troops strengths {zhiyuan bingli} to cooperate with the escort troop strengths {huhang bingli} and covering troop strengths {yanhu bingli} for operations. During key moments of operations, he should deploy reserve forces in a timely manner, to eliminate and drive out the enemy that [the formation] faces and that is destroying the traffic {po jiao}. In addition, the transport fleet {yunshu chuandui} should change formation at any time, under the command of the convoy formation commander and based on differing threats. [Transport fleets] usually adopt a formation that is broad and shallow {heng kuan zong

duan} in areas where there are enemy submarine threats; when crossing minefields, they adopt formations with a single column or a double column; and when resisting attacks by enemy conventional weapons, they should do their utmost to shorten the formation, on the premise of ensuring sailing security {*hangxing anquan*}.

When some of the ships are damaged by enemy attacks, the commander should organize strengths {*liliang*} to tow ships that cannot sail on their own and to repair battle damage. For vessels where there is no possibility of rescue, [the commander] should destroy these himself after evacuating the personnel, in order to keep them from falling into enemy hands; for ships that have no way to keep sailing, he should dispatch part of the troop strengths {*bingli*} to escort them to nearby ports. Rescue actions are primarily undertaken by specialized rescue vessels and small ships; it is prohibited for major operational ships and large cargo ships to participate in the rescue, and also [we] should not have all of the convoyed transport group {*huhang yunshudui*} stop and wait for a few ships. When [the commander] finds out that there is no way to pass through a dangerous region of naval mines for a while or that it will be impossible to ensure sailing security {*hangxing anquan*} because the weather has suddenly changed, he should promptly instruct the convoy formation to change its sailing route or sail toward an estuary to shelter for a while {*bi bo*}.

In situations where there are conditions for it, the commander should organize formations of troop strengths that are feints {*yangdong bingli*}, based on the situation, to carry out active activities along directions where it is easy to attract the enemy's attention, in order to attract and divert the enemy's troop strengths that are destroying traffic {*po jiao bingli*} and the actions [that these are engaged in], to ensure that transport actions are smoothly carried out.

III. Organizing and covering cargo ships as these enter port and unload {*zuzhi he yanhu yunshu jianchuan jin gang he xiezai*}...96

Before the cargo ships arrive at the unloading port, the unloading port should make thorough preparations for the ships to enter port and unload. In order to ensure security, [we] should strengthen various forms of defense for the port, and [we] should especially pay attention to organizing observations against naval mines and inspections of channels, to ensure that the channels are unobstructed. When the cargo ships arrive at the port or at a designated sea region, [we] should send corresponding troop strengths {*bingli*} to receive them at sea, to jointly escort them to [an area] close to the port, and then afterwards to break up {*jiesan*} the transport fleet or convoyed transport group {*huhang yunshudui*}, in accordance with a predetermined procedure. The various cargo ships [then] enter port according to sequence and sail to their individual unloading points and quickly unload. When the cargo ships are unloading, [we] should pay attention to strengthening air defense. The direct warning troop strengths {*zhijie jingjie bingli*} and troop strengths that provide cover while accompanying [the ships] {*bansui yanhu bingli*} can be used to reinforce the strengths {*liliang*} that protect the loading and unloading port, or they carry out a new operational mission in accordance with orders.

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Chapter 6

Support to Naval Operations in Joint Operations...97

Support to naval operations {*haijun zuozhan baozhang*} in joint operations is the various support measures for operations that are taken so that naval strengths {*haijun liliang*} that are participating in joint operations can smoothly prepare for and carry out operations.

Section 1: Basic Requirements {*jiben yaoqiu*}...97

I. Support capabilities must correspond to operations capabilities {*baozhang nengli yao yu zuozhan nengli xiang shiying*}...97

Heavy use of support to troop strengths {*bingli*} is a new characteristic that is used for naval operations in joint operations under informationized conditions. As science and technology develop and along with innovations in weapons and equipment, the operational actions of naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} will increasingly rely upon support and cooperation [provided by] support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang*}. In a certain sense, the size of the ability to support operations {*zuozhan baozhang nengli*} will even directly restrict the forms, scale, and methods of operations, and will affect success or failure in naval operations. Therefore, when commanders make decisions, they must fully take into consideration the size of the ability to support operations {*zuozhan baozhang nengli*} as well as the effects of this on operational actions, and keep assault actions from exceeding support capabilities. After making a decision, they should actively mobilize all support strengths {*baozhang liliang*}, organize support to operations that is thorough and reliable, and fully bring its effectiveness into play. In sum, the commander must be willing to invest strengths {*liliang*} in support actions, so that support capabilities correspond to operational capabilities.

II. They correspond to the intentions of operations and meet the needs of operational actions {*fuhe zuozhan qitu, shiying zuozhan xingdong de xuyao*}...98

Support to naval operations {*haijun zuozhan baozhang*} is actions that are supportive in nature; the details, forms, and extent of their support must be based on and serve the needs of operational actions. Support that is separated from the needs of operational actions not only does not help in completing the mission of operations, but it also wastes manpower and materiel and even has an unfavorable effect on operational actions. Therefore, when the commander is organizing and planning naval operations, he must issue clear instructions about issues involving support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang wenti*} and clarify the missions and needs of support, the troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons that can be used, and the forms, procedures, and stipulations for cooperation that are to be carried out. His headquarters and the various support departments should carry out complete and thorough organization and preparations, based on the commander's decision and on his relevant instructions about support, and centered on the needs of operational actions. In the process of carrying these out, they must exercise command

over the naval support troop strengths {*haishang baozhang bingli*} in a timely and continual manner, and meet the needs of the assault troop strengths {*tuji bingli*}.

III. Carry out support in a comprehensive manner and with key points {*quanmian you zhongdian di jinxing baozhang*}...98

There are fairly prominent contradictions between the many support actions for naval operations in joint operations, the broad scope of support, and the great deal of work [on the one hand] and insufficiencies in support capabilities [on the other]. Therefore, support should be carried out in a way that has key points. When the commander and his various support departments are organizing and carrying out support to naval operations {*haijun zuozhan baozhang*}, they should have a comprehensive view of the entire situation, based on the mission, the enemy's situation, battlefield conditions, and support strengths {*baozhang liliang*}; they should foresee possible developments in the conditions of operations, and correctly determine the key points of support. That is, they must use the main support troop strengths {*baozhang bingli*} and materials to support the main directions, critical moments, and the troop strengths {*bingli*} that are carrying out the main missions; they also need to pay attention to the needs of other directions, other moments, and other troop strengths {*bingli*}, and energetically promote the development of operational actions. In order to support key points and struggle for the initiative, the commander should also have a certain number of reserve strengths for naval support {*haishang yubei baozhang liliang*}, so as to respond in a timely manner to unexpected circumstances within the complex and variable environment of operations, and to strengthen the ability [to provide] rapid support and continued support.

IV. The comprehensive use of various types of support strengths, and the execution of integrated support {*zonghe yunyong gezhong baozhang liliang, shishi zhengti baozhang*}...98

In support to naval operations {*haijun zuozhan baozhang*} in integrated operations, because the scope of support is broad, the details are numerous, the amount of work is prodigious, there is a strong sense of time-effectiveness, and the struggle between support and countering support is intense, it is [therefore] difficult to complete support missions by relying upon a single support troop strength {*baozhang bingli*} and support method. Hence, it is necessary to use the various support troop strengths {*baozhang bingli*} and support methods in an integrated manner, and to carry out integrated support. The various specialized units {*budui*} (or elements) that support naval operations {*haijun zuozhan baozhang*} have special technical equipment, undergo special technical training, and have fairly strong abilities for support; they are the backbone technical strengths {*jishu guban liliang*} for carrying out support missions for naval operations {*haijun zuozhan baozhang renwu*}. It is necessary to fully bring into play the backbone role of the specialized units {*budui*} (or elements) and the maximum effectiveness of their technical equipment, to form the hard core of support. The various groups of troop strengths {*bingli jituan*} that are involved in combat must fully utilize and bring into play their own support capabilities, based on the idea of self-support {*ziwo baozhang*}, and they [must] actively

cooperate with the support actions of the specialized units *{budui}* (or elements). The masses of the people, and especially fishermen and the various types of civilian vessels, are also an important support strength *{baozhang liliang}*, and can provide as much of the support mission *{baozhang renwu}* as they are capable of. The nature, characteristics, and support capabilities *{baozhang nengli}* of these support strengths *{baozhang liliang}* all differ from each other. When using them, it is necessary to combine “the land and the sea” *{tu yang}*, to combine the military and civilians, and to combine specialized support and self-support *{ziwo baozhang}*, based on their characteristics, so that they supplement and support one another and bring into play the power of integrated support, in order to meet the needs of naval operations.

Section 2: Main Details *{zhuyao neirong}*...99

The main details for support to naval operations *{haijun zuozhan baozhang}* in joint operations include reconnaissance intelligence support *{zhencha qingbao baozhang}*, operational camouflage *{zuozhan weizhuang}*, communications support *{tongxin baozhang}*, electronic warfare support *{dianzi duikang baozhang}*, defense and protection support *{fangyu he fanghu baozhang}*, navigation and hydrological and meteorological support *{hanghai ji shuiwen qixiang baozhang}*, disaster-avoidance and rescue support *{fang xian jiusheng baozhang}*, and engineering support *{gongcheng baozhang}*.

I. Reconnaissance intelligence support *{zhencha qingbao baozhang}*...99

Reconnaissance intelligence support *{zhencha qingbao baozhang}* is the various reconnaissance measures and means that are taken to get intelligence about the enemy’s naval situation and about the natural geographical conditions of the sea area of operations. Its main mission is to find the enemy in a timely manner and to ascertain the enemy’s intentions, the task organization of his troop strengths *{bingli}*, his deployment and positions, the nature of his task forces, his formations, the key factors of his movements, and his defensive organization; to ascertain how the enemy is deploying for operations at sea, and how he is setting up his defenses; to ascertain the geographic, hydrological, and weather conditions of the sea area for operations; to ascertain the weapons and equipment that the enemy could use; to guide our troop strengths *{bingli}* in closing with the enemy and provide instructions about targets; and to ascertain the effects of assaults.

The basic troop strengths *{jiben bingli}* that are responsible for naval intelligence reconnaissance *{qingbao zhencha}* are naval aviation troops, submarines, reconnaissance flotillas at sea, coastal observation and communications stations, and technical reconnaissance units *{jishu zhencha budui}*. Under certain conditions, surface ships can also take on reconnaissance missions. In order to obtain the intelligence needed for operations in a timely and accurate manner, [we] should comprehensively deploy naval reconnaissance strengths *{haishang zhencha liliang}*, with key points, forming a tight network of naval reconnaissance intelligence *{haishang zhencha qingbao}*. [We] should

use the various reconnaissance troop strengths {*zhenchabingli*} and means of reconnaissance in an integrated manner, unify plans, appropriately differentiate among reconnaissance missions, and carefully organize coordination for reconnaissance. [Finally, we] should actively take the initiative to continually carry out reconnaissance, and pay attention to concealment and surprise in reconnaissance actions.

II. Operational camouflage {*zuozhan weizhuang*}...100

Operational camouflage {*zuozhan weizhuang*} is the measures for concealing what is real and showing what is false {*yin zhen shi jia*} that are taken to conceal ourselves and confuse the enemy. The goal is to conceal naval military targets within the surrounding environment by changing their shapes, and to thus conceal the intentions of the operation, the conditions of units {*budui*}, and the nature of actions, in order to conceal unit actions {*budui xingdong*} and achieve surprise, and to enhance the survivability and operational capabilities of units {*budui*}.

In order to ensure the effects of camouflage, naval camouflage must be carried out under the unified organization and supervision of joint operations, and it must act in coordination with the entire operation. To do this, naval camouflage should fully take into consideration the enemy's reconnaissance capabilities and means of reconnaissance, and draft detailed camouflage plans and feasible camouflage measures that correspond to reality. The main measures in naval camouflage are [as follows]. First is combat measures, that is, actively destroying the enemy's reconnaissance and observation troop strengths {*bingli*} and equipment, and carrying out feints or modifying in a virtual way deployments and concentrations of troops strengths {*jizhong bingli*}. Second is technical measures, that is, jamming the enemy's radio observation materials and concealing or lowering the visibility of targets. Third is organizational measures, that is, keeping military secrets and disseminating false intelligence.

III. Communications support {*tongxin baozhang*}...100

Naval communications support {*haijun tongxin baozhang*} is the basic means for ensuring command and coordination in naval operations, and is an important guarantee for naval operations to be smoothly carried out and for them to achieve victory. Its primary tasks are to support naval operations command, coordinate movements, accurately transmit advisories and intelligence, and [keep] rear area command and supplies unobstructed.

Naval communications support {*haijun tongxin baozhang*} should be organized based on the upper echelon's intentions and on the navy's operational mission, on deployments for operations, and on actual communications capabilities. Its basic requirements are comprehensive organization and ensuring key points; combining and using many means of communications, such as radio, optical, and mobile, with an emphasis on radio communications; establishing and controlling the use of reserve communications forces; and actively launching the work of mass communications. In order to make

communications support {*tongxin baozhang*} effective and reliable, [we] should draft communications plans in a timely manner and issue communications instructions during the stage of preparing for operations. [We should] organize and improve communications networks, supplementing and strengthening the existing communications systems on the battlefield. [We should] pay close attention to stockpiles of communications equipment and organize technical support. [Finally, we should] organize operational-readiness training {*linzhan xunlian*}. During the process of carrying out operations, [we] should adjust the communications plan at the proper time, modify the organization of communications contacts, strengthen and supplement communications personnel and equipment, organize and command emergency repairs and emergency communications operations {*cang tong zuoye*}, establish new communications networks, start using covert command and communications networks, use local communications facilities, engage in communications confrontations, and select and use correct means of communications and allocate reserve communications forces, in order to ensure that naval operations communications are unimpeded and continuous.

IV. Electronic warfare support {*dianzi duikang baozhang*}...101

Electronic warfare refers to electromagnetic conflict that two hostile sides engage in using electronic equipment or devices. Because of the rapid advances in modern information technology, there is an increasing amount of electronic equipment and devices that the navy is equipped with, and the navy's abilities for operations rely to a very great extent upon bringing the effectiveness of electronic equipment into play. Therefore, in naval operations in future joint operations, the role of electronic warfare support {*dianzi duikang baozhang*} will become quite important.

The types of naval electronic warfare consist of radar confrontations, sonar confrontations, communications confrontations, and optoelectronic confrontations. The basic details consist of electronic reconnaissance, jamming, and destruction, and counter-reconnaissance, counter-jamming, and counter-destruction. In organizing and carrying out support to the navy's electronic warfare {*haijun dianzi duikang baozhang*}, [we] should keep an eye on the overall situation of joint operations, ensuring that the navy's electronic warfare corresponds to the overall plans for operations. [We should] plan carefully, have close cooperation, and ensure that not only is the effectiveness of electronic warfare fully brought into play but that it also does not affect the normal work of our electronic equipment. [We should] use it in a concentrated manner, with an emphasis on key points, and have control over a certain number of reserve strengths {*yubei liliang*}. [Finally, we should] use a number of means of confrontation in an integrated manner, combine electronic offense with electronic defense, and combine electronic jamming, suppression, and firepower destruction.

V. Nuclear, chemical, and biological defense {*he hua sheng fanghu*}...101

In future joint operations, naval operational strengths {*haijun zuozhan liliang*} may carry out operational missions in a nuclear-chemical-biological environment (that is, nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons). Therefore, the adoption of effective measures to avoid or reduce the dangers of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and secondary nuclear, chemical, and biological [dangers] is very significant for the operational capabilities of naval troop strengths that are engaged in combat {*haijun canzhan bingli*} as they smoothly carry out their operational missions and maintain continuity. The main measures for defense include careful drafting of defense plans and setting up various defensive organizations; doing a thorough job of stockpiling and providing defensive devices and materials, and improving defensive engineering installations; carrying out in-depth investigations into the state of installations in the area of operations such as nuclear power stations and chemical factories, and thoroughly carrying out corresponding preventive preparations; organizing monitoring and reporting services, and issuing forecasts and alerts about nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon attacks; quickly ascertaining the conditions of enemy attacks, and report to upper echelons and inform friendly neighboring units {*you lin budui*} and relevant local departments in a timely manner; and after suffering an enemy attack, [we should] quickly organize emergency rescues, emergency construction, firefighting, and cleaning {*xixiao*}, eliminating the consequences that the enemy attack caused.

VI. Navigation and hydrological and meteorological support {*hanghai ji shuiwen qixiang baozhang*}...102

[The term] navigation and hydrological meteorological support {*hanghai ji shuiwen qixiang baozhang*} refers to a series of measures taken to ensure the security of ships and aircraft that sail and fly in the area of naval conflict. The natural geographic conditions of a sea area have a great impact on the navy as it carries out operations and as it brings its operational capabilities into play. The main tasks of navigation and hydrological and meteorological support {*hanghai shuiwen qixiang baozhang*} are to provide operations with such necessary materials as geographical and hydrological and meteorological [materials], and navigational equipment; to organize hydrological and meteorological support services, to provide information about the hydrology and weather of the sea area of operations, and to issue various alerts about dangerous weather; to establish rigorous and reliable navigation systems, ensuring that these are used by our naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} in wartime under various conditions and not by the enemy; to organize military navigation and draft the regulations for navigation in operations, so that our ship troop strengths {*jianting bingli*} that are participating in combat will have a basis and support when they enter and exit harbors and anchorages and when they use reserve channels; and to organize overhauling services for navigational devices, timely inspections, calibrations, repairs, and supplies of navigational instruments and navigational charts.

The main measures in navigational support {*haihang baozhang*} are to establish complete navigational guidance systems, to adopt anti-jamming and anti-destruction measures, and to ensure that navigational equipment works in a stable manner; to collect, compile, and provide navigational data; and to strengthen the supply and technical support of navigational equipment and navigational devices.

The main measures of hydrological and meteorological support are to organize unified hydrological and meteorological intelligence networks; to continually collect, arrange, and supply hydrological and meteorological data; to study and report in a timely manner on the effects that hydrological and meteorological conditions have on operations; to closely coordinate with the hydrological and meteorological stations {*tai, zhan*} of other services and service arms and with local [hydrological and meteorological stations], and to strengthen consultations; and to actively carry out hydrological and meteorological combat against the enemy.

VII. Engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*}...102

[The term] engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*} refers to the engineering actions of building and making emergency repairs to facilities during preparations for operational readiness and the process of operations, in order to support the needs that naval troop strengths {*haijun bingli*} have for anchorages, supplies, concealment, and command. Its main tasks are to provide units {*budui*} with engineering materials; to build engineering facilities for ships' anchorages, supplies and maintenance when on the verge of war {*linzhan*}; to set up engineering obstacles in the water; to open up paths for landing troops to land; to build field warfare airfields; and to do emergency repairs to engineering installations that have been damaged.

In organizing and carrying engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*}, [we] should carefully organize engineering reconnoitering, reconnaissance, and collection of intelligence and data, in order to provide a reliable basis for conducting engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*}; based on engineering conditions and the needs of the mission, [we should] make overall plans and arrangements, support key points, and ensure in a timely manner the supply of the various engineering camouflage materials; [we should] concentrate strengths {*liliang*} along the major directions of operations, for the major missions, and for important engineering facilities, in order to carry out engineering tasks, to reduce losses as much as possible, and to have control over a certain amount of reserve troop strengths {*yubei bingli*} and materials; and [we should] adopt forms for combining the units involved in combat {*canzhan budui*} and the specialized units {*budui*} (or elements), in order to complete the support mission.

VIII. Disaster-avoidance and rescue support {*fang xian jiusheng baozhang*}...103

Disaster-avoidance and rescue support {*fang xian jiusheng baozhang*} are actions that are taken to reduce accidents to ships, aircraft, and personnel or the damages [to them] when they are damaged. Its main tasks are to supply ship units {*jianting budui*} with materials for avoiding disasters and for rescues {*fang xian jiusheng*} and for [preventing] ruin; search and rescue for accidents and for ships, civilian boats, aircraft, and personnel who have suffered damage; getting rid of obstacles, sunken ships, and dangerous goods {*weixianwu*} that obstruct navigation; and inspecting and guiding the work of avoiding disasters for ships and of rescues {*jianting fang xian jiusheng*}, and enhancing the ability [for ships] to rescue themselves and to rescue each other.

In organizing and carrying out disaster avoidance and rescues {*fang xian jiusheng*}, [we] should establish rescue troop strengths {*yuanjiu bingli*} who await orders in specified sea areas or who accompany formations' activities; [we should] concentrate and use the main troops strengths that avoid disaster and do rescue {*fang jiu bingli*} and materials, and control a certain amount of reserve troop strengths {*yubei bingli*} and materials; [we should] command specialized rescue units {*yuanjiu budui*} in closely coordinating aid to accidents and to ships that have been damaged, as well as self-rescue activities {*zi jiu huodong*}, and [we] must do our best to arrive at the scene and rescue personnel where there is no hope of rescuing a ship.

Part III

Air Force Operations Application in Joint Operations...104

According to the overall campaign intention and a unified *jihua*-plan and under unified command of joint operations command institutions, an air force operation in joint operations is a general designation for air force operational strength to achieve the goal of overall or local situation in joint operations. The recent local warfare practice indicates that due to a large amount of applications of high technology, especially information technology, in air force weapons and equipment, the air force operational capability is highly enhanced, air force operational modes also continue to develop and improve. [The applications of high technology] are more and more prominent in the role and function of joint operations and even have an important or decisive influence on the course and outcome of joint operations.

In addition to having general characteristics, the air force operation also has other characteristics: 1) the air force operation is closely related to the overall situation of joint operations, and the operational goal is resolute; 2) tasks are strenuous, and operational needs are contradictory to actual capability; 3) seizing command of air is fierce, which penetrates the course of operations; 4) essential factors are complex, and command coordination is very demanding; and 5) operation, and support tasks are arduous.

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Chapter 1

Main Battlefields for Air Force Operations in Joint Operations...105

The battlefields for air force operations {*kongjun zuozhan zhanchang*} in joint operations are places where air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} conduct operations; they are the spaces where the two hostile sides' air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} use military thinking, operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}, forms of operations, and means of operations to compete during a certain period of time. Battlefields for air force operations {*kongjun zuozhan zhanchang*} are one of the objective factors that restrict air force operational actions, and they have an important effect on victory or defeat in operations. Therefore, commanders in joint operations and air force commanders must conscientiously analyze and study the battlefield for air force operations {*kongjun zuozhan zhanchang*}, find the conditions that facilitate air force operational actions and the conditions that do not, and move toward what is beneficial and avoid what is not beneficial, as they guide air force operations.

Section 1: The Characteristics of the Battlefield {*zhanchang tedian*}...105

The structure of the battlefield for air force operations {*kongjun zuozhan de zhanchang*} primarily includes the air battlefield, the surface battlefield, and the electromagnetic battlefield. Of these, the air battlefield is the place where air force aviation troops carry out operational activities against the air, against the ground, and against the sea, and it is the main battlefield for air force operations in joint operations. The surface battlefield is the place where surface-to-air missile troops, antiaircraft artillery troops, and airborne troops carry out operations, as well as the place for carrying out support to such operations as early warning and command, communications and navigation, aircraft maintenance, weather forecasting, and material supply, as well as logistics [support] and technical [support]; these are the support and backing for the air battlefield. The electromagnetic battlefield is the space where the two hostile sides engage in electromagnetic combat; its scope is quite broad, covering the space of the entire battlefield for air force operations {*kongjun zuozhan de zhanchang*} and permeating all of the air force's weapons systems. It is a crucially important battlefield for air force operations {*kongjun zuozhan de zhanchang*}, and it plays a supporting role to the air battlefield and the surface battlefield. As space strengths {*hangtian liliang*} have developed and tended to become increasingly "married" {*lianyin*} to air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*}, space will also become an important battlefield for air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*}.

The battlefield for air force operations {*kongjun zuozhan zhanchang*} is an important component part of the key factors in air force operations; compared to other services' and service arms' battlefields, it has the following distinct characteristics.

I. The breadth of battlefield spaces {zhanchang kongjian de guangkuoxing}...106

Compared to the battlefields for ground forces' [operations] and naval operations, the battlefield for air force operations {kongjun zuozhan de zhanchang} is broad, which is primarily shown [in the following]. First, its horizontal spans are relatively large; it can move across directions, across theaters of war and even the entire country, and across sea regions. Its horizontal scope far exceeds the scope of the battlefield for ground forces' operations and the battlefield for naval operations. The second is that its three-dimensional spaces are large, from the surface to the low altitudes, middle altitudes, high altitudes, and even super-high altitudes, and it is now expanding into space. In joint operations, air force strengths {kongjun liliang} can move troop strengths {bingli} and firepower at all depths and in all directions.

II. The battlefield's overlap of spaces {zhanchang kongjian de chongdiexing}...106

The battlefield for air force operations {kongjun zuozhan de zhanchang} overlaps, regardless of whether this is horizontal or vertical. On the one hand, this is manifested in the interwoven overlapping of objective geographical positions and in the interlocking and overlay between the air battlefield and the land and sea battlefields, which produces tangible overlapping. On the other hand, it is manifested in the interwoven overlay between the electromagnetic battlefield and the air battlefield, which produces intangible overlapping.

III. The battlefield environment is restrictive {zhanchang huanjing de zhiyuexing}...106

In future joint operations, the battlefield environment will be extremely complex, and this will have great effects and restrictions on the air force's operational actions. For example, terrain conditions will affect the air routes and flight profiles {hangxing poumian} that aviation troops select; they will also have a certain effect on the selection of surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, and radar sites and on how the effectiveness of operations is brought into play. Weather conditions will affect the takeoff and landing and movement of aircraft, as well as the targets that they attack. Complex electromagnetic environments {dianci huanjing} will have unfavorable effects on the command of air force strengths' {kongjun liliang} operations, on early warning, and on the accuracy of strikes. In operations, whether or not it is possible to overcome these effects in an effective manner will directly affect the effectiveness of air force operations.

IV. The installation in advance of battlefield installations {zhanchang sheshi de yushexing}...106

Air force operations rely heavily on airfields and sites; if they are kept separate from airfields and sites, it will be difficult for air force strengths {kongjun liliang} to smoothly carry out their operational missions; however, there are many key factors in the construction of airfields and sites, there is a huge amount of work in their engineering,

and technical standards and requirements are high, while the cycle of construction is long. Therefore, air force airfields and sites usually are set up in advance, in peacetime.

Section 2: The Effects of the Battlefield Environment on Air Force Operations **{zhanchang huanjing dui kongjun zuozhan de ying xiang}...106**

Air force operations are carried out in various types of battlefield spaces, and how good or how bad {hao huai} the battlefield environment is will have multi-faceted effects on air force operational actions. Sometimes this will directly restrict the process and outcome of air force operational actions. The battlefield environment for air force operations refers to the sum of the various natural factors and manmade factors within the scope of the spaces for the two hostile sides' military actions that affect air force operational actions. The battlefield environments that affect air force operations primarily include: the natural environment {ziran huanjing}, the social environment {shehui huanjing}, and the electromagnetic environment {dianci huanjing}.

I. The effects of the natural environment on air force operations {ziran huanjing dui kongjun zuozhan de yingxiang}...107

The natural environment {ziran huanjing} of the battlefield refers to the various natural factors within the space of operations that affect operational activities; these include the weather, terrain, and hydrology. These natural factors will affect how air force operational actions and the functions of weapons are brought into play.

(1) The natural environment affects naval operational decisions and plans {ziran huanjing yingxiang kongjun zuozhan juece he jihua}

The natural environment {ziran huanjing} of the battlefield has a major impact on planning for air force operations and on the drafting of plans for operations. If weather and terrain conditions are poor, this will affect launchings, flights, and assaults by aviation troops as well as the spreading out and operations of air defense troops, airborne troops, and radar troops. Therefore, commanders and command organs must fully take into consideration the effects of the natural environment {ziran huanjing} when planning operations and drafting plans of operations.

(2) The natural environment affects air force operational actions {ziran huanjing yingxiang kongjun zuozhan xingdong}

First, the terrain conditions affect the air force's operational activities. High plateau regions are high above sea level, and air density [there] is low. This affects the dynamics of aviation air {hangkong kongqi}, it increases the distance that aircraft roll when taking off, and it reduces the weight for takeoff; sometimes [aircraft] cannot take off with a full load. High plateaus lack oxygen; crews and their operations personnel use up a great deal of physical strength, affecting their ability for operations. Landforms in mountainous

country are complex and landmarks are markedly few in number, which poses fairly great threats to flight security. Overlaps in mountain chains weaken the effectiveness of airborne radio equipment, and it is easy for this to interfere with the aiming of airborne radar. When attacking targets on mountain slopes, ammunition's ability to penetrate is weakened, and it is not easy to destroy fixed targets. In mountainous country, slopes are high and precipitous, with large angles of obstruction {*zhebi jiao da*}, which affects the selection of sites for radar, antiaircraft artillery, and surface-to-air missiles as well as their coordinated movement and mobile transfers. They frequently encounter blowing sand and sudden changes in the weather, which increases the difficulty of flight support. Tropical regions with mountain jungles have variable terrain; surface vegetation is luxuriant, and it is difficult to find and identify from the air targets concealed on the surface. Forests are dense, mountain chains overlap, and landing fields are narrow, [so] it is difficult for airborne troops to make air landings. In addition, the special natural geographical environment in regions like coastal areas and wilderness grasslands also has important effects on the air force's operational activities.

Second, weather and meteorological {*tianhou qixiang*} conditions affect air force operational activities. In flight procedures of operations, aviation troops are affected by the weather, no matter whether it is during takeoff, assembly, and formation or it is flying toward the airspace of operational activities, attacking the target, and withdrawing from the attack. Clouds and fog lower visibility, which helps aviation troops in flexibly choosing attack flight paths and flight profiles {*hangxing poumian*}, in closing with the enemy, and in defeating opponents by a surprise move, but which creates a great deal of difficulty in flying toward the target, in searching for and finding the target, and in accurate bombing. It is impossible to use laser sighting devices in clouds, the effectiveness of infrared-guided weapons cannot be brought into play in an effective manner, and the intense lightning and electromagnetic fields in cumulus clouds and cumulonimbus clouds endanger flight safety. Not only does rain affect aviation troops' flight while in the air, but excessive accumulations on runways will affect the safety of aircraft while landing, and thunderstorm weather easily interferes with the various types of radar and radio equipment. Wind affects aircraft takeoffs, assembling, flying toward the target, bombing, shooting, and landing. On dark nights, it is very difficult to fly, and coordination is complicated; it is not easy to organize actions by large formations, it is difficult to find targets by eyesight, and it is difficult to bring into play the role of optical sighting.

(3) The natural environment affects how air force weapons and equipment functions are brought into play {*ziran huanjing yingxiang kongjun wuqi zhuangbei xingneng de fahui*}

Complexities in terrain conditions and fairly large numbers of obstacles will affect the probes of surface weapons against the air and shorten the distances for weapons systems' operations. Lake dampness {*hu shi*} and sand will cause weapons and equipment to have an increased rate of mishaps, like sparks that strike and short circuits, even to the point where [the weapons and equipment] do not function normally. In burning hot seasons, it is easy for components in aviation troops' weapons to age and deteriorate, for electrical

equipment insulation functions to deteriorate, and for accidents to increase. Under severely cold conditions, there is an increase in lubricants' resin viscosity {zhi niandu}, components' seals deteriorate, and snowpacks and freezing affect the normal working of weapons and equipment.

II. The effects of the social environment on air force operations {shehui huanjing dui kongjun zuozhan de yingxiang}...108

[The term] battlefield social environment {shehui huanjing} refers to the sum of the various relationships, such as the economic foundation and superstructure, that air force operations rely upon for their makeup. They include economics, public opinion, organizations {zuzhi jigou}, and groups of personnel. The social environment {shehui huanjing} is a soft-power environment, and it has fairly profound indirect and potential effects on air force operations.

(1) The social environment affects the basis for air force operations {shehui huanjing yingxiang kongjun zuozhan jichu}

The social environment {shehui huanjing} – a nation's policies, the will of its people, society's opinion, and the nature of the nation's people – is soft power for operations, and it can indirectly affect air force operations. The quality of a nation's people and their educational basis affect the quality of sources for personnel in air force operations, while the nation's policies and the treatment of air force operations personnel affect the enthusiasm for engaging in combat and the combat capabilities of air force operations personnel. The people's will and society's opinion affect resolve and faith in air force operations.

(2) The social environment affects the scale of air force operations {shehui huanjing yingxiang kongjun zuozhan de guimo}

The social environment {shehui huanjing} also includes the nation's infrastructure and the conditions of its economic development. Whether the nation's infrastructure is good or bad restricts the scale of air force operational strengths' {zuozhan liliang} deployment and their operations. At the same time, consumption in air force operations under informationized conditions has increased to an unprecedented extent, the intensity of operations is extraordinarily intense, and the nation's economic power determines the ability of air force operations to continue.

III. The effects of the electromagnetic environment on air force operations {dianci huanjing dui kongjun zuozhan de yingxiang}...109

As the level of informationization in air force weapons and equipment has risen and as air force operational actions rely more and more on electronic equipment, electronic confrontation in air force operations has become more and more intense; this has led to

the battlefield electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*} becoming more and more complex, and has had fairly major effects on air force operational actions.

(1) The electromagnetic environment affects reconnaissance and probes {*dianci huanjing yingxiang zhencha tance*}

In future joint operations, the enemy will adopt various means of electromagnetic attack to carry out intense electromagnetic jamming of our various types of reconnaissance and probe equipment in order to block our ways of getting information, and to weaken and destroy the ability of our reconnaissance and probes. This will primarily be displayed in how the enemy will adopt forms to prevent our electromagnetic reconnaissance and jamming, primarily using wired [communications] but also using radio as an auxiliary, and he will make widespread use of many means, such as submarine cables, submarine fiber optic cables, satellite communications, digital microwaves, digital radio relays, and radio, to carry out communications contacts. Moreover, he will adopt such tactical and technological measures as reduced broadcasting power, the use of powerful directional antennas, and the use of spread spectrum, frequency hopping, and information encryption, to make it more difficult for us to obtain his electromagnetic signals. The enemy will carry out intense electromagnetic jamming against us, blinding our probes and sensors, so that our perception is confused. He will also use large amounts of stealth camouflage and measures that conceal what is real and show what is false {*yin zhen shi jia*}, which presents a grim challenge to [our] ability to process and differentiate information and which seriously affects the accuracy of [PRC] commanders and operations personnel at each echelon as they appraise [the situation] and make decision. PRC early warnings and surveys of the air situation primarily rely upon such means as radar detection and optoelectronic probes, and the various types of reconnaissance and early warning equipment will suffer active and passive jamming that is carried out by enemy long-distance support jammers {*yuanjuli zhiyuan ganraoji*}, electronic jammers that accompany [troops] {*bansui dianzi ganraoji*}, and jamming equipment on the earth/sea surface, blinding our radar and reducing the distance of surveys. In addition, the functions of most of our air reconnaissance and early warning equipment are outdated, and the problem of “amblyopia” {*ruoshi*} will be even more pronounced.

(2) The electromagnetic environment affects command and control {*dianci huanjing yingxiang zhihui kongzhi*}

In future joint operations, use of the spectrum will be extremely intense; in particular, our command and control systems will be key targets for enemy electromagnetic jamming and suppression. Under the enemy’s powerful electromagnetic suppression, our command and control capabilities will be weakened to a fairly great extent. This is primarily manifested in the following. First is that it will be easy to block and interrupt information transmission. Shortwave and ultrashortwave network communications are the PRC’s main form of communications in the command of operations, and they are used over a broad scope. When jammed electromagnetically by the enemy or by our side, this will on the one hand paralyze our information transmission system, interrupting the

transmission of information. On the other hand, the frequency bands used by our main battle weapons and equipment are broad, and the frequency bands for the work of various types of electronic equipment seriously overlap; when communications equipment and other equipment are used simultaneously, it is easy for channels to be blocked and overrun. The appearance of these two situations ultimately threatens the stability of relations between command and information, and thus it affects the continuity of command and control in air force operations. Second is that the error rate in information transmission increases. In operations, the complex electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*} of the battlefield interrupts radio communications activities, or sometimes these are interrupted and sometimes they continue {*shi duan shi xu*}; sometimes there is no choice but to resend the information in order to achieve the transmission of the information. This leads to an increase in error rate and a decrease in reliability, thus distorting the information that has been sent. Third is that the timely effectiveness of command and control decreases. In future air force operations, the sphere, target, contents, and rate of information flow for command and control will greatly increase; in addition, there will be many forms of command and control, a heavy rate of flow, and multiple directions of flow; the amount of information that must be processed within a unit of time will increase by many times, the amount of information that command information systems process will increase, and the timely effectiveness for receiving, processing, distributing, and sending information in real time will be greatly affected.

(3) The electromagnetic environment affects the effectiveness of precision strikes {*dianci huanjing yingxiang jingque daji xiaoneng*}

As the number and quality of the PRC air force's precision-guided munitions increase, precision strikes will become a major means for air force operations to achieve their goals of operation. In operations, precision strikes will primarily be achieved through precision positioning, precision guidance, and precision aiming of assaults. However, a complex electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*} greatly reduces the accuracy in our getting, identifying, and transmitting information. At the same time, precision-guided weapons are relatively sensitive to electromagnetic effects, and they have a weak ability to resist jamming; these factors will have a fairly major negative effect on our carrying out precision strikes and will lower the effectiveness of the precision strikes.

(4) The electromagnetic environment affects the coordination of operations {*dianci huanjing yingxiang zuozhan xietong*}

In future air force operations, there will be diverse strengths involved in operations {*canzhan liliang*}, there will be many segments in actions, and the coordination of confrontations will be intense; a complex electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*} in the area of operations will make organizing coordination even more complex. First, it will be difficult to be aware of the battlefield, and there will be less focus in coordination. In wartime, as soon as there is any electronic jamming, awareness of the battlefield will be extraordinarily difficult, and the focused nature of cooperation in operations will be greatly lowered. Second, command systems will easily be suppressed, and it will be

harder to coordinate command. Given a complex electromagnetic environment {*dianci huanjing*}, when carrying out air force operations, the control system is inseparable from such information equipment as satellite reconnaissance, radar surveys, navigational positioning, identification friend or foe, and radio communications. In wartime, this equipment will become key targets for enemy jamming and destruction. As soon as [the equipment] is suppressed or destroyed by the enemy, it will become much more difficult to coordinate command, and it is possible that in wartime phenomena will appear where the coordination of command is interrupted. Third, there is serious self-jamming and mutual jamming {*zi rao hu rao*}, and the effectiveness of coordination will decline. As the levels of informationization in weapons and equipment increases, in future air force operations, various types of equipment that use frequencies will be positioned closely together within the limited space of the battlefield; the problem of overlap and radiation interweaving among the frequencies used by major electronic equipment will become extraordinarily serious, and the phenomenon of self-jamming and mutual jamming {*zi rao hu rao*} will become fairly general; if this cannot be satisfactorily resolved, it will have a serious effect on effective coordination among the various service arms within the air force and as well as [effective coordination] between the air force and other services and service arms.

Chapter 2

The Task Organizations and Missions of Air Force Strengths in Joint Operations...111

Section 1: Task Organizations of Strengths {*liliang biancheng*}...111

The task organization of air force strengths in joint operations {*lianhe zuozhan kongjun liliang biancheng*} usually is determined based on the scale of operations, the nature of operations, the task of operations, the enemy situation that [the air force strengths] are facing, their operational capabilities, and the battlefield environment.

I. The needs of task organizations {*biancheng yaoqiu*}...111

(1) Structures are rational and functions are diverse {*jiégou heli, gongneng duoyang*}

Under informationized conditions, air force operations are becoming ever more complex, and no one service arm (or type of aircraft {*ji zhong*}) can meet the needs of operations. Looking at practices in recent local wars, the task organizations of strengths {*liliang*} in air force operations have undergone a number of new changes. In the area of aerial strengths {*kongzhong liliang*}, a trend has appeared in which the proportion of support aircraft has risen, while the proportion of attack aircraft has fallen. In operations, support aircraft {*baozhang jizhong*} that make up a high proportion [of the airplanes involved] act in close cooperation and coordination with precision attack aircraft {*gongji jizhong*} and are able to achieve great benefits in operations. In the area of ground air defense strengths {*dimian fangkong liliang*}, the stress will be on the integrated organization of various types of surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery, forming an air defense firepower system where high-altitude, medium-altitude, and low-altitude [firepower] as well as long-distance, medium-distance, and close-in [firepower] will be combined and where [differing types of firepower] can support each other and supplement each other. Therefore, when determining the task organizations of air force strengths {*kongzhong liliang biancheng*}, it is necessary to rationally determine the proportion in which the various key factors of strengths {*liliang yaowu*} are combined, based on the mission that will be undertaken, so that they will have many types of operational functions, so that the mission and capabilities will be coordinated together, so that troop strengths {*bingli*} and firepower will be coordinated together, so that the operational system and support system will be coordinated together, and so that functions will supplement one another, forming an integrated whole.

(2) Fairly strong focus and adaptability {*jiao qiang de zhenduixing, shiyingxing*}

With differing forms of operations, differing operational missions, differing operational targets, and differing battlefield environments, the task organizations of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang de biancheng*} will also differ. Therefore, the task organizations of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang biancheng*} must have fairly strong

focus and adaptability {zhenduixing he shiyingxing}. First, it is necessary to determine the scale and makeup of task organizations, based on the target and mission of the operation. In future joint operations, the air force will undertake many types of missions; it will not only have air defense operations missions, but it will also have aerial attack operations missions; in addition, it will have airdrop and aerial blockade operations missions and [operational missions] to support the ground forces and the navy. Differing missions will have differing needs for the scale and structure of air force strengths' task organizations {kongjun liliang biancheng}, and it will be necessary to determine the task organization based on the operational missions that the upper echelons assign. Second, the makeup of the air force strengths {kongjun liliang} will be determined based on the operational environment. China is a populous and large country, its borders are long, and its terrain is complicated; the air force might not only operate over broad sea regions, but it might also operate in the air over islands; also, it could operate in the air over complicated terrain like the cold regions of plateaus, tropical jungles, and deserts and grasslands. These special geographical environments place differing requirements on the makeup of the air force strengths {kongjun liliang}, and the task organizations of air force strengths {kongjun liliang biancheng} must be very adaptable. Third, task organizations are determined based on the target of operations. In the future, the targets of operations that the PRC military will face will be varied; they could be a powerful enemy, but they could also be a weak enemy. With differing targets of operations, the task organizations of operations and the characteristics of operations will also be different, and it will be necessary to determine the number of combatant troop strengths {bingli} and weapons and the form of the task structure based on the organizational structure and organizational system {tizhi}, the method of operations, and the operational capabilities of the primary target of operations. Fourth, the task organization of operations is determined based on battlefield conditions. The air force's operational actions are restricted to a fairly great degree by battlefield conditions, and when determining the task organization of operations, it is necessary to fully take this factor into account and to rationally determine the scale and structure of air force strengths {kongjun liliang}.

(3) Combine peace and war, and be flexible and elite {ping zhan jiehe, linghuo jinggan}

When an incident occurs along a given strategic direction, [you] should bring into play the characteristics that air force troop strengths {kongjun bingli} have of rapid mobility, on the basis of the troop strengths {bingli} already existing in this theater of war and based on such factors as the goal of operations, enemy conditions, and the battlefield conditions. [You should] transfer elite troops and weapons from within the scope of the entire air force to this theater of war for rapid mobility, forming a task organization of air force strengths {kongjun liliang biancheng} whose scale is appropriate and whose structure is rational. For this reason, [you] should organize units {budui} in peacetime who are responsible for mobile operations missions and who are familiar with operational scenarios and with the theater of war's conditions, and who will regularly go to predetermined battlefields to carry out training in adaptability, in order to ensure that they can quickly form an operational entity in wartime whose operational capabilities are fairly strong.

In future joint operations, the success or failure of air force operations will have an important and even decisive effect upon the process and final outcome of the joint operations, and the task organization of the air force strengths {*kongjun liliang de biancheng*} must be commensurate with this. It is necessary to have crack strengths {*liliang*} with excellent weapons and equipment, with good training and quality, and with a high level of war-readiness, and [it is necessary] to organize operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} whose structure is compact and whose operational capabilities are strong, in order to meet the needs of joint operations. In addition, in future military operations, high-tech confrontations will be intense; in order to achieve predetermined operational goals, the two combatants will use various types of elite troops and weapons in a concentrated way. In order to adapt to the various developmental trends in aerial operations, [you] should do all you can in peacetime to enhance the high-tech contents of the air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} in each theater of war, and to have available {*zhangwo*} emergency-response mobile operational strengths {*yingji jidong zuozhan liliang*} that primarily have high-tech weapons and equipment and that have a strong ability to adapt. In wartime, [these] are to quickly move to predetermined theaters of war for whichever strategic direction requires them, they are to quickly combine with existing troop strengths {*bingli*} in the theater of war to form an air force operations group, and they are to complete various operational missions.

II. Forms of task organizations {*biancheng fangshi*}...113

The task organizations of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang biancheng*} include peacetime task organizations and wartime task organizations. Whether the task organizations of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang de biancheng*} are scientific and rational or not directly determines whether their operational capabilities can be fully brought into play or not, and it affects the completion of the operational mission and the outcome of the operations.

(1) Peacetime task organizations of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang pingshi biancheng*}

The peacetime task organizations of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang pingshi biancheng*} have a certain amount of stability, and generally have the aviation forces as the main body; they are composed of certain corps and professional units {*budui*} (or elements) from such service arms as the aviation forces, surface-to-air missile troops, antiaircraft artillery troops, radar troops, electronic warfare troops, radio technology reconnaissance troops, and airborne troops. The theater of war air force is responsible for the operational missions along a strategic direction; it is subordinate to the Central Military Commission Air Force's {*junwei kongjun*} organizational structure and it comes under the dual command of the Central Military Commission Air Force {*junwei kongjun*} and the theater of war. It usually jointly carries out joint operations with other services and service arms, or it independently organizes and carries out air force operations. Certain command posts, aviation troop divisions and regiments, surface-to-air missile divisions (or brigades or regiments), and antiaircraft regiments, as well as specialized

radio technology reconnaissance, electronic warfare, radar, and communications units {*budui*} (or elements) are directly subordinate to the theater of war air force. Airborne troop armies {*kongjiangbing jun*} are small-scale campaign large formations {*juntuan*} that carry out airborne missions; they generally carry out operational missions during joint operations, but they can also independently carry out airborne operational missions with the support of and cooperation from other service arms in their air force. They temporarily strengthen the theater of war, usually based on need. Their task organization generally includes aviation troop divisions, as well as corresponding specialized support units {*budui*} (or elements).

(2) Wartime task organizations of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang zhanshi biancheng*}

The wartime task organizations of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang zhanshi biancheng*} are formed based on the objective actual conditions of wartime, by adding and adjusting certain units {*budui*} on the basis of the peacetime task organization.

Against the background of differing joint operations, air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} have differing task organizations. Under normal conditions, when carrying out joint campaigns for a number of theater of wars, the Central Military Commission Air Force {*junwei kongjun*} will transfer troop strengths {*bingli*} in a unified manner within the various theaters of war air forces in order to temporarily form air force campaign large formations {*kongjun zhanyi juntuan*}. When carrying out theater of war joint campaigns, troop strengths {*bingli*} that are subordinate to the theater of war air force, acting as the main part, and some troop strengths {*bingli*} that have been reinforced by the upper echelon will jointly organize air force campaign large formations. When carrying out small-scale joint campaigns (including theater of war direction campaigns {*zhanqu fangxiang zhanyi*}), some troop strengths {*bingli*} from the theater of war air force will organize air force campaign large formations or combined tactical corps. [Finally,] when carrying out joint combat, certain operational and support units {*budui*} (or elements) from the air force will organize combined tactical corps.

Section 2: Main Missions {*zhuyao renwu*}...114

The main missions of air force strengths in joint operations {*lianhe zuozhan kongjun liliang*} usually are determined based on such factors as operational goals, the conditions of the enemy that they face, and our side's operational capabilities.

I. The basic missions undertaken by air force strengths in joint operations {*lianhe zuozhan kongjun liliang danfu de jiben renwu*}...114

The forms of joint operations differ, and the missions that air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} undertake also differ somewhat. Under normal conditions, air force strengths in joint operations {*lianhe zuozhan zhong kongjun liliang*} undertake the following basic missions.

- (1) Seizing and holding command of the air, and ensuring the aerial security of our military's main deployments, important targets, and important operational actions;
- (2) Carrying out aerial attack operations and assaulting the enemy's important in-depth targets;
- (3) Carrying out air defense operations and protecting the security of important targets;
- (4) Carrying out aerial deterrence and deterring enemy actions;
- (5) Carrying out aerial blockade operations and cutting off contact between the enemy and the outside world;
- (6) Carrying out aviation firepower support to ground force and naval units {budui};
- (7) Carrying out airborne and anti-airborne operations;
- (8) Carrying out aviation reconnaissance, reconnaissance against the air, and anti-reconnaissance;
- (9) Participating in electronic warfare combat;
- (10) Carrying out battlefield services like air transport, airdrops, rescue, and communications; and
- (11) Participating in military actions other than war such as counterterrorism and upholding the nation's maritime interests.

II. Specific missions of the various service arms of air force strengths in joint operations {*lianhe zuozhan kongjun liliang ge bingzhong juti renwu*}...115

- (1) The main missions of aviation troops {*hangkongbing de zhuyao renwu*}

The main missions of fighter aviation forces {*jianji hangkongbing*} are to carry out aerial engagements, attack enemy aerial targets, and seize and hold command of the air; to annihilate enemy air raid weapons and maintain the aerial security of the nation's strategic points, its important targets, and its major actions; to carry out aerial cover and be responsible for escort missions for other aviation troops' and airborne troops' combat actions; and to prevent such enemy actions as aviation reconnaissance, air transport, air landings, and airdrops.

The main missions of bomber aviation troops {*hongzha hangkongbing*} are to carry out aerial assaults, annihilate and destroy military and political targets and [targets involving] war potential in the enemy's strategic and campaign depths, and paralyze the enemy's

war systems; to assault such enemy targets as airfields, air defense positions, and radar positions and to seize command of the air; to assault enemy heavy troop assembly areas and destroy the enemy's effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*}; and to assault enemy traffic nodes and cut off enemy traffic and transportation.

The main missions of ground attack aviation forces {*qiangji hangkongbing*} are to suppress and annihilate the enemy's ground air defense firepower, assault enemy airfields and ground reconnaissance and detection systems, and seize command of the air; to assault such enemy targets as his effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*}, technical weapons, and communications nodes; and to support ground force and naval operations.

The main missions of reconnaissance aviation troops {*zhencha hangkongbing*} are to ascertain the conditions of important enemy military, political, and economic targets; to ascertain the conditions of enemy troop strength {*bingli*} deployments; to reconnoiter major enemy operational actions; to collect information on the distribution of the enemy's various pieces of equipment that use frequencies {*yong pin shebei*} and on how these frequencies are being used; to ascertain the results of assaults against the enemy; and to inspect the conditions of our military's camouflage protection.

The main missions of transportation aviation troops {*yunshu hangkongbing*} are to support units' {*budui*} movement by air; to carry out air landing deliveries; to transport by air and airdrop weapons and equipment and logistics materials; and to carry out aerial rescues.

(2) The main missions of surface-to-air missile troops {*di kong daodan bing de zhuyao renwu*}

[The main missions of these troops are] to maintain the security of key points and important targets and regions against the air; to attack the enemy's various kinds of air raid targets and participate in operations to seize command of the air; to support and shield the operational actions of services and services arms like the ground forces, the navy, and the Second Artillery; to attack enemy reconnaissance aircraft and prevent enemy aerial reconnaissance; to attack enemy aviation transportation targets like air transport, airdrops, and air landings; and to participate in electronic warfare combat and annihilate enemy airborne electronic jamming of targets.

(3) The main missions of anti-aircraft artillery troops {*gaoshepao bing de zhuyao renwu*}

[The main missions of these troops are] to attack enemy air raid weapons and maintain the security of important targets and important regions against the air; to carry out operations against the air and struggle for command of the air; to intercept enemy reconnaissance aircraft and prevent enemy reconnaissance; and to annihilate enemy transportation aircraft and helicopters and block enemy parachute [landings] and airborne [landings].

(4) The main missions of airborne troops {*kongjiangbing de zhuyao renwu*}

[The main missions of these troops are] to carry out airborne [landings] in enemy depths and to seize and occupy important targets in the enemy's rear areas; to carry out vertical landings and cooperate with landing units {*denglu budui*} in seizing landing sites; to carry out special airborne operations and annihilate or destroy important enemy targets; and to carry out emergency response deployments and to support and shield the movement and deployment of units along the front {*zhengmian budui*}.

(5) The main missions of radar troops {*leida bing de zhuyao renwu*}

[The main missions of these troops are] to carry out reconnaissance against the air and provide aerial intelligence in real time, and to support the smooth execution of command, guidance, and air control.

(6) The main missions of electronic warfare troops {*dianzi dikang bing de zhuyao renwu*}

[The main missions of these troops are] to carry out aerial [electronic warfare reconnaissance] and electronic warfare reconnaissance against the air, and detect how enemy electronic jamming [is proceeding]; to jam the enemy's radio signals, intelligence radar, and weapons control systems; to annihilate the enemy's important electromagnetic radiation sources; and to cooperate with other service arms in carrying out electronic defense.

(7) The main missions of communications troops {*tongxin bing de zhuyao renwu*}

[The main missions of these troops are] to establish and maintain communications contacts, carry out communications jamming and anti-jamming; establish and maintain command automated systems, and carry out navigation services support.

(8) The main missions of chemical defense troops {*fang hua bing de zhuyao renwu*}

[The main missions of these troops are] to carry out chemical tests and nuclear surveys; to measure and inspect chemical and radiation doses; to carry out chemical decontamination and decontamination of contamination {*zhanran xixiao*}; to organize and carry out smokescreen support; and to organize and guide units {*budui*} in protection against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons attacks and against secondary nuclear, chemical, and biological dangers.

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Chapter 3

Guiding Thought and Basic Principles for Air Force Operations in Joint Operations...117

The guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} and basic principles {jiben yuanze} for air force operations in joint operations are the basic theoretical foundation for planning and organizing air force operations, and they are the basic criteria for guiding and carrying out air force operational actions. The guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} for air force operations is a collective manifestation of the basic principles {jiben yuanze} of air force operations, while the basic principles {jiben yuanze} of air force operations are the specific reflections of the guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} for air force operations, from differing angles.

Section 1: Guiding Thought for Operations {zuozhan zhidao sixiang}...117

The guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} for air force operations in joint operations is a high-level generalization of the guiding laws for air force operations in joint operations; it occupies a core position in the theoretical system for air force operations, and it has a general guiding role for air force operations in the various forms of joint operations. The guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} for air force operations is directly affected by the restrictions and effects of multiple factors, such as the guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} for joint operations, the thinking about air force strategy, the levels of weapons and equipment, the targets of operations, and the operational environment. In giving overall consideration to these various restrictive factors, air force operations in joint operations should establish the guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} of “offensive operations, with a focus on controlling the air” {gongshi zuozhan, zhongdian zhi kong}.

I. The basic connotations of guiding thought for operations {zuozhan zhidao sixiang de jiben neihan}...117

The basic connotations of the guiding thought {zhidao sixiang} of “offensive operations with a focus on controlling the air” {gongshi zuozhan, zhongdian zhi kong} are: rely on the integrated power of joint operations by the various services and service arms, fully bring into play the advantages of the air force and its important role in joint operations, combine offense and defense with an emphasis on offence, and win victory [by] an offensive {gongshi zhisheng}. With seizing and holding command of the air as the core [action], concentrate elite troops and good weapons, use precision operations, and control the air and win victory {zhi kong zhi sheng}.

[The idea of] offensive operations {gongshi zuozhan} means that in joint operations, the air force carries out precision-node {jingque jiedian} attacks against the enemy, by using preparations for and execution of operations that must be [done] on the basis of paying attention to both offense and defense and that use active offensive operations {gongshi zuozhan} as their core, utilizing fairly large-scale air attack operations and special

operations. It quickly achieves the goals of the operation at a fairly low cost, such as destroying the enemy's will to fight; seizing command of the air in important areas and at important periods of time; weakening the enemy's war potential; supporting ground forces, navy, and Second Artillery operational actions; and annihilating the enemy's operational groups {*zuozhan jituan*} of heavy troops.

Focus on controlling the air {*zhongdian zhi kong*} means that in joint operations, the focus for using the air force is aerial security for seizing and holding command of the air, for shielding important targets, and for the important deployments and important operational actions of the ground forces, navy, and Second Artillery. Combining control of the air from the ground {*zhi kong yu di*} through air offensives and special operations with control of the air from the ground {*zhi di yu kong*} by air intercept and surface resistance, and seizing and holding command of the air at important nodes and in important areas, creates conditions for victory in joint operations.

The guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} for operations of “offensive operations with a focus on controlling the air” {*gongshi zuozhan, zhongdian zhi kong*} reflects the basic guiding laws of air force operations in joint operations; the two rely upon one another, supplement one another, cooperate with one another, and permeate one another, and they are a unified entity that is connected together while still having differences. Offensive operations {*gongshi zuozhan*} are a major way to annihilate the enemy and seize victory, as well as a major means for seizing command of the air; a focus on controlling the air {*zhongdian zhi kong*} is the primary task in offensive operations {*gongshi zuozhan*} as well as a premise and condition for completing other tasks. However, offensive operations {*gongshi zuozhan*} certainly do not mean just offense, while ignoring air defense operations, nor does a focus on control of the air {*zhongdian zhi kong*} mean that command of the air replaces everything [else], with no attention paid to other tasks. It is necessary to have offense and defense help one another {*gong fang xiang ji*} and to pay attention to both when doing planning, based on the needs of the overall situation in joint operations.

II. The key points in carrying out the guiding thought in operations for “offensive operations, with an emphasis on control of the air” {“*gongshi zuozhan, zhong dian zhi kong*” *zuozhan zhidao sixiang luoshi yaodian*}...118

The guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} for operations involving “offensive operations, with an emphasis on control of the air” {*gongshi zuozhan, zhongdian zhi kong*} is a macroscopic delineation of the essence of air force operations, as well as the general principle and general requirement of air force operations in joint operations. Carrying out the guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} of “offensive operations, with an emphasis on control of the air” {*gongshi zuozhan, zhongdian zhi kong*} touches on the various aspects of air force operations.

(1) The key points in carrying out the thinking of “offensive operations” {“*gongshi zuozhan*” *sixiang luoshi yaodian*}

As the level of informationization in air force weapons and equipment has risen, the air force’s ability for offensive and defensive operations {*fangyu zuozhan*} has been strengthened to an unprecedented degree, but because an imbalance existed in the development of offensive and defensive weapons, where the “spear” {*mao*}⁴ had precedence and the “shield” {*dun*}⁵ was secondary, the air force’s offensive nature was strengthened, and the asymmetry where attack was “strong” {*qiang*} and defense was “weak” {*ruo*} became even more pronounced. This is shown by the improvements in the long-range operations capabilities of modern operational aircraft, the ability to attack the defensive zone from outside, and the ability to penetrate defenses, which made surprise and flexibility in air force operations stronger. The manifold increase in bomb-carrying capacity {*zai dan liang*} has markedly increased the lethal and destructive power of air force operations. The universal use of precision guided munitions has greatly enhanced the accuracy and destructiveness of air attacks. Firmly holding to the thinking of offensive operations {*gongshi zuozhan*} means fully bringing into play the offensive specialties of aerial strengths {*kongzhong liliang*}, and treating offensive operations {*gongshi zuozhan*} as the basic way and most effective means for winning command of the air and for annihilating the enemy.

First, it is necessary to have an intense awareness of offense. Practices in recent local wars have fully shown that it is from the air that joint operations often first raise the curtain of war on the battlefield, and that this is a relatively independent stage of operations. The results of operations at this stage have a major effect on the progress and outcome of the war. In future joint operations, the key to bringing the effectiveness of air force operations into play lies in the one word: “offense” {*gong*}. In offensive joint operations, this requirement must be based on moving first in order to subdue the enemy {*xian ji zhidi*}, by forming powerful air assault groups to carry out violent initial assaults against the enemy, and through continuous offensive actions, leaving him with no way to organize an effective counterattack. In defensive joint operations, it is necessary to firmly supplement defense with attack, to be based on offensive defense, and to combine inner lines of defense with outer lines of offense, in order to seize the initiative at a time when [we] are on the defensive, and to achieve the goals of defense through active and effective counterattack operations.

Second, it is necessary to concentrate and use things {*jizhong shiyong*}. Concentrating and using things {*jizhong shiyong*} means using the main air force troop strengths {*kongjun zhuyao bingli*}, and especially its elite strengths {*jingrui liliang*}, along the main directions of operations, forming an advantage over the enemy and attacking key targets that play a supporting role in the enemy’s system of operations, doing this at

⁴ Translator’s note: that is, offensive weapons.

⁵ Translator’s note: that is, defensive weapons.

crucial moments in operations. Under informationized conditions, concentration is primarily manifested in the following several aspects. First is concentration of elite troops and good weapons. The strength and weakness of air force combat strength are not merely [a matter of] quantity, but rather of quality. Second is the concentration of information and firepower. Under informationized conditions, the superiority and inferiority of information not only determine the attributes {*guishu*} of the initiative in operations, but they also determine how the effects of weapons and equipment are brought into play, while firepower is the ultimate means of annihilating the enemy. Therefore, in operations, it is necessary to scientifically combine the various types of information support strengths {*xinxi baozhang liliang*}, information offense and defense strengths {*xinxi gong fang liliang*}, and firepower attack strengths {*huoli daji liliang*}, and to carry out “soft kills” {*ruan daji*} and “hard kills” {*ying cuihui*}, bringing into play the operational effectiveness of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} as much as possible. The third is dynamic concentration. In joint operations, air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} are deployed in a dispersed manner; the battlefield is broad, while at the same time there are also targets for the enemy to focus on attacking. [We] should fully bring into play the specialties of aerial strengths’ {*kong zhong liliang*} long-range movement and rapid movement, adopt forms that use static and dispersed deployment as well as dynamic concentration, concentrate things as the occasion demands, and form a “heavy hammer” {*zhong chui*} effect. The fourth is focused attack. It is necessary to keep an eye on structured destruction {*jiégou pohuai*}, to select key point targets that play a supporting role in the enemy’s system of operations and that have a major effect on the process and outcome of operations, to carry out precision attacks, to rapidly paralyze the enemy’s system of operations, and to strive for a quick fight and a quick resolution.

Third, it is necessary to properly handle the relationship between offense and defense. Thought that stresses offensive operations {*gongshi zuozhan*} certainly does not reject or exclude defensive operations {*fangyu zuozhan*}. Our opponent also stresses offensive operations {*gongshi zuozhan*}, and inevitably will adopt many forms of offense, doing his utmost to struggle for the initiative. Therefore, in joint operations, air defense operations are a major mission for air force operations, as well as an important means for annihilating the enemy. Only carrying out effective air defense can our operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} and operational potential be preserved, and only in this way can [we] smoothly organize and carry out offensive operations {*gongshi zuozhan*}. This requires that the air force’s offensive and defensive operational actions be regulated and controlled through unified planning and at the proper times. When carrying out offensive operations {*gongshi zuozhan*}, it is necessary on the one hand to actively pursue and master various types of favorable opportunities for battle, to carry out fierce and continuous assaults against the enemy, and to force the enemy into a situation where he struggles to cope, is put on the defensive, and has to endure attacks. On the other hand, it is necessary to have thorough control over the rhythm [of operations] and over switches from offense to defense, to avoid having “pinnacles” {*dingdian*} appear in operations, and to prevent impetuous fights that are not worth the effort or fights that consume things but do nothing {*wuwei de xiaohao*}. When carrying out defensive operations {*fangyu zuozhan*}, it is necessary to be skilled at plotting and creating momentum, and to create

conditions for an offense through integrated resistance and rigorous defense; as soon as conditions permit, it is necessary to organize counterattack operations at the proper time.

(2) The key points in carrying out the thinking of “focusing on controlling the air” {*zhongdian zhi kong*}” *sixiang luoshi yaodian* }

Command of the air means command of the air battlefield in joint operations; it is won through destroying [the enemy] in large numbers and through effective restriction of the enemy’s strengths for controlling the air {*zhi kong liliang*}. The stress on controlling the air {*zhongdian zhi kong*} is determined on the one hand by the importance of command of the air. In joint operations, the air battlefield is a support for the land battlefield and the sea battlefield; without command of the air, there is no command of the seas or freedom of action for the military on the surface, and winning or losing command of the air has a major effect on the process and outcome of joint operations. Only under the premise of mastering command of the air is it possible to use this advantage; to attack the enemy with integrated operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} on the multidimensional land, sea, air, space, and electronic battlefields; and to seize victory in joint operations. The air force is the main strength {*zhuti liliang*} in seizing command of the air, and it must treat command of the air as the core of its operations. On the other hand, [the stress on controlling the air] is based on the air force’s operational capabilities. The PRC air force is currently in an important period of transition from defensive models [of operations] to models that have both offense and defense, and its levels of weapons and equipment and its operational capabilities have both been greatly enhanced. However, there is still a great gap with the needs of future joint operations and with our opponents in operations. In joint operations, it is impossible to comprehensively use [these levels and capabilities] and completely satisfy the needs of joint operations. The extreme importance of command of the air and the contradiction of “supply and demand” {*gongxu*} between the PRC air force’s operational capabilities and its operational needs have determined that air force operations in joint operations must stress their use in seizing command of the air. In carrying out a “focus on controlling the air” {*zhongdian zhi kong*}, we should emphasize doing [the following].

First, it is necessary to have joint control of the air {*lianhe zhi kong*}. In joint operations, the air force is the main strength {*zhuti liliang*} for seizing and holding command of the air, and it will play a backbone role in operations. But under informationized conditions, there has been a great expansion in the constituent factors for seizing command of the air, and various types of information warfare strengths {*xinxi zuozhan liliang*}, space strengths {*hangtian liliang*}, surface air defense strengths {*dimian fangkong liliang*}, armed helicopters, and special operations units {*tezhong zuozhan budui*} have become important strengths {*zhongyao liliang*} in operations to seize command of the air.. Particularly in operations in the electromagnetic sphere, they have become important factors for getting the upper hand and that accompany command of the air {*xiang ban*}, and where [operations in the electromagnetic sphere and command of the air] give rise to one another {*xiangsheng*}. The variety and complexity of the constituent factors mean that it is not only necessary to limit enemy aviation troops’ activities in an effective

manner, but it is also necessary to resist [the enemy] by using many types of strengths {*liliang*} and means, and with many other types of objectives. In future joint operations, our adversary in operations will have a fairly strong ability to control the air; it can be envisioned that the enemy and we will inevitably center on this key point, command of the air, and will concentrate various types of strengths {*liliang*} and utilize various combat methods and means in order to launch a series of aerial offensive operations {*gongshi zuozhan*}, aerial engagements, and air defense operations in broad and multidimensional battlefield spaces. Therefore, it is necessary to bring into play the integrated power of the various services' and services arms' joint operations, and it is especially important to fully bring into play the role of information warfare strengths {*xinxi zuozhan liliang*}, space strengths {*hangtian liliang*}, and missile assault strengths {*daodan tuji liliang*}, and to achieve the goal of jointly controlling the air {*lianhe zhi kong*} through unified command and close coordination.

Second, it is necessary to stress key points. Command of the air is a situation, and complete and comprehensive command of the air is an ideal objective that operations seek after. Practices in warfare have shown that there is no absolute command of the air; this is so even under conditions where there the gap between the two combatants' aerial strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} is fairly disparate. Therefore, relativity is a fixed attribute in command of the air. In future joint operations, because our strengths for controlling the air {*zhi kong liliang*} will not have absolute superiority over the enemy, they usually will only be able to have command of the air during a given time and space and to a certain extent. Even if they achieve fairly great command of the air at the start, as soon as they cannot have effective control, it is quite possible that situations will emerge where they will win [command of the air] and then lose it, and where there are repeated struggles. In order to ensure that joint operations are smoothly carried out, it is necessary to stress key points, based on the enemy situation and on our actual operational capabilities, and to ensure seizing and holding relatively stable command of the air at important moments of time and in important regions.

Third is to combine controlling the air from the ground {*zhi kong yu di*} and controlling the air from the air {*zhi kong yu kong*}, with an emphasis on controlling the air from the ground {*zhi kong yu di*}. Operations to seize command of the air primarily consist of two basic methods: controlling the enemy on the surface {*zhi di yu dimian*} through aerial assaults and annihilating the enemy in the air through air warfare and through operations against the air. In comparing the two methods, it is easier to quickly achieve the goals of an operation by controlling the enemy on the surface {*zhi di yu dimian*}, and the price that is paid is much smaller than methods for annihilating the enemy in the air. However, our assault capabilities are limited, and our chances of completely controlling on the ground {*zhi yu dimian*} the enemy's strengths for controlling the air {*zhi kong liliang*} are not great. Therefore, at the same time that [we] predominantly hold to controlling the enemy on the surface {*zhi di yu dimian*}, [we] must also combine the two methods in an integrated manner, based on the actual background of operations, and [we must] flexibly utilize such measures as aerial assaults, resistance on the ground, and aerial engagements, to destroy the enemy's strengths for controlling the air {*zhi kong liliang*} in large

numbers and to limit these [strengths] in an effective manner, and to reach the goal of seizing command of the air.

Fourth is to manage well the relationship between operations to seize command of the air and other operational actions. Seizing command of the air is in itself not the ultimate goal of air force operations, but is only done to create the necessary conditions for joint operations in order to seize the initiative and to achieve the ultimate goals [of joint operations]. In a broad sense, throughout the entire process of joint operations, whether it is resistance between the enemy's and our aerial strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} or between aerial strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} and air defense operations' strengths {*duikong zuozhan liliang*}, and regardless of the scale [of operations], these all directly or indirectly affect the struggle to seize command of the air. Speaking in this sense, most of the air force's operational actions include to differing extents details for seizing command of the air. However, the main goal of many operational actions is not to seize command of the air. Therefore, it is impossible to use command of the air to replace everything; it is necessary to do a good job of managing the relationship between operations to seize command of the air and the completion of other operational missions. Under normal conditions, seizing command of the air takes place sequentially or simultaneously with such actions as the initial stage of joint operations and seizing command of information; as soon as the predetermined objectives are achieved, [we] should switch to carrying out other operational missions, under the premise of continuing to hold command of the air and based on the intentions and plans of the joint operations. If command of the air is not stable enough during the process of operations, or if the ground forces and the navy need to make a fairly large number of requests for air force assistance and support, it certainly is necessary to proceed from the overall situation of the operations, with a stress on using command of the air, and to avoid by all means dividing troop strengths {*bingli*} up equally or using them in a dispersed manner.

Section 2: The Basic Principles of Operations {*zuozhan jiben yuanze*}...122

The basic principles {*jiben yuanze*} for air force operations in joint operations is a reflection of the basic laws of air force operations, a specific reflection and refinement of the guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} for air force operations, and the basic criteria that should be obeyed when organizing and carrying out air force operations. In operations, the commander must be skilled at combining specific situations and correctly using these principles, and at organizing and planning air force operational actions.

I. Keep an eye on the overall situation, and be prudent in making decisions {*zhuoyan quanju, shenzhong juece*}...122

Air force operations in joint operations are no longer a purely military action; their success or failure affects the overall situation, and will be severely restrained by the nation's political and diplomatic struggle. The commander should stand at the heights of strategy, keep an eye on the overall situation of the joint operations, profoundly understand the intentions of the upper echelon and the needs that the political and

diplomatic struggle and situation have for the operations, and fully understand the status and role that air force operational actions have in the overall situation of joint operations. On the basis of fully mastering the enemy situation, our situation, and the battlefield conditions, he should proceed from the overall situation, grasp the important issues in planning for operations, and be prudent in making decisions. [He should] correctly select the main direction of operations in air force operations and the targets of attack, accurately grasp the moment for launching operations and the transformation of stages of operations, make scientific use of troop strengths {*bingli*}, and ensure that the operational goals that have already been determined are achieved.

II. Careful planning and complete preparations {*zhoumi jihua, chongfen zhunbei*}...123

Situations in air force operations are sudden, are very intense, and are highly consumptive; the first battle could be a decisive one. Success or failure in the operation is determined to a very great extent by whether preparations for the operations are complete or not. The commander must take the most complex and most difficult situations into consideration, based on the mission assigned by the upper echelon and focusing on the specific target of operations and the area of operations; he must make careful plans and be fully prepared. In peacetime, he must pay attention to mastering and collecting various intelligence materials, and strengthen his study of the target of operations; [he must] construct the battlefield and stockpile materials in a focused manner; [he must] adjust and improve scenarios at the proper moment, based on developments and changes in the enemy situation and the battlefield environment; and [he must] strengthen training that is flexible and be familiar with plans, scenarios, and the battlefield environment. Prior to the battle {*linzhan qian*}, he must carry out modifications, based on the mission and the situation, and complete the various preparations within a specified period of time, in a concealed and rapid manner.

III. Stress offense, and combine offense with defense {*zhuzhong jin'gong, gong fang jiehe*}...123

Offense is the most effective means of winning and keeping the initiative, and it is the basic means for completing the missions of air force operations and for achieving the goals of joint operations. Air force operations must strive to create and seize opportunities for battle, and attack the enemy in an active way that takes the initiative. In offensive operations {*gongshi zuozhan*}, it is necessary to carry out intense and violent initial assaults against the enemy and, through continuous offensive actions, to leave him with no way to organize an effective counterattack. At the same time, [we] should organize effective air defense, using defense to assist offense, to ensure the stability of the attack posture. In air defense operations, it is necessary to be based on the thinking of an offensive air defense {*gongshi fang kong*}; at the same time that [we] intercept incoming enemy aircraft level by level, [we should] actively organize counterattack actions of differing scales, in order to achieve the goals of defense.

IV. Integrated operations and close coordination {zhengti zuozhan, miqie xietiao}...123

Air force operations under informationized conditions are an integrated confrontation between the enemy's and our systems of operations. The various operational strengths {zuozhan liliang}, the various directions of operations, and the various operational actions must be closely coordinated, while the various service arms' units {bingzhong budui} and the various weapons systems must carry out scientific allocations and rational deployments, under unified intentions and in accordance with the needs of the mission and the functions of operations, forming an integrated joint force. In order to ensure that the units {budui} involved in the operations act in a coordinated manner, it is necessary to carry out unified command over the operational strengths {zuozhan liliang}, to carefully draft and coordinate plans, to differentiate among operational missions in a proper manner, to clarify the relationships that are being coordinated, and to tightly organize coordination in operations. [It is necessary] to establish a coordinated organization and to strengthen coordinated support; to rigorously observe battlefield conditions and to adjust and coordinate the operational actions of the various strengths {liliang} in the task organization, in a timely manner; and to educate subordinate units {budui} to base themselves on overall concepts, and [to educate them] to proceed from the interests of the overall situation, obey the unified command, resolutely carry out the plans of operations, trust and support one another, and take the initiative for close coordination.

V. Concentrate elite [troops] and attack key points {jizhong jingrui, da di yaohai}...124

Concentrating and using [force] is the basic method for forming superiority. Under informationized conditions, the air force should not only stress the concentration of numbers when concentrating and using [force], but even more, it should stress the concentration of elite troops and good weapons as well as the concentration of firepower and information strengths {xinxi liliang}. It is necessary to concentrate elite units {jingrui budui} and advanced and new technical equipment along the main directions of offense and along directions of defense where the threat is greatest, for carrying out missions at crucial moments that play a decisive role for the overall situation; to stress attacking the enemy's key targets; to carry out structured destruction {jiegou pohuai}; and to try to gain an advantage over the enemy {youshi zhi di}.

VI. Concealment and surprise, and defeating the opponent by a surprise move {yinbi turan, chuqizhisheng}...124

Acting in a concealed and sudden way can leave the enemy with no way to quickly respond in an effective manner; this supplements our inferiorities in equipment and technology and it can achieve the goals of operations in one blow before the enemy's advantages can be effectively brought into play, winning fairly large combat results at a fairly low price. In planning operations and using troop strengths {bingli}, commanders

should use all their means, measures, and combat methods to try to achieve surprise and to win victory through surprise *{yi qi zhi sheng}*. To do this, they must organize preparations for operations and operational movements in a concealed way; cleverly select the moment, direction, and location for operational actions; carry out widespread electronic warfare and organize operational feints; and fully utilize natural conditions like the weather and terrain to attack the enemy, by appearing where he does not expect it.

VII. Be rapid and flexible, and move first in order to subdue the enemy *{kuaisu linghuo, xian ji zhidi}*...124

Air force operations are intense *{jinzhang jilie}*; only by reacting rapidly and moving flexibly is it possible to seize favorable opportunities, to move first in order to subdue the enemy *{xian ji zhidi}*, and to seize the initiative in operations. To do this, it is necessary to quickly obtain intelligence materials, to quickly make decisions, to quickly organize and plan things, and to quickly act, trying to move before the enemy does and to change before the enemy does. Commanders should be skilled at fully bringing into play their subjective dynamism, based on battlefield situations; at studying and weighing situations, at flexibly using and changing combat methods, and at selecting and changing the directions of operations and the targets of attack at appropriate times, [in order to] force the enemy into a situation where he is on the defensive.

VIII. Comprehensive support and stressing key points *{quanmian baozhang, tuchu zhongdian}*...125

Air force operations are highly intense, missions frequently change, large amounts of materials and equipment are consumed, and support is quite complex. Losses or destruction that could occur during any segment could have a negative effect on the process and outcome of operations. It is necessary to take into account all factors when planning things, and to comprehensively organize each item of support. It is necessary to establish a scientific support system; to rationally use each support strength *{baozhang liliang}*; to comprehensively utilize each means of support; to provide in a timely fashion the information, equipment and materials, and technology that are needed for operations; and to support the commander's command and [to support] units *{budui}* as they securely and smoothly complete operational missions. At the same time that there is comprehensive support, it is necessary to stress key points, to concentrate main support strengths *{zhuyao baozhang liliang}* and superior support equipment, and to stress supporting operational actions by the main units in operations *{zuo zhan budui}* along the main directions and at crucial moments.

Chapter 4

The Command Organizations of Air Force Strengths in Joint Operations...125

The command of air force operations in joint campaigns is a series of organization and leadership activities that the commander of the joint operations, the commander of the air force, and his command organs exercise for the operational actions of their subordinate air force units {*kongjun budui*} and of the relevant service and service arm units {*budui*} that are supporting and cooperating with these operations.

Air force operations in joint operations usually consist of the comprehensive command and control that the air force operational group headquarters {*kongjun zuozhan jituan zhihuibu*}, established under the joint operations headquarters, exercises over air force operations. Based on the scale of the operations and on the mission of the air force, it can be organized by a command group sent out by the Central Military Commission Air Force {*junwei kongjun*}, but it can also be established on the basis of the theater of war air force command organization. The air force operations group headquarters {*kongjun zuozhan jituan zhihuibu*} in joint operations is made up of the commander and his command organ. The main commander is delegated or assigned by the upper echelon committee, and the command organ is formed in accordance with the principles of it being elite and highly effective. The functions of the air force operations group headquarters {*kongjun zuozhan jituan zhihuibu*} are based on the intentions of the joint operations headquarters, and [this air force operations group headquarters] is specifically responsible for organizing and carrying out various air force actions, including commanding in a unified manner the offensive and defensive actions of the various types of operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} within the task organization and [including] organizing the various items of support; [it is also responsible for] proposing the needs [that it has] for support from the other service and service arm operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} that are supporting operations, and for guiding and coordinating support actions of the service and service arm aerial strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} and air defense strengths {*fangkong liliang*}.

In order to facilitate command and to maintain the stability of command, the air force operations group headquarters {*kongjun zuozhan jituan zhihuibu*} usually sets up a basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} and reserve command post {*yubei zhihuisuo*}; based on need, it can also set up a forward command post {*qianjin zhihuisuo*} and an aerial command post {*kongzhong zhihuisuo*}.

Section 1: The Basic Command Post {*jiben zhihuisuo*}...126

The air force basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} is the command center for air force strengths' {*kongjun liliang*} operational activities in joint operations; it usually has a commander and general duty personnel {*zong zhiban yuan*}, as well as intelligence, communications, cryptographic, navigation, electronic warfare, ground air defense, air

traffic control, weather, and radar departments. Personnel consist of the commander, political committee member, and the chief of staff as well as the leaders of command, political, logistics, and equipment departments, along with commanders from the other services and service arms that are subordinate or are supporting [the air force] or their coordinating and contact representatives. [Finally,] it has necessary services support {*qinwu baozhang*} personnel.

The basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} is responsible for keeping a grasp on overall intelligence and for unified command over units' {*budui*} actions. Its primary responsibilities are: to keep a grasp on and report the overall situation of the joint operation, to command the spreading out {*zhankai*} and deployment of subordinate units {*budui*} in accordance with the intentions and operational decisions of the joint operations headquarters, to determine the operational missions of the various units {*budui*}, to exert effective control over the various air force units' {*budui*} operational actions, to order reserve forces to become involved in operations at an appropriate time, to command at an appropriate time the switch between offensive and defensive operations, to coordinate operational actions with other services and service arms, and to organize various support items.

Section 2: The Reserve Command Post {*yubei zhihuisuo*}...126

The air force reserve command post {*yubei zhihuisuo*} is a command organization that is held in reserve and that is established to replace command by the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*}. It can be set up at the same time as the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*}. It usually consists of the deputy commander of the air force operations group {*kongjun zuozhan jituan*} and other necessary command personnel, and it has necessary service support strengths {*qinwu baozhang liliang*}. Prior to its replacing command by the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*}, it generally only receives situational bulletins; it keeps abreast at all times of how operations are unfolding, in order to facilitate taking over command at any time. If the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} has an excessive amount of command [work] to do or under other necessary conditions, [the reserve command post] can take on some local command duties, based on the instructions of the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*}.

Section 3: The Forward Command Post {*qianjin zhihuisuo*}...126

The forward command post {*qianjin zhihuisuo*} is a command organization that is set up in order to strengthen command along major operational directions or to facilitate command of, coordination of, and support to the operations of units {*budui*} on the ground (or at sea). It usually is deployed fairly close to the forward positions along the major direction or close to the ground forces or naval forward command post {*qianjin zhihuisuo*} that is coordinating operations. It can also have a lower-echelon command post as a substitute, based on need. It generally is set up with necessary command personnel led by a deputy commander of the air force operations group {*kongjun zuozhan jituan*}.

Section 4: Aerial Command Post {kongzhong zhihuisuo}...127

The aerial command post {kongzhong zhihuisuo} is a command organization situated on an aircraft in the air. An aerial early warning command aircraft has good mobility and it does not easily come under attack; moreover, radar and communications equipment are not affected very much by terrain, they function over long distances, they can surveil the entire airspace over a fairly large scope, they can find enemy aerial targets in a timely manner and command and guide their own side's aircraft, and they can independently assume command over a given region. Therefore, the aerial command post {kongzhong zhihuisuo} generally is set up in an aerial early warning and command aircraft.

An aerial early warning and command aircraft mainly is controlled by the commander of the air force operations group {kongjun zuozhan jituan}; usually, a deputy commander or deputy chief of staff leads a small number of command and control [personnel] and specialized personnel in exercising command. Based on the functions and number of the aerial early warning and command aircraft, the region and scope of early warning and command is usually differentiated in accordance with the operational direction or the operational mission. In order to carry out continuous aerial surveillance and command, aerial early warning and command aircraft usually must alternate with each other by turn for activities in the air.

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Chapter 5

The Major Operational Actions of the Air Force in Joint Operations...127

In future joint operations, the major operational actions of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} will consist of [the following]: air deterrence {*kongzhong weishe*}, information operations {*xinxi zuozhan*}, air offensive operations {*kongzhong jin'gong zuozhan*}, air defense operations {*fang kong zuozhan*}, aerial blockade operations {*kongzhong fengsuo zuozhan*}, airborne landing operations {*kongjiang zuozhan*}, and support to other services' operations {*zhiyuan qita junzhong zuozhan*}.

Section 1: Air Deterrence {*kongzhong weishe*}...127

Air deterrence {*kongzhong weishe*} means using powerful air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} as a backdrop to awe and contain antagonists through threatening to use or through the limited use of air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*}. The goal in carrying out air deterrence {*kongzhong weishe*} is to show the enemy our side's air operations' power and resolve, through the comprehensive use of offensive-type deterrence and defensive-type deterrence, active deterrence and static deterrence, and soft deterrence and hard deterrence. This will give [the enemy] a mindset of fear as he weighs advantages and disadvantages and gains and losses, and he will abandon his original intentions or have some restraint in the scale, intensity, and measures for his operation, so that [we] will deter war. In future joint operations, to have air deterrence {*kongzhong weishe*} truly play its role of awing [the enemy], it will be necessary to have three basic conditions: the first is to have superior air deterrence strengths {*kongzhong weishe liliang*} that can put the enemy in fear; the second is to have the resolve and will to use air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*}; and the third is to have smooth channels to transmit the deterrence information to the antagonist, so that the antagonist truly will feel deterred.

Air deterrence {*kongzhong weishe*} is hierarchical, and it is possible to differentiate air deterrence {*kongzhong weishe*}, in accordance with differences in their intensity, into: low-intensity displays to deter the enemy {*di qiangdu xianshi she di*}, medium-intensity high pressure to deter the enemy {*zhong qiangdu gao ya she di*}, and high-intensity small attacks to deter the enemy {*gao qiangdu xiao da she di*}. In future joint operations, it will be possible, based on differing targets, opportunities, and goals, to flexibly use forms and means of deterrence. [We] usually should try to achieve the goal of containing antagonists at fairly low levels [of deterrence]. If we cannot resolve issues in an effective manner, [we should] incrementally increase the level of deterrence.

I. Low-intensity displays to deter the enemy {*di qiangdu xianshi she di*}...128

Low-intensity displays to deter the enemy {*di qiangdu xianshi she di*} means displaying to the enemy [our] own side's powerful air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} by such means as strengthening the buildup of air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} and carrying out air

force weapons and equipment {*kongjun wuqi zhuangbei*} experiments in peacetime and in the initial period of a crisis, so that the enemy will not lightly dare to act rashly. This form of deterrence usually is carried out in coordination with a political and diplomatic struggle. Its primary methods consist of [the following].

(1) Strengthening the buildup of air force strengths {*jiaqiang kongjun liliang jianshe*}

The emergence and development of the aerial battlefield produced a huge challenge for traditional forms and methods of operations. Recent local wars have shown that the aerial battlefield has become a dominant battlefield for joint operations, that air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} already have the ability to independently achieve strategic and campaign goals, and that the use of air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} often can play a huge role in awing [the enemy]. In order to fully bring into play the deterrent role of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*}, [we] should energetically strengthen the buildup of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} in peacetime. If we can build up informationized air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} whose quality is first-rate, whose structure is rational, whose systems are complete, and who have both offensive and defensive [capabilities], this will have a powerful deterrent [effect] against the enemy, both in repelling invasion by a powerful enemy and in the struggle to uphold the fatherland's unity.

(2) Researching and developing and testing new types of air force weapons and equipment {*yanzhi he shiyan xinxing kongjun wuqi zhuangbei*}

The primary condition in carrying out air deterrence {*kongzhong weishe*} is to have armed force and actual strength as a backdrop, and an important factor in forming armed force and actual strength is air force weapons and equipment {*kongjun wuqi zhuangbei*}. How advanced air force weapons and equipment {*kongjun wuqi zhuangbei*} are is an important symbol of air force strengths' {*kongjun liliang*} strength or weakness, and openly or semi-openly carrying out certain important air force equipment tests – such as publishing how research and development of new types of warplanes and missiles is being planned and proceeding, test flights of new types of warplanes, and the launching and testing of new types of missiles - and selectively displaying to the outside world the accomplishments in the buildup of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} through various media, will show the enemy that we have a powerful air operations capability, and thus deter him. In using these methods, [we] should broadly utilize strategy; not only must we let the enemy know that we have a powerful air operations capability but we also cannot reveal all of [our] actual strength to the antagonist. It is necessary to partially conceal and partially display [things] {*ruo yin ruo xian*} and to have things half open and half secret, so that the enemy will not be clear about what is fake and what is real, and so that he will be worried and not at ease and will not dare to act rashly.

(3) Military exhibitions, and displays of weapons and equipment {*junshi biao yan he wu qi zhuang bei zhan shi*}

Organizing military exhibitions {*junshi biao yan*} and displaying weapons and equipment {*wu qi zhuang bei zhan shi*} are also important ways of deterrence that show the actual strength of air force operations. In order to bring into play the deterrent role of air force strengths {*kong jun li liang*}, we can hold military exhibitions {*junshi biao yan*} for visiting military and political notables from various countries, organize displays of new-type air force weapons and equipment {*kong jun wu qi zhuang bei zhan shi*} for them to attend, and arrange for some advanced air force weapons and equipment {*kong jun wu qi zhuang bei*} to participate in world air shows. Through these forms, [we can] send a message of air deterrence {*kong zhong wei she*} to the outside world.

(4) Organize routine military exercises {*zuzhi richang junshi yan xi*}

By organizing routine air force live exercises, it is possible to achieve a dual goal, that is, it is possible to comprehensively investigate the air force units' {*budui*} war readiness and training by means of these exercises and to test the functions of air force weapons and equipment {*kong jun wu qi zhuang bei*} as well as the air force units' {*budui*} ability to carry out operational missions, while at the same time it is also possible to deliver a message to the antagonist in operations about air deterrence {*kong zhong wei she*}. It is possible to adopt many forms in organizing routine air force live exercises; these primarily include transforming {*zhuan jin*} air force units' {*budui*} levels of war readiness, mobile transfers {*ji dong zhuan yi*}, training in methods of combat {*zhan fa yan lian*}, and rapid support {*kuai su bao zhang*}. In order to better bring into play the deterrence role of air force exercises, [we] should suitably select opportunities for exercises, rationally arrange the details of the exercises, and broadcast these to the outside world through various media.

II. Medium-intensity high pressure to deter the enemy {*zhong qiang du gao ya she di*}...128

Medium-intensity high pressure to deter the enemy {*zhong qiang du gao ya she di*} means that when a crisis is tending to become obvious and the enemy is clearly acting to prepare for actual war, and when war is imminent, then based on changes in the enemy situation, [we should] adopt such measures as exercises for confrontations on the verge of war, strengthen aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, adjust operational deployments, and organize patrols and warnings, to show [our] own side's current situation and its resolve for operations, and to let the enemy know that we are well-prepared for operations and that we have the resolve and the ability to win victory in operations. This will thus put pressure on the enemy, so that he will not dare to rashly act. The primary methods consist [of the following].

(1) Organize aerial reconnaissance and surveillance {*zuzhi kongzhong zhencha he jianshi*}

When a crisis is near at hand, organizing aerial reconnaissance and surveillance strengths {*kongzhong zhencha jianshi liliang*} at the proper time to carry out continuous reconnaissance and surveillance against the enemy not only can make thorough preparations for subsequent aerial combat, but it can also send a message of deterrence to the antagonist. As appropriate, [we] can adopt a number of means, such as aerial close-in reconnaissance and aerial transit reconnaissance {*kongzhong guojing zhencha*}, to ascertain the various situations that the enemy has and to surveil his every action, and as appropriate, [we can] make announcements through the media to let him know that we already have found out about his detailed information, which will then have the effect of awing [him].

(2) Organize aerial patrols and warnings {*zuzhi kongzhong xunluo jingjie*}

Organizing air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} to carry out patrols and warnings {*xunluo jingjie*} close to sensitive areas lets the enemy realistically feel deterrence from the air, and this is an important form of deterrence that can be used in the initial period of a crisis. When the enemy exhibits signs that he will launch a war, it is possible at an appropriate time to use operations aircraft to carry out aerial patrols and warnings {*kongzhong xunluo jingjie*}. The specific form of patrols, the areas of patrols, and the scale and strength of troop strengths {*bingli*} should be flexibly determined based on the situation at that time, in order to achieve optimal effects in deterrence.

(3) Organize live-fire air force exercises in confrontations when war is imminent {*zuzhi linzhan kongjun shibing duikang yanxi*}

Live-fire exercises in confrontations when war is imminent {*linzhan shibing duikang yanxi*} are a form of quasi-real warfare {*zhun shizhan xing*} aerial deterrent actions that have actual warfare as their background, that have both {*xianghu*} offense and defense, and that are carried out using computer simulations and live-fire and live-ammunition forms. Their goal is enhance the live-warfare capabilities of air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} through exercises, to test operational scenarios, and to show the antagonist our resolve and will to use air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} in wartime. The goals of this method are very explicit and relevant; they have an intense nature of confrontation and actual warfare, they are used during the initial period of a crisis to send the enemy a clear message of deterrence, and they often can have fairly good deterrent effects. There are many forms of air force live-fire exercises in confrontations {*kongjun shibing duikang yanxi*}; for example, we can organize air defense exercises and air attack exercises, the scale can be large or small, and while it is possible to independently organize and carry these out, it is also possible to jointly carry them out with ground [strengths] and strengths at sea {*haishang liliang*}. The specific forms of the exercises, their timing, their scale, and their details should be flexibly determined based on the situation at that time.

(4) Setting up deployments on the verge of war {*jianli linzhan bushu*}

Fully bringing into play the features that air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} have of speed and long-distance movement, moving air force troop strengths {*kongjun bingli*} rapidly to the area of operations, and setting up deployments on the verge of war {*jianli linzhan bushu*} are a critical form of air deterrence {*kongzhong weishe*} situated in between non-live-warfare deterrence and live-warfare deterrence; if this goes a step forward, it can be transformed into live warfare. Setting up this kind of deployment on the verge of war {*linzhan bushu*} undoubtedly is equivalent to sending the antagonist [a message that we are giving] an order to start a war {*fachu kaizhan ling*} and will give him a feeling that soldiers are coming and that he is faced with imminent catastrophe, and thus it will have a huge effect in awing [him]. In order to ensure that operational deployments are smoothly carried out, we should in peacetime strengthen battlefield construction in predetermined areas of operations; when a crisis intensifies, [we should] complete operational deployment, so that the enemy will retreat from these difficulties.

III. High-intensity small attacks to deter the enemy {*gao qiangdu xiao da she di*}...131

High-intensity small attacks to deter the enemy {*gao qiangdu xiao da she di*} are the use of small numbers of elite air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} to carry out warning-style attacks against the enemy's sensitive positions, when the adoption of various forms of non-military force still cannot restrain an escalation of the crisis; this warns the antagonist that we have made full preparations for operations and that we will not hesitate [to pay] any price to maintain our rights and interests, and that if he persists in doing what he is doing, he will come under even more serious attack. This is an air deterrence {*kongzhong weishe*} that has the nature of real warfare, and it is also the supreme form and means of air deterrence {*kongzhong weishe*}; it can better indicate [our] own side's resolve and will to uphold [our] rights and interests. Therefore, it has stronger deterrence than non-live-warfare air deterrence {*fei shizhan xing kongzhong weishe*}, and it often can have the effect of subduing the enemy with [only] a little fighting. Its main methods consist of [the following].

(1) Information soft kill {*xinxi ruan shashang*}

Information soft kill {*xinxi ruan shashang*} is the use of air force information operations strengths {*xinxi zuozhan liliang*} to carry out violent electromagnetic jamming and suppression as well as deception and confusion of the enemy's information collection and transmission [systems] and command and control systems in space, in the air, on the ground, and at sea; this blinds the enemy's information, cuts off his information, and [causes] his command to malfunction. At the same time, it adopts attack actions to steal, distort, remove, deceive, and block his information, paralyzing the enemy's network system and causing the enemy to fully feel our powerful information operations {*xinxi zuozhan*} capabilities. This will increase his worries about taking military action. There are many methods of information soft kill {*xinxi ruan shashang*}, and the means are

flexible; the specific opportunities for jamming, methods of jamming, targets of jamming suppression, scope of jamming, and levels of jamming should be cautiously chosen based on the various circumstances of the enemy and of ourselves. These [means] must be at an appropriate time and an appropriate level; not only do they need to have the effect of awing [the enemy], but they also cannot escalate the confrontation.

(2) Warning-style aerial firepower assaults {*jingshi xing kongzhong huoli tuji*}

Warning-style aerial firepower assaults {*jingshi xing kongzhong huoli tuji*} mean concentrating small numbers of crack air assault strengths {*kongzhong tuji liliang*} to carry out sudden, short, and limited firepower attacks against sensitive parts of the enemy's operations system, "showing military force to frighten the enemy" {*qiao shan zhen hu*}, so that he truly understands our power for operations and that in our resolve and will to uphold national interests, we will not hesitate to fight to the bitter end. Warning-type aerial firepower assaults {*jingshi xing kongzhong huoli tuji*} are the ultimate means that are adopted to achieve the goal of deterrence; as soon as they fail, this will mean that all actions of air deterrence {*kongzhong weishe*} have suffered defeat. Therefore, they should be meticulously organized. First, it is necessary to select targets of assault in an optimal way. Warning-style aerial firepower assaults {*jingshi xing kongzhong huoli tuji*} emphasize warning and punishing the enemy; it is necessary to hurt {*da tong*} the enemy, but you cannot enrage the enemy. Therefore, in selecting targets, these must be small but precise; usually [you] should select a number of nodes and targets in the enemy's operations system for carrying out an attack, causing local paralysis or structural shocks to the enemy's operations system. Second, [you should] have an accurate grasp of the moment for action. [You] usually should only use these [assaults] when other means of deterrence have not had an effect. In special circumstances, it is also possible to directly carry out warning-style aerial firepower assaults {*jingshi xing kongzhong huoli tuji*}. Third, [you should] strictly control the scale and intensity. It is necessary to prevent these from leading to the enemy's carrying out a full-scale retaliatory action against us because of their excessive scale and intensity. Fourth, it is necessary to comprehensively prepare for carrying out live warfare. As soon as the warning-style aerial firepower assaults {*jingshi xing kongzhong huoli tuji*} do not achieve their expected goal of deterrence, immediately switch to carrying out large-scale live warfare, and force the enemy to submit through this live warfare.

Section 2: Information Operations {*xinxi zuozhan*}...132

Information operations {*xinxi zuozhan*} are a series of operational activities and measures that air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} engage in so as seize and hold command of information {*zhixinxi quan*}. It is an important operational action in air force operations, as well as an important measure for ensuring victory in air force operations. Seizing and holding command of information {*zhixinxi quan*} refers to the capability to destroy the enemy's ability to obtain, transmit, process, and use battlefield information, while at the same time ensuring that [our] own side can gain these abilities. Information operations {*xinxi zuozhan*} primarily includes three major actions: information reconnaissance

{*xinxi zhencha*}, information offense {*xinxi jin'gong*}, and information defense {*xinxi fangyu*}.

I. Organizing and carrying out information reconnaissance {*zuzhi shishi xinxi zhencha*}...132

[The term] air force operations information reconnaissance {*xinxi zhencha*} refers to the use of various detection devices, sensors, computer networks, and other means to obtain various kinds of battlefield and related information, in order to provide information support to information offensive and defensive confrontation, operational command, and weapons control. Air force operational command organs should plan out and organize information operations reconnaissance {*xinxi zuozhan zhencha*} in a unified manner, adopt various measures, and collect intelligence and information materials about enemy operations in a wide-ranging manner.

During the stage of preparing for operations, it is necessary to carry out information reconnaissance {*xinxi zhencha*} against the enemy [we] are facing, based on the needs of joint operations, with an emphasis on ascertaining the makeup of enemy information systems, how these are deployed, and his main means for carrying out information operations {*xinxi zuozhan*}. Examples are the deployment of the enemy's early warning radar network, its working frequencies, its organizational system {*tizhi*}, and the scope of its probes; the position and capabilities of his information system's command nodes; the key points of the computer network in the C4ISR system; the position, communications forms, and communications frequencies of major installations; the types, numbers, forms of guidance, and deployment positions of information weapons; and his jamming capabilities, his types of platforms, and the number of his electronic jamming equipments. Reconnaissance provides a basis for information offense and defense, while at the same time, it provides a basis for the commander to analyze and appraise enemy conditions and to make operational decisions, and for the command organ to draft operational plans.

During the stage of carrying out operations, [information reconnaissance] primarily ascertains the functions and technical characteristics of enemy information technological equipment and informationized weapons systems that newly appear along our main directions of operations. It is especially necessary to pay attention to surveilling the battlefield deployments of enemy guidance systems, electronic jamming devices, and anti-radiation weapons and to how these are used, in order to provide a basis for jamming and annihilating these kinds of enemy devices and for us to adopt corresponding defensive measures. At the same time, it provides intelligence information for keeping a grasp on changes in enemy conditions and for us to determine countermeasures.

II. Organizing and carrying out information offensives {*zuzhi shishi xinxi jin'gong*}...133

[The term] information offensives {*xinxi jin'gong*} refers to degrading the enemy's capabilities for battlefield information activities and even causing him to lose these, and to taking deceptive, jamming, suppressive and annihilation activities against the enemy's various information devices and systems. Air force commanders and command organs should use various kinds of information offensive strengths {*xinxi jin'gong liliang*} in a centralized manner to carry out violent information jamming, suppression, and annihilation of the enemy along major directions and in regions [of operations] and at key moments of operations, on the basis of correctly judging the enemy's information operations {*xinxi zuozhan*} intentions, deployments, means, and forms, and based on the needs of the overall situation of the joint operations.

Jamming and annihilating enemy electromagnetic targets {*ganrao he cuihui di dianci mubiao*}. [We] should flexibly determine the methods and focus of jamming and annihilation, based on differences in the forms and missions of operations. In air defense operations, [we] should utilize various information offensive strengths {*xinxi jin'gong liliang*} in an integrated manner, such as electronic jammers, ground jamming stations, and anti-radiation attack weapons, with a focus on jamming and annihilating the navigational, communications, radar, and weapons control systems of enemy aerial early warning and command aircraft and other aerial targets; on destroying the enemy's command and control capabilities; on degrading the effectiveness of enemy aerial defense penetrations and attacks; and on supporting the smooth execution of our resistance and protective operations. In air offensive operations {*kongzhong jin'gong zuozhan*}, the emphasis is on jamming and annihilating the electronic receiving and transmitting devices in the enemy's C4ISR systems, such as early warning radar, ground-to-air communications {*duikong tongxin*}, and command and guidance systems, as well as the fire control systems and airborne radars of enemy air defense weapons. This will make it hard for the enemy to carry out effective air interception against us and will support our aircraft in smoothly carrying out penetration of defenses and attacks. In airborne landing operations, the focus is on jamming and annihilating enemy surface-to-air missile guidance radars and the guidance and targeting radars of other air defense weapons along our aircraft's air routes and within the scope of [our] airborne landing field, degrading his threat against our air transport {*kongzhong shusong*} aircraft and supporting airborne landing troops in smoothly touching down. In aerial blockade operations, the focus is on jamming and annihilating the direction, guidance, and targeting radar of enemy air defense weapons in the blockade zone that pose a direct threat [to us]. [The focus is] also on suppressing the early warning radars of enemy early warning and command aircraft, on the airborne radars of his operational aircraft, and on the enemy's air-to-air and air-to-ground communications, as well as on supporting the stability of our aerial blockade zone and on smoothly achieving the goal of cutting off the enemy's contact with the outside world.

Destroying and annihilating the important equipment at key points in the enemy's network {*pohuai he cuihui di wangluo jiedian shang de zhongyao shebei*}. In preparing for and carrying out operations, [we] should intrude into and carry out virus attacks against key parts of the enemy's C4ISR network system. [We] should [also] use precision firepower to annihilate key points in the enemy's information system, such as intelligence processing centers, command and control [centers], and large-scale computer centers.

Carrying out electromagnetic and network deception {*shishi dianci he wangluo qipian*}. In preparing for and carrying out operations, [we should] fully utilize means for intruding into the network to enter fake intelligence, fake commands, and fake data into the enemy's key systems. At the same time, it is necessary to broadly carry out electronic camouflage and feints. That is, [it is necessary] to use regulation and makeshift devices to engage in electronic camouflage against command posts, air fields, positions, and other defense targets, and to set up anti-enemy radar {*fan di leida*} and fake optoelectronic reconnaissance targets, so as to achieve the goal of confusing the enemy.

III. Organizing and carrying out information defense {*zuzhi shishi xinxi fangyu*}...134

Organizing information defense {*xinxi fangyu*} means the various measures and actions that are taken to keep [our] own side's information equipment and systems from coming under enemy information reconnaissance {*xinxi zhencha*} and information attacks {*xinxi jin'gong*}. Information defense {*xinxi fangyu*} primarily includes such measures as countering enemy information reconnaissance {*xinxi zhencha*}, countering enemy electronic jamming, countering enemy annihilation of our information equipment, and countering enemy use of computer networks to carry out information attacks.

Countering enemy information reconnaissance {*fan di xinxi zhencha*}. [We] should utilize various kinds of active and passive measures to defend against enemy information reconnaissance {*xinxi zhencha*}, decreasing the effectiveness of enemy information reconnaissance {*xinxi zhencha*} systems as much as possible. The main methods consist of [first], adopting stealth technology and other camouflage measures for air force weapons and equipment {*kongjun wuqi zhuangbei*}, carrying out radio silence, and making it more difficult for enemy reconnaissance and surveillance systems to find, track, and identify our information platforms. [Second, they consist of] strengthening the management of the electromagnetic spectrum, using communications equipment with concealed frequencies or ones that use systems with a low probability of being captured, strictly controlling the capabilities and timing of electromagnetic radiation, and shortening and encrypting signals, so as to keep the enemy from capturing our side's information chain signals or so that even if the enemy captures these, it will be hard for him to extract usable information. [Finally, they consist of] setting up large numbers of fake targets and carrying out electromagnetic feints and deception on a widespread basis, so that it is difficult for the enemy to carry out accurate reconnaissance and positioning against our aerial information platforms and ground facilities.

Countering enemy electronic jamming and suppression *{fan di dianzi ganrao yazhi}*. Important targets to be protected as [we] counter enemy electronic jamming and suppression are our own side's command and communication nodes, weapons guidance and control systems, early warning radar networks, and early warning and command aircraft. In order to combat enemy electronic jamming and suppression in an effective way, [we] should use various kinds of tactical and technical measures in an integrated manner, fully bring into play the equipment's own ability to fight jamming, and supplement these with measures like rational deployment and cautious use, so as to reduce to a minimum losses caused by enemy jamming. The main methods [for doing this] consist of [first,] adopting technical and tactical means to increase radar transmission power, using radar systems that have powerful anti-jamming capabilities, and rationally deploying radars with differing frequency bands and differing organizational systems *{tizhi}*, to resist the enemy's jamming and suppression of [our] reconnaissance and early warning systems. [Second, they consist of] adopting such technical and tactical means as ones that use communications forms that have powerful anti-jamming capabilities, like encrypted communications and laser communications; ones that enhance the strength of signals at the receiving end; ones that use frequency-hopping technology; and ones that establish covert communications networks, to resist the enemy's jamming and suppression of radio communications systems. [Finally, they consist of] adopting such means as enhancing the anti-jamming capabilities of optoelectronic equipment and using composite guidance technology *{fuhe zhidao jishu}*, to prevent the enemy's jamming of optoelectronic equipment.

Countering enemy attacks on computer networks *{fan di jisuanji wangluo gongji}*. Computer network systems are the core and control center of the air force information system, and once computer networks are paralyzed, this will have a lethal effect on the air force information system and even the entire air force operations system. Therefore, countering enemy attacks on computer networks is an important detail in air force information defense *{xinxi fangyu}*. The primary methods [of countering these attacks] are first, preventing intrusions *{qinhai}* by viruses. This primarily means adopting such means as strengthening the administration of network systems, checking for viruses and eliminating viruses on a regular or irregular basis, inserting anti-virus cards *{fang bingdu ka}*, installing anti-virus chips, and using anti-virus modules *{fang bingdu mokuai}*, to prevent viruses' invasions of [our] own side's computer network systems. Second is preventing network infiltration. This is primarily the adoption of firewall technology, setting up a screen between the network being protected and the outside world, to prevent the enemy's possible destructive invasions.

Resisting physical annihilation by enemy firepower *{kang di huoli shiti cuihui}*. In operations, [we] should use various defensive methods and means in an integrated manner to prevent air force information systems from being annihilated by the enemy. The main methods [for doing this] are [first,] adopting such means as technologies that control the power of radar emissions and that use frequency agility and frequency diversity, developing dual-base or multi-base radar and multi-radar *{duobu leida}* networks, and reducing the length of time that the radar is operating, so as to prevent enemy anti-radiation attacks. [Second, they consist of] adopting such measures as putting

the core equipment of air force information systems underground, strengthening the concealment and camouflage of air force information systems, strengthening their mobility and evasion, and strengthening the firepower screening of air force information platforms and equipment, to prevent enemy firepower attacks.

Section 3: Air Offensive Operations {kongzhong jin'gong zuozhan}...136

[The term] air offensive operations {kongzhong jin'gong zuozhan} refers to the sum total of a series of air attack actions that air force operational strengths {zuozhan liliang} carry out against the enemy at a certain time and place, in cooperation with other service and service arm strengths {liliang}. The missions of air offensive operations {kongzhong jin'gong zuozhan} are: to annihilate enemy aerial operational strengths {zuozhan liliang} and anti-air operational strengths {zuozhan liliang}, and to seize command of the air {zhikongquan}; to attack important enemy military, political, and economic targets and to achieve specified strategic and campaign goals; and to attack the enemy's effective strengths {yousheng liliang} and his traffic and transportation systems and to isolate the battlefield, creating [favorable] conditions for operations on the ground and at sea. The primary actions in air offensive operations {kongzhong jin'gong zuozhan} include aerial penetration of defenses {kongzhong tufang}, first strikes {shouci tuji}, follow-up strikes {erhou tuji}, and resisting enemy air counterattack operations {kang di kongzhong fanji}.

I. Carrying out aerial penetration of defenses {shishi kongzhong tufang}...136

Aerial penetration of defenses {kongzhong tufang} is actions by the aviation troops that are carrying out air offensive operations {kongzhong jin'gong zuozhan} to break through enemy air defense systems. It is a prerequisite condition for carrying out aviation offensive operations {kongzhong jin'gong zuozhan}. There are primarily two methods for breaking through the enemy's air defense systems.

(1) Hiding what is real and revealing what is false, and covert breakthroughs {yin zhen shi jia, yinbi tufang}

Hiding what is real and revealing what is false {yin zhen shi jia}, and covert breakthroughs {yinbi tufang} means breaking through the enemy's air defense system by adopting various measures to hide what is real and reveal what is false {yin zhen shi jia}, confusing and maneuvering the enemy, concealing the intentions of our actions, and appearing where he does not expect it. The primary measures [in doing this are first,] selecting an air route for covert breakthroughs, doing our best to avoid areas where enemy air defenses are strict, and selecting a direction where enemy air defense radar is relative weak [that is, where it is] blind and where there are dead angles, to break through defenses. [Second, they are] adopting favorable flight cross-sections {poumian}, and to break through at low altitudes and ultra-low altitudes. [Third, they are] using opportunities where the enemy neglects to keep a lookout, such as night darkness and unfavorable weather. [Fourth, they are] rigorously controlling the use of electronic equipment and maintaining radio silence; [Fifth, they are] adopting such deceptive

measures as feints and fake communications, to confuse and maneuver the enemy. [Finally, they are] using stealth air raid weapons to carry out stealth breakthroughs.

(2) “Soft” suppression and “hard” kills, and breaking through by force {“*ruan*” ya “*ying*” *hui*, *qianggong tufang*}

“Soft suppression and “hard” kills {“*ruan*” ya “*ying*” *hui*} and breakthroughs by force {*qianggong tufang*} mean adopting means that combine “soft” {*ruan*} suppression with “hard” {*ying*} kills in order to forcefully open up a gap in the enemy’s air defense system, to open up a corridor for penetrating defenses, to support the attacking troop strengths {*bingli*} in smoothly passing through the enemy air defense system, and to launch an attack against a predetermined target. The main measures [in doing this are first,] to launch decoys that trick the enemy’s air defense system into operating, and then carrying out intense electronic jamming and anti-radiation attacks [against this system], as well as and destroying the enemy’s early warning, target acquisition, and ground guidance radars and communications installations. [Second,] they use such weapons as unmanned aerial attack vehicles and cruise missiles to penetrate defenses at ultra-low altitudes, attacking the enemy air defense command centers and paralyzing the enemy’s air defense command system. [Third,] they use fighter-bombers, ground attack aircraft, unmanned aerial fighter vehicles, attack helicopters, cruise missiles, and ground force and naval long-range firepower to attack enemy surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery sites that are close to the aviation troops’ flight paths, in order to open up air corridors for penetrating defenses. [Fourth,] they use weapons like bombers, fighter-bombers, ground attack aircraft, unmanned aerial attack vehicles, and cruise missiles to suppress and blockade enemy combat aircraft airfields that pose a fairly strong threat to us. [Finally,] they use assault aviation troops in adopting such forms as shielding for regions {*quyu yanhu*} and shielding that accompanies things {*bansui yanhu*} to conduct aerial convoys for groups of assault aircraft and to break through enemy air interception.

II. Conducting air assaults {*shishi kongzhong tuji*}...137

Conducting air assaults {*shishi kongzhong tuji*} is the most crucial operational action in air assault operations, and it directly affects whether or not it is possible to achieve the goal of the operation. The development of aviation technology and its continual transformation {*wuhua*} into new aviation weapons and equipment have greatly enriched the means of air assault {*kongzhong tuji*} operations, and the traditional form of air assault {*kongzhong tuji*} [involving] air attacks and overhead bombing by a single service arm or type of aircraft will be replaced by such forms as joint assaults, long-range raids, stealth assaults, and night assaults [involving] multiple service arms and types of aircraft. At the same time as this, the ability that air assaults {*kongzhong tuji*} have to damage things will also be strengthened to an unprecedented degree. Not only will they be able to use precision guided munitions like laser-guided bombs to conduct precision attacks against the enemy that hit at lethal points {*dianxue*}, but they will also be able to use area destruction {*mian shashang*} like cluster bombing to carry out attacks against the enemy that cover [a large area]. They will also be able to use ammunition with new

mechanisms, like electromagnetic pulse bombs and graphite bombs, to conduct disabling attacks against the enemy. In order to get optimal effects in assault, [we] should use the various forms and methods of assault and damage in an integrated manner. Air assaults {*kongzhong tuji*} include first strikes {*shouci tuji*} and follow-up strikes {*erhou tuji*}.

(1) First strikes {*shouci tuji*}

[The term] first strikes {*shouci tuji*} refers to concentrating strengths {*liliang*} during a certain period of time in the initial stage of an operation to carry out the first assault action against targets, in multiple waves. Its goal is to carry out sudden and intense attacks against crucial and key enemy targets in all of his depths, to weaken in an effective manner all of the enemy's operational capabilities, to paralyze the enemy's operational systems, and to create [favorable] conditions for follow-up strikes. In air offensive operations {*kongzhong jin'gong zuozhan*} under informationized conditions, the first battle has the nature of a decisive battle; winning or losing the first battle has a major effect on the process and outcome of the entire operation. Doing a good job of fighting the first battle {*da hao shou zhan*} sometimes can have the final say [for the operation]. For example, the US air raids on Libya⁶ and Israel's air raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor⁷ achieved their operational goals through a one-time strike. In order to do a good job of fighting the first battle {*da hao shou zhan*}, if you want to have the resolve to accomplish the whole task at one stroke, [you] should use troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons in an extraordinary manner, and [you] usually should use most or even all of the assault troop strengths {*tuji bingli*} in the first strike {*shouci tuji*}; it is necessary to adopt methods that combine long-range attacks from outside the defense area {*fangqu*} with overhead bombing, and [that combine] carpet bombing with precision attacks, carrying out concentrated assaults and continuous assaults against crucial enemy targets along multiple directions and in multiple waves. The targets that first strikes {*shouci tuji*} must attack usually are enemy command centers, airfields where warplanes are parked, early warning radars, surface-to-air missile sites, and communications nodes, in order to seize battlefield command of the air {*zhikongquan*}. If the scale of assaulting troop strengths {*tuji bingli*} is fairly large, it is also possible to assault enemy targets with potential strength for war, such as political, economic, and cultural centers and important energy and hydroelectricity infrastructures as well as targets like important military bases and military installations.

(2) Follow-up strikes {*erhou tuji*}

[The term] follow-up strikes {*erhou tuji*} refers to strike actions that are taken after the first strike {*shouci tuji*}. Their goal is to solidify and expand the effects of the first strike {*shouci tuji*} by carrying out strikes against targets that could not be annihilated during the first strike {*shouci tuji*}, targets that were not assaulted, and new targets that have

⁶ Translator's note: This was Operation El Dorado Canyon in 1986.

⁷ Translator's note: This was Operation Babylon in June 1981.

appeared, [thus] comprehensively achieving the goals of the operation. Follow-up strikes {*erhou tuji*} should fully utilize the effects of the first strike {*shouci tuji*}, and [we should] do all we can to shorten the time gap with the first strike {*shouci tuji*}; before the enemy has recovered from the turmoil of suffering our first attack, [we should] concentrate troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons to carry out supplementary strikes, concentrated strikes, and continuous attacks against the enemy's important targets, keeping up continuous pressure against the enemy until [we] achieve [our] predetermined goals. The targets that follow-up strikes {*erhou tuji*} must attack are not only political targets like government organs, radio stations, and television stations, but they are also economic targets like traffic nodes and energy and hydroelectric infrastructures, as well as military targets like command centers, air force and naval bases, missile sites, and logistics facilities. Follow-up strikes {*erhou tuji*} usually last for a fairly long period of time; [we] should scientifically and rationally arrange the use of troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons, strengthen logistics and equipment technical support, and maintain the ability for a prolonged strike.

III. Resisting enemy air counterattacks {*kang di kongzhong fanji*}...138

Resisting enemy air counterattacks {*kang di kongzhong fanji*} is an important component part of air offensive operations {*kongzhong jin'gong zuozhan*} as well as a defensive action during air assaults {*kongzhong jin'gong*}; its goal is to ensure the stability of deployments during our air offensive operations {*kongzhong jin'gong zuozhan*}, the security of important targets, and the smooth execution of air offensive actions {*kongzhong jin'gong xingdong*}.

In resisting enemy air counterattacks {*kang di kongzhong fanji*}, it is first necessary to clearly differentiate between offensive and defensive troop strengths {*bingli*}. Under normal conditions, the troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons that undertake air offensive {*kongzhong jin'gong*} and air defense operations are not used [in ways that] intersect with one another, in order to facilitate units' {*budui*} preparations and cooperation. At the same time, it is necessary to rationally divide up the missions of the various units {*budui*} and their areas of responsibilities, based on the battlefield situation and the enemy's incoming attack flight paths, so that the troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons that are responsible for air defense missions form a tight air defense system. Second, it is necessary to concentrate elite troops and weapons along the major defensive directions, focusing on attacking the [enemy] assault planes, early warning and command aircraft, and tankers that present the greatest threat to us, and destroying the integrated structure of groups of enemy air fleets. Third, it is necessary to deploy attack aviation troops and ground air defense troops in echelons centered on the enemy's main incoming attack direction and on key targets to be defended, forming a continuous state of resistance that combines high, medium, and low altitudes and that links long ranges, medium ranges, and close-in ranges, to attack incoming enemy aircraft level by level.

Section 4: Air Defense Operations {fang kong zuozhan}...139

Air defense operations {fang kong zuozhan} are a series of operational actions that air force strengths {kongjun liliang} undertake with the assistance and cooperation of other services and service arms and of local unit {difang budui} and civilian air defense strengths {fang kong liliang}, in accordance with unified intentions and plans, in order to defeat enemy air raids. Their primary missions are [first,] to carry out strict surveillance of trends in air raids, to discover and ascertain in a timely manner actions and opportunities for the enemy to carry out air raids, and to report these to the various units {budui} and civilian air defense organizations. [Second, they are] to resist enemy air raids against [our] own side's military, political, and economic targets, so that we do not suffer damage from enemy air raids or [suffer only] a little [damage]. [Third, they are] to organize counterattack operations, to weaken the enemy's air raid strengths {kongxi liliang}. [Finally, they are] to organize defense, reducing the damage caused to personnel and war resources by enemy air raids. Air defense operations {fang kong zuozhan} under informationized conditions are characterized by [the following]: there is very little time for preparations when on the verge of war, and it is easy to be trapped in passivity; the space involving air defense is broad, and missions are arduous; there are diverse combatant strengths {canzhan liliang}, and cooperation is complex; and there are intense confrontations among systems, and offense and defense are intertwined. In order to ensure that air defense operations {fang kong zuozhan} are smoothly carried out, [we] should carry out the following operational principles: strengthen precautions and react quickly; actively take the initiative and carry out offensive operations; have unified command while differentiating responsibilities; concentrate strengths {liliang}, with a focus on direct military operations; and have careful organization and close cooperation.

I. Have a grasp on trends in enemy air raids, and send out alerts about air raids {zhangwo di kongxi dongtai, fachu kongxi jingbao}...139

Air defense operations {fang kong zuozhan} commanders and command organs must make careful plans; utilize space, aerial, maritime, and ground forms of reconnaissance as well as means of reconnaissance and reconnaissance devices in an integrated manner; and carry out continuous and strict reconnaissance and surveillance at all times against an enemy [engaging] in air raids. [They must] focus on ascertaining the task organization and numbers of enemy air raid troop strengths {bingli}; the intentions and scale of air raids; the departure bases of air raid weapons, missile launch bases, and cruise missile launch platforms at sea; the direction of the air raids, the opportunities for attack, the targets of the air raids, and means for penetrating defenses; and the air raid flight routes and flight altitudes. Commanders and command organs should quickly judge the enemy's air raid actions, based on the intelligence that is obtained, and send air raid forecasts, air raid alerts, and signals for canceling alerts, at the appropriate time, to various units {budui} and civilian air defense organizations as the enemy air situation continually intensifies or moderates.

II. Integrating aircraft, missiles, and artillery, and resisting enemy air assaults {*ji dan pao yiti, kang di kongzhong tuxi*}...140

[The term] resistance operations {*kangji zuozhan*} refers to the integrated use of the various services' and service arms' air defense strengths {*fang kong liliang*} and the militia reserve duty air defense strengths {*fang kong liliang*} in setting up deployments for dynamic resistance over a broad area that integrate aircraft, missiles, and artillery along the main direction of incoming enemy raids. These are to eliminate and block the operational actions of enemies [carrying out] air raids, by means of air warfare and air defense operations {*duikong zuozhan*}. They are the major operational actions in air defense operations {*fang kong zuozhan*}.

(1) Air defense systems for resisting enemy attacks {*kangji di tuji fangkong tixi*}

For the enemy to launch air raids against us, he must concentrate his elite strengths {*liliang*} and first suppress and eliminate our air defense systems, so that we lose the ability to resist and counterattack, [thus] ensuring that his air raid intentions will be smoothly carried out. Therefore, resisting the enemy's attacks on [our] air defense systems is the core mission in the first battle in air defense operations. Air defense systems for resisting enemy attacks {*kangji di tuji fangkong tixi*} can adopt the following actions.

The first is to rapidly go forward and to intercept as far away as possible {*yi shi kuaisu qian chu, jin yuan lanjie*}. When an enemy [who is carrying out] air raids enters the scope of our interception but is as far away as possible, the assault aviation troop units {*budui*} that are responsible for interception missions should adopt methods that combine waiting for battle in the air {*kongzhong dai zhan*} with waiting for battle at airfields {*jichang dai zhan*}, rapidly go forward {*qian chu*} to engage with the enemy, and strive to intercept the enemy's air raid formations as far away as possible, to keep the enemy from continuing with his raid. They should use some of their troop strengths {*bingli*} to contain the enemy's aerial escort formation; pursue or eliminate the enemy's aerial early warning and command aircraft, electronic jamming aircraft, and aerial tankers; destroy the integrated structure of the enemy's air raid formation; and throw the enemy's aerial deployments into confusion. At the same time, [they should] concentrate one line of major troop strengths {*bingli*} to attack in echelon along the enemy's main air raid direction, to continuously intercept the enemy's assault troop strengths {*bingli*} from as far away as possible, to throw the enemy's air raid formations into confusion, and to force the enemy to drop his bombs early. The air defense weapons of ground air defense units {*budui*} that are deployed along the forward lines and of ships at sea should closely cooperate with attack aviation troops to annihilate enemy air raid weapons that enter the scope of their firepower.

The second is to continuously attack and to block [the enemy] with all our strength {*er shi lianxu chuji, quanli fengzu*}. When the enemy {that is conducting} the air raid breaks through our farthest interception zone and continues his raid, [we] should concentrate the

first line of [our] attack aviation troop units {*budui*} to continue the attack and to carry out focused attacks against enemy air raid weapons along the main direction, doing everything possible to plug up the enemy's aerial corridor for penetrating defenses. When the first line troop strengths {*bingli*} suffer fairly heavy losses from the enemy's air raid, [we] should quickly organize a second line of troop strengths {*bingli*} or reserve forces to quickly come forward {*qian chu*} and support them, to strengthen the resistance operations along the main direction. When the enemy changes the main air raid direction, [we] should quickly adjust deployments, organize mobile troop strengths {*bingli*} or reserve forces to carry out resolute attacks against the air raids along the main direction, block the enemy's air route for attacks {*jin xi*}, and prevent the enemy from carrying out an in-depth attack against us. When part of the enemy breaks through our first line of defense and carries out an all-out attack against our air defense system, [we] should organize follow-up troop strengths {*bingli*} from the attack aviation troops, [have them] take off from many points and enter along many directions, and in cooperation with ground air defense firepower, resolutely annihilate the attacking enemy and keep our air defense system stable.

(2) Resisting enemy attacks against our major in-depth targets {*kang di tuji zongshen zhongyao mubiao*}

After the enemy [that is conducting] the air raid breaks through our air defense system, he inevitably will concentrate crack air raid weapons against the major military, political, and economic targets within our depths and will carry out powerful air attacks [against these]. In order to smash the intentions of the enemy's air raids, [we] should, on the basis of resisting the enemy's assaults against our air defense system, concentrate the resistance troop strengths {*kangji bingli*} of [our] various services and service arms and civilian air defense strengths {*liliang*} and flexibly utilize combat methods to intercept the enemy level by level, upholding the security of the important targets in our depths.

First is a combination of the air and the ground, and resistance level by level {*yi shi kong di jiehe, ceng ceng kangji*}. When the enemy breaks through our long-range interception and attack {*lanjie*} and carries out air raids against the command and control systems, concentration of heavy troops, air force and naval bases, traffic nodes, telecommunications facilities, and civilian installations within our depths, [we] should fully utilize the effectiveness of [our] long-range interception {*jieji*}, use troop strengths {*bingli*} echelon by echelon, adopt methods that combine air interception {*kongzhong jieji*} and air defense blocking {*duikong zuji*}, and attack the incoming enemy level by level. When organizing air interception {*kongzhong jieji*}, [we] should coordinate and use fighter planes with high-level, mid-level, and low-level functions, scientifically organize these into groups, and rationally divide them up into interception sections along each direction, ensuring that continuous interception can be carried out against the enemy that is [carrying out] air raids. When the enemy breaks through our air interception and enters the firepower range of [our] ground air defense troop strengths {*fang kong bingli*}, the air defense units {*fang kong budui*} of the various services and service arms and of the militia and reserves should fully utilize the effects of air interception, using sudden

and concentrated firepower to block the incoming enemy at all altitudes, and trying to annihilate the incoming enemy along the margins of the targets they are protecting.

Second is that mobility is wide-ranging, and resistance is dynamic {*er shi guangfan jidong, dongtai kangji*}. Resistance operations are a form of operations where the enemy takes the initiative and we are passive; the incoming enemy can flexibly change the direction of his air raids and the targets of their attack and [can] flexibly use means for attack, while our resistance operations must wait for the enemy and then move. In order to resist in an effective manner the enemy's air raids, on the basis of solidifying the attacks that the air defense troop strengths {*fang kong bingli*} that have been deployed carry out against the enemy level by level, [we] also must have broad-ranging and mobile air defense troop strengths {*fang kong bingli*} and weapons, and carry out dynamic resistance against the incoming enemy. [We] should correctly utilize mobile troop strengths {*bingli*} and [should] select favorable opportunities as well as spaces for movement and targets of attack, based on the characteristics and patterns of the enemy's air raid operations and on the basis of having an accurate grasp and appraisal of trends in the enemy situation; in particular, under situations where we already have accurate intelligence about enemy air raids, [we should] quickly organize air defense strengths {*fang kong liliang*} to move to places that the enemy must pass through and then adopt such combat methods as guerilla attacks within positional warfare {*zhen zhong youji*}, luring [the enemy] into ambushes, and setting up ambushes along flight paths {*hanglu she fu*}, doing everything to intercept incoming enemies or enemies that are returning from [a raid].

(3) Resist an enemy who is carrying out continuous attacks {*kang di shishi lianxu tuji*}

After an enemy [who is carrying out] air raids carries out his first attack against us, he will organize strengths {*liliang*} to carry out continued attacks of differing scales against targets that were not annihilated in the first attacks and against targets that have been newly discovered, in order to expand on the results of battle, until he achieves the goal of his operations. For this reason, [our] commander and his command organ should fully utilize the gaps in between enemy air raids to quickly complete preparations to resist the enemy's continued air raids, to firmly attack the incoming enemy, and to shatter his intentions.

First is to strengthen reconnaissance and early warning, and to find signs in a timely manner of another enemy air raid. After we defeat the enemy's first air raid, we will on the one hand need to continue organizing strengths {*liliang*} to resist small-scale enemy harassment air raids, while on the other hand, we will need to use all reconnaissance and surveillance means and methods that can possibly be used, to watch closely for trends where the enemy will again launch air raids, with a focus on ascertaining how the enemy's troops strengths {*bingli*} are assembling, moving, and being replenished, as well as the scale, direction, targets, and opportunities for additional enemy air raids.

Second is to adjust and replenish strengths {*liliang*} at an appropriate time. After the enemy's first air raids, [we] should adjust and replenish [forces] at the proper time, based on what damage [our] air defense strengths {*fang kong liliang*} have suffered. When main directions of resistance have suffered serious losses from enemy air raids, [we] should quickly adjust the strengths {*liliang*} of secondary directions and other directions, to replenish and reinforce [the main directions]. We can also adjust the strengths {*liliang*} that have been moved forward in the depths {*qian yi zongshen*} to supplement [these forces], in order to ensure that there will be enough strengths {*liliang*} to resist the enemy's continued air raids.

Third is to quickly organize continued resistance. When the enemy [that is carrying out] the air raids again carries out air raids against us, the commander and command organ should organize resistance strengths {*kangji liliang*} to continue to resist the incoming enemy. When the enemy [that is carrying out] the air raids continues to carry out attacks against us using a small number of troop strengths {*bingli*}, [we] should concentrate superior resistance troops strengths {*kangji bingli*} to carry out continued attacks against the enemy, striving to give the enemy a lethal blow and to force the enemy to abandon his intentions for air raids. When the enemy carries out large-scale, powerful air raids against us with fairly large [numbers of] troop strengths {*bingli*}, [we] should concentrate all [our] resistance strengths {*kangji liliang*} and when necessary deploy [our] reserve forces, going all out to resolutely defeat the enemy's continued air raids.

III. Have command of opportunities for battle, and organize counterattacks at the proper time {*bawo zhanji, shishi zuzhi fanji*}...142

Counterattack operations use long-range attack strengths {*yuancheng daji liliang*} within the operational task organization of air defense operations to take the initiative to carry out assault actions against the enemy's air raid weapons and bases and [against] other targets. These are offensive operational actions within air defense operations, and they have profound effects upon the process and outcome of air defense operations. The commander and command organs should prudently make decisions based on the intentions of the upper echelon, the needs of developments in the war situation, and the ability for counterattack operations; they should skillfully select {*shan ze*} opportunities, hand-pick targets {*jingxuan mubiao*}, count up the enemy and then resort to arms {*liang di yongbing*}, cleverly use methods of combat {*qiao yong zhanfa*}, and actively and flexibly counterattack the enemy [who is carrying out] air raids.

(1) Prudently select opportunities for counterattacks {*shen xuan fanji shiji*}

Opportunities for counterattacks {*fanji shiji*} are an important detail that must be clarified in organizing and carrying out counterattack operations. Opportunities for counterattack operations should be meticulously selected based on the intentions of the upper echelon, the enemy situation, our situation, and the actual conditions of the battlefield. The following opportunities usually can be selected for counterattack operations: when there are clear signs of an enemy air raid, that he is currently making preparations, and [our]

own side has conditions for an immediate counterattack; when the enemy is attacking from one direction and things are favorable for [our] own side to counterattack from another direction; after the main [enemy] attack formations have flown back and are carrying out preparations at their base to launch another [attack], and it is hard for them to take off and meet [us] head-on; and when the enemy air raid strengths {*kongxi liliang*} have been clearly weakened and their positions have holes, when there are opportunities that can be taken advantage of, or when weather conditions favor [our] own side and do not favor the enemy.

Opportunities that favor counterattack and opportunities that do not favor counterattack are not static and unchanging; they can be transformed. Therefore, the commander and the command organ must stand at the heights of the overall situation of operations as they plan counterattacks, in order to strengthen their foresight for counterattack operations. They must actively create and seize opportunities that favor counterattack, and as soon as the opportunity is right, [they must] immediately organize the counterattack.

(2) Hand-pick targets {*jingxuan mubiao*}

Determining the target of a counterattack is crucial to organizing and carrying out the counterattack operation, and it directly affects the effectiveness of the counterattack operation. The target of a counterattack should be meticulously selected based on the intentions of the upper echelon, our counterattack capabilities, and the deployment of the enemy's air raid troop strengths {*kongxi bingli*} and weapons. It is not only necessary to keep an eye on destroying the enemy's air raid plans and weakening the enemy air raid capabilities, but at the same time it is also necessary to consider the losses that [our] own side could incur and to strive to get a major victory at a low cost. Under normal conditions, counterattack operations should primarily select the following targets: the enemy's command and control system, launching and firing platforms like his air force bases and aircraft carriers, and the enemy logistics supply system. The commander and command organ should pay attention to having a grasp on [the following] when selecting targets for counterattack: first, they must be firmly obedient to the needs of the state's political and diplomatic battle, ensuring that the counterattack operation is rational and limited; two, they must meticulously attack crucial points {*jing da yaohai*}, with a focus on attacking targets that can violently shake the enemy's production and that can weaken the enemy's air raid capabilities in an effective manner, and there should not be too many targets during a single counterattack; and third, they must select targets that are good for attacking – that are concentrated, exposed, easy to find and annihilate, and where it is easy to penetrate defenses.

(3) Using many methods together to carry out a counterattack {*duo fa bing ju, shishi fanji*}

The flexible use of combat methods is an important way to get the upper hand in counterattack operations. The commander and command organ should rationally determine the method of counterattack, based on battlefield conditions, the enemy's air

defense conditions, the conditions of the target being counterattacked, and our capabilities for the counterattack operation.

First is to organize a missile counterattack {*daodan fanji*}. Missile counterattacks {*daodan fanji*} primarily are carried out using the Second Artillery's conventional missile and cruise missile [units] and the ground forces' campaign and tactical missile units {*budui*}. Under ordinary conditions, a missile counterattack {*daodan fanji*} should stress attacking large-scale fixed targets that cover a wide area {*mian zhuang*}, such as enemy airfields and command and control systems. When missile counterattacks {*daodan fanji*} and air counterattacks {*kongzhong fanji*} are jointly carried out, [we] should first carry out the missile counterattack {*daodan fanji*}, to suppress and annihilate the enemy's air defense system, and to create [good] conditions for the aviation troops to penetrate defenses.

Second is to organize an air counterattack {*kongzhong fanji*}. Air counterattacks {*kongzhong fanji*} primarily are carried out using air force and naval bomber aviation troop [units], fighter-bomber aviation troop [units], and ground attack aviation troop units {*budui*}. They emphasize attacking targets like enemy command and control systems, air force bases, aircraft carriers, and logistics supply systems. When air counterattacks {*kongzhong fanji*} and missile counterattacks {*daodan fanji*} are jointly carried out, [we] should fully utilize the effectiveness of missile assaults, organize air assault strengths {*kongzhong tuji lilian*} to carry out continued attacks and supplemental attacks against predetermined targets, and further expand on the results of battle. In order to ensure that air counterattacks {*kongzhong fanji*} are smoothly carried out, [we] should rigorously organize aerial penetration of defenses. When carrying out first-time air counterattacks {*kongzhong fanji*} or small-scale harassment-type air counterattacks, [we] should have covert penetration of defenses as the primary [method] and forceful penetration of defenses as supplemental. [We] should adopt deceptive methods, [methods of] electronic jamming, [methods] that use gaps in timing, and [methods] where we select concealed flight paths and low altitudes and ultra-low altitudes to carry out the raid, quickly breaking through the enemy air defense system and attacking the target. When organizing large-scale counterattack operations, it will not be easy to achieve surprise, because the enemy will be prepared in advance; [we] should have forceful penetration of defenses as the main [method] and concealed penetration of defenses as supplemental. [We] should scientifically organize counterattack strengths {*fanji lilian*}, forming a group of air raid aircraft that integrates multiple capabilities – electronic jamming, suppression, cover, and assault – that with cooperation from electronic and troop strength {*bingli*} feints, punches a gap through the enemy air defense system to support the main assault formation as it smoothly breaks into the enemy's depths and launches attacks against predetermined targets.

Third is to organize a counterattack at sea {*haishang fanji*}. Counterattacks at sea {*haishang fanji*} primary are carried out by surface ship units {*budui*} and submarine units {*budui*}. The targets of attack are primarily enemy aircraft carrier groups, cruise missile launch platforms, and ships transporting supplies. Counterattacks at sea

{*haishang fanji*} usually are carried out in combination with air counterattacks {*kongzhong fanji*} and missile counterattacks {*daodan fanji*}, [but] when conditions are favorable, they can also be carried out on their own. Usually, missile and air firepower {*hangkong huoli*} are first used for the attack, to throw enemy formations at sea into confusion, and afterwards surface ships and submarine troop strengths {*bingli*} are concentrated, to make full use of the effectiveness of missile and air firepower {*hangkong huoli*} attacks in carrying out fierce assaults against predetermined counterattack targets. Submarine troop strengths {*bingli*} can also use the method of setting ambushes to attack predetermined enemy targets at sea.

Fourth is to organize special counterattacks {*tezhong fanji*}. Special counterattacks {*tezhong fanji*} primarily use elite special operations teams and adopt such forms as airborne landings (or parachuting) or directly sneaking in or penetrating from the sea or the land, to carry out ambushes, destruction, and harassment against the enemy. The targets of attack primarily are enemy command and control centers, radar stations, and fuel and ammunition dumps.

IV. Rigorously organize protection, and reduce losses from air raids {*yanmi zuzhi fanghu, jianshao kongxi sunshi*}...145

[The term] protective operations {*fanghu zuozhan*} refers to various measures, means, and actions that are taken to lower the effectiveness of enemy air raids, to reduce personnel casualties and damage to targets, to keep the war situation stable, and to preserve operational capabilities. The strengths {*liliang*} that participate in protective operations {*fanghu zuozhan*} mainly consist of: the military's protective strengths {*fanghu liliang*}, including specialized protective strengths {*fanghu liliang*} within task organizations and the combatant units {*canzhan budui*} of the ground forces, the navy, the air force, and the Second Artillery; and local protective strengths {*fanghu liliang*}, including the specialized protective strengths {*fanghu liliang*} subordinate to the local governments of the various provinces (or cities) and autonomous regions, as well as the masses of the people. The key targets to be protected include the chief organs and strategic command systems of the [Chinese Communist] Party, the government, and the military; air defense systems; targets related to the national economy and the people's livelihood and [targets] with war potential, such as power plants, oil refineries, military-industrial enterprises, and waterworks; and targets where it is easy to produce secondary nuclear, biological, and chemical disasters, such as nuclear power stations and chemical plants.

(1) Strengthen battlefield control and maintain order on the battlefield {*jiaqiang zhanchang kongzhi, weihu zhanchang zhixu*}

Strengthening battlefield control and [maintaining] strict battlefield discipline are extremely important in ensuring order on the battlefield and in strengthening the effectiveness of protection. For this reason, it is first necessary to strengthen controls over city lights, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the flow of the masses, reducing the

chances of being discovered by the enemy as much as possible. Second, it is necessary to strengthen controls over traffic roads, to maintain excellent traffic order and to ensure the transportation needs of operations, production, and living. Third, it is necessary to strengthen controls over the press and the broadcast media, and to firmly attack people who spread lies and who seduce people into wrongdoing, in order to stabilize the hearts and morale of the people. Fourth, it is necessary to strengthen controls over social order, fully bringing into play the roles of the units {*budui*}, armed police, public security, militia, and local government, and broadly mobilizing the strengths {*liliang*} of the masses of the people to maintain public order and to maintain excellent social order.

(2) Targeting the weak points of the enemy's air raid weapons, and using protective measures in an integrated manner {*zhendui di kongxi bingqi de ruodian, zonghe caiqu fanghu shouduan*}

In air defense operations under informationized conditions, we face an extremely serious aerial threat; as we organize protective operations, we must fully utilize various forms and methods. [We must] combine static protection with dynamic protection; combine protection by fortifications with covert, dispersed, and camouflaged [protection]; combine traditional protection with modern protection; combine technological protection with tactical protection; and combine specialized protection with protection by the masses, in order to obtain excellent results in protection. The primary measures [are as follows]. First, it is necessary to rely upon fortifications, seeking survival through concealment. [We] should use existing engineering works for protection along with protective fortifications that have been temporarily built, and conceal personnel, weapons and equipment as well as materials and devices, in order to prevent the enemy's high-precision and very powerful attacks. Some important weapons and facilities should be put in caves or be transferred underground as much as possible, to conceal them. Second, it is necessary to conceal what is real and show what is fake, using deception to survive. Based on the characteristics of the enemy's air raids, [we] should adopt methods like natural camouflage, man-made camouflage, disseminating false information, and building fake targets. This will make it hard for the enemy to distinguish between what is real and what is fake, and it will lure the enemy in to attack what is fake and to bomb what is fake, lowering the effectiveness of the enemy air raids. Third, it is necessary to move at appropriate times. That is, [we] lower the effectiveness of the enemy's air raids through broad-ranging movement. [We] should organize units {*budui*} and weapons to move quickly, using movement to seek survival and changing positions and locations, to evade enemy air attacks. Fourth is to be spread out widely, seeking survival through dispersion. That is, this deploys troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons in a dispersed manner and conceals personnel and materials in a dispersed manner, in order to reduce the effectiveness of enemy air raids.

(3) Combining the military and civilians, and eliminating the consequences of air raids
{*jun min jiehe, xiaochu kongxi houguo*}

Eliminating the consequences of air raids is an important detail in organizing protective operations. After we suffer an enemy air raid, the commander and the command organ should fully bring into play the roles of the various ranks {*duiwu*} of professionals and of the masses of the people, and they should organize the work of emergency repairs and emergency rescue in an urgent but orderly manner. [They] should organize strengths {*liliang*} to ascertain the damage, and [they should] rationally differentiate tasks, with a focus on damage to airfields, air defense positions, weapons and equipment, command and communications facilities, and major operational materials as well as personnel casualties. [They] should organize special strengths {*zhuanye liliang*} to repair things as they are bombed {*sui zha sui xiu*} at airfields, air defense positions, and intelligence, communications, and command facilities, restoring these in a timely manner. For other targets, [they] should organize the masses of the people to carry out emergency repairs and emergency rescue. Equipment that has been seriously damaged in an air raid should be replaced in a timely manner based on need, when there is no way to repair it. When the enemy uses air raids with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, or when he causes nuclear, chemical, and biological leaks, [they] should quickly organize chemical defense troops and specialized technical personnel to clean this up {*xixiao*}, taking strict precautions against spreading these to create nuclear, chemical, and biological damage on a broad scale. When enemy air raids start fires, [they] should quickly cut off the paths of the fires {*huo lu*}, start fighting the fires {*zhankai pujiu*}, and prevent the fires from continuing to spread and doing greater harm to the lives and property of the masses of the people, primarily by using professional firefighting strengths {*zhuanye xiaofang liliang*} but also by mobilizing nearby units {*budui*} and the masses of the people.

Section 5: Aerial Blockade Operations {*kongzhong fengsuo zuozhan*}...146

[The term] aerial blockade operations {*kongzhong fengsuo zuozhan*} refers to a series of operational actions for blocking the enemy's paths to the outside by air, by sea, and by land and for cutting off his economic and military contacts with the outside, primarily using air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} but also with the support and cooperation of other strengths {*liliang*}. Their goal is to restrict the activities of enemy air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} through carrying out three-dimensional, sustained blockade actions in all directions, to cause him to lose the potential {*weishi*} "high ground" {*zhigaodian*}, to cut off the enemy's contact channels with the outside, and to force the enemy to submit to our will. In future joint operations, it will not only be possible to carry out aerial blockade operations {*kongzhong fengsuo zuozhan*} independently, but it will also be possible to carry them out simultaneously with blockades by sea and by land. Aerial blockade operations {*kongzhong fengsuo zuozhan*} usually do not stress annihilating the enemy's effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*}; the level of intensity in operations is fairly low, they are kept up for a fairly long period of time, and their policy nature {*zhengce xing*} is high. Aerial blockade operations {*kongzhong fengsuo zuozhan*} primarily achieve their operational goals through such offensive operational actions and

measures as prohibiting air flights {*kongzhong jin fei*}, prohibiting [air] navigation {*jin hang*}, and prohibiting transportation {*jin yun*}, and air attacks. Aerial blockade operations {*kongzhong fengsuo zuozhan*} usually have blockades as their main [part], while attacks are supplemental; attacks are subservient to blockades, and they create [favorable] conditions for the blockades. Sometimes it is even possible to just have blockades, without fighting; under conditions where there is no direct exchange of fire with the antagonist, [it is possible] to deter and contain the enemy by establishing a strict blockade system, and to force him to surrender. In organizing and carrying out aerial blockade operations {*kongzhong fengsuo zuozhan*}, [we] should delineate the scope of the aerial blockade, based on the goals of the aerial blockade operations {*kongzhong fengsuo zuozhan*}, the ability [to carry out] the blockade operations, the natural geographical conditions of the operations area, and relevant provisions of international law. This scope includes the air, the land, and the sea, and it can cover the enemy's principle paths to the outside by air, on land, and at sea. After the scope of the blockade has been determined, [we] should announce it to the outside at the proper time. The main actions of aerial blockade operations {*kongzhong fengsuo zuozhan*} include such operational actions as aerospace inspection and control {*kong tian jiankong*}, aerospace examinations {*kong tian hecha*}, blockading accesses, and suppressing the enemy's anti-blockade system.

I. Aerial inspection and control {*kongzhong jiankong*}...147

Aerial inspection and control {*kongzhong jiankong*} means operational actions where aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*} and ground air defense units {*dimian fangkong budui*} monitor and control the activities of aircraft, ships, and vehicles that are not their own within the blockade area, to block enemy contacts with the outside world. After aerial blockade operations {*kongzhong fengsuo zuozhan*} begin, units {*budui*} that are responsible for the task of aerial inspection and control go forward to the area of aerial inspection and control, by echelon {*fen tici*}, to focus on inspecting and controlling aircraft, ships at sea, and vehicles on land that are not their own within the blockade area. Reconnaissance satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, early warning and command aircraft, ground radar, and reconnaissance ships carry out continual monitoring of the enemy's main airfields and principle accesses with the outside in the air, by land, and at sea, to ascertain in a timely manner the deployments and activities that the enemy has with third-country aircraft, ships, vehicles, and ground air defense strengths {*fang kong liliang*}. Attack aviation troop units {*jianji hangkongbing budui*} control the deployments and activities of enemy and third-country aircraft, ships, vehicles, and ground air defense strengths {*fang kong liliang*} within the blockade area, through patrols and waiting for battle {*dai zhan*}.

II. Aerial examinations {*kongzhong hecha*}...147

Aerial examinations {*kongzhong hecha*} are actions where aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*} identify and check and verify aircraft, ships, and vehicles that are not their own and that are passing through and entering the blockade area. When enemy

or third-country aircraft, ships, or vehicles engage in acts that violate interdictions, [we] should ascertain in a timely manner the various acts that have violated the interdictions and, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, resolutely take harmful {*shanghai*} and non-harmful {*fei shanghai*} actions to deal with the aircraft, ships, and vehicles that have violated the interdictions; firmly cut off contacts between the enemy and the outside world; and achieve the goal of closely trapping {*feng kun*} the enemy. Aerial examinations {*kongzhong hecha*} usually primarily involve aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*}, and they are carried out using methods that combine aerial patrols with waiting on the ground for opportunities and then quickly taking off. When targets in the air, on the ground, and at sea are unclear, first carry out appraisals and identifications on the ground, and then have aircraft quickly take off and assume the duty of aerial examinations {*kongzhong hecha*}, or guide fighter planes that are patrolling in the air to track and identify targets that are violating interdictions, to ascertain the nationality, nature, and type of the target that is violating the interdictions, as well as its level of threat to us and the attempts that it might want to make, and then create [favorable] conditions for taking further actions.

III. Closing off accesses {*fengbi tongdao*}...148

Closing off access {*fengbi tongdao*} [refers to] actions that use air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} to adopt such measures as troop strengths {*bingli*}, firepower, and obstacles to cut off enemy contacts with the outside by air, by land, and by sea. They primarily include prohibiting aerial flights {*kongzhong jin fei*}, closing off enemy access by land {*fengbi di lushang tongdao*}, and closing off enemy access by sea {*fengbi di haishang tongdao*}.

(1) Prohibiting aerial flights {*kongzhong jin fei*}

Prohibiting aerial flights {*kongzhong jin fei*} means actions that primarily use air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} to publicly announce that flights are prohibited in a certain spatial region, and using a series of no-fly actions to prevent enemy and third-country aircraft from entering or passing through the no-fly zone, cutting off the enemy from aerial contact with the outside world and forcing the enemy to submit. To organize and carry out aerial no-fly actions, [we] should first determine a rational no-fly scope. [We] usually should set up certain no-fly zones centered on the enemy's primary aerial accesses with the outside, based on such factors as [our] operational intentions, airfield conditions, blockading troop strengths {*fengsuo bingli*}, weapons capabilities, and command and control capabilities, and fully taking into consideration the needs of the political and diplomatic struggle as well as relevant provisions of international law. Second, [we] must concentrate superior troop strengths {*bingli*}, form a situation where heavy troops put pressure on the border, and establish an in-depth, multi-echelon operational posture that combines a ban on offense with [a ban] on defense {*jin da fang xiang jiehe*}, [all] centered on the enemy's major aerial accesses with the outside. The major actions in prohibiting aerial flights {*kongzhong jin fei*} consist of [the following].

Aerial expulsion and forcing [aircraft] to land {*kongzhong quli, po jiang*}. These are actions that use aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*} to drive away aircraft that are not our own and that have passed through or entered the no-fly zone, so that these fly away from the no-fly zone and the inspection and control region, or to force them to land. This is one of the major actions in prohibiting aerial flights {*kongzhong jin fei*}. Aerial expulsion {*kongzhong quli*} and forcing [aircraft] to land {*po jiang*} are carried out on the basis of aerial inspection and control {*kongzhong jiankong*} and aerial examinations {*kongzhong hecha*}, they have very strong policy requirements {*zhengce xing*}, and the results of their handling are closely connected to the political and diplomatic struggle. Therefore, [we] should flexibly adopt corresponding measures based on differing circumstances. In regards to civilian flights, cargo aircraft, and commercial aircraft of neutral countries or third nations under normal operations that mistakenly enter the no-fly zone or inspection and control area {*jiankong qu*}, [we] usually adopt such means as radio communications, light displays, or aerial coercion to drive them away from the no-fly zone and inspection and control area {*jiankong qu*}. As for aircraft that are not [our] own, that forcibly enter the no-fly zone and inspection and control area {*jiankong qu*}, and that are suspected of doing acts that violate the interdiction, and where it is hard to verify that they are neutral or third-country aircraft, force these to land at a specified airfield by adopting such means as aerial warnings and aerial coercion.

Air interception {*kongzhong lanjie*}. This refers to actions where aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*} and ground air defense units {*dimian fang kong budui*} strengths {*liliang*} use firepower to intercept aircraft that are not our own and that are violating interdictions and entering the no-fly zone and that are destroying and jamming our no-fly actions. After the aerial blockade action {*kongzhong fengsuo xingdong*} begins, [we] should concentrate our air-based, ground-based, and sea-based attack firepower against enemy military aircraft that enter the no-fly zone and inspection and control area {*jiankong qu*} to firmly attack them and to prevent them from destroying and jamming our no-fly actions. As for enemy cargo aircraft that enter the no-fly zone and inspection and control area {*jiankong qu*}, under conditions where warnings are of no effect, it is possible to attack them and cut off their aerial access. As for aircraft from neutral countries and third countries that refuse to obey no-fly orders and orders for a forced landing, it is possible, after asking for instructions and [getting] approval, to attack them.

(2) Closing off access by land {*fengbi lushang tongdao*}

Closing off access by land {*fengbi lushang tongdao*} means actions that use air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} to close off enemy access by land to the outside. Traffic routes by land are the main trunk lines for the enemy to move troop strengths {*bingli*}, to carry out logistics supply, and to engage in economic contacts with the outside world; cutting off the enemy's traffic routes by land has an important role in cutting the enemy's traffic lifeline, isolating the enemy military, and paralyzing the enemy economy. Closing off enemy access by land {*fengbi di lushang tongdao*} not only can be carried out independently by air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*}, but it can also be done jointly with troop strengths {*bingli*} that blockade [the enemy] by land. It usually is necessary to

delimit certain areas where transportation is prohibited {*jin yun qu*}, centered on the enemy's main traffic trunk lines by land to the outside and on his traffic nodes (areas of blockades by land). The main methods are [as follows].

Closing off traffic thoroughfares by land {*feng bi lushang jiaotong yaodao*}. This is usually done through a combination of aerial mine laying and firepower obstructions. After the blockade action has begun, [we] will drop mines and lay minefields in areas through which enemy transportation must pass, centered on railroads, highway trunk lines, railroad and highway tunnels, intersections, and mountain passes, using air force transportation aviation troops and bomber aviation troops as well as ground forces' aviation troops. At the same time, these will carry out intense assaults on enemy trains, transport motorcades, and marching columns that enter the no-transportation zone {*jin yun qu*} in violation of interdictions, using air force bomber [units], fighter-bomber [units], ground attack aviation troops, ground forces' aviation troops, and Second Artillery campaign and tactical missile units {*budui*}, to cut off enemy traffic lines with the outside by land.

Destroy enemy traffic nodes {*pohuai di jiaotong shuniu*}. Traffic nodes, that is, key nodes {*guan jiedian*} for traffic on land, include railway marshaling yard stations {*bianzu zhan*} and railway and highway bridges. The destruction of enemy traffic nodes often can have the effect of a multiplier, and it is one of the important methods for closing off enemy traffic on land. It primarily uses air force bomber [units], fighter-bomber [units], ground attack aviation troops, ground forces' aviation troops, and Second Artillery campaign and tactical missile units {*budui*} to attack such traffic nodes as enemy railway marshaling yard stations {*bianzu zhan*} and bridges as well as transport vehicles that are crossing these, to block the delivery of enemy personnel and materials.

(3) Closing off access by sea {*fengbi haishang tongdao*}

Closing off access by sea {*fengbi haishang tongdao*} means actions using air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} to close off enemy access by sea with the outside. Traffic lines at sea are a major traffic lifeline for contact between the enemy and the outside world; cutting off enemy traffic lines at sea also cuts off a main access for enemy contacts with the outside world. It will isolate the enemy, his economy will be paralyzed, and this will help in achieving the goals of the blockade. Closing off the enemy's access by sea {*fengbi di haishang tongdao*} is usually carried out jointly by air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} and troop strengths {*bingli*} that blockade by sea; it also can be independently carried out by air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*}. It usually is necessary to set up certain no-sail zones {*jin hang qu*} (zones for blockading by sea), centered on the enemy's main access by sea. The main methods consist of [the following].

Laying mine blockades by air {*kongzhong bulei fengzu*}. Usually, air force and naval bomber aviation troop [units], transportation aviation troop [units], and ground forces' aviation troop units {*budui*} are used to lay naval mines and set up naval mine fields at important enemy ports, along channels that ships must pass through, and along channels

that traffic at sea must pass through, to close off and obstruct the entrance and exit of enemy ships and their comings and goings, paralyzing the enemy's traffic and transportation system at sea.

Firepower sealing by air {*kongzhong huoli fengkong*}. This primarily uses air force and naval bomber [units], fighter-bomber [units], ground attack aviation troops, ground forces aviation troops, and Second Artillery campaign and tactical missile units {*budui*} to carry out firepower attacks against enemy cargo ships and operational ships {*zuo-zhan jianting*} that enter the no-sail zones {*jin hang qu*} in violation of interdictions, weakening the enemy's sea transportation strengths {*haishang yunshu liliang*} and cutting off the enemy's transportation and traffic lines at sea.

IV. Suppressing the enemy's anti-blockade system {*yazhi di fan fengsuo tixi*}...150

In future aerial blockade operations {*kongzhong fengsuo zuozhan*} that we carry out against the enemy, the enemy will not lightly let us cut off his contacts with the outside world, and he inevitably will concentrate his air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} to do all they can to carry out aerial anti-blockade operations, struggling with us for command of the blockade area and to establish contact and access with the outside world. Therefore, at the same time that we close off the enemy's contacts and access with the outside world, we also must concentrate strengths {*liliang*} to attack at the proper time the enemy's anti-blockade operations system, to suppress and weaken the enemy's anti-blockade operational capabilities, and using fighting to help the blockade {*yi da zhu feng*} and using the fighting to support the blockade {*yi da bao feng*}. Usually, enemy C4ISR systems are attacked first, using aerial information operations strengths {*kongzhong xinxi zuozhan liliang*} that adopt methods that combine soft suppression with hard kills, to seize information superiority, and then afterwards various kinds of firepower are concentrated against the key targets in the enemy's anti-blockade system {*fan fengsuo tixi*}, such as his main air force bases, air defense positions, surface-to-surface missile sites, and operational platforms at sea, to paralyze at one blow the enemy's anti-blockade system {*fan fengsuo tixi*}.

Section 6: Airborne Landing Operations {*kongjiang zuozhan*}...151

Airborne landing operations {*kongjiang zuozhan*} are operational actions that are carried out in the enemy's depths by means of aerial movements, in which airborne troops predominate but with the support and assistance of aviation troops and other services and service arms, in order to achieve certain strategic and campaign goals, and in accordance with unified intentions and plans. Airborne landing operations {*kongjiang zuozhan*} are characterized by delivering troop strengths {*bingli*} by air and by attacking by leaping over long distances, by carrying out the main operational actions in the enemy's depths, and by dangerous battlefield environments; by complex command and coordination; and by no direct rear-area support and by difficulties in support. In order to ensure that airborne landing operations {*kongjiang zuozhan*} are smoothly carried out, [forces] should implement the operational principles of complete preparations and careful

planning, unified command and rigorous coordination, concealment and surprise and ambushes to get the upper hand, concentrated strengths {*jizhong liliang*} and attacks on the enemy's key links, and comprehensive support and a stress on key points. In accordance with differences in actions and missions, the troop strengths {*bingli*} that are engaging in the airborne operation {*kongjiang zuozhan*} usually form an airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*}, an air transport group {*kongzhong shusong jituan*}, an air shielding group {*kongzhong yanhu jituan*}, an air assault group {*kongzhong tuji jituan*}, a missile attack group, a rear area support group {*houfang baozhang jituan*}, and an air defense group {*duikong fangyu jituan*}.

I. Seizing command of information and command of the air on the battlefield {*duoqu zhanchang zhixinxiquan, zhikongquan*}...151

Under informationized conditions, command of information {*zhixinxiquan*} and command of the air {*zhikongquan*} are prerequisite conditions for ensuring that airborne landing operations {*kongjiang zuozhan*} will be smoothly carried out, they are important operational actions in the airborne landing operations {*kongjiang zuozhan*}, and they permeate the operations from start to finish. The commander should utilize the various types of strengths {*liliang*}, adopt various means, and do all he can to seize command of information {*zhixinxiquan*} and command of the air {*zhikongquan*}.

(1) Seizing command of information {*duoqu zhixinxiquan*}

Prior to the launching of airborne landing operations {*kongjiang zuozhan*} and during the process of carrying them out, [we] should fully utilize the various types of electronic reconnaissance equipment and the various reconnaissance strengths {*zhencha liliang*}, to survey, search for, and obtain electromagnetic signals from enemy equipment in the airborne landing operations region {*kongjiang zuozhan diyu*} and in related regions, and to get a grasp on their location, positioning, main technical parameters, and patterns of use. On this basis, [we should] concentrate troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons, to carry out soft kills and hard kills against the important nodes in enemy information systems, to lower and destroy their operational effectiveness, and to break up the integrated structure of the enemy's information systems. In order to prevent enemy information attacks, [we] should rigorously organize information defense {*xinxi fangyu*} by adopting such measures as strict control of radio communications, organizing electronic camouflage and feints, setting up concealment nets, flexibly changing work styles, and fully utilizing the terrain and fortifications to strengthen protection.

(2) Seizing command of the air {*duoqu zhikongquan*}

First, it is necessary to carry out firepower assaults and sabotage in the enemy's rear, to control the air from the land {*zhi kong yu di*}. [We] should concentrate the main strengths {*zhuyao liliang*} of [our] air assault group {*kongzhong tuji jituan*}, and with the support and cooperation of the missile assault group {*daodan tuji jituan*}, carry out sudden and violent firepower assaults against the enemy's important airfields, air defense warning

systems, command and control systems, and air defense firepower systems; in particular, [we] should concentrate on attacking the enemy's air defense troop strengths {*fang kong bingli*} and weapons in predetermined flight zones and airborne landing operations areas {*kongjiang zuozhan diyu*}. For key targets that are not easily annihilated by firepower and that have fairly great effects on airborne actions {*kongjiang xingdong*}, [we] can organize sabotage elements, using airborne infiltration [methods] or methods of infiltration by land (or by sea) to enter the operations region and annihilate [these targets] using the method of surprise attacks.

Second, it is necessary to organize aerial convoys and aerial blockades. When organizing and carrying out aerial convoys, it is possible to use the forms of shielding that accompanies [aircraft] or shielding of a region, to eliminate or pursue incoming enemy aircraft, and to ensure the security of air transport {*kongzhong shusong*} formations. The focus of an aerial blockade is the enemy's combat aircraft airfields, so as to prevent operational actions by enemy aviation troops and to reduce or eliminate the threat that enemy aviation troops pose to our group of airborne transport planes.

Third, it is necessary to organize aerial patrols and regional air defense. Aerial patrols are shielding actions that the aerial shielding group {*kongzhong yanhu jituan*} carries out at a specified time and airspace in order to ensure the security of the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} and air transport group {*kongzhong shusong jituan*}. They can be divided into warning-type aerial patrols {*jingjie xing kongzhong xunluo*} and screening and protection-type aerial patrols {*pinghu xing kongzhong xunluo*}. When carrying out warning-type aerial patrols {*jingjie xing kongzhong xunluo*}, these generally use a fairly small number of airborne screening troop strengths {*kongzhong yanhu bingli*} to carry out warnings at a specified time and airspace; they pay close attention to the conditions surrounding the airspace, and after they discover enemy conditions, they immediately report to the command post. Depending on conditions, they then participate in combat, cooperating with ground air defense weapons to exterminate incoming enemy aircraft. When carrying out screening and protection-type aerial patrols {*pinghu xing kongzhong xunluo*}, a fairly large number of aerial screening troop strengths {*kongzhong yanhu bingli*} usually form an aerial screen in a specified time and airspace; they annihilate and expel enemy aircraft, clean up the airspace, form local air superiority, and shield our ground and aerial operational actions in a reliable manner. Regional air defense is air defense actions that the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} organizes. The airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} should establish a regional system with focal points for allocating air defense; combined with the combat activities of fighter aviation troops, they annihilate incoming enemy aircraft and ensure command of the air {*zhikongquan*} over the airborne landing operations region.

II. Carrying out firepower barrages {*shishi huoli zhunbei*}...153

Firepower barrages {*huoli zhunbei*} are firepower assault actions that are taken to clear out obstacles so that the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*}

[can] airdrop and join in battle. They include advance firepower barrages {*yuxian huoli zhunbei*} and direct firepower barrages {*zhijie huoli zhunbei*}.

(1) Advance firepower barrages {*yuxian huoli zhunbei*}

Advance firepower barrages {*yuxian huoli zhunbei*} primarily are jointly carried out by the bomber aviation troop [unit], fighter-bomber aviation troop [unit], and ground attack aviation troop unit {*budui*} of the air assault group {*kongzhong tuji jituan*}, with the support and cooperation of the missile assault group {*daodan tuji jituan*}. The main objectives of the advance firepower barrage {*yuxian huoli zhunbei*} assault are: enemy airfields, radar stations, and ground air defense firepower systems that could pose a threat to our airborne actions; the enemy military's defensive fronts in the airborne landing operations region, and enemy tanks and mechanized units {*jixiehua budui*} and the enemy military's groups that are close to the airborne landing region; and enemy command and control systems, electronic warfare systems, supply and support systems, traffic nodes, and anti-airborne landing installations. If the enemy defenses in the predetermined airborne landing area and its nearby [areas] are weak or if advance operations have attacked and suppressed the enemy in an effective manner, then in order to gain greater surprise, it may not [be necessary] to carry out advance firepower barrages {*yuxian huoli zhunbei*}.

(2) Direct firepower barrages {*zhijie huoli zhunbei*}

Direct firepower barrages {*zhijie huoli zhunbei*} are firepower assaults that are carried out in the predetermined airborne landing area prior to carrying out the airborne landing, on the basis of an advance firepower barrage {*yuxian huoli zhunbei*} that has been carried out, an initial blockade, and isolating the airborne landing area; they focus on how the enemy is adjusting his positions and restoring his defenses. Direct firepower barrages {*zhijie huoli zhunbei*} primarily are jointly carried out by the fighter-bomber aviation troop [unit] and attack aviation troop unit {*budui*} of the air assault group {*kongzhong tuji jituan*}, with the support and cooperation of the missile assault group {*daodan tuji jituan*}; they focus on assaulting and suppressing the enemy's effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*} and air defense weapons in the airborne landing area, on annihilating and destroying the enemy's defense installations and anti-airborne landing obstacles, on blockading the roads and bridges that lead to the airborne landing area, and on assaulting enemy anti-airborne landing reserve forces, especially his tank and mechanized units {*budui*}.

III. Air transport {*kongzhong shusong*}...153

Air transport {*kongzhong shusong*} is the most tense, most crucial, and most complicated moment in airborne landing operations {*kongjiang zuozhan*}; it touches on whether or not the airborne landing troops can safely and smoothly arrive at the airborne landing area, and it must be meticulously organized. Its main actions include loading, opening up an air corridor, air transport, and the airborne landing.

(1) Organizing the loading {*zuzhi zhuangzai*}

The airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} usually, in accordance with the airborne landing task organization, will use the darkness of night and favorable weather to enter the transportation area {*dai yun diqu*} and the departure airfield {*chufa jichang*} in a conceal manner, to load; the operational materials, devices, vehicles, ammunition, and heavy equipment of the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} normally are directly transported to the departure airfield {*chufa jichang*} for loading. The loading of the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} usually should begin two to three hours before takeoff and be completed twenty to thirty minutes prior to takeoff. The procedure by which the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} loads and boards the aircraft {*chengzai dengji*} is: the advance echelon, the assault echelon, the rear area echelon, and the follow-up echelon. Each unit {*budui*} proceeds in accordance with the method of first loading heavy equipment and materials and then having personnel board the aircraft. The loading and boarding should be carried out in accordance with a unified plan, and it is the responsibility of the commander of each departure airfield {*chufa jichang*} to organize this. The airborne landing operations commander must precisely coordinate and have a grasp on the moments when each airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} and air transport group {*kongzhong shusong jituan*} enters the transportation area {*dai yun diqu*} or departure airfield {*chufa jichang*}; [he must,] in a timely manner, find out about and have a grasp on how the loading is proceeding at each departure airfield {*chufa jichang*}; and [he must] supervise the close cooperation between the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} and air transport group {*kongzhong shusong jituan*} and the airfield station {*changzhan*}, proceeding strictly in accordance with the loading plan.

(2) Opening up an air corridor {*kaipi kongzhong zoulang*}

In order to ensure that the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} and the air transport group {*kongzhong shusong jituan*} smoothly enter the predetermined airborne landing area, [we] usually should, on the basis of seizing command of the air {*zhikongquan*}, open up an air corridor {*kaipi kongzhong zoulang*} in a predetermined flight zone. This is normally done by the air assault group's {*kongzhong tuji jituan*} fighter-bomber aviation troop [unit] and ground attack aviation troop unit {*budui*}, with the support and cooperation of the Second Artillery and ground forces' campaign and tactical missile units {*daodan budui*}. The targets to be assaulted are the enemy's ground air defense systems along the flight route and its two sides, such as the enemy's warning radars, control and guidance radars, surface-to-air missile sites, and anti-aircraft artillery positions. After opening up the air corridor, the commander should continually keep abreast of changes in the enemy's conditions in the corridor and its two sides, take effective measures in a timely manner, and prevent the enemy from sealing off [the corridor].

(3) Organizing air transport {*zuzhi kongzhong shusong*}

In order to ensure the security of the airborne landing operations group's {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} air transport, and to be able to accurately arrive at the airborne landing region and carry out airborne landings, after the various formations take off, they should deploy for operations in the air, prior to arriving at the starting point of the air route. [This should be done] in accordance with their various missions, with the airborne landing transport formations as the main body. During the process of air transport, the reconnaissance formation should report on weather conditions along the transport flight path and in the airborne landing area as well as on changes in enemy conditions there. The jamming formation should jam the electronic equipment of enemy air defense systems that have been found. The suppression formation should annihilate and suppress enemy radar, air defense missiles, and antiaircraft artillery positions. The shielding formation should eliminate or drive out incoming enemy aircraft, using a form that combines shielding that accompanies [the aircraft] {*bansui yanhu*} and a regional shield {*quyu yanhu*}. The transport formation should fly toward the airborne landing area along the predetermined air corridor, with the shielding and support of the various formations. [Finally,] early warning and command aircraft [should] command the actions of the various formations from an advantageous airspace. Prior to arriving at the starting point for the airborne landing flight route, the shielding formation should first go to the air above the airborne landing region or to the direction where the threat from enemy aircraft could be greatest, and clear out the airspace, and the suppression formation should carry out an airborne blockade against the enemy's important airfields, and suppress enemy air defense firepower in the airborne landing region, ensuring the transport formation's security during the airborne landing. When the various tactical transport formations arrive at the airborne landing's flight path, they should separately fly toward each of their airborne landing sites, in accordance with a predetermined plan, and carry out the airborne landing.

(4) Airborne landing touchdowns {*kongjiang zhuolu*}

[The term] airborne landing touchdowns {*kongjiang zhuolu*} refers to the process [of actions] from when airborne landing troops separate from the aircraft to when they touch down. These are crucial actions in airborne landing operations {*kongjiang zuozhan*} where they switch from airborne operations to ground operations. Therefore, the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} should use the factor of surprise and the effects of firepower barrage {*huoli zhunbei*} as much as possible, doing its best to reduce the length of time when the airborne landings are continuing, and quickly touch down. In order to ensure the security of airborne landing troops during the airborne landing touchdown, each assisting and supporting group should strengthen its firepower support and aerial shielding of the airborne landing troops, eliminating enemy air strengths {*kongzhong liliang*} and ground operations strengths {*dimian zuozhan liliang*} that attack the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*}.

IV. Ground operations {*dimian zuozhan*}...155

Ground operations {*dimian zuozhan*} are the main operational actions in airborne landing operations, as well as the crucial link in ultimately achieving the goals of airborne landing operations.

(1) Seizing the airborne landing site {*duozhan kongjiang chang*}

After the advance echelon of the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} touches down, it should launch an attack with the support and shielding of aviation troops and based on a predetermined plan, to eliminate the enemy's effective strengths {*yousheng lilian*} within the airborne landing site; control the tactical key points, bridges, fords, and important traffic routes in the airborne landing site and its environs; and prevent enemy mobile units {*jidong budui*} from approaching the airborne landing site. [It should] quickly set up guidance devices, report on weather conditions, mark the position of the airborne landing site, get rid of obstacles in the airborne landing site that would seriously affect touchdowns, command and guide the airborne formation, and ensure that the assault echelon touches down. When the advance echelon lands at an airfield, it should quickly attack and seize such important targets as the ground installations, air defense positions, and fuel and ammunition depots; control the command and communications facilities at the airfield; and afterwards quickly form a circular defense with key points {*you zhongdian de huanxing fangyu*}, clear obstacles from off the runway, make thorough preparations for command and guidance, and support the assault echelon as it lands {*jijiang*}.

(2) Establishing airborne landing bases {*jianli kongjiang jidi*}

Airborne landing bases {*kongjiang jidi*} are established on the basis of airborne landing sites that have been occupied. After the assault echelon of the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} touches down, it quickly, with the cooperation of the advance echelon, clears out the remaining enemy from the airborne landing site; occupies predetermined areas and key points within the airborne landing area; smashes the enemy's counterattacks; solidifies, expands, and connects the airborne landing sites; and repairs as quickly as possible the airfield that has been occupied or does rush repairs to field warfare airfields, striving to establish an airborne landing base {*kongjiang jidi*} in as short an amount of time as possible, to support the rear area echelon and the follow-up echelon as these land by parachute or make airborne landings. After the airborne landing base {*kongjiang jidi*} has been established, apart from some of the troop strengths {*bingli*} that are left to organize defenses, the main troop strengths {*bingli*} should quickly switch to offensive or defensive operations, in accordance with the predetermined plan. They should also quickly set up a forward support base, with the airborne landing base {*kongjiang jidi*} as its support; make thorough preparations for moving forward or for evacuation; and support the operational actions of the various units {*budui*}. The follow-up echelon of the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} usually lands by parachute or makes airborne landings after the airborne landing base

{*kongjiang jidi*} has been established; after it touches down, it deploys for attack or defense, in accordance with the predetermined plan of operations. When the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} undertakes sabotage operations missions in the enemy's rear, it also can establish an airborne landing base {*kongjiang jidi*} after completing its mission, based on the situation.

(3) Carrying out ground attacks {*shishi dimian jin'gong*}

After the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} touches down, it should quickly establish offensive positions, complete its preparations for attack, and then launch attacks against the enemy that it faces and seize important targets or key areas. Prior to the airborne landing operations group's {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} first echelon launching its attack, it should use an engineering troops element to use methods like blowing things up or searching by hand and eliminating [things] {*rengong sou pai*} to clear out remaining obstacles from the field of obstacles {*zhang'ai chang*}. After the various attack units {*gongji budui*} of the first echelon receive orders to attack, they should immediately launch attacks against predetermined targets in accordance with the predetermined plan. The commander of the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} should command his subordinate artillery troops to annihilate the enemy's defensive fortifications and firing points; the air assault group {*kongzhong tuji jituan*} is to redirect its fire against targets like the enemy's in-depth command posts, artillery positions, and reserves; and the aerial shielding group {*kongzhong yanhu jituan*}, in cooperation with the ground air defense troop strengths {*fangkong bingli*} of the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*}, is to eliminate enemies that are coming in for raids and to support the first echelon in completing its current tasks. When the first echelon has completed its current tasks, or when the enemy deploys his reserve forces to carry out a counterattack in order to stabilize his defense, the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} should deploy the second echelon or reserve forces at the proper time, to resist the enemy's counterattack and to solidify the front that has already been taken. The first echelon should be active in shielding the second echelon as it joins the battle. After the enemy carrying out the counterattack has been annihilated or beaten back, the commander of the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} should organize the units {*budui*} at the proper time to launch an attack against the enemy's depths, surround and annihilate the enemy within [the enemy's] depths, and seize predetermined targets.

(4) Switching to defense {*zhuanru fangyu*}

After the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} has completed its offensive mission or when its attack is blocked, it usually should switch to defensive operations. The commander of the airborne landing operations group {*kongjiang zuozhan jituan*} should study and weigh the situation, and make prompt decisions, based on instructions from the upper echelon, on the enemy's situation, and on the terrain conditions; [he should] complete his defensive preparations within the shortest amount of time possible, first along the main defensive directions and then along the secondary

defensive direction, and first along the periphery and then within [the defense's] depths. When the enemy draws close to the defense area {fangqu}, the air assault group {kongzhong tuji jituan} and missile assault group {daodan tuji jituan} should adopt methods that combine setting up physical barriers {shezhang lanzu} with firepower barriers {huoli lanzu}, in cooperation with the airborne landing operations group's {kongjiang zuozhan jituan} artillery troop units {paobing budui}, to blockade the roads that the enemy is advancing along and to prevent enemy mobility. When the enemy launches an assault, each unit {budui} of the airborne landing operations group {kongjiang zuozhan jituan} should, relying upon the defensive front, open up with each kind of firepower, resolutely resist the enemy's assault, hold key points, and protect the stability of the defensive system. When the enemy breaks through our defensive fronts, the air assault group {kongzhong tuji jituan} and missile assault group {daodan tuji jituan} should resolutely block off the enemy's breach by means of fierce firepower, preventing any assault by the enemy's follow-up echelon. With support from aviation firepower and missile firepower, the airborne landing operations group {kongjiang zuozhan jituan} is to launch a fierce counterattack against enemies who have broken through, resolutely block off the breach, and restore and maintain the stability of the defensive system. During the process where the airborne landing operations group {kongjiang zuozhan jituan} switches to defense and to defensive operations, the commander should organize the air assault group {kongzhong tuji jituan}, missile assault group {daodan tuji jituan}, air shielding group {kongzhong yanhu jituan}, and rear area support group {houfang baozhang jituan} in supporting, shielding, and safeguarding [the airborne landing operations group] in a timely manner, ensuring that the airborne landing operations group {kongjiang zuozhan jituan} smoothly completes its defensive mission.

Section 7: Cooperating with and Assisting the Operations of Other Services and Service Arms {xietong zhiyuan qita jun bingzhong zuozhan}...157

In joint operations, air force strengths {kongjun liliang} not only need to organize and carry out relatively independent operational actions, but they also need to cooperate with and support the ground forces, the navy, and the Second Artillery in completing operational missions. When air force strengths {kongjun liliang} are cooperating with and supporting other services' and service arms' operations, the major tasks that they undertake include: seizing and holding command of the air {zhikongquan} on the battlefield; carrying out in-depth air assaults against, annihilation of, and destruction of important targets within the enemy's depths; carrying out close-in aviation firepower support and assaulting important targets along the enemy's front and in his forward depths; and carrying out air reconnaissance and air transport, ensuring that the other services and service arms smoothly carry out their operational actions. The main actions consist [of the following].

I. Aerial shielding {kongzhong yanhu}...157

[The term] aerial shielding {kongzhong yanhu} refers to operational actions that fighter aviation force units {jianji hangkongbing budui} take in order to ensure that the

deployments and actions of other services' and service arms' units {*budui*} do not come under the threat of enemy air raids, or come under little [threat]. The air force commander should flexibly determine the methods of shielding, based on such conditions as the differences in the shielding capabilities of fighter aviation force units {*jianji hangkongbing budui*} and the functions of aircraft and airborne weapons; the [differences in the] positions, numbers, operational occasions {*zuozhan shijie*}, directions of operations, and missions of the troop strengths {*bingli*} or targets being shielded; and [the differences in] the moments of enemy air raids, his weapons functions, his methods, and his numbers, as well as [our] intelligence support and command and control capabilities.

In order to ensure the security of the other services' and service arms' units {*budui*}, in organizing and carrying out aerial shielding {*kongzhong yanhu*}, it is first necessary to strengthen coordination with the air defense troop strengths {*fang kong bingli*} of the services and service arms that are being assisted, striving to join with the air defense troop strengths {*fang kong bingli*} of the services and service arms that are being assisted as they annihilate the enemy. Second, it is necessary to have a grasp on the focus of the shielding {*yanhu zhongxin*}; [we] should concentrate troop strengths {*bingli*} in operations along major directions and at crucial moments, to form an aerial screen. Third, it is necessary to correctly handle the relationship between shielding and annihilating the enemy; [we] should have an emphasis on shielding, with annihilating the enemy secondary. Fourth, it is necessary to stress attacks on key points; [we] should emphasize intercepting groups of enemy air attack aircraft, and strive to avoid a love for war {*lian zhan*}⁸ with groups of enemy fighter planes.

II. In-depth air assaults {*zongshen kongzhong tuji*}...158

[The term] in-depth air assaults {*zongshen kongzhong tuji*} refers to aerial firepower assault actions that bomber [units] and fighter-bomber aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*} carry out against targets in the enemy's depths that could seriously affect ground force and naval operations. Their goals are to eliminate the enemy's main battle weapons and equipment, command organizations, in-depth echelons, and reserve forces; to prevent enemy troop strengths {*bingli*} from moving and reinforcing [his troops]; to destroy enemy logistics and supply systems; and to create favorable conditions for ground force and naval operational actions.

Because there are a fairly large number of targets within the enemy's depths, and [because] his defense against the air is relatively rigorous, when air force aviation troops launch an assault against the enemy's in-depth targets, under normal conditions a precision attack from outside the defense zone {*fangqu*} is first carried out against enemy targets by bomber and fighter-bomber aviation troops using air-to-surface missiles.

⁸ Translator's note: based on the context, this may be a typo for something like "strive to avoid engagements {*jiaozhan*} with groups of enemy fighter planes."

Afterwards, aviation bombs are used to carry out supplemental assaults. Or fighter-bomber aviation troops whose ability to penetrate defenses is fairly strong are first used to carry out the assault, and then bomber aviation troops are used to carry out assaults. When assisting ground force units' {*budui*} operations, [we] should stress assaults on such targets as the enemy's in-depth echelons and reserve forces, command organizations, surface-to-surface missile sites, logistics supply systems, and traffic nodes. When assisting naval operations, [we] should stress attacks on such targets as the enemy's naval bases, ports, and ship formations at sea.

III. Close-in aviation firepower support {*jinju hangkong huoli zhiyuan*}...158

[The term] close-in aviation firepower support {*jinju hangkong huoli zhiyuan*} refers to aviation firepower assault actions that are undertaken against targets along the enemy's front and in his forward depths that would directly affect operational actions by ground force and naval units {*budui*}. Its goals are to assault the enemy troop strengths {*bingli*}, firepower, and other important targets that [our] ground force and naval units {*budui*} are facing, and to create favorable conditions for offensive and defensive operations by [our] ground force' and naval units {*budui*}. Close-in aviation firepower support {*jinju hangkong huoli zhiyuan*} includes aviation firepower barrages {*huoli zhunbei*}, aviation firepower barrages to counter [the enemy] {*huoli fan zhunbei*}, and direct aviation firepower support.

[The term] aviation firepower barrages {*huoli zhunbei*} refers to aviation firepower assault actions that aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*} carry out against enemy targets prior to an attack by their own side's ground force and naval units {*budui*}. They are divided into advance aviation firepower barrages {*huoli zhunbei*} and direct aviation firepower barrages {*huoli zhunbei*}. They usually are done by the air force's bomber, attack-bomber, and ground attack aviation force units {*hangkongbing budui*}. Their goals are to destroy the enemy's air defense system, eliminate the enemy's effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*}, isolate the battlefield, weaken the enemy's ability to resist, and create favorable conditions for attack actions by the ground forces and the navy. Aviation firepower barrages {*huoli zhunbei*} usually are conducted in tandem with ground forces' artillery barrages {*paohuo zhunbei*} or naval ships' artillery firepower barrages {*huoli zhunbei*}, but they can also be carried independently. The key targets of assault include such targets as the enemy's command organizations, his important support points {*zhichengdian*}, his surface-to-surface missile sites, his artillery positions, his defense fortifications, his heavy troops' staging places, and his land and sea obstacles systems.

[The term] aviation firepower barrages to counter [the enemy] {*huoli fan zhunbei*} refers to aviation firepower assault actions that aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*} carry out against an enemy prior to [the enemy's] launching an attack, in order to destroy the enemy's ground force and naval units {*budui*}. They usually are done by the air force's bomber, fighter-bomber, and ground attack aviation force units {*hangkongbing budui*}. Their goals are to annihilate the enemy's effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*} and main battle technical weapons, to prevent enemy movements, to weaken enemy offensive

capabilities, and to create favorable conditions for defensive operations by ground force and naval units {*budui*}. Aviation firepower barrages to counter [the enemy] {*huoli fan zhunbei*} usually are carried out together with ground forces' artillery firepower barrages to counter [the enemy] {*huoli fan zhunbei*} and naval ships' artillery firepower barrages to counter [the enemy] {*huoli fan zhunbei*}, but they can also be carried out independently. The key targets of assault include the enemy's command organizations; roads, bridges, narrow passages, and mountain passes that the enemy's attack must pass over, as well as surface-to-surface missile sites and the enemy's follow-up echelons and reserve forces.

[The term] direct aviation firepower support refers to aviation firepower assault actions that aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*} carry out against enemy targets during the process of ground force or naval units' {*budui*} offensive or defensive operations. They usually are carried out by fighter-bomber or ground attack aviation force units {*hangkongbing budui*}. Their goals are to eliminate enemy targets that form a direct threat to [our] ground force and naval units {*budui*} and to create favorable conditions for offensive and defensive operations by the ground forces and the navy. Direct aviation firepower support usually is carried out together with ground forces' artillery support and naval ships' support, but it can also be carried out independently. The key targets of assault include enemy command organizations, support points {*zhichengdian*}, defensive fortifications, artillery fronts, surface-to-surface missile sites, heavy troops' staging areas, and traffic nodes.

IV. Aviation reconnaissance {*hangkong zhencha*}...159

[The term] aviation reconnaissance refers to actions by air force reconnaissance aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*} to obtain battlefield intelligence, using many means of aerial reconnaissance. Their goal is to provide a basis for ground force, naval, and Second Artillery units' {*budui*} commanders to make decisions and to [exercise] command. During joint operations, under normal conditions, the ground force, naval, and Second Artillery command organizations that are receiving support make requests to the air force command organization for aviation reconnaissance support, based upon their operational needs, and the air force reconnaissance aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*} organize and carry this out based on the aviation reconnaissance tasks given them by their upper echelon and on a plan of cooperation. When carrying out aviation reconnaissance support, [we] should stress ascertaining the distribution of the enemy's main targets, the makeup of his fronts, the number of his troop strengths {*bingli*}, the equipment that he is using, and trends in his activities.

V. Air transport {*kongzhong shusong*}...160

[The term] air transport {*kongzhong shusong*} refers to support actions using transport aviation troops to transport personnel, materials, and equipment to specified areas. Its goal is to provide air transport support for the troop strength {*bingli*} movement and logistics supply of ground force [units], naval [units] and Second Artillery units {*budui*},

in order to ensure that the offensive and defensive operations of ground force [units], naval [units], and Second Artillery units {*budui*} proceed smoothly. In air transport {*kongzhong shusong*}, usually the air force commander organizes the unit that receives the shipment {*shou yun budui*}, the transport aviation troop unit {*yunshu hangkongbing budui*}, and the units at the departure and arrival airfields {*qiyun he jiangluo jichang budui*} to carry out [the transport], based on instructions [the commander] receives from the upper echelon or on requests from the services and service arms receiving the support. In order to ensure that the boarding (or loading) and unloading are smoothly carried out, [we] should establish command groups at the departure and arrival airfields, to execute specific command over the air transport {*kongzhong shusong*}.

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Chapter 6

Support to Air Force Operations in Joint Operations...160

Support to air force operations {*kongjun zuozhan baozhang*} is the general term for the various support measures that are planned and organized in a unified manner by headquarters in order to support air force operational strengths {*kongjun zuozhan liliang*} in securely and smoothly carrying out operational missions.

Section 1: Basic Requirements {*jiben yaoqiu*}...160

Air force operational strengths {*kongjun zuozhan liliang*} in joint operations are combined operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} composed of differing service arms (or aircraft types). What they carry out are combined operations involving multiple service arms (or aircraft types), and they have many types of weapons and equipment, where technology is concentrated. Confrontation on the battlefield is intense, and situations change rapidly. Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, jamming and counter-jamming, and assault and counter-assault are interwoven. The level of support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang*} will directly affect the process and outcome of air force operations. The basic requirements are [as follows].

I. Rigorous organization, coordination with one another, and bringing into play the integrated effectiveness of support systems {*yanmi zuzhi, xianghu xietiao, fahui baozhang xitong de zhengti xiaoneng*}...161

Support to air force operations {*kongjun zuozhan baozhang*} is a complex and huge system made up of many professional departments. Each professional department and each service task is an important component part in the support system to operations {*zuozhan baozhang xitong*}. Although the role of each of these in operational actions is regional, an error by any department or in any task can create serious and even fatal harm to operational actions, either directly or through an adverse chain reaction. Only through rigorous organization is it possible to have each component part in the support system to operations {*zuozhan baozhang xitong*} operate in a coordinated manner. And only through close coordination and by fully bringing into play the integrated effectiveness of support to joint operations is it possible to create favorable conditions for smoothly organizing and carrying out air force operational actions.

II. Scientific management, and enhancing the rapid reaction capabilities of support to operations {*kexue guanli, tigao zuozhan baozhang de kuaisu fanying nengli*}...161

Support to air force operations {*kongjun zuozhan baozhang*} must have the ability to react rapidly, in order to adapt to the characteristics of air force operations, where actions are sudden and conditions are variable. Whether or not [support] reacts rapidly is determined not only by the quality of personnel and the functions of equipment, but also by how scientific the management of personnel and equipment is.

During the stage of preparing for operations, [we] should collect relevant information on a widespread basis, predict the support missions that could be taken on and the environment in which support will be carried out, and draft multiple support plans that would correspond to [these missions and the environment], so that support personnel will have a fairly strong ability to react and to adapt. After the decision for operations and the plan of operations have been made, [we should] immediately compare and assess the various support plans, evaluate them and select the best, and modify and supplement them; [we should] draft support plans and assign the execution {*xiada zhixing*} [of those plans] in a timely manner; and [we should] use modern management means and advanced information technology to strengthen monitoring and management of support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang*}. [We] should quickly adopt effective measures to resolve problems that arise because of defects in planning and execution or because of changes in the situation.

III. Use many support measures simultaneously and ensure the stability and reliability of the work {*duo zhong baozhang shouduan bingyong, quebao gongzuo wending kekao*}...161

To make support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang*} stable and reliable, the commander and headquarters must make careful plans and scientifically organize the strengths {*liliang*} of the various professional departments and support units {*budui*} (or elements) when planning operational actions; [they must] use both advanced technical equipment and ordinary technical equipment, employ both automatic means and manual operations, and take the lead to get support and cooperation from other services and service arms, from local [Chinese Communist] Party and government organs, and from the masses of the people, as they carry out support missions to operations {*zuozhan baozhang renwu*} in a coordinated manner. They must be skilled at modifying and improving support organizations, based on the operational situation and on changes and developments in the various stages of operations as well as on changes in timing and location and in the conditions of the operational environment, and [they must] adopt corresponding countermeasures and measures, to ensure the timeliness, continuity, and effectiveness of the various action to support operations {*zuozhan baozhang xingdong*}.

Section 2: Major Details {*zhuyao neirong*}...162

Support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang*} for air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} in joint operations primarily includes reconnaissance and intelligence; communications; radar; navigation; flight management and control {*hangxing guanzhi*}; management of the electromagnetic spectrum {*dianci pinpu guanli*}; weather; camouflage for operations {*zuozhan weizhuang*}; nuclear, chemical, and biological protection {*he hua sheng fanghu*}; airfield security, and battlefield management and control.

I. Reconnaissance and intelligence support {*zhencha qingbao baozhang*}...162

The careful organization of reconnaissance and the timely and accurate grasp of the battlefield situation is an important premise for commanders as they organize operations. When planning operational actions, it is necessary to carefully draft reconnaissance plans for operations, based on instructions from the commander and the upper echelon, and to comprehensively and in a focused manner deploy the various types of reconnaissance strengths {*zhencha lilian*}, forming a reconnaissance and intelligence system that has many functions, [covers] all directions, and has integrated effects. It is necessary to rationally employ such means as satellite reconnaissance, air reconnaissance, and radio technological reconnaissance, and to rigorously surveil the enemy situation on the ground, at sea, and in the air. [It is necessary] to obtain [information about] the enemy's intentions for aerial operations, the deployment of his aviation troops and air defense troops, his radar and radio communications spectrum, and information materials about his targets, in a timely and accurate manner. During the process of operations, it is necessary to obtain information in a timely manner about damage that the enemy's command organization, communications nodes, airfields, air defense sites, radar sites, ports, and heavy infantry groups have suffered after our air attacks, so that the commander [can] modify his decisions about operations in a timely manner. It is necessary to broaden intelligence sources and to actively establish relations with national [organizations], other services and service arms, and local organizations, and to collect intelligence materials on a widespread basis through such channels as spies, intercept, and various information networks. It is necessary to process in a timely manner the intelligence that is obtained, to analyze it in an integrated manner, to differentiate what is real from what is false, and to reach correct conclusions. It is necessary to quickly transmit [these conclusions], to enhance the timely effectiveness of the intelligence, and to provide a basis for the commander to make decisions.

II. Communications support {*tongxin baozhang*}...162

Communications contacts are the nervous system of the military, and they are the basic means for supporting command of operations. The structure of the air force communications system is complex, there are many forms and types of communications technology, the volume of information that is transmitted by the various types of communications is large, and there is a heavy demand for timely effectiveness and secrecy in communications. In organizing communications support {*tongxin baozhang*} to air force operations, [we] should carefully draft communications support plans {*tongzhi baozhang jihua*} based on the needs that the various operational actions have for communications contacts; determine the organization of communications for alerts, intelligence, command, cooperation, and the rear area; rationally differentiate missions; and form a tight communications network. It is necessary to adopt such advanced communications technologies as fiber optics communications, satellite communications, and mobile communications; to bring into play the specialties of the many types of communications means; to establish roundabout communications networks of many types, with multiple routes, and with many directions; and to set up a network with the

ground forces, navy, Second Artillery, and local communications that have already been set up, ensuring that the communications network is unimpeded and [meets] the needs of operations. It is necessary to strengthen the protection of communications facilities, to do a good job of dispersing and concealing [these facilities], and to move important communications facilities underground as much as possible, in order to enhance the ability of the communications facilities to resist destruction. It is necessary to carefully organize the stockpiling, supplies, and technical support of communications devices, based on the needs of the various types of operations.

III. Radar support {*leida baozhang*}...163

Radar support {*leida baozhang*} is an important measure of information support for the command and units {*budui*} of operations as they smoothly carry out their operational missions. In organizing radar support {*leida baozhang*}, [we] should rationally deploy [radars] based on such conditions as the needs of operations, the number and quality of radar troops' troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons, and the theater of war terrain, forming a radar support network {*leida baozhang wang*}. [We] must carefully draft support plans, and rigorously organize radar intelligence support {*leida qingbao baozhang*} for air alerts and aviation troops' operations. [We] must do all we can to adopt advanced equipment for transmission and processing, reduce [the number of] echelons in transmitting intelligence, and enhance the timely effectiveness of radar intelligence. [We] must stress radar support {*leida baozhang*} for the main directions and the main areas of operations, but on the basis of comprehensive support. [We] must energetically adopt advanced technical equipment, and enhance the levels of automation in support. [Finally, we] must adopt effective measures to ensure that [radar support] can work normally in a complex electromagnetic environment.

IV. Navigation support {*linghang baozhang*}...163

Navigation support {*linghang baozhang*} refers to the various measures and actions that guide aviation troops in smoothly completing their missions, in accordance with specified periods of time, locations, and targets. In organizing navigation support {*linghang baozhang*}, [we] must use the engineering principles of military systems as well as modern computing technology, rationally determine probable targets, accurately establish mathematical models, carry out navigational calculations for operations, predict the effects of operations, combine qualitative analyses and demonstrations, integrate correlations, and provide navigation data and proposals to ensure that aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*} achieve maximum effects in operations. [We] must fully utilize the guidance organizations and modernized guidance facilities in the theater of war, to enhance the efficiency of guiding air [operations] {*duikong yindao*}. [We] must correctly organize such support as aerial navigation, bombing and air transport, and airdrops; scientifically select air routes, flight profiles, bombing weapons, plans for bomb loads, and methods for assaulting targets; and increase efficiency in penetrating defenses and [increase] the effects of assaults. [We] must enhance the organization and planning

ability of navigation departments and adopt scientific means and methods of management in order to raise the levels of navigation support *{linghang baozhang}*.

V. Flight management and control *{hangxing guanzhi}*...164

Flight management and control *{hangxing guanzhi}* is an important support task for surveilling, monitoring, and controlling aircraft flying in the theater of war; for maintaining flight order; and for ensuring flight safety. Flight management and control *{hangxing guanzhi}* departments must exercise unified management and control over flight activities in the theater of war, and rigorously surveil and monitor these. They must draft plans for flight management and control *{hangxing guanzhi}* in the theater of war, based on the operational mission, troop strength *{bingli}* deployment, and distribution of airfields, and delineate areas for flight management and control *{hangxing guanzhi}* as well as no-fly zones, air corridors, restricted areas, and dangerous areas. They [must] use various means to get an accurate grasp on the various flight activities in the theater of war, they [must] organize flight allotments, and they [must] inform relevant departments in a timely manner of intelligence involving our aircraft's aerial flights. They [must] have a rigorous grasp of the conditions of aircraft in the air, and they [must] make proposals in a timely manner about allotting flights, clearances, restricting flights, grounding [aircraft], and alternates for aircraft in operations *{zuo-zhan feiji beiji-ang}*, based on the needs of operations. They [must] draft specifications for supporting special aircraft *{zhuanji}* in wartime, organize and inspect the various types of support for flights by special aircraft *{zhuanji}*, keep up on the flight situations of special aircraft *{zhuanji}*, and inform relevant departments in a timely manner of situations.

VI. Management of the electromagnetic spectrum *{dianci pinpu guanli}*...164

Management of the electromagnetic spectrum *{dianci pinpu guanli}* is the various management tasks that are undertaken for military and local equipment and facilities that use the spectrum *{yong pin}*, in order to maintain order in the battlefield electromagnetic spectrum and to ensure that units *{budui}* methodically organize and launch operations. In organizing and carrying out management of the electromagnetic spectrum *{dianci pinpu guanli}*, [we] should plan in a unified manner the deployment and allocation of the various units' *{budui}* main equipment that uses frequencies *{yong pin}*, to come up with unified specifications and differentiations for the times to use the equipment, the ways in which [the equipment] works, its frequencies, its frequency bands, and its working time intervals. [We] must draft regulations for encryption, control electromagnetic spectrum radiation, reduce the time for transmission, do a thorough job of coordinating electronic reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance and electronic offense and defense, and ensure that communications equipment, electronic reconnaissance equipment, guided munitions and equipment, and electronic warfare equipment work in a coordinated and orderly manner. [We] must rigorously monitor how the various units *{budui}* are implementing regulations, promptly prevent instances where regulations are violated, and based on changes in the situation, supplement the regulations on the use of frequencies in a timely manner and coordinate activities that use frequencies *{yong pin}*.

VII. Weather support {*qixiang baozhang*}...164

Weather conditions are a factor that air force operations cannot ignore. Not only can weather factors be used in military actions, but they can also block military actions, and the rigorous organization of weather support {*qixiang baozhang*} has an important role in air force operations. In order to rigorously organize weather support {*qixiang baozhang*}, air force headquarters must organize a theater of war weather network, with the weather department at the center; divide up responsibilities; fully bring into play the role of integrated support; and complete the mission of weather support {*qixiang baozhang*} to operations. It is necessary to bring into play the role of a weather intelligence network; to utilize the various means of weather intelligence; to continually receive air force reports on actual battlefield weather conditions, reports from local weather stations about dangerous aerial weather, theater of war weather data, and probes and data from weather radar and weather satellites; and to continuously keep abreast of changes in the weather. It is necessary to adopt various means to collect weather data from the enemy area, especially aerial weather intelligence about predetermined targets of attack. For important operational actions, it is necessary to organize special weather reconnaissance, in order to ensure that the operational mission is smoothly carried out. It is necessary to thoroughly organize coordination between air force weather departments and the upper echelon's and friendly neighbors' weather departments, to carefully prepare technical data, to strengthen consultations on weather forecasts, and to get energetic assistance from local weather departments and the weather departments of other services and service arms. It is necessary to quickly provide real-time weather data, focused on the differing types of operations, the differing stages of operations, and the needs for weather support {*qixiang baozhang*} that differing areas of operations have.

VIII. Camouflage for operations {*zuo zhan weizhuang*}...165

Camouflage for operations {*zuo zhan weizhuang*} is the various measures that are taken to deceive the enemy about important targets, in order to conceal the intentions, deployments, and actions of operations. In organizing and carrying out camouflage for operations {*zuo zhan weizhuang*}, it is necessary to have unified planning, to fully utilize natural camouflage, and to actively carry out artificial camouflage; at the same time that real targets are being camouflaged, [it is necessary] to adopt advanced techniques and technology, and to set up fake airfields, fake sites, and other fake targets, in order to conceal the PRC military's true intentions and deployments for operations. When setting up fake targets, it is necessary to adapt to terrain conditions and to be in accordance with the nature and characteristics of the target that is being set up, in accordance with the background for operations, and to try to keep things from becoming routine. In addition to using traditional methods of camouflage, it is necessary to energetically develop and use new camouflage techniques and camouflage tools. [It is necessary] to camouflage personnel, aircraft, weapons, technical equipment, and important installations, and to make it difficult for the enemy's aerial and ground reconnaissance equipment to find and see through [this camouflage]. It is necessary to use such means as electronic feints and electronic camouflage, setting up fake command posts, carrying out fake commands,

displaying fake concentrations of troops strengths {*bingli*}, and revealing fake intelligence, [all] based on the intentions of the operation, in order to conceal the PRC military's true intentions and shield the PRC military's true deployments and true actions.

IX. Nuclear, chemical, and biological protection {*he hua sheng fanghu*}...165

In future joint operations, air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} could carry out operations in a nuclear, chemical, and biological [weapons] environment; therefore, adopting effective measures to ensure that air force strengths engaged in combat {*kongjun canzhan liliang*} avoid or reduce [damage from] nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and secondary nuclear, chemical, and biological damage has an important significance for maintaining units' {*budui*} combat capabilities. In organizing and carrying out nuclear, chemical, and biological protection {*he hua sheng fanghu*}, it is necessary to carefully draft a plan for protection and to establish various organizations for protection, to do a good job of stockpiling and supplying protective devices and materials and to improve engineering facilities for protection, to strengthen hygienic protection against epidemics and medicine and first aid, to investigate in-depth the conditions of such installations in the area of operations as nuclear power stations and chemical factories, and to carry out suitable preventive preparations. [We] should especially make careful preparations for the protection of such important targets as weapons and equipment, materials, foods, water sources, airfields, and command organizations. [It is necessary] to establish observation and alert networks and reporting services that combine upper echelons and lower echelons, that combine the military and civilians, and that combine the various services and service arms; in particular, [we] should establish and improve {*jianquan*} networks for surveying (or observing), monitoring, and reporting nuclear, chemical, and biological [information], discovering signs in a timely manner that the enemy will attack, and issuing forecasts and alert signals in a timely manner. When coming under enemy attack, [we] should organize special strengths {*zhuanye liliang*} to quickly ascertain the damage and contamination, and report to superiors in a timely manner and inform friendly neighboring units {*budui*} and relevant local departments. After coming under enemy attack, [we] should quickly organize emergency rescue, emergency repairs, firefighting, and decontamination, to eliminate the consequences caused by the enemy attack.

X. Security support for airfields and sites {*jichang, zhendi anquan baozhang*}...166

Airfields and sites are the support for air force strengths {*kongjun liliang*} to carry out operational missions; at the same time, they are important targets for enemy attacks. Adopting effective measures to deal with enemy air and ground attacks and ensuring the security of airfields and sites have an important significance for enhancing units' {*budui*} survival capabilities in wartime and for completing operational missions on time. When organizing defenses for airfields and sites, it is necessary to draft scenarios for dealing with things under various circumstances, based on the number of airfields and sites within the theater of war and on the roles that these have in various kinds of operations. It is necessary to establish sound defensive organizations, to rationally differentiate the

defensive regions, to divide up the tasks of defense, and to clarify command relationships. It is necessary to take the initiative to get support and cooperation from other services and service arms and from local strengths {*difang liliang*}, under the unified organization of the joint command organization. It is necessary fully utilize advanced defensive installations, defensive means, and defensive fortifications as well as natural conditions in order to carry out a rigorous defense against the means of attack that the enemy could adopt. [Finally], in addition to deploying suitable ground defensive strengths {*fanghu liliang*} for major airfields and sites, it is also necessary to organize aviation troop units {*hangkongbing budui*} to shield [these airfields and sites] from the air and to deploy antiaircraft artillery and ground-to-air missile units {*budui*} for carrying air defense.

XI. Battlefield management {*zhanchang guanli*}...166

Battlefield management {*zhanchang guanli*} is the management measures and management activities that are undertaken for air force units involved in combat {*kongjun canzhan budui*} in order to keep order on the battlefield. In air force operations, spaces are wide, the scope of the battlefield is large, there are many units involved in combat {*canzhan budui*}, and operational missions are complex; the task of battlefield management {*zhanchang guanli*} is quite complex and arduous. In organizing and carrying out battlefield management {*zhanchang guanli*}, [we] should carry things out by adopting the methods of unified management and responsibility by grade {*an ji fuze*}. In managing the ground battlefield for air force operations, [we] should draft a battlefield management plan {*zhanchang guanli guihua*}, differentiate the areas of responsibility for battlefield management {*zhanchang guanli*}, clarify the missions of battlefield management {*zhanchang guanli renwu*}, and set discipline for battlefield management {*zhanchang guanli jilyu*}. Each unit {*budui*} [should] separately organize and carry out specific management tasks; the main details are: managing airfields, sites, and weapons and equipment, and organizing warning services and adjusting traffic services. In managing the air battlefield {*kongzhong zhanchang guanli*}, the main thing is to specifically specify the methods of management for aerial flights, in order to ensure the security of air operations and [to ensure] that groups of aircraft in the air carry out their operational missions in an orderly manner.

Part IV

Second Artillery Operations Application in Joint Operations...168

Under a unified *jihua*-plan and command of joint operations command institutions, a Second Artillery operation in the joint operation means that the Second Artillery conventional missile strength focuses on the unified goal of the joint operation and independently implements or coordinates with other service strengths to conduct a series of missile deterrence and assault activities. In joint operations, the Second Artillery mainly applies conventional missile firepower, assaults important targets in the enemy's strategic campaign depth, and achieves operational goals. A missile firepower operation is a basic form of Second Artillery operations, and its basic attribute is an offensive operation.

As an important component of our armed forces joint operational strength, the Second Artillery conventional missile strength has a prominent status and function. It not only optimizes the joint operations strength *tixi*-system but also expands the joint operations firepower control area and strengthens deterrent and operational capabilities of our armed forces. In order to fully bring into play the Second Artillery's role in joint operations, we must look at this from the overall situation, seriously study and discuss the operational characteristics and laws of Second Artillery in joint operations, and implement correct operational guidance.

In joint operations under future informationized conditions, in addition to having common characteristics of modern conditions, the Second Artillery operation also has the following characteristics: 1) operational effectiveness has a big impact on the war situation, and operational control has many requirements; 2) the technical quality and integrated-whole quality of the operational system is strong, and there are many constraining factors; 3) the battlefield space is widespread and operational environment is complex; and 4) the time effectiveness of operational activities is strong, and organizing command and support is difficult.

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Chapter 1

The Primary Battlefields for Second Artillery Operations in Joint Operations...169

The primary battlefields for Second Artillery operations in joint operations refers to the spaces involved in confrontations that Second Artillery troop strengths {*bingli*}, weapons, and firepower engage in with the enemy when Second Artillery conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} that are involved in combat carry out operational missions. An objective understanding of the characteristics of the battlefield for Second Artillery operations during joint operations, familiarity with the key factors of battlefields, and clarity about the effects that the various battlefield key factors have on the Second Artillery have an important significance for planning, organizing, and carrying out Second Artillery operations.

Section 1: Battlefield Characteristics {*zhanchang tedian*}...169

The operational battlefield {*zuo-zhan zhanchang*} of the Second Artillery in joint operations include {*xiang kuo*} the land, the sea, the air, space, and electromagnetic spheres; it is a multidimensional integrated composite battlefield composed jointly of land battlefields, sea battlefields, air battlefields, space battlefields, and electromagnetic battlefields. The main battlefields for Second Artillery operations not only have the characteristics of ordinary battlefields, but they also have their [own] specialties.

I. Battlefields involve a great deal of prepositioning {*zhanchang yushe xing qiang*}...169

Second Artillery operations rely very much upon positions {*zhendi*}, and the makeup of the fighting positions {*zuo-zhan zhendi*} have a great many key factors, a huge amount of engineering, and high technological standards and requirements. Therefore, the fighting positions {*zuo-zhan zhendi*} of the Second Artillery usually are constructed in advance during peacetime, fighting positions {*zuo-zhan zhendi*} have a great deal of prepositioning {*yushe xing*}, and their operational activities, such as “move” {*zou*}, “attack” {*da*}, “defend” {*fang*}, and “resist” {*kang*}, all need to be carried out in operational areas that have already been set up. If [Second Artillery actions] are separated from fighting positions {*zuo-zhan zhendi*}, it will be hard for [the Second Artillery] to smoothly carry out its operational missions. At the same time, most launches of the missile weapons that the Second Artillery uses are fixed, and this means that the maximum scope, the main directions, and the primary targets of their battlefields have also basically been determined. It can be seen from this that the relatively predetermined nature of fighting positions {*zuo-zhan zhendi*}, of the scope of the battlefield, and of the main operational targets directly lead to having the strengths that are involved {*canjia liliang*}, the deployments of operations, the targets to be attacked, the main operational scenarios, and the various types of support all clearly positioned and determined in advance. Thus, plans and preparations for Second Artillery operations involve prepositioning and planning.

II. There are many factors that reveal traces of the battlefield {zhanchang zhenghou baolu yinsu duo}...170

Missile sites {daodan zhendi} are an important component part of the Second Artillery operational battlefield {zuozhan zhanchang}, they are important venues for storage and management of weapons and for unit {budui} training in peacetime, they are basic requirements for producing units' {budui} combat capabilities, and they are an important basis for operational actions in wartime and for protecting [units'] survival. Because conventional missile weapons systems are large in volume and are heavy, they place special requirements on the roads that they move [along] and on fighting positions {zuozhan zhendi}. In addition, [the fact that] missile sites {daodan zhendi} are built in advance and their locations are fixed means that there are clear traces of the missile sites {daodan zhendi}, that it is easy for the enemy to reconnoiter and find them, and that they easily come under enemy attack and are destroyed. First, the enemy's widespread use of his superior air and space reconnaissance technology and means make it extremely easy for enemy reconnaissance aircraft and reconnaissance satellites to find the Second Artillery's fighting positions {zuozhan zhendi}. Second, the enemy's extensive use of long-range precision attack munitions makes it easy for the enemy's long-range precision munitions to attack and annihilate missile sites {daodan zhendi} that are relatively fixed. Therefore, strengthening the concealment and camouflage of the Second Artillery and its fighting positions {zuozhan zhendi} and enhancing their resistance and defense against enemy reconnaissance and long-range precision guided munitions attacks are important tasks that the construction and use of the Second Artillery's operational battlefield {zuozhan zhanchang} face during joint operations under informationized conditions.

III. The battlefield has the distinct characteristic where its overall disposition is decentralized and nonlinear {zhanchang buju fensan, feixianxing tezheng mingxian}...170

In order to enhance the Second Artillery's survival capability and to make it easy for it to make the most of its firepower, the operational deployments of the Second Artillery during joint operations adopt a form where they are decentralized overall but locally concentrated. When deploying fighting positions {zuozhan zhendi}, they execute a "point-plate style" of deployment where the front and the rear are combined, where the spacing is grouped {shumi dapei}, where the technical positions {jishu zhendi} are the point {dian}, and where the standby fronts {daiji zhendi} and the launch sites {fashe zhendi} form the plate. This kind of troop strengths {bingli} deployment has the characteristic of being clearly non-standard. As units {budui} are continuously equipped with various types of mobile weapons and as the Second Artillery's capabilities for large-scale mobile operations that cross between regions are constantly strengthened, the form of the battlefield structure will further develop in the direction of being non-linear. The rapid development of military technology is continually strengthening units' {budui} long-range warfare capabilities. On future battlefields, the enemy and we will not have a so-called "secure rear area" {anquan houfang}. On the one hand, the range of our conventional missile weapons will reach several hundred and up to a thousand

kilometers, and they will be able to carry out long-range attacks against targets throughout the depths of the enemy's campaign. On the other hand, the Second Artillery also will always face full-dimensional threats of enemy long-range raids, destruction by air-dropped [troops], sabotage by special [forces], electronic jamming, and even network attacks. Therefore, it will be difficult to differentiate between the forward and the rear areas on the Second Artillery's operational battlefield {*zuozhan zhanchang*}; the Second Artillery's in-depth firepower attacks and full-depth defense operations will be interwoven together on the joint operations battlefield, they will unfold comprehensively, and they will be implemented throughout the entire course [of operations], and a non-linear battlefield situation will emerge where offense and defense are integrated and where operations are full-depth.

IV. It is made up of many key factors, and its preparation cycle is long {*goucheng yaosu duo, zhunbei zhouqi chang*}...171

In joint operations, the battlefield spaces for the Second Artillery are broad, and the key factors that compose [the battlefield] are complex. Not only does [this battlefield] involve tangible geographical spaces, but it also involves intangible electromagnetic spaces, and not only does it include the natural environment, but it also involves the social environment. Whether the building of fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} is a set or not and whether their deployment is rational or not directly affects how the effectiveness of Second Artillery operations is brought into play. During joint operations, the fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} of the Second Artillery usually are made up of such key factors as the places where the Second Artillery command post (or two levels of forward command posts: the Second Artillery and the missile base), the rear area command post, certain missile brigade fighting positions {*ruogan daodan lyu zuozhan zhendi*}, and the various support units {*budui*} (or elements) are deployed. The fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} of missile brigades usually are made up of such key factors as the places where the brigade command post, technical positions {*jishu zhendi*} (or central repository {*zhongxin ku*}), standby repository positions {*daiji ku zhendi*} (or area), loading aprons {*zhuanzai chang ping*}, certain launch positions, and positions for various sets of support elements. The structure of fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} is complex, there are many key factors [involved], there is a great deal of engineering, and technical standards are high; without a fairly long cycle of preparations, it would be difficult to smoothly complete preparations for these fronts. In addition to this, Second Artillery operational actions are restricted and affected by such natural conditions of the battlefield as weather conditions and the electromagnetic environment and by social factors within the area of operations, such as politics, economics, culture, public order, popular emotions, folk customs, and religion. Prior to a battle, it is necessary to carry out a comprehensive and detailed analysis of these battlefield factors and to adopt corresponding measures, tending toward what is favorable and avoiding what is harmful, and reducing as much as possible the unfavorable effects that these various battlefield factors have on Second Artillery operational actions. All of these fully display the characteristics that the battlefield for Second Artillery operations has, [that is,] of many key factors and a prolonged cycle [of preparation].

Section 2: The Effects that the Battlefield Environment Has on Second Artillery Operations {zhanchang huanjing dui di'er paobing zuozhan de yingxiang}...171

The battlefield environment for Second Artillery operations primarily includes the natural geographical environment, the social environment, and the electromagnetic environment; these have a multifaceted effect on Second Artillery operations.

I. The effects of the natural environment on Second Artillery operations {ziran huanjing dui di'er paobing zuozhan de yingxiang}...171

The battlefield natural environment {zhanchang ziran huanjing} refers to non-manmade natural conditions such as the terrain, the weather, and meteorology within the area of operations. The battlefield natural environment {zhanchang ziran huanjing} has an important effect on the Second Artillery's operational activities; it not only affects the operational deployment and operational actions of the Second Artillery, but it also affects how the functions of weapons and various pieces of technical equipment are brought into play.

(1) Terrain {dixing}

Terrain primarily includes mountain country, hilly country, plains, islands, and coasts, as well as grassy plains, deserts, and areas where there are networks of rivers. The effect that terrain has on Second Artillery operations primarily is shown by [the following]. First, it affects the deployment of Second Artillery operational strengths {zuozhan liliang}. A complex terrain environment limits the selection of missile sites {daodan zhendi}. The selection and construction of missile sites {daodan zhendi} are a huge systems engineering, and they primarily include many key factors, such as a command post, a communications node, a launch platform (or silo), technical positions {jishu zhendi}, a repository for missile bodies {dan ti ku}, a repository for warheads {dantou ku}, a transfer station, and a road and bridge {dao qiao}. In order to fully bring into play the operational capabilities of missile units {daodan budui} and to enhance their survival capabilities, the various key factors must usually keep a certain distance from one another as they are deployed; this requires that the areas of deployment must have corresponding room [for the deployments]. At the same time, when constructing the engineering works for the positions, [you] should also take into consideration the screening and protective effects that favorable terrain conditions have, and enhance their screening and camouflage effectiveness for fighting positions {zuozhan zhendi} as much as possible. Moreover, the various differing models of weapons have differing requirements for the natural conditions of the area of operations; therefore, only by selecting areas with conditions that correspond to the tactical and technical properties of the differing weapons is it possible to have these serve as the areas of deployment for operations by Second Artillery missile units {daodan budui}. Second, it affects the operational maneuvers of the Second Artillery. On the one hand, terrain conditions affect camouflage for Second Artillery operations. Because Second Artillery operations are characterized by complex weapons and equipment, by features that are obvious, and by a long period of

exposure during launches, carrying out effective camouflage has become an effective and important measure for survival. Complex terrain conditions, such as the convex and concave undulations of terrain, its vegetation, its forests, and its areas of inhabitation, all have a quite important effect on camouflage for Second Artillery operations. On the other hand, Second Artillery fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} generally are deployed in mountain and hilly regions; because the terrain is complicated and roads are few, this not only affects units' {*budui*} maneuvers, but it also makes command and coordination rather difficult.

(2) Weather and climate {*tianhou qixiang*}

Weather and climate primarily include air temperature, air pressure, humidity, day and night, wind, clouds, visibility, thunderstorms, fog, precipitation, haze, and sandstorms. The effects that these have on Second Artillery operations are primarily manifested [as follows]. First is the effect on the survival capabilities of missile weapons. When missiles fly through the atmosphere, the structural materials of their missile bodies and warheads themselves are affected by weather conditions. The warming effect of air dynamics causes warheads and missile bodies flying at high speed to rapidly heat up, which leads to a decrease in the strength of the structural materials on the surface of the missile and cause a decrease in the load-bearing capability of the warhead; when the increase in temperature is severe, this can cause the surface of the missile body and the warhead to ablate. As for warheads that reenter the atmosphere, when dynamic heating exceeds the ability of the warhead's insulation layer to withstand [the heat], the insulation layer of the warhead will be ablated; when this is severe, it can cause the warhead to burn up. If [the missile] encounters clumps of moisture in the atmosphere, such as clouds, snow, and rain, in addition to ablation from high temperatures and high-pressure air flows, the decrease in the strength of materials will also cause the missile's insulation layer to thin out, as well as to become ablated by such cloud particles and falling water particles as clouds, rain, and snow; this effect is called weather corrosion {*tianqi qinshi*}. Under the coupled effects {*ouhe zuoyong*} of ablation and corrosion, the insulation layer of the warhead can be seriously damaged and become rough and uneven; when serious, this can lead to the warhead disintegrating and losing its ability to attack. The second is the effect on operational actions. First, wind direction and wind speed have a definite effect on the erecting of a missile. A missile has fairly large geometric proportions; it is during the process of erecting [the missile] that [the missile] is affected the most by the wind. In particular, gusts of wind where there are fairly major changes in wind direction and wind speed will lead to continual changes in force for the missile and will cause the missile to sway; when this is serious, it can snap the missile. Second, air temperature affects the dynamic functions of the missile. When the air temperature is too low, this will then lower the temperature of the solid fuel propellant, the speed of fuel burning will slow, and there will be reduced thrust, so that the missile does not reach the speed that it should have, which leads to a failure to launch. But when the temperature is too high, this will cause the fuel to burn too fast, so that the pressure inside the combustion chamber rises quickly; when the combustion chamber cannot handle the sudden increased pressure, this will damage the engine and even have an explosion; moreover, changes in air temperature will also lead to fissures in the solid fuel, creating problems such as uneven

fuel burning. Poor weather conditions, like rain, snow, and heavy fog, also have very strong effects on storage, transportation, launching, and missile flight. The third is the effects on operational support. Weather conditions have very clear effects on such support as vehicles, equipment, positions, and facilities. When the weather is cold, this will make it difficult for vehicles to start; it takes them a long time to warm up, and they react slowly. Snow packs and ice on roads reduce the speed of vehicles, they reduce [the vehicles'] ability to climb slopes, and it is easy to have slippery slopes. When the snow pack is too deep, this will block the advance of vehicles, and there will be more accidents. But when the air temperature is too high, this will raise the water and oil temperatures in vehicles, and it will be easy for them to boil and have vapor lock, for [the engine] to die, and for it to run out of water, thus reducing the use functions {*shiyong xingneng*} of the vehicles. In damp seasons, increases in the environmental temperature produce condensation at the entrances to tunnels in positions; an increase in humidity will directly affect the work functions of various types of equipment within the tunnels. In seasons and regions where there is a great amount of rain, when rainstorms occur in the areas where there are positions, it is easy to have landslides and slippery slopes along massifs, destroying the camouflage [used] for the positions as well as the mouths of tunnels. Floods may gush into the tunnels, endangering and even completely annihilating internal facilities. Massifs, slippery slopes, and floods can also block or destroy roads and bridges. In severely cold areas, the temperature of ground surfaces is low in winter, and [the ground] is covered by ice and snow. This causes certain problems for unsealing positions and for maintenance work in positions, and it takes a great deal of effort to remove camouflage cover and snow packs (or ice) from positions. In addition, lightning may destroy electrical equipment as well as overhead or underground open wires {*ming xian*} and cables, and ice can snap off overhead open wires {*ming xian*}. When the temperature is high, overhead open wires {*ming xian*} expand and stretch in the heat, and it is easy for lines to get mixed up; when the temperature is low, overhead open wires {*ming xian*} shrink too much and it is easy for them to snap. Mountain floods in rainstorms may inundate wired communications lines, knock down telephone poles, and even destroy underground cables.

II. The effects of the social environment on Second Artillery operations {*shehui huanjing dui di'er paobing zuozhan de yingxiang*}...174

The social environment mainly includes the population situation, political situation, distribution of space, scale and size, and engineering and installations conditions for cities, towns, industry and agriculture, and communities. They have differing levels of effect upon the various specific activities of Second Artillery operations. Their key points are shown in the following three areas. The first is that the social environment affects the deployment of Second Artillery operations. Traffic conditions and the economic situation within the area of operations have a very important influence on the Second Artillery's selection of positions and setting up of operational deployments. The second is that the social environment affects the Second Artillery's information operations. The Second Artillery's information operations require large numbers of communications facilities and informationized equipment within the theater of war, as well as the vigorous support of advanced scientific and technological personnel who have a grasp of information

technology. At the same time, information jamming and attacks that come from each area of society, consciously or not, affect the Second Artillery's information operations in a way that cannot be underestimated. The third is that the social environment affects support to the Second Artillery's operations. The economic potential, ability to maintain machinery, loading and unloading and transportation capabilities, medical treatment and first aid capabilities, and the numbers and qualities of the population within the area of operations all have a fairly large effect on the Second Artillery's operations, logistics, equipment support, and troop replenishment.

III. The effects of the electromagnetic environment on Second Artillery operations {dianci huanjing dui di'er paobing zuozhan de yingxiang}...174

In the process of the Second Artillery's preparations for operations and execution of operations, the electromagnetic environment that it faces not only involves hostile jamming by the enemy, but it also involves jamming that our side does on its own or to itself {zi rao hu rao} as well as unwitting jamming by friendly neighboring units {you lin budui} and the locals, and it includes electromagnetic jamming from the natural world. The complex electromagnetic environment produces important effects on the Second Artillery's command of operations, its operational actions, and support to operations. First, regardless of whether the Second Artillery's missile weapons are operating in the initial area {shou qu}, [undergoing] flight guidance in the navigational zone {hangqu}, or attacking in the end zone, they have a certain need for the electromagnetic environment, particularly under circumstances where integrated guidance {zuhe zhidao} is being jammed, which could degrade the precision of attack or even cause the missile flight to fail. Second, support to Second Artillery operations involves many key factors; such key factors of support as reconnaissance, communications, the weather, telemetry, and electronic warfare all rely on spectrum support {pinpu zhichi}. In addition, units {budui} are constantly being equipped with spread spectrum equipment, which continually expands the need for spectrum resources {pinpu ziyuan} on the battlefield. Large numbers of equipment that use the spectrum {yong pin zhuangbei} and that have differing forms of guidance {butong zhi shi} are concentrated and deployed within a relatively narrow area of operations, and there are significant problems {wenti tuchu} where they jam themselves and jam each other {zi rao hu rao}. Third, when the Second Artillery is carrying out operational missions, at the same time that the receiving antennas of radar, communications, and satellite navigation are coupling {ouhe} usable electromagnetic signals, they are also coupling {ouhe} various types of malicious and unintentional electromagnetic jamming signals. When the jamming signals exceed a specified range, this will affect and even interrupt the effective reception of signals. At the same time, natural electromagnetic radiation will also have a fairly large effect on Second Artillery operations.

Section 3: Battlefield Preparations {zhanchang zhunbei}...175

Because the operational actions of the Second Artillery are all done in areas where positions that have been prepared in advance have already been set up, missile fighting

positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} are the core and basis for the Second Artillery's main battlefields. Preparing the fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} is the core detail in battlefield preparations {*zhanchang zhunbei*}.

I. The basic requirements for preparing fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi zhunbei de jiben yaoqiu*}...175

Fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} are the backing for Second Artillery operations, and position installations {*zhendi sheshi*} are an important detail in preparing positions for Second Artillery operations; they affect success or failure in Second Artillery operations. Therefore, it is necessary to make unified plans for and give comprehensive consideration to [these], based on the strategic intentions of the general headquarters and on the overall deployment for joint operations, the tactical and technical properties of missile weapons, and the theater of war terrain. The basic requirements for this are [as follows].

(1) Correspond to upper echelons' intentions for operations and satisfy the needs of joint operations {*fuhe shangji zuozhan qitu, manzu lianhe zuozhan yaoqiu*}

The fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} of the Second Artillery are primarily based on the Central Military Commission's analysis and judgment of China's security and strategic situation, on the capabilities and characteristics of the opponent [that China would face] in operations, and on the operational properties of China's missile weapons. They are deployed along differing strategic directions in accordance with the requirements of operations. The scale of positions that are set up is great, there are many items, costs are high, and it takes a long cycle [to do this]. Therefore, construction in peacetime should fully take into consideration wartime operational deployments and uses, and try not to make major modifications to the distribution of positions; [in this way,] it will be possible to meet the needs of joint operations and to adapt to the needs of the Second Artillery's independent [operations] or of operations that are coordinated with other services and service arms.

(2) A relatively stable area of operations helps to enhance units' survival capability {*zuozhan diyu xiangdui wending, li yu tigeo budui shengcun nengli*}

It can be seen from the recent several local wars that firepower systems in modern warfare are speeding up their development in the direction of precision guided firepower, where missiles are dominant. A trend is appearing where battlefield firepower is greatly in-depth, omni-directional, three-dimensional, and precise. In future joint operations, the fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} of the Second Artillery will be important targets that the enemy will do all he can to reconnoiter and assault, and they will face serious threats. Therefore, given the premise where Second Artillery fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} meet the needs of operational use, they should be deployed in the depths of the hinterland, and everything possible should be done to avoid areas that could be easily occupied by the enemy in wartime or that we could temporarily abandon; everything possible should be done to avoid political, economic, and military strategic targets that

could easily be attacked by the enemy, in order to reduce the collateral damage from enemy attacks; and everything should be done to avoid directions along which enemy campaign and tactical missiles and his aviation troops' firepower would attack, or to choose [positions] within the dead angles of enemy missiles and aircraft firing. Apart from this, we should also do everything possible to avoid flood zones, earthquake zones, and areas where resources are being exploited {*ziyuan kaifa qu*}. [Also,] everything possible should be done to avoid deploying close to other operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}, except for air defense and chemical defense for missile sites {*daodan zhendi*} as well as strengths protecting the positions {*zhendi fangwei liliang*}, in order to reduce damage from attacks as much as possible and to ensure the stability and relative security of missile sites {*daodan zhendi*}.

(3) Suiting measures to local conditions and dispersed deployment {*yindizhiyi, shusan peizhi*}

The setting up and construction of Second Artillery fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} should hold to the principles of suiting measures to local conditions {*yindizhiyi*} and of dispersed deployment {*shusan peizhi*}. Suiting measures to local conditions {*yindizhiyi*} means rational deployments in accordance with terrain characteristics, not sticking to one pattern, and being flexible, with many forms. Dispersed deployment {*shusan peizhi*} means deploying troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons at suitable distances from one another; it is not only necessary to consider the connections that the various key elements in the position have with their uses, but it is also necessary to suitably disperse them in order to reduce the chances that they will be eliminated when coming under attack. We should make it possible for missile units {*daodan budui*} to not only hide but also to fight, so that this not only makes it easy to maneuver and fully bring firepower into play, but it also helps in reliably preserving ourselves. Missile sites {*daodan zhendi*} usually are built in mountain country or hilly regions that make concealment and camouflage easy and that facilitate mobile operations and carrying out support. Mountain regions and hilly country not only help in constructing fortifications for the positions but they also make it easy for units {*budui*} to conceal their operational actions. But the deployment of missile sites {*daodan zhendi*} should not be too deep in the mountains or be too far from trunk-line roads; generally, they should be suitably close to highways and railway trunk lines, in order to make it easy to engage in mobile operations, and they should be close to mid-sized or small cities and towns or to large residential areas, in order to facilitate lifestyles in peacetime and support in wartime.

II. The structure and deployment of fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi de goucheng yu peizhi*}...176

In joint operations, Second Artillery fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} usually consist of such key factors as a given number of missile brigade fighting positions {*daodan lyu zuozhan zhendi*}, and areas where various support units {*budui*} (or elements) are positioned. Of these, the missile brigade fighting positions {*daodan lyu zuozhan zhendi*} are the main body of Second Artillery fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*}.

(1) Missile brigade fighting positions {*daodan lyu zuozhan zhendi*}

The Second Artillery's basic unit for operations is the missile brigade, and therefore [the Second Artillery's] fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} usually are dispersed and deployed in an independent and systematic manner based on the tactical and technical functions of the missile weapons with which [missile brigades] are equipped. Missile brigades' fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} primarily consist of a technical position {*jishu zhendi*} (or central repository {*zhongxin ku*}), a standby position (or area), and a certain number of launch sites. The distance among the technical position {*jishu zhendi*}, standby position, and launch sites is set {*peizhi*} in accordance with the flow of operations of the weapons and with tactical and technical needs. Under the premise of meeting the needs for operating and using the weapons, the combat formations at the technical position {*jishu zhendi*}, standby position, and launching sites can be deployed in differing forms, such as a fan shape, a ring shape, an umbrella shape, a plum blossom shape {*meihua xing*}, or a non-standard shape. Usually, in accordance with the direction of operations and the terrain conditions, the technical position {*jishu zhendi*} is in the rear while the launch sites are at the front, extending forward level by level {*zhu ji qian shen*} and being spread out according to their echelons {*yi ci zhankai*}. The technical position {*jishu zhendi*} is the core and foundation of the missile brigade's fighting position {*zuozhan zhendi*}; it is the place where missiles are stored and tested, and it should be selected and built in a concealed area at a suitable distance from the launch sites. It [should have] fairly strong defensive abilities built into it {*gouzhu*} as well as enough underground facilities for storing and testing missile weapons. The standby front generally is selected in an area where conditions are good for blocking things from view and where it is easy to move. Simple tunnels or screens that are partially underground are built, in order to provide main battle weapons and equipment an opportunity to wait [to go into battle]. Launch sites generally are constructed in the form of simple aprons and shallow caves or fortifications that are partially underground. The standby position and launch sites usually are built as a package, and in accordance with their differing distances from the technical position {*jishu zhendi*}, they are differentiated into emergency response fighting positions {*yingji zuozhan zhendi*}, basic fighting positions {*jiben zuozhan zhendi*}, and reserve fighting positions {*yubei zuozhan zhendi*}.

Missile brigades' fighting positions {*zuozhan zhendi*} usually should be selected within the depths of the battlefield. In the Second Artillery, based on the characteristics of modern joint operations, brigades should be suitably dispersed, one from another, or deployed in a hierarchical manner. The distance between the various missile brigades and the forward lines of the land battlefield normally is determined by the principle of being able to fully bring into play missile firepower as well as by [the principle] of being able to avoid as much as possible threats from enemy medium- and long-range firepower. Normally, offensive operations can be suitably close to the front, in order to make it easy to extend firepower forward, while defensive operations can be suitably close to the rear, in order to ensure that the missile position {*daodan zhendi*} is relatively stable. Both offensive operations and defensive operations must enable missile firepower to cover all predetermined targets of assault in an effective manner, and control the entire operational battlefield {*zuozhan zhanchang*}.

(2) Area of deployment for support units (or elements) {*baozhang bu (fen) dui peizhi diyu*}

The Second Artillery is a high-tech composite unit {*hecheng budui*}. It has many types of professions for its operational support, with large numbers of personnel; thus, support systems are an important detail in building sets {*peitao*} of the Second Artillery, and they are the basis for forming and enhancing operational capabilities. Support systems are composed of various support units {*budui*} (or elements) and their corresponding equipment and devices, as well as facilities at positions {*zhendi sheshi*}. And the many tasks in their construction must be carried out concurrently with the construction of the battlefield and the development of weapons. Therefore, the deployment of support units (*budui*) (or elements) and the construction of corresponding facilities are an important detail as the Second Artillery prepares the battlefield.

The area of deployment for support units {*budui*} (or elements) usually is set up echelon by echelon, in accordance with the support system's sub-specialties {*fen zhuanye*}.

[The term] operational support units {*budui*} (or elements) refers to support and service {*baozhang qinwu*} units {*budui*} (or elements) that are closely connected with operational command, that directly serve command, or that provide a basis for making decisions. Their command, technical reconnaissance, surveying and mapping, data calculation {*zhuyuan jisuan*}, weather, communications, electronic warfare, and engineering support units {*budui*} (or elements) usually are deployed in positions fairly close to the Second Artillery operational command organizations. Other units {*budui*} (or elements), which support missile assault actions, such as air defense, chemical defense, position defense {*zhendi fangwei*}, and specialized support elements that are subordinate to the brigade, are deployed as needed within the missile brigade's area of operations in areas where it is easy to maneuver and that facilitate support.

Logistics support units {*budui*} (or elements) primarily include medical treatment and first aid, ordnance, fuel, military supplies and materials management, and transport units {*budui*} (or elements). They usually are placed in areas close to the rear area command post or where it is easy to carry out support missions. Under most conditions, the location of logistics support organizations is basically the same as their peacetime deployments; in wartime, [the deployments] can be suitably adjusted based on the forms of support and the needs of the organizational system {*tizhi*}.

Equipment support units {*budui*} (or elements) primarily include missile technology, equipment, and position support {*zhendi baozhang*} units {*budui*} (or elements) and specialized personnel. They usually are placed close to the missile technical [positions], standby [positions], or launch sites, or in areas that help to carry out support missions.

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Chapter 2

The Task Organization and Missions of Second Artillery Operations in Joint Operations...178

Modern warfare consists of joint operations {*lianhe zuozhan*} that are launched in many dimensions and spaces; it is a contest between system and system and between one entire whole {*zhengti*} and another entire whole {*zhengti*}. There are many services and service arms, a great deal of weapons and equipment, and many means of operations that [all] engage in combat, forming a complex system of operations made up of a large number of operational key factors that are interrelated, that rely upon one another, and that restrain one another. Based on the fundamental principles of systems theory, we should conscientiously analyze the relationships among the various key factors of operations, rationally determine their task organizations, and scientifically differentiate their missions, in order to form optimal functions for the entire operational system.

Section 1: The Task Organizations of Strengths {*liliang biancheng*}...179

The task organizations {*biancheng*} of Second Artillery strengths {*liliang*} refer to the whole of integrated operations made up by the troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons of the Second Artillery's conventional missile units {*budui*} that carry out operational missions.

I. The basis for determining the task organizations of strengths {*queding liliang biancheng de yiju*}...179

The various conventional missile units that make up the Second Artillery are split up and deployed in peacetime to the various missile bases. The number of these units {*budui*} and the models of weapons that they are equipped with are calculated and determined based on the direction of operations {*zuozhan fangxiang*}. In wartime, the operational strengths' task organizations {*zuozhan liliang biancheng*} of the Second Artillery are determined based on the orders of the supreme headquarters, the specific missions that [the Second Artillery] is responsible for, and the weapons and equipment that are needed for completing these mission, and on the basis of peacetime deployments.

In determining the task organizations of the operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang biancheng*} of the Second Artillery, not only should we take into consideration the overall functional structure of the joint operations system, but we must also consider the needs of the operational missions that the Second Artillery undertakes on its own, and whether or not it is possible to optimize {*dedao zui jia de fahui*} firepower. The basic requirements are that they should meet the needs of the operational mission, on the basis of the peacetime organizational system {*tizhi*} of task organizations; [they should] be unified with the joint command's organizational system {*tizhi*}, to facilitate the integration of command; [they should] be adapted to bitter battlefield conditions and meet the special needs of the weapons and equipment of conventional missile units {*budui*};

[they should] meet the needs for independently carrying out operational missions, to facilitate [the Second Artillery's] internal command and coordination; [they should] help in enhancing combined operations capabilities; [they should] facilitate organizing emergency training on the eve of war; and [they should] easily organize various items of support.

II. The makeup of strengths {*liliang goucheng*}...179

Regardless of whether [it is carrying out] offensive joint operations or defensive joint operations, the basic operational form of the Second Artillery is missile firepower assaults; the operational task organizations for these are basically the same and are relatively stable, and generally are not adjusted as the forms and process of operations change. In joint operations, the Second Artillery usually unites brigades with differing models of missiles, along with their corresponding support units {*budui*} (or elements), [into its] task organizations, based on operational needs; these include: a certain number of close-range ballistic missile brigades, a certain number of medium-range ballistic missile brigades, a certain number of cruise missile brigades, and a certain number of service and support units {*budui*} (or elements).

Section 2: Primary Missions {*zhuyao renwu*}...180

The Second Artillery is an important long-range attack strength {*liliang*} for joint operations for the PRC military. In future joint operations, speaking macroscopically, it will primarily undertake deterrence and firepower attack missions.

Deterrence operations are operational actions that threaten to use conventional missile weapons or that use a small number of them to intimidate the enemy and to prevent the outbreak of war or to control the development of a certain state of affairs. They generally are under the unified command of the joint operations' headquarters and are based on the needs of the nation's political, diplomatic, and military struggles, by means of such forms as the Second Artillery entering into a state of war-readiness, organizing live-fire exercises, and conducting live-missile launches into predetermined areas and against [predetermined] targets, they show [the PRC's] shapes {*shi xing*} and create momentum {*zaoshi*}, show [the PRC's] actual strength, [produce] psychological awe, and [engage in] limited destruction. This displays the PRC's operational decision and strengths {*liliang*}, and it forces the enemy to restrain himself or to not lightly act in a rash manner.

Carrying out missile firepower attacks is the Second Artillery's basic function. It can fully bring into play the advantages of its missile weapons: long ranges, rapid speed, great power, and the ability to penetrate defenses. It actively and in a concealed manner attacks [the following] targets in the enemy's strategic and campaign depths: political and economic centers, important military bases, command centers, traffic hubs, groups of heavy troops, and rear-area bases.

During joint operations, the basic missions that the Second Artillery can take on consist of [the following]:

1. Attack enemy air force bases and air defense missile positions, weaken the enemy's aerial operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}, and engage in operations to seize command of the air;
2. Attack enemy surface-to-surface missile bases, weaken the enemy's long-range firepower attack capabilities, reduce his threat to the PRC's in-depth defenses, and enhance the security and stability of the PRC's joint operations deployments;
3. Attack the enemy's reconnaissance, early warning, command, control, communications, and intelligence centers and his important radar and electronic warfare facilities; paralyze the enemy's command system and early warning system; upset his command deployments; weaken his command effectiveness and his information warfare capabilities; and participate in operations to seize information dominance;
4. Attack the enemy's naval bases, weaken the enemy's operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*} at sea, and participate in operations to seize naval dominance and to support landings;
5. Attack enemy traffic hubs, slow down and destroy his troop strengths' {*bingli*} mobility, and interrupt his supplies of equipment and materials;
6. Attack groups of the enemy's heavy troops, particularly the enemy's strategic reserve troops and long-range firepower support troop strengths {*bingli*}; annihilate the enemy's effective strengths {*liliang*}; and support the operational actions of other [PRC] services and service arms;
7. Attack such important economic targets as the enemy's important military and industrial bases, his logistics supply bases and energy resources, and his railroads, and weaken his war potential; and
8. Attack such targets as the enemy's political, military, and economic centers, and shock the enemy's psychology, which will lead to anti-war feelings and create social turmoil.

In addition, based on strategic needs, [the Second Artillery] can also take on other special firepower attack missions. Examples are attacks on enemy nuclear weapon launch devices and silos, and attacks on solid {*jian'gu*} point targets {*dian mubiao*} and on large, slow-moving targets on land (and at sea).

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Chapter 3

The Guiding Thoughts and Basic Principles for Second Artillery Operations in Joint Operations...181

The guiding thinking and basic principles of Second Artillery operations in joint operations are the basic foundation for organizing and carrying out the operations of Second Artillery conventional missile unit {*changgui daodan budui*} that engage in combat during joint operations. They have very important significance for conscientiously exploring and studying these [operations], for revealing in depth the intrinsic laws of Second Artillery operations, for correctly guiding units' {*budui*} actions, and for smoothly completing operational missions.

Section 1: Guiding Thoughts for Operations {*zuozhan zhidao sixiang*}...181

The guiding thoughts {*zhidao sixiang*} for Second Artillery operations in joint operations are guiding laws for Second Artillery operations, which have been highly generalized as regards theory. They have a macroscopic guiding role for the basic principles and combat methods in Second Artillery operations.

I. The basis for determining the guiding thoughts in operations {*queli zuozhan zhidao sixiang de yiju*}...182

(1) The program of military strategy for the new period {*xin shiqi junshi zhanlyue fangzhen*}

The program of military strategy for the new period {*xin shiqi junshi zhanlyue fangzhen*} is the starting point for preparing for military combat, for the military's buildup, and for waging war. Therefore, proposals for the guiding thoughts {*zhidao sixiang*} for Second Artillery operations in joint operations must have the program for military strategy in the new period {*xin shiqi junshi zhanlyue fangzhen*} as their basis, and they must firmly implement the requirements for the program of military strategy {*junshi zhanlyue fangzhen*}. The Second Artillery's conventional missile units' {*changgui daodan budui*} operations are used in a relatively flexible manner; they are the long-range attack strengths {*yuancheng daji liliang*} that are first deployed for operations in local wars under informationized conditions, they are used to attack important targets in the enemy's strategic and campaign depths, and they create an excellent situation in which other services and service arms bring their firepower into play. Therefore, proposals for the guiding thoughts {*zhidao sixiang*} for Second Artillery operations must fully manifest the mentality of active attack, and they must stress having command of decisive opportunities, carrying out effective attacks, and fully grasping the initiative in operations.

(2) The basic guiding thoughts for the PRC military's campaigns {*wo jun zhanyi jiben zhidao sixiang*}

Establishing guiding thoughts {*zhidao sixiang*} for Second Artillery operations not only requires implementing the PRC military's basic guiding thoughts {*jiben zhidao sixiang*} for its campaigns, but it also requires stressing the characteristics for operations using missile units {*daodan budui*}, so that the two are highly consistent.

(3) The characteristics and patterns of Second Artillery operations {*di'er paobing zuozhan tedian he guilyu*}

As overall guidance for organizing and carrying out Second Artillery operations in joint operations, the guiding thoughts for operations {*zuozhan zhidao sixiang*} are the product of mastering the patterns of Second Artillery operations and of abstract generalizations of [the Second Artillery's] guiding patterns. The Second Artillery is an important strategic and campaign assault strength {*tuji liliang*} that is directly controlled by the general headquarters, and the missile weapons that it uses have strong capabilities for long-distance warfare, they react quickly, and they are strongly capable of penetrating defenses. They are very effective at destroying things, they can inflict heavy casualties on the enemy within a short period of time, and they can thus speed up the process of operations and achieve strategic goals. Therefore, in establishing the guiding thoughts {*zhidao sixiang*} for Second Artillery operations, it is necessary to keep an eye on fully bringing into play missile units' {*daodan budui*} special advantages and to enhance missile units' {*daodan budui*} operational effectiveness as much as possible.

(4) The characteristics and developmental trends of joint operations {*lianhe zuozhan de tedian he fazhan qushi*}

Second Artillery operations are an important component part of joint operations. In establishing guiding thoughts for operations {*zuozhan zhidao sixiang*}, it is necessary to fully reflect the characteristics and developmental trends of joint operations {*lianhe zuozhan de tedian he fazhan qushi*}. Looking at the recent several local wars, the characteristics and developmental trends of joint operations {*lianhe zuozhan de tedian he fazhan qushi*} are exhibited in four⁹ areas. The first is that the depths of operational actions are greater, and there is an increasingly pronounced trend toward “non-linear” {*feixianxing*} operations. The second is that operational actions have more of a multidimensional nature, and operational actions will unfold simultaneously or consecutively on the land, at sea, in the air, in space, and electronically. The third is that the status of firepower warfare will become more and more prominent, with an emphasis on long-range precision firepower attacks. The fourth is that operational actions will be more integrated in nature, and victory in warfare will rely more upon unified coordination of the various key factors in operations and on bringing into play overall operational

⁹ Translator's note: The Chinese text actually lists five areas.

capabilities. The fifth is that attacking the enemy's strategic points {*da di yaohai*} and attacking his crucial links and important positions have become basic ways to paralyze and annihilate the enemy and to ultimately achieve strategic and campaign goals. The guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} for Second Artillery operations should fully reflect these characteristics and developmental trends, [they should] grasp the major contradictions and important links that affect the overall situation of operations, and they should be used to guide operational actions.

II. The basic connotations of guiding thoughts for operations and the key points to be implemented {*zuozhan zhidao sixiang jiben neihan ji luoshi yaodian*}...183

In accordance with the PRC military's program of military strategy in the new period {*xin shiqi junshi zhanlyue fangzhen*} and on its basic guiding thoughts {*jiben zhidao sixiang*} for campaigns, and keeping an eye on the characteristics of Second Artillery operations in joint operations under high-tech conditions, Second Artillery operations in joint operations should establish guiding thoughts {*zhidao sixiang*} for operations that "contain the enemy upon decisive occasions, and focus on attack" {*xianji zhidi, zhongdian tuji*}. The basic connotation of this is that in joint operations, [it is necessary to] fully bring into play the mobile capabilities of the Second Artillery, its long-distance warfare capabilities, and the advantages of its powerful attack capabilities, using assault actions by conventional missile firepower that is quick and sudden to carry out in-depth and focused attacks against the enemy. This plays an especially important role in the overall situation of joint operations and in reaching the predetermined goals of operations. This guiding thought not only reflects the basic characteristics and objective requirements of Second Artillery operations, but it also unifies [the Second Artillery's] operational missions, form of operations, and effectiveness of operations in an integrated manner.

"Containing the enemy upon decisive occasions" {*xianji zhidi*} primarily means that the Second Artillery must act ahead of the enemy in its operational actions, appearing where the enemy does not expect it and attacking where the enemy is not prepared; at the same time, it should be used first, during the initial stage of operations or during some given stage. In implementing and carrying out the idea of "containing the enemy upon decisive occasions" {*xianji zhidi*}, it is first necessary to based this on offensive operations, when making plans for operations. The Second Artillery is an important assault strength {*tuji lilang*} of the PRC military in local wars under informationized conditions; just like the nuclear missile units {*he daodan budui*}, it has the role of deterring the enemy. However, it clearly is more realistic and prominent [than the nuclear missile units are] when it is used in actual warfare. As regards offensive and defensive roles, its offensive role is much greater than its defensive [role], and assaults by conventional missiles are themselves offensive operations. Therefore, in planning operations, it is necessary to pay attention to anticipating the enemy and to always maintain acute momentum {*ruishi*} in attack. Second, the Second Artillery must enter into operations in advance of the PRC military's other assault strengths {*tuji lilang*}. Assaults by conventional missiles are very much in-depth, fast, and highly precise, and [they cover] a broad scope, with few

casualties among PRC personnel and low costs; this is something that no other means of assault can replace. Therefore, the Second Artillery inevitably will be in the vanguard of the various types of firepower assault during joint operations. Third, it is necessary to take the initiative in seeking opportunities for battle, moving ahead of the enemy {*xian di er dong*}, and changing faster than the enemy {*xian di er bian*}. In joint operations, the enemy will inevitably adopt many measures to keep from being contained {*fan zhi cuoshi*}, and will do his best to change the situation where he is on the defensive. The commander must foresee the enemy's intentions, know the enemy in advance, command the Second Artillery at each stage of operations, act before the enemy does, and have a firm mastery of the initiative in operations. [He must] seek and master the various favorable opportunities for battle, and under a unified plan, suddenly and violently carry out attacks against the enemy using conventional missiles, so that the enemy is always put in circumstances where he is exhausted by having to respond {*pi yu yingfu*} and has to passively take a beating. Fourth, it is necessary to carry out highly effective and concise command as well as flexible and agile operational actions. During intense confrontations between the enemy and the PRC, the commander's and the unit's {*budui*} highly effective actions are the key to winning the initiative in operations. The commander and the command organ must continually improve their means of command, optimize their command structure, and enhance the efficiency of command, and the Second Artillery must constantly raise the levels of its technical skills and the tactical levels for operating [things], ensuring that operational actions are quick and agile, and fully bringing into play the effectiveness of weapons and equipment in operations.

“Focus on attack” {*zhongdian tuji*} means that the Second Artillery must pay attention to mastering the focus of operations during joint operations; it must use its main strengths {*zhuyao liliang*} at decisive moments and against key targets along the main direction, forming superior firepower at specified spaces and times and achieving the expected effects of the assault. Carrying out focused assaults {*zhongdian tuji*} is determined by the operational capabilities of the Second Artillery and by the objective needs of joint operations under informationized conditions. The ideas in implementing and carrying out “focused assaults” {*zhongdian tuji*} are that first, there must be a key point in assaulting targets. Fully utilize limited missile assault strengths {*daodan tuji liliang*} in carrying out focused assaults {*zhongdian tuji*} against such important targets as the enemy's command centers, his air force bases, and his naval bases, as well as his air defense installations, his electronic warfare installations, and his heavy troop assembly areas. Second is the need to have key points in using operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}; we should concentrate and use troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons, based on the operational missions that have been undertaken. It is necessary to use the strongest strengths {*liliang*} for the primary attack, and to give the mission of assaulting key targets to units {*budui*} that have operational capabilities. Third, it is necessary to have key points during the sequence of the assault and the waves {*boci*} [of the assault]. The PRC military has always stressed being cautious about initial battles; the success or failure of the initial battle often has a major effect on the entire war situation. Therefore, the commander must pay a great deal of attention to the initial missile assault; for important waves of attack {*tuji boci*} that affect the success or failure of operations, he should increase the intensity of the assault and give it focused support.

“Containing the enemy upon decisive occasions” {*xianji zhidi*} and “focusing on attack” {*zhongdian tuji*} reveal from differing sides the Second Artillery’s ways to get the upper hand, and they are a closely connected whole. The former stresses mastering crucial opportunities for subduing the enemy as regards time, while the latter stresses the need as regards plans for firepower to keep an eye on selecting the enemy’s strategic points, on systematic destruction, on carrying out effective attacks, and on achieving the goal of pushing the development of the entire war situation forward.

Section 2: The Basic Principles of Operations {*zuozhan jiben yuanze*}...185

The basic principles {*jiben yuanze*} of Second Artillery operations refer to the basic criteria of actions that guide Second Artillery operations; they are also the concrete manifestation of the guiding thoughts for operations {*zuozhan zhidao sixiang*}. Based on the guiding thoughts {*zhidao sixiang*} for Second Artillery operations, and integrating the characteristics in the use of Second Artillery operations, [we are] proposing the following basic principles of operations {*zuozhan jiben yuanze*}.

I. Unified command and close coordination {*tongyi zhihui, miqie xietong*}...185

Unified command {*tongyi zhihui*} means that the right to command {*zhihui quan*}, the right to use {*shiyong quan*}, and the right to make decisions {*jueding quan*} for the Second Artillery’s conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} in joint operations must be centralized and unified as much as possible. On the one hand, the conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} are the main strengths {*zhuyao liliang*} for carrying out strategic, in-depth firepower assaults in joint operations, and the use of conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} has major effects on the overall strategic situation and the process of operations; objectively, this requires carrying out centralized and unified macroscopic control over the opportunities and scale of [the units’] first strikes and over the nature of the assault targets. On the other hand, in the process of carrying out operations, coordination between conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} and other services’ and service arms’ actions, reconnoitering and judging the effectiveness of attacks, and opportunities for using firepower all require unified planning and unified organization from the vantage point of the overall situation of operations, and [they require] scientific decision-making. Only by executing unified command is it possible bring into play the effects of conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} to the greatest extent possible at a specified space and time.

Close coordination {*miqie xietong*} means having to do a good job of coordinating actions among the various key factors of operations of the conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} and between them and other services and service arms. In joint operations under informationized conditions, close coordination {*miqie xietong*} is an effective means for forming integrated power. Joint operations are an integrated system of operations made up of many types of strengths {*liliang*}, which are interrelated and which supplement one another; the Second Artillery’s conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} are a component part of these, and they coordinate many

details with the other services and service arms, over a broad scope. Only by holding to the principle of close coordination {*miqie xietong*} is it possible to fully bring into play the operational effectiveness of the Second Artillery conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*}, and to form integrated superiority in operations within a specified space and time.

II. Centralized use and attacking the enemy's strategic points {*jizhong shiyong, da di yaohai*}...185

Centralized use {*jizhong shiyong*} means centralized use of the conventional missile units' {*changgui daodan budui*} operational strengths {*zuozhan lilian*} along the primary directions, at key opportunities, and against key targets. Centralized troop strengths {*bingli*} and firepower have always been the main idea {*yaozhi*} in the PRC military's operations. Conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} have fairly strong troop strength {*bingli*} and firepower mobile capabilities; their centralized use {*jizhong shiyong*} can on the one hand fully bring into play the advantages of missile weapons' long-range attacks, surprise, and concealment along the primary directions of joint operations and at crucial opportunities, achieving the goals of operations. On the other hand, they can supplement insufficiencies in such areas as the limited scale of the PRC's conventional missile units' {*changgui daodan budui*} strengths {*lilian*}, joining with other services' and service arms' long-range firepower to form integrated attack power. Therefore, during the process of carrying out operations, it is necessary to be skilled at the centralized use of conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*}, at mobilizing troop strengths {*bingli*} and firepower at opportune opportunities, and at forming powerful assault dynamics {*tuji lidu*}. Centralized use {*jizhong shiyong*} can be achieved through methods of troop strength movement {*bingli jidong*} or firepower movement; the centralized use {*jizhong shiyong*} of conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} is primarily achieved by relying upon firepower movement.

Attacking the enemy's strategic points {*da di yaohai*} means selecting the enemy's most crucial strategic point targets, the ones that pose the greatest threat to us, and carrying out missile firepower assaults; this is based on the needs of the overall situation of operations and on the tactical and technical nature of the missile weapons, and on the basis of an overall analysis of the deployment and makeup of the enemy's operations and on the conditions of important targets. Joint operations under informationized conditions are an integrated confrontation between one system and another. The enemy's system of operations is made up of a certain number of key links that are joined together. Only by being skilled at carrying out focused assaults against targets that are key strategic points within the enemy's strategic and campaign depths is it possible to fully bring into play the advantages that conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} have, to weaken in an effective way the enemy's capabilities for integrated operations, to paralyze the enemy's system of operations, and to create conditions for victory in the joint operations. To do this, the Second Artillery's conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} should establish an intelligence reconnaissance system in all directions, using many means, and have a timely grasp of information about developments in the enemy's

situation and about targets. Scientifically plan firepower, correctly select the types of missiles, cleverly utilize methods of assault, and ascertain the effects of attacks in a timely manner, in order to ensure that our missile firepower is used at key moments and against important targets.

III. Combine offense and defense, and react rapidly {*gong fang jiehe, kuaisu fanying*}...186

The combination of offense and defense {*gong fang jiehe*} means the need to establish and use operational mechanisms that have both offense and defense so that there is defense within offense, resistance within defense, and preparations for offense within defense. Looking at the realities of conventional missile units' {*changgui daodan budui*} operations and at the operational missions that they take on, offense is the basic attribute of conventional missile units' {*changgui daodan budui*} operations, and attack operations are the main form of operations for conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*}. However, having an emphasis on offense does not mean that you do not need defense. Offense and defense are a contradiction, and they can replace one another at differing states of operations and under differing situations. In particular, given that the status and role of conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} are quite prominent, [these units] will inevitably be key targets for the enemy that he reconnoiters from many directions and that he assaults [using] many means; a stress on the integrated combination of attack and resistance and of defense and counterattack appears to be even more important. For this reason, conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} must persist in dispersed deployment, [they must] do a thorough job of constructing and camouflaging positions, and [they must] strengthen protection against the air. At suitable times, organize switches between offensive and defensive operations, and resist and pulverize the enemy's actions for surprise attacks.

Rapid reaction {*kuaisu fanying*} means carrying out countermeasures in a timely manner that correspond to changes in the battlefield situation and to changes in the operational mission and operational actions, as well as reactions to actions. Rapid reactions {*kuaisu fanying*} are prerequisite conditions for seizing and holding the initiative in operations. First, it is necessary to study and weigh the situation, to have the ability to make scientific predictions, to master and judge the battlefield situation in a timely manner, to know yourself and know others, to change as the enemy changes {*di bian wo bian*}, to change before the enemy does {*xian bian yu di*}, and to strive to have subjective guidance correspond to objective reality. Second, it is necessary to keep an eye on the most complex and most difficult situations, to anticipate many situations, to be thoroughly prepared, and to have the ability to adapt to changes. Third, it is necessary to correctly implement the guiding thoughts for operations {*zuozhan zhidao sixiang*}, to strictly carry out the orders of the upper echelon, to flexibly utilize and alter methods of combat, to quickly and resolutely handle special situation, to restrain speed by means of speed {*yi kuai zhi kuai*}, and to struggle for the initiative. When [you] find evidence of enemy raids, [you] should quickly disperse and conceal [yourselves], to carry out effective protection; after coming under enemy attack, [you] should quickly deal with the

aftereffects, and restore the ability for operations; and after [you] receive an order, [you] should quickly complete all the preparatory work, and complete the missile attack mission in a timely and accurate manner.

IV. Complete preparations and comprehensive support {*chongfen zhunbei, quanmian baozhang*}...187

Complete preparations {*chongfen zhunbei*} means that conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} fully utilize the relatively abundant amount of time in peacetime to carry out various preparations, based on the characteristics of the use of weapons systems in operations and on the needs for various types of support, so that as soon as an order is given, every one will rush forward, they will be able to move, they will be able to get in contact {*lian de shang*}, they will be able to join together {*he cheng*}, and they will be able to prepare {*da de zhun*}. Conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} must strengthen education on the war-readiness situation and in ideological and political work, be always on the alert, and maintain units' {*budui*} strong will to fight {*gao'ang douzhi*}, in accordance with the supreme headquarters' needs for mobile operations units that react to emergencies {*yingji jidong zuozhan budui*}. They need to draft various plans of operations, to collect materials for putting targets in order, to carefully construct the battlefield, and to stockpile war-readiness materials in advance. [Finally, they need] to strengthen relevant training and war-readiness exercises, and to keep weapons and equipment in a good state [of readiness].

Comprehensive support {*quanmian baozhang*} requires establishing support systems with multiple layers and multiple functions and that are forceful, and that combine joint logistics support {*lian qin baozhang*} with independent support. It organizes various types of support in a way that is timely and completely reliable, in order to satisfy the essential conditions for conventional missile units' {*changgui daodan budui*} operations and to ensure that units {*budui*} have freedom of action and security. To do this, it is necessary to work out feasible support for operations, technical support for equipment, and logistics support programs, based on how much conventional missile units' {*changgui daodan budui*} operations rely upon support, and to strengthen the training of support elements. [It is also necessary] to carry out support in a timely, comprehensive, and reliable manner, to lay a firm foundation for conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} to seize victory in operations.

Chapter 4

The Command Organization for Second Artillery Operations in Joint Operations...188

The operational command {*zuozhan zhihui*} for the Second Artillery in joint operations refers to the organizational and leadership activities for subordinate conventional missile units' {*changgui daodan budui*} operational actions [that are carried out] within the joint operations' task organization, using the Second Artillery's command system.

In order to ensure that joint operations' command is unified and timely, fully bringing into play the integrated power of missile units {*daodan budui*}, a group headquarters {*jituan zhihuibu*} for Second Artillery operations should be set up underneath the headquarters for joint operations, to exercise comprehensive command and control over Second Artillery operations.

The group headquarters {*jituan zhihuibu*} for Second Artillery operations usually is set up by organs led by command personnel who are dispatched by the Second Artillery; it accepts commands from the joint operations headquarters, exercises command over subordinate units {*budui*}, and guides and coordinates other service arm units {*junzhong budui*} in support operations. When carrying out operations at missile bases, it is possible to have the Second Artillery appoint the command organ of this base to exercise the function of a group headquarters {*jituan zhihuibu*} for operations.

To facilitate command, the group headquarters {*jituan zhihuibu*} for Second Artillery operations usually sets up a basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*}, a reserve command post {*yubei zhihuisuo*}, and a rear area command post {*houfang zhihuisuo*}; when necessary, it can also set up a forward (or direction) command post {*qianjin (fangxiang) zhihuisuo*} or other command posts.

I: Basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*}...188

A basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} for the Second Artillery is a command center that commands Second Artillery operations in a unified manner. It usually is composed of a principal senior officer and a chief of staff, as well as relevant personnel from headquarters, the Political Department, the Logistics Department, the Equipment Department, and subordinate and support units {*budui*}. Under it, there is a command center, an intelligence center, a communications center, an electronic warfare center, a military affairs mobilization center {*junwu dongyuan zhongxin*}, a logistics support center, an equipment support center, and a political work center. Its basic functions are: to get a grasp on changes in the enemy and our situation as well as the actions and intentions of enemy long-range attack strengths {*liliang*}; to implement and carry out the intentions of the joint operations headquarters and to strictly carry out its orders and instructions; to draft and report to superiors on [Second Artillery] plans, based on the decisions of the joint operations commander; to issue various types of orders and

instructions in a timely manner; to organize units {*budui*} in preparing for operations and to inspect and report to superiors on the status of these preparations, in a timely manner; to actively organize cooperation for operations; to command units {*budui*} in carrying out operational missions, to exercise battlefield control in an effective manner, and to report to superiors in a timely manner on the status of operations; to organize and command defense operations, to deal with the consequences of coming under attack, and to restore operational capabilities; and to provide summary reports and detailed reports to superiors in a timely manner after operations are over.

II. Reserve command post {*yubei zhihuisuo*}...189

A reserve command post {*yubei zhihuisuo*} for the Second Artillery is a reserve command organizations that is prepared to take over from the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} in exercising command. It usually consists of a deputy senior officer and a deputy chief of staff as well as relevant personnel from the headquarters, the Political Department, the Logistics Department, and the Equipment Department. Its basic functions are: to have a grasp on the command process of the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} and who units {*budui*} are preparing for and carrying out the operation; when detecting problems, to make proposals to the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} in a timely manner; to assist the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} in organizing cooperation for the operation; and to replace [the basic command post] when the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} comes under attack and while it has yet to restore its command functions.

III. Rear area command post {*houfang zhihuisuo*}...189

A rear area command post {*houfang zhihuisuo*} is a command organization that commands logistics support, equipment support, and rear area support, in a unified manner. It usually is composed of a deputy senior officer who serves as commander, with relevant personnel primarily from the Logistics Department but also from the headquarters, the Political Department, the Equipment Department, and local organizations that support the front. Its basic functions are: to receive orders from the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} and to keep a grasp on the overall situation of logistics and equipment support; to organize and command logistics and equipment organs and units {*budui*} (or elements) in carrying out logistics and equipment support; to organize cooperation for logistics support; and to organize and command defense in the rear area.

IV. Forward (or direction) command post {*qianjin (fangxiang) zhihuisuo*}...189

A forward (or direction) command post {*qianjin (fangxiang) zhihuisuo*} is an auxiliary command organization that is set up to strengthen command along the main direction of operations; it primarily assists the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} in exercising command. It usually is composed of a deputy senior officer and elite staff personnel. Its basic functions are: to maintain contact with the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*};

to assist the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} in commanding the operational actions of units {*budui*} along this direction; and when the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*} comes under attack and has yet to restore its command functions, to contact and liaise with superiors, and then in accordance with [the superiors'] orders and instructions, to continue to exercise command over the units {*budui*} along this direction.

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Chapter 5

The Main Operational Actions of the Second Artillery in Joint Operations...190

The main operational actions {*zhuyao zuozhan xingdong*} of the Second Artillery in joint operations include deterrence {*weishe*}, attack and destruction {*poji*}, blockade {*fengsuo*}, harassment {*xirao*}, and defense {*fangwei*}.

Section 1: Conventional Missile Deterrence {*changgui daodan weishe*}...190

[The term] Second Artillery's conventional missile deterrence in joint operations refers to a series of deterrent actions that the Second Artillery's conventional missile strengths {*changgui daodan liliang*} carry out to show the enemy the actual strength of missile units {*daodan budui*} and their determination to use this [strength], in accordance with the upper echelon's intentions for deterrence and in order to achieve specified strategic and campaign goals, under a unified plan and [unified] command. The conventional missile deterrence {*changgui daodan weishe*} of the Second Artillery in joint operations usually can be used in the initial [stage] of the joint operations or at a given special stage. Its primary missions are to show actual strength and resolution, to contain the outbreak of war, and to deter the escalation of warfare. Conventional missile deterrence {*changgui daodan weishe*} often consists of the following four types of deterrent actions.

I. Displays of missile units in public media {*yulun meiti zhanshi daodan budui*}...190

[The term] displays of missile units {*daodan budui*} in public media refers to messages of deterrence about conventional missile units' {*changgui daodan budui*} power, intentions, and resolve that are revealed to the enemy, either openly or by a hint, by means of public media in a planned manner; these are based on the intentions that the joint operations headquarters has for deterrence, under unified deployment {*tongyi bushu*}. In this way, they force the enemy not to dare to lightly act in a rash manner. These kinds of deterrent actions are a basic deterrent action for the Second Artillery and are a low-intensity deterrence; they commonly are used in combination with other deterrent actions.

The primary methods whereby missile units {*daodan budui*} are displayed in the public media are [as follows]. First, issue public announcements about new types of missile weapons with which [the Second Artillery] is being equipped. Second, "leak" {*xielu*} in a planned manner the new tactical and technical properties of missile weapons. Third, send pictures to the outside world of the Second Artillery's training and preparations for war. Fourth, send a warning to the enemy that [the Second Artillery] is prepared to carry out a missile attack.

In the process of displaying missile units {*daodan budui*} in the public media, the commander of joint operations and his command organ will have a grasp on [the

following]. First, they will combine deterrence [using] public opinion that is ordinary in nature {*yiban xing yulun weishe*} with deterrence [using] public opinion whose nature is pointed [toward a particular direction] {*zhixiang xing yulun weishe*}, with an emphasis on deterrence [using] public opinion whose nature is pointed [toward a certain direction] {*zhixiang xing yulun weishe*}. Second, they will combine propaganda about deterrence that the Second Artillery [carries out] by itself with propaganda about other services' joint deterrence, with an emphasis on joint deterrence. Third, this needs to be planned in a unified manner, at appropriate times and to an appropriate degree.

II. Display the power of missile units to an appropriate degree {*shidu xianshi daodan budui shili*}...191

[The term] displaying the power of missile units {*daodan budui shili*} to an appropriate degree refers to displaying the Second Artillery's weapons and equipment, deployments and adjustment, and such activities as unit {*budui*} training, exercises, and live-missile firing, sometimes openly and sometimes as a hint, in cooperation with the public media and supplemented by many means of deception, in order to further get the enemy to believe in our power and resolve.

The primary methods by which the power of missile units {*daodan budui shili*} is displayed in an appropriate manner are [as follows]. The first is to organize missile units' {*daodan budui*} parade activities. The second is to organize displays of conventional missile weapons. The third is to select times when enemy satellites are overhead, and to organize missile troop strength {*daodan bingli*} movements in a planned manner along the main directions. The fourth is to coordinate troop strengths' {*bingli*} movements and to organize missile troop strengths' {*daodan bingli*} feints and electronic feints, in order to make their momentum {*zaoshi*} more effective. The fifth is to select times when satellites are overhead and to organize missile units {*daodan budui*} in carrying out simulated launches, in order to increase the intensity of deterrence. The sixth is to launch missiles toward predetermined areas (or sea areas), using launch exercises as the basic form and using live troops and live ammunition.

The joint operations commander and his command organ, during the process of displaying the power of missile units {*daodan budui shili*} to an appropriate degree, should pay attention to keeping a grasp on [the following]. First, they must carefully manage the relationship between displaying power and keeping secrets, they must be prudent in displaying power and [must do it] to an appropriate degree, and they cannot reveal missile units' {*daodan budui*} overall intentions and core secrets. Second, they must carefully manage the relationship between showing what is real and showing what is fake; the two must be used in combination, and the showing of what is real must be done to an appropriate degree while the showing of what is fake must be lifelike.

III. Limited and indirect missile firepower attacks {*youxian jianjie daodan huoli daji*}...191

[The term] limited and indirect missile firepower attacks {*youxian jianjie daodan huoli daji*} refers to limited missile firepower assaults or missile “tests” {*shiyān*} that are openly carried out against certain special targets close to the enemy’s land and sea areas, using small numbers of missile units {*daodan budui*} at specific times, in order to enhance the intensity of deterrence against the enemy. These are a type of medium-intensity missile deterrence.

The main methods of limited and indirect missile firepower attacks {*youxian jianjie daodan huoli daji*} are [as follows]: the first is missile firepower attacks {*daodan huoli daji*} that come close to land boundaries (or sea boundaries), while the second is missile firepower attacks {*daodan huoli daji*} that cross the boundaries.

When organizing and carrying out limited indirect missile firepower attacks {*daodan huoli daji*}, the joint operations commander and his command organ should keep a grasp on [the following]. First, they must carefully handle the relationship between war and deterrence and keep a firm grasp on the intensity of deterrence. Second, they must ensure the accuracy of the attacks, to keep the deterrence actions from getting out of control, which would lead to changes in the nature of the deterrence actions. Third, they must meticulously select the targets of attack and the timing of the launches, in order to get optimal effectiveness in the deterrence. Fourth, they must serve the political and diplomatic struggle and have a grasp on the policy nature [that the deterrence has].

Limited and indirect missile firepower attacks {*youxian jianjie daodan huoli daji*} are not to involve important targets within the enemy borders, they certainly are not to create any substantive damage to the enemy, and there is no need to announce them to the enemy through diplomatic channels or make a public notification. No-fly zones and restricted navigational zones can be announced to the outside world by other means, delineating evacuation zones for personnel, in order to avoid harming personnel and ships of third countries by mistake. When carrying out limited and indirect missile firepower attacks {*youxian jianjie daodan huoli daji*}, the target area and the missile trajectory area must be suitably kept at a certain distance from the enemy’s borderlines (or sea area [lines]), and a highly precise missile [must be] selected, to avoid hitting an enemy target due to errors in precision or a loss of control over the missile during flight time, which would change the nature of deterrence, give the enemy a handle on things {*shou di yi bing*}, and create [a situation] where follow-up deterrence would be passive [in nature]. The selection of timing for a missile launch should be based on the level of deterrence that it could create for the enemy as well as on developmental trends in the situation; it should accurately judge turning points in the situation and ensure that [the launching] gets optimal effects in deterrence. Limited and indirect missile firepower attacks {*youxian jianjie daodan huoli daji*} have a nature that is very strongly directed [in a given direction] {*zhixiang xing*} and are very politically sensitive; it is quite easy for international public opinion to be concerned about them, and military powers could

directly or indirectly engage in military intervention, using various pretexts. Therefore, it is necessary to hold to the principles of being rational, being beneficial, [doing things by] degrees, stopping when one is ahead, and paying attention to actual effects, and to firmly grasp the initiative in deterrence.

IV. Limited and direct missile firepower attacks {*youxian zhijie daodan huoli daji*}...192

[The term] limited and direct missile firepower attacks {*youxian zhijie daodan huoli daji*} refers to the use of conventional missiles to conduct low-intensity missile firepower direct attacks against certain special enemy targets, in order to show our ability and firm resolve to carry out in-depth attacks and to pursue the goal of forcing the enemy to submit. Limited and direct missile firepower attacks {*youxian zhijie daodan huoli daji*} come under [the category of] high-intensity deterrence, they are the supreme form for conventional missile deterrence, and they are commonly used at extremely serious moments in a situation. They very much [involve] the nature of policy, they are quite risky, and they must be carried out based on orders from the supreme headquarters or from the joint operations headquarters; the scale of firepower attack actions [must be] strictly kept {*kongzhi*} within the category of very limited deterrence.

The major methods for limited and direct missile firepower attacks {*youxian zhijie daodan huoli daji*} [consist of the following]. The first is to carry out limited attacks against enemy command centers, in order to cut these down to size. The second is to carry out limited attacks against enemy energy systems, in order to disturb the minds of his people {*rao qi min xin*}. The third is to carry out limited attacks against the enemy's key military targets, in order to punish his military and issue a warning {*cheng jun shi jing*}.

During the process of limited and direct missile firepower attacks {*youxian zhijie daodan huoli daji*}, the joint operations commander and his command organs should have a grasp on [the following]. The first is to combine limited and direct missile firepower attacks {*youxian zhijie daodan huoli daji*} with the political and diplomatic struggle; limited and direct missile firepower attacks {*you xinan zhijie daodan huoli daji*} must serve the political and diplomatic struggle. The second is to combine limited and direct missile firepower attacks {*youxian zhijie daodan huoli daji*} with public opinion and propaganda deterrence; firepower assaults should be used in coordination with public opinion and propaganda, psychological attacks and substantive attacks should be used together, and threats and attacks [should be done] alternately, in order to strengthen the shock {*zhenhanli*} of deterrence. The third is to carefully handle the relationship between limited and direct missile firepower attacks {*youxian zhijie daodan huoli daji*} and the use of actual warfare, and to strictly control the scope and intensity of firepower assaults. Direct missile firepower assaults are firepower attacks in a situation on the verge of war, and the boundary between war and deterrence tends to blur; [direct missile firepower assaults] are strongly policy in nature, and they must strictly abide by the deterrence intentions of the supreme headquarters or joint operations headquarters, and be careful in

selecting targets. It is necessary to keep the number of missile launchings under strict control; their goal should not be to kill or wound a certain number of the enemy, but to warn [the enemy] and teach him a lesson. In practice, it is necessary to control the “warning nature” {*jingshi xing*} of deterrent attacks, and [you] cannot cross the line of military deterrence.

Section 2: Missile Firepower Attacks and Destruction {*daodan huoli poji*}...193

[The term] missile firepower attacks and destruction {*daodan huoli poji*} refers to the annihilation and destruction of important enemy military targets and to achieving specific military goals while carrying out relatively large-scale missile firepower attack operations against the enemy; this is a major operational action by the Second Artillery. Its major characteristics are that there are a large number of targets to be assaulted, and the level of destruction is high; the missile troop strengths {*daodan bingli*} and firepower are very powerful; and they are primarily used at important moments and along major directions in joint operations.

In organizing and carrying out missile firepower attacks and destruction {*daodan huoli poji*}, [we] should pay attention to having a grasp on the following several key points.

First, it is necessary to make complete preparations and to meticulously select targets. Missile firepower attacks and destruction {*daodan huoli poji*} place heavy requirements on the weapons and equipment of the Second Artillery, their missions are arduous, and the time is pressing. Making complete preparations is a basic premise for doing a thorough job of launching a missile firepower attack and destruction {*daodan huoli poji*}. Practices in recent local wars, such as the Gulf War and the Kosovo Conflict, show that the U.S. military spent a number of months in carrying intensive preparation, in order to prepare for strategic air raids. Therefore, Second Artillery combat strengths {*canzhan lilang*} should make thorough and careful preparations on the basis of advance preparations in peacetime, for troop strength {*bingli*} deployments, for [the deployment of] weapons and equipment, for operational fronts, and for intelligence support. At the same time, missile firepower attacks and destruction {*daodan huoli poji*} primarily achieve the goal of paralyzing enemy operational systems through destroying key targets in the enemy operational systems. Therefore, it is necessary to conscientiously analyze enemy conditions, to analyze and judge the enemy’s important target systems, and to scientifically select key enemy targets.

Second, it is necessary to centralize firepower and to make surprise attacks. The missile units {*daodan budui*} that are used in missile firepower attacks and destruction {*daodan huoli poji*} are large in scale, they have many targets to attack, and their missions are difficult; it is necessary to insist on using them in a centralized manner and to use them in a focused manner, and to use the main missile firepower at important moments in joint operations, along the main direction, and against the main targets. To do this, the Second Artillery commander must exercise highly centralized control over missile units’ {*daodan budui*} actions, so that the various units {*budui*} coordinate their actions in an

orderly and unified manner. In addition, because the scale of strengths {*liliang*} for these actions is large and it is easy for intentions to be exposed, it is necessary to adopt effective measures to do a thorough job of camouflaging the units {*budui*}, to prevent enemy reconnaissance and surveillance, and to conceal operational intentions; [it is also necessary] to carry out surprise attacks at a time when the enemy does not expect these, from positions that the enemy does not expect, and against targets that the enemy does not expect, quickly seizing the initiative in operations.

Third, it is necessary to strengthen support for continuous operations. In missile firepower attacks and destruction {*daodan huoli poji*}, the Second Artillery has many targets to attack, and it uses up a large number of missiles; this places heavy demands on the various items [that require] support, and it is necessary to strengthen support for these items. It is necessary to adopt extraordinary measures such as one stand with multiple missiles {*yi jia duo dan*}, support that accompanies [the units], and close-in firing, to reduce the time as much as possible for missile units {*daodan budui*} to load their missiles and fight again, and to enhance the continuity of missile firepower. During actions, they should organize reconnaissance and appraisals of the effectiveness of the assault in a timely manner; if they have not achieved the set effects of destruction or if new targets appear, they should organize subsidiary assaults in a timely manner. In addition, missile firepower attacks and destruction {*daodan huoli poji*} usually are used jointly with other services' long-range assault strengths {*liliang*}. Therefore, in the process of organizing preparations and carrying out [attacks], these actions must pay attention to cooperation with relevant services' strengths {*liliang*} in the operation.

Section 3: Missile Firepower Blockades {*daodan huoli fengsuo*}...194

[The term] missile firepower blockades {*daodan huoli fengsuo*} refers to missile firepower assaults that are taken against important enemy targets like traffic hubs, bridges, airfields, and ports, in order to destroy and prevent enemy troops strengths' {*bingli*} movements and logistics resupply. Missile firepower blockades {*daodan huoli fengsuo*} are an important operational action in firepower operations against mobility. Their primary characteristics are: they involve a great deal of time-effectiveness against movements, they place heavy requirements on missile units' {*daodan budui*} rapid reaction capabilities, and their intelligence support is complicated and difficult.

When organizing and carrying out missile firepower blockades {*daodan huoli fengsuo*}, [you] should stress having a grasp on the following several key points.

First, it is necessary to carry out timely and highly effective intelligence support. Missile firepower blockade {*daodan huoli fengsuo*} operations involve a great deal of time-effectiveness, and they have special needs for intelligence support. For this reason, the commander must strengthen the work of intelligence support for missile firepower blockade {*daodan huoli fengsuo*} operations. He must adopt many means for full-spectrum and continuous reconnaissance against the enemy, and [must] make accurate appraisals as early as possible about the enemy's intentions for movement, the times of

his movements, the routes he will move by, and the means [he will use] for movement, [so as] to create favorable conditions for carrying out missile firepower blockade {*daodan huoli fengsuo*} operations.

Second, it is necessary to have rapid reaction, and select an opportunity to control the enemy {*ze ji zhi di*}. Because the enemy has diverse forms and means of mobility as well as strong mobile capability, opportunities for battle in missile firepower blockade {*daodan huoli fengsuo*} operations are fleeting, and they are not easy to seize. Therefore, Second Artillery combat strengths {*canzhan liliang*} must draft careful operational scenarios and determine the special preparations for firepower blockade operations that missile units {*daodan budui*} must thoroughly do within a certain period of time, so that as soon as they detect enemy preparations for movement, they will quickly react. They must focus on getting a grasp on favorable opportunities when the enemy is going to move, when he is about to move, when he is passive, and when he is about to arrive, to block and attack {*feng da*} him at an appropriate time, in order to get the best effects in blockades. Favorable opportunities for battle usually consist of blockading and destroying important enemy airfields when enemy aircraft are about to take off or land; suppressing and killing enemy effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*} when these are assembling and waiting for aircraft {*dai ji*}, assaulting enemy ship units {*jianting budui*} while at anchor, and blockading important enemy bridges and traffic hubs when the enemy has not yet passed over these.

Section 4: Missile Firepower Harassment {*daodan huoli xirao*}...195

[The term] missile firepower harassment {*daodan huoli xirao*} refers to interfering with and disrupting normal enemy actions and to comparatively small-scale, random missile firepower assaults. Their main characteristics are that operational actions are quite random, the scale of strengths {*liliang*} that are used is relatively small, and they primarily use ballistic missile units {*dandao daodan budui*} to carry out the mission.

In organizing and carrying out missile firepower harassment {*daodan huoli xirao*}, we should focus on having a grasp of the following key points.

First, it is necessary to focus on the conditions of the target and to be flexible in using firepower. In order to put strong psychological pressure on the enemy, based on the operational goal, we can carry out sudden and random missile firepower attacks against many types of enemy targets, so that missile firepower harassment {*daodan huoli xirao*} actions are flexible and changeable and so that the enemy has no pattern that he can follow {*wu zhang ke xun*}. This will achieve the best effects in harassment.

Second, it is necessary to designate relatively solid ballistic missile units {*dandao daodan budui*} to be responsible for harassment missions within a given period of time. Because missile firepower harassment {*daodan huoli xirao*} is quite random, units {*budui*} must have strong rapid reaction capabilities, and as regards the use of strengths

{*liliang*}, ballistic missile units {*dandao daodan budui*} with fairly strong reaction capabilities are usually used to carry out the harassment mission.

Third, it is necessary to strictly control the amount of missiles that are used up. Because missile firepower involves a great deal of surprise and deterrence, usually the use of only a small number of missile troop strengths {*bingli*} and firepower within a unit of time can be effective in harassment. Therefore, missile firepower harassment {*daodan huoli xirao*} should have as its standard effective “control” {*kongzhi*} over the target within a certain period of time; and not easily adopt the form of massed attacks, in order to reduce unnecessary waste of firepower.

Section 5: Defensive Operations {*fangwei zuozhan*}...196

[The term] defensive operations {*fangwei zuozhan*} refers to a series of operational actions that Second Artillery combat strengths {*canzhan liliang*} engage in, in accordance with a unified plan by the upper echelon, in order to be on guard and to defeat the enemy’s various assaults, and to preserve [their] effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*}, with the support of other services’ units {*budui*} and the people’s armed strengths {*renmin wuzhuang liliang*}. In local wars under informationized conditions, continual improvements to the main operational opponent’s reconnaissance, surveillance, and long-range attack capabilities have presented a great threat to the battlefield survival of conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*}. Therefore, we should pay especial attention to doing a thorough job of defensive operations {*fangwei zuozhan*}. The basic missions in defensive operations {*fangwei zuozhan*} are: first, to defend against the enemy’s multiple forms of attack and to enhance the survival capabilities of units {*budui*}, and second, to rapidly deal with the aftereffects of coming under attack and to restore operational capabilities.

In joint operations under informationized conditions, the Second Artillery’s defensive operations {*fangwei zuozhan*} should treat as their key points defense against enemy precision-guided munitions attacks {*fang di jingque zhidao wuqi daji*}, defense against surprise attacks by enemy aviation troops {*fang di hangkongbing xiji*}, defense against enemy airborne surprise attacks {*fang di kongjiang xiji*}, and defense against harassment by enemy special forces {*fang di tezhong budui xirao*}.

I. Defense against enemy precision-guided munitions attacks {*fang di jingque zhidao wuqi daji*}...196

[The term] defense against enemy precision-guided munitions attacks {*fang di jingque zhidao wuqi daji*} refers to defensive actions by the Second Artillery’s combat strengths {*canzhan liliang*} to defend against attacks by enemy long-range precision-guided munitions. Looking at the practices of the several local wars in recent times, the status and role of conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} will be quite pronounced in future wars, and they will inevitably become main targets for attacks by enemy precision-guided munitions. Therefore, doing a thorough job of organizing actions to

defend against enemy precision-guided munitions attacks {*fang di jingque zhidao wuqi daji*} will have a major significance for the Second Artillery's combat strengths {*canzhan liliang*} as they maintain their operational capabilities. In dealing with attacks by enemy precision-guided munitions, the following several methods should primarily be adopted.

The first is smoke screens to confuse things {*yanmu mimang*}. Based on the characteristic that precision-guided munitions are easily affected by such factors as smoke, fog, and the atmosphere, it is possible to use smoke screens to confuse [the munitions] and to lower the precision of their attacks, and by means of this to enhance the survival capabilities of missile units {*daodan budui*}. Prior to coming under attack by enemy precision-guided munitions, it is possible to emit smoke screens along the direction of the enemy's attack or close to key targets, forming several smoke screen belts within a certain distance and with a certain altitude, thickness, and length, so that laser-, infrared-, and television-guided missile seekers will not be effective, lowering the attack effectiveness of their precision-guided munitions.

The second is revealing things that are fake, and deception {*shi jia qipian*}. The use of manufactured devices or makeshift materials to make {*fangzhi cheng*} fake targets, such as fake missiles, fake equipment, fake missile sites, and fake roads, makes it hard for enemy reconnaissance systems to differentiate the real from the fake; launching infrared decoys deceives enemy precision-guided munitions and guides the enemy precision-guided munitions toward fake targets, thus achieving the goal of protecting ourselves.

The third is electronic jamming {*dianzi ganrao*}. The integrated use of various types of electronic jamming {*dianzi ganrao*} measures to jam enemy precision-guided munitions in an effective manner reduces the accuracy of their attacks and reduces the power of their attack. The technical measures in precision-guided munitions systems are complex, with a great many interconnected intermediary links; if there are major limitations to bringing their functions into play, their reliability and accuracy will be easily affected. Moreover, most precision-guided munitions use probes to acquire their targets, and if they use visible light, infrared rays, microwaves, millimeter waves, and lasers, it is possible to jam the guidance systems of precision-guided munitions that work within these electromagnetic wavelengths. Therefore, it is possible to adopt various types of electronic jamming {*dianzi ganrao*} measures to jam them, blinding them in an instant; the weapons will get out of control, and it will be difficult for them to bring into play the effectiveness that they should have.

The fourth is interception and destruction {*lanjie cuihui*}. The air defense strengths {*fangkong liliang*} of the services that coordinate, arrange, and support operations utilize many measures to intercept and destroy {*lanjie, cuihui*} enemy precision-guided munitions, in order to protect important targets that are coming under attack. Based on the characteristics that during the attack process, precision-guided munitions have low flight altitude, are constrained by the terrain, and have long flight times, [it is possible] to use various types of intercept weapons to intercept enemy precision-guided munitions at

far and near [distances], at separate stages {*fen jieduan*}, at multiple levels, and in a focused manner, and to try to destroy them prior to their reaching their targets.

The fifth is mobile evasion {*jidong guibi*}. Conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} should fully bring into play their advantages in mobile operations and utilize gaps in enemy reconnaissance, to evade in a mobile manner detection by enemy satellites and to prevent OUR weapons systems from being destroyed by enemy long-range precision-guided munitions, in order to maintain the operational capabilities of conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*}.

II. Defense against surprise attacks by enemy aviation troops {*fang di hangkongbing xiji*}...197

[The term] defense against surprise attacks by enemy aviation troops {*fang di hangkongbing xiji*} refers to a series of operational actions that Second Artillery combat strengths {*canzhan liliang*} carry out against incoming enemy aviation troops in order to ensure the safety of personnel, weapons and equipment, operational positions, and other important targets against aerial [attack]. During the process of operations, conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} should adopt many measures and means to protect important targets within the operational region, reducing to the maximum extent the possible damage that enemy air raids would cause.

When enemy aviation troops attack, the basic method that should be adopted [by defending forces] should be “Use troops in accordance with the enemy, and three-dimensional defense” {*liang di yong bing, liti fanghu*}. Based on the characteristics of the enemy air raid troop strengths {*kongxi bingli*} and weapons, the timing of the attack, and the possible direction [of the attack], adopt flexible and diverse operational methods, base yourself on the operational thinking of active resistance, adopt flexible and mobile tactics, bring into play the advantages that the various services and service arms have in air defense firepower, rationally utilize support air defense troop strengths {*fangkong bingli*} and [troops strengths] that have been allocated {*peishu*} [to you], and use the limited troop strengths {*bingli*} [available] to set up defenses in a focused manner around important targets. Deploy [these troops strengths] level by level {*fen ceng*}, forming a three-dimensional defense network, and actively destroy the incoming enemy in a way that takes the initiative, ensuring the security of the conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} and their operational positions and facilities. The specific methods [of doing this are as follows].

The first is timely early warning {*jishi yujing*}, and using troops in accordance with the enemy {*liang di yong bing*}. After he detects enemy air raids or receives early reports in advance or warnings from the upper echelon and friendly neighbors about air raids, the joint operations commander and his command organ should organize an observation and reporting {*bao zhi*} system within the area of operations, strengthen air surveys, and report on conditions in a timely manner; they should also report to air defense units {*fangkong budui*} on the types of enemy aircraft, [number of] sorties, direction of attack,

and flight altitude. The Second Artillery commander and his command organ must use troops in accordance with the enemy {*liang di yong bing*} and, based on the needs of the air defense mission, levy requirements for air defense support. Moreover, they should organize air defense troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons that have been allocated {*peishu*} [to them] and that support them, and be prepared at any time to resist incoming enemy aircraft.

The second is three-dimensional defense {*liti fangyu*} and concentrated fire to resist an attack {*ji huo kang ji*}. When enemy aircraft break through long-range interception by our fighter aviation troops and surface-to-air missile troops, and enter the airspace where the Second Artillery is deployed, the commander should organize the air defense troop strengths {*fangkong bingli*} and weapons that support [him] and are allocated {*peishu*} [to him], to concentrate fire and attack the incoming enemy, ensuring the security of the Second Artillery's operational positions.

III. Defense against enemy airborne surprise attacks {*fang di kongjiang xiji*}...198

[The term] defense against enemy airborne surprise attacks {*fang di kongjiang xiji*} refers to operational actions by the Second Artillery's combat strengths {*canzhan liliang*}, in concert with units {*budui*} of other services and the local armed forces {*difang wuzhuang*}, to annihilate an airborne enemy who has entered the area of operations of our missile units {*daodan budui*}. In future joint operations, the enemy could use many forms, such as gliders {*ji jiang*} and parachuting, to carry out airborne attacks against us. Therefore, Second Artillery combat strengths {*canzhan liliang*} should rigorously organize operations to defend against enemy airborne attacks and actively cooperate with units {*budui*} of other services to annihilate airborne enemies that are harassing important targets in our operational areas.

The basic method adopted for defense against enemy airborne surprise attacks {*fang di kongjiang xiji*} is to "Race to a favorable position ahead of the enemy, split him up and surround him, and annihilate the enemy while he is still unstable" {*xian di qiangdian, fen'ge baowei, jian di wei wen*}. Racing to a favorable position ahead of the enemy {*xian di qiangdian*} means discovering aerial conditions as quickly as possible, swiftly organizing units {*budui*}, racing to the high ground in the landing zone ahead of the enemy, and struggling for the initiative. Splitting up and surrounding {*fen'ge baowei*} means dividing up and surrounding an enemy who has landed, and not letting the enemy get close or harass [our forces]. Annihilating the enemy while he is still unstable means launching violent attacks against an enemy who has landed but before his position is stable {*lizu wei wen*}. The specific methods [of doing this are as follows].

First is to race to a favorable position ahead of the enemy {*xian di qiangdian*} and to quickly subdue the enemy {*kuaisu zhi di*}. Commanders and their command organs should have a timely grasp of aerial conditions through various means, find traces of enemy air landings, adjust troop strengths {*bingli*} at appropriate times, foresee how the enemy will use troops, and race to seize key points. After receiving warnings about an air

landing or glider landing, they should make accurate judgments about the scale, timing, or region where the enemy could land, based on the intentions of the upper echelon and the terrain conditions of the area of operations, and they should race to a favorable position ahead of the enemy {*xian di qiangdian*} and attack the enemy in a focused manner.

Second is to integrate air and land {*kong di yiti*} and have three-dimensional attacks {*liti daji*}. [You] should adopt operational methods that integrate air and land {*kong di yiti*} and attack an airlanding enemy in a three-dimensional manner {*liti daji*}, level by level. In differentiating operational missions, [you] should clearly distinguish between what is primary and what is secondary. When attacking parachuting enemies and enemy aircraft, [you] should primarily attack the enemy aircraft; when attacking dispersed targets and attacking concentrated targets, [you] should primarily attack concentrated targets, and when attacking light transport aircraft and heavy transport aircraft, you should primarily attack heavy transport aircraft. When an airlanding enemy moves by air, [you] should use various service arms' assault aviation troops and surface air defense troops to intercept enemy airlanding transport formations level by level; when the airlanding enemy arrives at the landing region and lands by parachute or glider, [you] should concentrate the various types of firepower to fiercely attack the airlanding enemy, and strive to annihilate the enemy in mid-air.

Third is to lay regional ambushes {*quyu shefu*} and to defend points and await the enemy {*shou dian dai di*}. In anti-airlanding operations, it is possible to have a certain number of troop strengths {*bingli*} set up ambushes along roads, bridges, narrow passages, and high grounds where the enemy may land, and to defend points and await the enemy {*shou dian dai di*}. When the enemy lands in the region where an ambush has been set up, [you] should quickly react, move toward the center, surround and annihilate him level by level, and strive to completely annihilate the airlanding enemy who is invading.

IV. Defense against harassment by enemy special forces {*fang di tezhong budui xirao*}...199

[The term] defense against harassment by enemy special forces {*fang di tezhong budui xirao*} refers to a series of operational actions that Second Artillery combat strengths {*canzhan lilian*} carry out against enemy special forces {*tezhong budui*} that are invading our missile units' {*daodan budui*} area of operations, in coordination with other services' units {*budui*} and local armed forces.

The basic methods that are adopted to defend against harassment by enemy special forces {*fang di tezhong budui xirao*} are: "Set up in-depth defenses, block [the enemy] at multiple levels, and actively surround and annihilate [the enemy]" {*zongshen bufang, duo ceng zuji, jiji weijian*}. Based on the characteristics of [your] own defensive strengths {*fangwei lilian*} and of multiple kinds of strengths {*lilian*}, such as those of the theater of war, the armed police, and the militia, scientifically organize subordinate units {*budui*} into a group, set up defenses level by level from the forward edge of the area of

operations to the periphery of targets in the depths [of the area of operations], block [the enemy] at many levels, and resolutely annihilate the enemy special forces {*tezhong budui*} that are invading. The specific methods [for doing this are as follows].

The first is joint defense by the military, the police, and the militia {*jun jing min lian fang*} and comprehensive defense {*quanmian fangwei*}. The various Second Artillery combat units {*canzhan budui*} should closely coordinate with the strengths {*liliang*} of the service strengths {*junzhong liliang*}, armed police units {*wujing budui*}, and militia that are allocated [to them] within the theater of war, and scientifically organize these into a group, establishing a triad defense system of the military, the police, and the militia. Defense of key positions should primarily be carried out by the various services' defensive strengths {*fangwei liliang*}, defense of key roads and bridges should primarily be carried out by the armed police strengths {*wujing liliang*}, and defense of other targets should primarily be carried out by militia strengths {*minbing liliang*}. A combination of the military, the police, and the militia carries out comprehensive defense {*quanmian fangwei*} of the conventional missile units' {*changgui daodan budui*} area of operations.

The second is to split up and defend points {*fenqu shou dian*} and to block [the enemy] level by level {*ceng ceng zuji*}. When the enemy special forces {*tezhong budui*} invade, our first-line defense strengths {*fangwei liliang*} are to split up and occupy operational positions; hold the high ground, key points, and passes and key roads; tenaciously resist the enemy; concentrate various types of troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons to kill the enemy in large numbers; and slow down the enemy's actions [as he tries] to destroy the our important targets. Along the enemy's major routes of action, block him level by level {*ceng ceng zuji*}, intercept and kill him, slow down his attack, and quickly assemble ground defense units {*fangwei budui*} and organize [actions] in a timely manner to surround and annihilate [the enemy].

The third is to combine fighting and suppression {*da jiao jiehe*} and to surround and round up and annihilate [the enemy] {*hewei jujian*}. When the enemy's special forces {*tezhong budui*} disperse to conduct surveillance, destruction, and harassment in our area of operations, and when they seriously threaten the security of our key positions, such as operational fronts, communications hubs, and key traffic roads, defensive units {*fangwei budui*} within the theater of war should immediately form a net to surround them, from differing directions and differing places, using such operational actions as "search, find, resist, gather, and fight" {*cha, zhao, kang, sou, da*} to completely annihilate the enemy's special forces {*tezhong budui*} (or elements).

V. Dealing with the consequences of coming under attack {*chuzhi zao xi houguo*}...200

[The term] dealing with the consequences of coming under attack {*chuzhi zao xi houguo*} refers to the actions adopted by Second Artillery combat strengths {*canzhan liliang*} after they come under enemy assault, with the assistance and cooperation of other services' units {*budui*} and local armed forces, for emergency rescue and emergency repairs

{*qiangjiu qiangxiu*} and for adjusting and replenishing [things] {*tiaozheng buchong*}, in order to restore the operational capabilities as soon as possible of the units {*budui*} that came under attack.

(1) Ascertain the conditions of what was attacked {*chaming zao xi qingkuang*}

After Second Artillery combat strengths {*canzhan liliang*} come under enemy attack, they should quickly adopt effective measures and ascertain the time, place, and form of the enemy's attack as well as the scope of damage that [this attack] has caused; [they should ascertain] what the damage is to the command organization, weapons and equipment, positions, communications facilities, roads, and bridges; and [they should ascertain] what damage the personnel of the unit {*budui*} that came under attack have suffered.

(2) Report to superiors in a timely manner on the situation {*jishi shang bao qingkuang*}

[The fact that] Second Artillery units {*budui*} have come under attack directly affects the decisions of the joint operations commander. Therefore, after coming under attack, the Second Artillery commander and his command organs should immediately report to the upper echelon about conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} coming under attack and suffering losses, and make proposals for handling this, in order to facilitate quickly handling the consequences of the attack and to restore operational capabilities as quickly as possible, [all] under the unified command of the upper echelon.

(3) Rapidly carry out emergency rescues and emergency repairs {*xunsu jinxing qiangjiu qiangxiu*}

After ascertaining the situation of the attack, [you] should quickly organize emergency repairs to the weapons and equipment and positions and facilities that have been damaged, actively launch [actions] for personnel who have been wounded to help themselves and help each other, and to do a thorough job of evacuating the wounded. At the same time, [you] should organize strengths {*liliang*} in a timely manner to quickly extinguish fires that are threatening missile weapons, to do emergency repairs to urgently needed roads and bridges, and to remove obstacles that have collapsed and are blocking the direction of actions, in order to ensure that conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} can smoothly carry out mobile operations. Conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} that rely upon fixed fronts for operations must quickly adjust their strengths {*liliang*} and rationally divide up missions, and strengthen emergency repairs to the fixed launching equipment and fortifications, in order to speedily restore their operational capabilities and to thoroughly prepare to resist further attacks by the enemy.

(4) Adjust and replenish things in a timely manner {*shishi tiaozheng buchong*}

On the basis of ascertaining the situation and quickly [carrying out] emergency rescues and emergency repairs {*qiangjiu qiangxiu*}, the Second Artillery commander should resolutely make decisions, based on what happened in the attack that [the units] suffered, on the effectiveness of the emergency rescues and emergency repairs, and on the operational missions that the various units {*budui*} are responsible for, and [he should] quickly adjust operational deployments, replenish things at appropriate times, and quickly restore operational capabilities. A conventional missile unit {*changgui daodan budui*} is very much a complete set {*peitao xing qiang*}, and the destruction of local key factors will to varying degrees affect the operational capabilities of the entire unit {*zhengge budui*}. When the commander and his command organ adjust deployments and replenish personnel, weapons, and other materials, they must pay especial attention to maintaining and restoring the entire set of weapons systems, in order to ensure that integrated operational capabilities will take shape.

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Chapter 6

Support to Second Artillery Operations in Joint Operations...201

Support to Second Artillery operations {*di'er paobing zuozhan baozhang*} in joint operations refers to various support measures and actions that support Second Artillery commanders in making timely decisions and in carrying out continuous command, and that support units {*budui*} in preparing for operations and in carrying out operational missions in a concealed, secure, and smooth manner; they are planned and organized by the command organ in a unified manner.

Section 1: Basic Requirements {*jiben yaoqiu*}...202

In joint operations under informationized conditions, there are many details [involving] support to Second Artillery operations {*di'er paobing zuozhan baozhang*}, touching on a wide scope; the support system is complicated, there are many types of specialties, there is a strong requirement for precision support, and organization and coordination are difficult. There is a great deal of confrontation involved in support, and the mission of support is difficult to carry out. As regards the characteristics of support to operations under informationized conditions, the basic requirements are [as follows].

I. Careful planning, and preparations in advance {*zhoumi jihua, yuyou zhunbei*}...202

The Second Artillery's operational actions in joint operations directly affect the overall situation of all operations. Therefore, when organizing support to operations, it is necessary to make careful plans and to prepare in advance. It is necessary to keep peace and war combined, with an emphasis on the principles of peacetime. In peacetime, [it is necessary] to stress the widespread collection of relevant information, and to draft various plans (or preliminary plans {*yu'an*}) of support to operations and to carry out training and preparations in a focused manner, based on operational missions that could be undertaken and in accordance with the standards and requirements that they always have {*changbei zhuangtai*}, in order to enhance their ability to adapt and their ability to respond to contingencies. The programs (or preliminary plans {*yu'an*}) that are drafted must be complete sets and they must take into consideration the comprehensive uses for support that the various support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} have, ensuring that support measures are specific, so as to meet the needs of operations.

II. Timely and reliable, and with rapid reaction {*jishi kekao, kuaisu fanying*}...202

Because the rhythm of joint operations under informationized conditions is faster, the timeliness of support has become an important factor in enhancing the benefits of command and in strengthening units' {*budui*} rapid reaction capabilities as well as their defensive capabilities. The timeliness of support means that the collection, transmission, and processing of intelligence must be fast; that command and coordination must be kept

unimpeded; and that the various support measures must fight for minutes and seconds {*fenmi bi zheng*}, they cannot lose any opportunities, and [they must] truly be able to bring their role into play at key links of the operation. The reliability of support means that the intelligence that is received must be real, that the transmission of each piece of information must be accurate, that each support measure must reach its destination, and that the various support means must be effective, ensuring that they bring the role of support into play. Strengthening the timeliness and reliability of support in joint operations is crucial to smoothly completing support to operations. It is necessary, on the basis of adopting measures to improve the quality of personnel in support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} and the functions of equipment, and based on the needs for developing joint operations, to rationally divide up and use support strengths {*baozhang liliang*}, to react rapidly and operate flexibly, and to provide effective methods of support in a way that does not lose any opportunities. [It is also necessary] to inspect the effects of the support in a timely manner, to collect feedback information about the support, to modify methods of support and key points of support in a timely manner, in order to meet the needs of joint operations.

III. Make overall preparations for the overall situation, and support key points {*tongchou quanju, baozhang zhongdian*}...203

The deployment of the Second Artillery involves many points and a broad area; the types of weapons differ, there are fairly wide differences in environmental conditions, and forms of operations are varied. When carrying out support to operations, it is impossible to merely consider the needs of a given aspect of joint operations; [rather,] it is necessary to consider the overall situation, to look out for the overall system of joint operations, to carry out comprehensive support, and to keep from paying attention to one thing while losing sight of another. As regards space, it is necessary to look out for the front, flanks, and depths of the battlefield; as regards time, it is necessary to carry out operations from start to finish and to continually do a thorough job of support. At the same time that [you] are paying attention to the overall situation, [you must] keep a grasp on key links and carry out comprehensive and focused support. The commander should predict possible developments in operations, based on the mission of operations, the enemy's situation, the battlefield conditions, and support strengths {*baozhang liliang*}; he should make overall preparations for arrangements, make comprehensive plans, differentiate between what is important and what is not and between what is urgent and what is not, stress the key points of support, rationally organize and deploy the various types of support strengths {*baozhang liliang*}, and concentrate the main strengths {*zhuyao liliang*} to support operational actions that have a major effect on the overall situation of operations. [He should] give priority to supporting the main battlefield, the main directions and areas, crucial occasions {*shijie*}, and the units {*budui*} that are carrying out the main missions, and ensure that key missions will be completed. At the same time, it is also necessary to pay attention to other areas, to other occasions {*shijie*}, and to the needs of other units {*budui*}, so that the work of support can bring into play its maximum effectiveness for the entire operation.

IV. Ensuring survival and maintaining stability {*quebao shengcun, chixu wending*}...203

In joint operations, support to Second Artillery operations {*di'er paobing zuozhan baozhang*} must adopt defensive measures and strengthen the survival capabilities of the support system. Survival and support are two sides of the same issue; the former is the conditions {*tiaojian*} and the foundation, while the latter is the goal and the result. Without survival, there is no use talking about support; survival becomes the premise for seizing the initiative in support. For support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} that have been damaged, if the support installations that have been damaged cannot be restored in a timely manner, there is no point to talking about {*chengwei kong tan*} the maintenance of continual support. Therefore, strengthening the survival capabilities of support systems to operations and their regeneration capabilities is a problem that must be resolved when organizing and carrying out support to operations. Only through rigorous organization and by using many methods together is it possible to ensure that command of operations will be constant and that operational actions will be continuous and stable.

V. Close coordination and integrated support {*miqie xietong, zhengti baozhang*}...203

The operational actions of the Second Artillery in joint operations involve broad areas, with many units {*budui*} directly and indirectly participating in combat. The items involved in support to operations are complex, and the missions are arduous. It is impossible to complete support missions by relying upon only any one support strength {*baozhang liliang*} and means. Just like the supply of materials for strategic objectives, such tasks as support to roads and bridges must have assistance from relevant parties before they can be completed. At the same time, the various support tasks within the Second Artillery's system of support to operations also must rely upon one another for their existence and have a strict sequence; only by organizing close cooperation inside and outside the Second Artillery's system of support, and by carrying out integrated support, is it possible to meet the needs of operations.

Section 2: Main Details {*zhuyao neirong*}...204

In joint operations, the main details in support to Second Artillery operations {*di'er paobing zuozhan baozhang*} include reconnaissance intelligence support {*zhencha qingbao baozhang*}, target support {*mubiao baozhang*}, surveying and mapping support {*cehui baozhang*}, data and trajectory calculations support {*zhuyuan yu dandao jisuan baozhang*}, weather support {*qixiang baozhang*}, communications support {*tongxin baozhang*}, electromagnetic spectrum management {*dianci pinpu guanli*}, engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*}, and camouflage operations {*zuozhan weizhuang*}.

I. Reconnaissance intelligence support {*zhencha qingbao baozhang*}...204

Reconnaissance intelligence support {*zhencha qingbao baozhang*} refers to the activities that the various types of reconnaissance intelligence strengths {*zhencha qingbao liliang*}

used by the Second Artillery engage in and to the many ways by which they get and provide the intelligence needed for operations. The primary missions are [as follows]. First, they obtain and fully understand {*zhangwo*} basic information about the enemy's long-range attack strengths {*daji liliang*}, military targets, and early warning missile defense systems, and they provide accurate and reliable information about achieving objectives {*mubiao chengguo*} and data on the target situation. Second, they ascertain as early as possible indications of surprise attacks by the enemy against the PRC's conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*}, opportunities [for these attacks], and the scales and targets [of the attacks]. Third, they master the situation of the air {*kong qing*} [around] the conventional missile units' {*changgui daodan budui*} positions and the patterns of strategic reconnaissance that the enemy conducts against PRC missile units {*daodan budui*}, they find incoming targets, and they issue warning signals in a timely manner, in order to give units {*budui*} even more time for early warning. Fourth, they provide information on how effective destruction has been of targets that have been attacked.

In joint operations, it is the command organ of the Second Artillery that actually organizes and carries out reconnaissance intelligence support {*zhencha qingbao baozhang*} for Second Artillery operations, under unified planning by the joint operations headquarters and in cooperation with relevant department. When organizing reconnaissance intelligence support {*zhencha qingbao baozhang*}, it is necessary to pay attention to coordinating reconnaissance and to intelligence support, so that [different sources of] intelligence supplement one another and confirm one another, and so that they enhance the rate at which the intelligence is utilized {*liyonglyu*} and the reliability [of the intelligence].

II. Target support {*mubiao baozhang*}...204

Target support {*mubiao baozhang*} refers to activities that are carried out to provide accurate and reliable target data for drafting firepower plans. The basic missions of target support {*mubiao baozhang*} are to collect, arrange, and compile materials about achieving objectives {*mubiao chengguo*}, and to provide real-time information on the state of the target. Target support {*mubiao baozhang*} needs to have precise positioning, all of the key factors, and strong relevance.

Target support {*mubiao baozhang*} for the Second Artillery is a long-term basic task in war-readiness. In the process of carrying out joint operations, under the unified planning of the joint operations headquarters and under the specific leadership of relevant departments in the general headquarters, [the Second Artillery] organizes and carries out [target support] jointly with other services and specialized strengths {*zhuanmen liliang*}. Target support {*mubiao baozhang*} in the process of operations must have real-time reconnaissance, [must] have an accurate grasp of information about changes in the situation of targets, [must] correct and supplement the parameters for the various targets in a timely manner, and [must] enhance the effects of firepower assaults by conventional missiles.

III. Surveying and mapping support {cehui baozhang}...205

Surveying and mapping support {cehui baozhang} is activities that are carried out in order to provide precise and complete geodetic data for conventional missile units' {changgui daodan budui} operations. It is an important premise for ensuring missiles' precise locating and for hitting the target, and it is an indispensable [item in] launch preparations in conventional missile firepower assaults. Its primary missions are to survey and map predetermined areas of operations and set up points in a network for measuring the earth, and to measure the coordinates and altitudes for launch points.

In joint operations, the surveying and mapping support {cehui baozhang} for conventional missile units {changgui daodan budui} has such features as a large number of surveying and mapping points, a broad scope, a nature that is strongly real-time, a strong need for precision in support, and complex technical means. Commanders and command organs of Second Artillery units {di'er paobing budui} should carefully organize and carry out [surveying and mapping] based on the characteristics and needs of support for surveying the earth {ce di}.

IV. Data and trajectory calculations support {zhuyuan yu dandao jisuan baozhang}...205

Data and trajectory calculations support {zhuyuan yu dandao jisuan baozhang} is the calculations for the firing direction, relevant trajectory parameters, and supplementary parameters that are done to ensure the accuracy of missiles in hitting the target. Its primary missions are to calculate data about the earth, data for the launch, and data for binding {zhuangding} warheads, and to provide a necessary basis for drafting and revising firepower plans, for tests, and for launching missiles.

In joint operations, there is a [great deal of] data for conventional missile units {changgui daodan budui} and a many details for ballistic calculations, there is a strong real-time nature, and there a strong need for precision. In the process of organizing and carrying out [support], the commanders and command organs of Second Artillery units {di'er paobing budui} must carefully organize cooperation between the calculation elements {jisuan fendui} and relevant units; have a firm grasp on the transmission, input, and calculations of data; and ensure that the data is accurate and error-free.

V. Weather support {qixiang baozhang}...205

Weather support {qixiang baozhang} is actions and measures that are taken for weather monitoring, forecasting, and alerts in order to ensure that the Second Artillery carries out its operational missions in a secure and smooth manner. Its goals are to ensure that units {budui} correctly utilize weather conditions; avoid damage that dangerous weather could cause to missile weapons, ground installations, and personnel; fully bring into play the effectiveness of weapons and equipment in operations; and smoothly complete operational missions. Its primary tasks are to determine weather information for the

missile launch zone and target zone, to monitor changes in the weather, to receive and provide weather forecasts, and to issue alerts about dangerous weather in a timely manner.

In joint operations, Second Artillery weather support {*qixiang baozhang*} has these characteristics: the scope of its support is broad, the period of time [involved] is long, the areas of cooperation are broad, and the support [involves] great difficulties. When organizing weather support {*qixiang baozhang*}, each echelon of commander must be familiar with minimal weather conditions for missile units' {*daodan budui*} operations during the joint operations. They are to propose requirements for weather support {*qixiang baozhang*} in a timely manner on the basis of information about the missile launch zone and target zone that has been collected, arranged, and analyzed in peacetime; this ensures that weather support {*qixiang baozhang*} is carried out in a timely, accurate, and continuous manner.

VI. Communications support {*tongxin baozhang*}...206

Information support {*tongxin baozhang*} is the measures that the Second Artillery takes to establish reliable communications contacts for carrying out operational missions. Its basic task is to establish and maintain communications contacts between upper and lower echelons and with cooperating units {*budui*} (or elements) and relevant local organizations; to organize and carry out communications for command, coordination, alert notifications, intelligence sharing, and trajectory observations within the task organization, and logistics and equipment support; to manage the communications equipment in the area of operations; and to organize and carry out military postal services.

In joint operations, the actual organizing and carrying out of communications support {*tongxin baozhang*} for the Second Artillery is done by Second Artillery command organs under the unified planning of the joint operations' command organs and in cooperation with other services and relevant local departments. Commanders at each echelon must constantly pay attention to how smooth communications are. Communications departments at each echelon must meet {*guanche*} the basic requirements {*jiben yaoqiu*} of being rapid, accurate, secret, and continuous; [they must] depend on support that has already been set up and is integrated, combine multiple dimensions and set up a three-dimensional network, network at multiple levels and have direct communications that skips levels, resist destruction and resist jamming, block reconnaissance and defend against being cut off, and select means and maintain communications during emergencies.

VII. Electromagnetic spectrum management {*dianci pinpu guanli*}...206

Management of the electromagnetic spectrum {*dianci pinpu guanli*} is the actions and measures that are adopted to reduce the effects that electromagnetic signals have on Second Artillery operational actions and to ensure that [our] own side's operational

systems operate in a stable and highly efficient manner. Its basic missions are to draft plans for managing the electromagnetic spectrum {*dianci pinpu guanli*}, to differentiate the tasks of control, and to clarify the responsibilities, timing, areas, and frequency bands that are to be controlled; to organize monitoring of the electromagnetic spectrum, with a focus on the electromagnetic environment of such areas as command posts and missile sites, and to monitor the working frequency bands of high-powered emissions sources and main battle weapons; to utilize many forms and means in order to resolve as much as possible various contradictions in the use of the electromagnetic spectrum; to organize and launch investigations into jamming and to eliminate in a timely manner the jamming that [we] do to ourselves {*zi ran*} and the jamming that we do to each other {*hu ran*}; and to guide and assist local governments in controlling the electromagnetic spectrum.

In joint operations, it is Second Artillery command organs that actually organize and carry out the Second Artillery's management of the electromagnetic spectrum {*dianci pinpu guanli*}, adopting methods that combine unified management and graduated responsibility, under the unified plans of the joint operations' command organs and in cooperation with other services and relevant local departments. During the process of organizing and carrying out [this management], the Second Artillery command organs should scientifically plan and allocate frequencies, based on the battlefield electromagnetic environment and the realities of electromagnetic spectrum resources, as well as on the numbers of the Second Artillery's weapons and equipment that use frequencies {*yong pin*} and on the characteristics of their functions, thus ensuring that the requirements that the various weapons and equipment that use frequencies {*yong pin*} have for their use of frequencies {*pinlyu shiyong*} [will be met]. At the same time, it is necessary to monitor all frequency domains, all directions, and all time intervals in the battlefield electromagnetic environment, and to have a firm grasp on the battlefield electromagnetic situation. [It is necessary] to comprehensively analyze and appraise in a timely manner how the enemy is using the electromagnetic spectrum and how he is jamming us electromagnetically, when we monitor and discover [he is doing so]; to make proposals on how to handle this and to report [these proposals] to relevant departments; to guide units {*budui*} in properly using frequencies; and to ensure that coordination on the use of frequencies is orderly and that the effectiveness of weapons and equipment is fully brought into play.

VIII. Engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*}...207

Engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*} is the various engineering measures that are taken to ensure that Second Artillery units {*budui*} smoothly complete their operational missions. Its goal is to provide the working conditions that Second Artillery conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*} need for their operations and defense, and to enhance units' {*budui*} survival capabilities, mobile capabilities, and conventional missile assault capabilities. The basic tasks of engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*} are to strengthen and do emergency repairs to positions and to traffic and engineering facilities in the area of operations, through the integrated use of various engineering measures, and centered on the goals of operations and on the operational

actions of conventional missile units {*changgui daodan budui*}; to build launch sites and defensive fortifications, for responding to emergencies; and to camouflage fortifications. The basic requirements of [engineering support] are comprehensive planning and a combination of peace and war, integrated coordination and a stress on key points, and integrating the military and civilians and combining [things that involve] the masses and [things that are] specialized.

In joint operations, it is usually Second Artillery command organs that actually organize and carry out engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*} for the Second Artillery, under the unified leadership of the joint operations headquarters and with support and cooperation from other services and service arms as well as local support strengths {*difang zhiyuan liliang*}. During the process of engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*}, it is necessary to establish a mobile engineering support system {*jidong gongcheng baozhang tixi*}, to carefully organize battlefield engineering reconnaissance, and to have unified organization and integrated overall planning, so as to ensure that engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*} is reliably carried out.

IX. Camouflage operations {*zuo-zhan weizhuang*}...207

Camouflage operations {*zuo-zhan weizhuang*} are the various measures that conceal what is real and reveal what is false {*yin zhen shi jia*} that the Second Artillery takes to conceal itself and to deceive and confuse the enemy. The goal is to create misconceptions among the enemy and to obstruct the enemy's reconnaissance and attacks. The basic mission in camouflage operations {*zuo-zhan weizhuang*} is to conceal the intentions of operations, to deceive and confuse the enemy, and to provide a secure environment for smoothly completing operational missions. It includes using various camouflage techniques and materials in a planned manner, in order to conceal troop strength {*bingli*} positions, the locations of sites, and unit movements {*budui xingdong*}; to establish such false targets as false sites and false equipment; and to carry out troop strengths {*bingli*} feints, electronic feints, and launching position {*fashe dian*} feints. The basic requirements for camouflage operations {*zuo-zhan weizhuang*} are that they proceed from the overall situation of the operations and that they have unified planning, organization, and execution; that they use many means in an integrated manner and that they are systematic, are coordinated, have form rather than substance {*xingxiang*}, and are lifelike; that they have stronger relevance and targeting; and that they strengthen their supervision, inspection, and management.

In joint operations, Second Artillery camouflage operations {*zuo-zhan weizhuang*} are organized and carried out in a unified manner by Second Artillery command organs under unified planning by the joint operations headquarters and in cooperation with relevant departments. In the process of organizing and carrying out camouflage operations {*zuo-zhan weizhuang*}, it is necessary to have strict camouflage discipline; to fully utilize various kinds of natural conditions; to completely deceive and confuse the enemy through the positioning and creating of false targets, false sites, and false

intelligence; and to [thus] create an excellent environment for units' *{budui}* operational actions.

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Part V

Armed Police Unit Operations Application in Joint Operations...209

The armed police is an important component of our armed strength. In peacetime, it mainly is in charge of defending domestic security and safeguarding social stability. In the future joint operation, the one that our armed forces launches for focusing on safeguarding homeland unification and defending territorial sovereignty and marine rights and interests, no matter whether is a joint campaign or joint battle, our armed police unit is an indispensable important strength. In future possible joint operations, in addition to completing wartime internal defense service, the armed police units will focus on ground defensive operations, take charge of cooperating with the PLA to carry out rear defensive operations, and safeguard social stability according to the organizational structure and equipment situations of armed police units.

In joint operations, operational activities of armed police units are important components. The main characteristics are as follows:

1) the tasks are widespread; 2) operational zone is widespread; 3). too many objectives make it difficult for defense; 4) preparation time is short; 5) concealing the intention is difficult; 6) operational means are limited; 7) command coordination is complex; and 8) support tasks are arduous.

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Chapter 1

Main Battlefields for Armed Police Units' Operations in Joint Operations...209

The [term] main battlefields {zhuyao zhanchang} for armed police operations {wuzhuang jingcha zuozhan} refers to the various forms of operations and means and methods of operations that armed police units {wuzhuang jingcha budui} employ under the unified command of joint operations headquarters, in accordance with unified intentions, in order to achieve the goals of integrated operations, at a certain time and in a place where they are having a dispute with enemy forces. The main space in this place is the ground. The primary battlefield for armed police operations {wuzhuang jingcha zuozhan} in joint operations is one of the objective factors that affect the armed police's operational actions {wuzhuang jingcha zuozhan xingdong}, and it has an important effect on the overall situation of the joint operations. Therefore, the commander of the joint operations and the commander of the armed police units {wuzhuang jingcha budui} must conscientiously study the main battlefield {zhuyao zhanchang} for armed police operations {wuzhuang jingcha zuozhan} in joint operations, analyze favorable and unfavorable conditions, and move toward what is beneficial while avoiding what is harmful as they guide operations.

Section 1: The Effects of the Battlefield Environment on Armed Police Units' Operations {zhanchang huanjing dui wuzhuang jingcha budui zuozhan de ying xiang}...210

The main battlefields {zhuyao zhanchang} of armed police units' operations {wuzhuang jingcha budui zuozhan} in joint operations primarily include the natural geographic environment {ziran dili huanjing}, the human social environment {renwen shehui huanjing}, and the information environment {xinxi huanjing}. These environments have major effects on the operational actions of armed police units {wuzhuang jingcha budui}.

I. The effects of the natural geographic environment on the operational actions of armed police units {ziran dili huanjing dui wu jing budui zuozhan xingdong}...210

[The term] natural geographic environment {ziran dili huanjing} refers to the non-artificial natural conditions in the area of joint operations, such as the terrain and meteorological phenomena. The natural geographic environment {ziran dili huanjing} has a major effect on the operational actions of armed police units {wuzhuang jingcha budui} in joint operations. Because the patterns of distribution in an area are not the same as the composition of operational strengths {zuozhan liliang}, the natural geographic environments {ziran dili huanjing} that armed police units {wu jing budui} face in joint operational actions are many and varied; they primarily consist of the geographic environment of nationalities' regions; the geographic environment of coastal regions; and the geographic environments of tropical mountain jungle areas, high-altitude cold regions, desert regions, and cities, as well as the geographic environment of important targets where [police] are on duty {zhiqin mubiao}.

The modern battlefield has a very great degree of uncertainty. First, high-tech weapons are not restricted very much by the terrain, and any space or place could become a battlefield. Second, battlefields are not merely determined by [your] own side; at the same time, there are also restraints from the enemy. A powerful enemy pays a great deal of attention to winning “freedom” {*ziyou du*} on the battlefield, that is, having full control over the initiative in the battlefield situation. But speaking fundamentally, the conditions of the geographical environment are still the basis for the two hostile sides’ operations, and it is still impossible to become completely separated from and to surpass these conditions. Differing geographical environments involve {*juyou*} differing adaptabilities, and they have differing special requirements for units’ {*budui*} operational actions.

In future joint operations, the effects that the natural geographical environment {*ziran dili huanjing*} has on armed police operational actions {*wu jing zuozhan xingdong*} will be primarily manifested in the following several areas.

The first is effects on obtaining intelligence in an effective manner. On the one hand, bad weather is an unbeatable rival to advanced scientific and technological reconnaissance devices. On the other hand, natural conditions, such as mountain valleys, forests, dense fog, and the darkness of night, can conceal personnel’s actions quite well, reducing the chance that these will be discovered by opponents. This is a very big problem for getting an accurate grasp on intelligence information.

The second is effects on command devices. Terrain like mountainous country, hills, forests, high-rise buildings in urban areas, and inhabited areas restrain wired communications and ultrashortwave communications, while thunder and lightning, windstorms, and clouds and rain will also interfere with communications; these all affect the transmission and feedback of command information, thus directly affecting the effectiveness of command.

The third is effects on units’ {*budui*} command and control. Extreme cold or the intense heat of summer affects how technical equipment brings its functions into play, and it can create non-combat reductions in personnel; noxious weather and reduced visibility are not helpful for firing [weapons] and for observing [things], but they help in concealing the intentions of actions. Rainy and snowy weather affect the speed of marches, and it does not help in movements by large units {*da budui*}, but it does help to achieve surprise in actions. When commanders are setting units’ {*budui*} missions, main directions, and the steps and methods for carrying out missions, they should fully take into consideration the effects of natural conditions, and they must exercise correct command based on objective conditions.

The fourth is effects on units’ {*budui*} moving in an effective manner. Differing forms of traffic, such as mountainous country, hilly country, city roads, and high-speed [highways] between cities, directly affect armed police units’ {*wu jing budui*} moving into position for operational actions and their reinforcements to operations.

II. The effects that the human social environment has on armed police units' operational actions {*renwen shehui huanjing dui wu jing budui zuozhan xingdong de yingxiang*}...211

The [term] human social environment {*renwen shehui huanjing*} refers to social, political, economic, and cultural environments where people are the main actors. They include population composition, political organizations, nationalities' religions, science and education and health, and economic development. Because armed police units {*wu jing budui*} are an armed strength {*wuzhuang liliang*} in which social attributes are more pronounced, their organizational structure, task organization, and deployments basically are standardized in accordance with administrative districts {*quhua*}; the places where they are stationed extend over every place in the entire country, and they truly are [a case where] there are many points covering a broad area {*dian duo mian guang*}. The most direct goal of their units {*budui*} is to maintain stability in local society and the security of important targets; this forms an even more inseparable relationship between the operational actions of the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} and the human social environment {*renwen shehui huanjing*}. Therefore, in joint operational actions, armed police units {*wu jing budui*} inevitably will have a greater need to rely upon the local human social environment {*renwen shehui huanjing*}, [in order to] carry out their various operational actions in an effective manner.

In future joint operations, the effects of the human social environment {*renwen shehui huanjing*} on armed police operational actions {*wu jing zuozhan xingdong*} will be primarily manifested in the following several areas.

The first is that in joint operations, when armed police units {*wu jing budui*} carry out operational missions in such differing environments as central cities, villages, towns, and coastal regions, they will have to take into account many factors, such as civilian casualties, important targets, and strategic traffic {*zhanlyue jiaotong*}; in particular, when protecting objectives that involve the outside [world] and cities that are economic centers, their means and forms of operations and their use of weapons must entail certain special requirements and methods of use.

The second is that China's special nationalities, border, and territorial seas issues also form a special social environment that the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} must face in their operations. Under the conditions of joint operations, the enemy inevitably will use the various conditions in China's campaign depths and even its strategic rear area, and will adopt various forms to carry out a great deal of harassment and destructive activities, planning to arouse, induce, and enlarge the social problems and the contradictions [among] nationalities that already exist in China. He will do his utmost to destroy the overall situation of China's social stability, to arouse social turmoil, and to affect the overall disposition of the armed police units' {*wu jing budui*} operations and the resolve and intentions of their operations. In areas where the conditions of political, economic, nationalities, and social issues differ, there will also be obvious differences in the actual pressures faced by armed police units {*wu jing budui*}.

III. The effects of the battlefield information environment on the operational actions of armed police units {zhanchang xinxi huanjing dui wu jing budui zuozhan xingdong de yingxiang}...212

The battlefield information environment {zhanchang xinxi huanjing} is the general term for the various types of information and information systems related to the battlefield and to the operations surrounding {zhouwei} it. The battlefield information environment {zhanchang xinxi huanjing} is the basis for organizing and carrying out information operations; looking at the differences in information facilities and in transmitting information, electromagnetic spaces, computers, and their network spaces are the most basic key factors in the battlefield information environment {zhanchang xinxi huanjing}. The electromagnetic environment refers to how many electronic facilities there are within a given area (or space) and to their quality, as well as to their share of the electromagnetic space [within that area (or space)]. This is the main sphere that battlefield information depends on for its existence, and most of the collection and transmission of battlefield information takes place within this sphere. Electromagnetic spaces have become a basic key factor in the information environment. The spaces of computer networks refer to the virtual spaces formed jointly by computers systems and their networks; network spaces have expanded to the various spheres of economics, science and education, culture, medical treatment, and amusement, and the lives of more and more people are closely bound to networks. Network spaces have become the main battlefield in information operations.

In future joint operational actions, armed police units {wu jing budui} will directly face an extremely complex battlefield information environment {zhanchang xinxi huanjing}, which will have a fairly large effect on the armed police units {wu jing budui} and will restrict their actions. In the complex and varied electromagnetic information environment that they will face, their relatively weak electronic warfare capabilities will result in armed police units' {wu jing budui} operational actions facing even more tests, and they will urgently need information support from upper echelons and friendly neighboring units {you lin budui} for their operational actions. In joint operational actions, special functions and missions, the environment of special operational actions, and the varied [pieces of] electromagnetic information will place even greater requirements on the armed police units' {wu jing budui} ability to screen electromagnetic information.

Section 2: Battlefield Preparations for Armed Police Units in Joint Operations {lianhe zuozhan zhong wuzhuang jingcha budui zhanchang zhunbei}...213

Armed police units' {wu jing budui} construction of the battlefield in joint operations is a systems engineering. Judging by the characteristics of the operational missions that the armed police units {wu jing budui} undertake and by their actual situation, the work of constructing the battlefield primarily should include five links: selection of the battlefield {zhanchang xuanze}, reconnoitering the battlefield {zhanchang kancha}, construction of battlefield engineering projects {zhanchang gongcheng jianshe}, stockpiling battlefield

materials {*zhanchang wuze chubei*}, and construction of battlefield data {*zhanchang ziliao jianshe*}.

I. Selection of the battlefield {*zhanchang xuanze*}...213

Selection of the battlefield {*zhanchang xuanze*} means that the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} determine the scope of the battlefield and the main spaces for operations, based on the intentions of the upper echelon and combining the mission at [the units'] own echelon and the military geographical environment.

Because the component parts of the battlefields of the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} differ from the structure of [the police units'] operational strengths {*zuo-zhan lilian*}, [the battlefields] are diverse. The battlefields of the armed police units that are on duty {*wu jing zhiqin budui*} usually are the core positions, important targets, and other targets [where the police] are on duty {*zhiqin mubiao*}, for each place throughout the entire country. This attribute has determined that the battlefields of the armed police units that are on duty {*wu jing zhiqin budui*} are primarily the areas in which the targets [where they are] on duty {*zhiqin mubiao*} are located. In wartime, the various armed police units {*wu qin ge budui*} can coordinate with relevant departments based on the specific conditions of the battlefield, in order to ensure the security of the targets; at the same time that they do a thorough job of concealing, camouflaging, and protecting the targets [where they are] on duty {*zhiqin mubiao*}, they [can] consider the issue of moving the target [where they are] on duty {*zhiqin mubiao*}. For example, they [might] transfer the targets that they are guarding or have taken into custody {*kanya*} to areas that are in the depths [of the country], to mountainous regions, or to other places where it is easy to conceal, camouflage, and protect them. In wartime, the battlefields of the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} usually are the same as the battlefields of the other service and service arm units {*budui*} with which they are coordinating defensive operations, but in cases where the emphasis is on battlefields for operational missions that the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} are themselves carrying out, these primarily consist of battlefields for rear area defensive operations and battlefields for counterattack operations in border regions. The battlefields of the police service units of the armed police {*wu jing jingzhong budui*} usually primarily consist of constructing engineering projects and the areas where their targets work; there are also battlefields for operational units {*zuo-zhan budui*} that they are supporting and are subordinate to. [These battlefields thus] have a dual nature. The armed police units' {*wu jing budui*} selection of the battlefield {*zhanchang xuanze*} should be based on the natures and characteristics of the differing units {*budui*} and on the characteristics of their mission; [they should] move toward what is beneficial while avoiding what is harmful, scientifically select [the battlefield], and be meticulous in building it.

II. Reconnoitering the battlefield {*zhanchang kancha*}...213

Reconnoitering the battlefield {*zhanchang kancha*} is the basis for preparing the battlefield, and it consists of on-site investigations that are conducted of the

predetermined battlefield in order to gather the situational data and information that are needed for operations. Through investigation, [the police units] become more familiar with the battlefield environment, [they] analyze and judge the operational actions that the enemy could take, and they make thorough preparations for making decisions about the operation, for drafting operational scenarios, for constructing the battlefield, and for carrying out operational actions. Armed police units' {*wu jing budui*} reconnoitering of the battlefield {*zhanchang kancha*} refers to activities for investigating the basic conditions of the area where the operational mission has been assigned. It focuses on ascertaining [the following]. The first is a terrain survey. This includes the characteristics of the terrain, landforms, and surface features in the predetermined area of operations as well as the roads, the scope of the battlefield, the capacity {*rongliang*} of the battlefield, and the makeup of the various key factors of the terrain. The second is the water system and hydrological conditions. These include the inventory and quality of rivers, lakes, and reservoirs, and to the width of rivers, to water quality, to the direction of flow, to the speed of flow, and to the rate of flow. [They also include] the hydrology and sea conditions of the sea area, harbors, and adjacent islands in the sea area of operations. The third is meteorological conditions. These include the weather characteristics in each season and the various indicators of weather conditions. The fourth is traffic and transportation conditions. These include the conditions and transport capacity of land, sea, and air transportation systems. The fifth is communications conditions. These include communications infrastructure, the structure of communications systems, the quality of communications personnel {*duiwu*}, and the conditions of communications coverage. The sixth is the conditions of human society. These include the numbers, political quality, population distribution and density, nationalities' makeup and customs, living habits, religious beliefs and culture, mass organizations, medical treatment and health, and local disease conditions {*bing qing*} among the masses on the predetermined battlefield. The seventh is the conditions of relevant strengths {*liliang*} that are cooperating with the operation. These primarily [involve] a grasp of the distribution of local friendly neighboring units {*you lin budui*} and public security police as well as the potentials of reserve strengths {*houbei liliang*}; [they also involve a grasp of] the numbers, quality, distribution, and support capabilities of operational command and communications and of rear area support facilities that have already been set up.

Armed police units' {*wu jing budui*} reconnoitering of the battlefield {*zhanchang kancha*} must be organized and carried out in a relevant and focused manner, centered on the operational mission that has been assigned; units {*budui*} that take on differing operational missions will have differing battlefield reconnoitering {*zhanchang kancha*}. Commanders at each echelon should scientifically organize battlefield investigations and reconnaissance prior to the battle, based on the mission that they have undertaken, on the direction of operations, and on the land (or sea) area. On this basis, [they should] stress using military topography {*bing yao dizhi*} and deepen their studies of the battlefield environment. On-site reconnoitering of the battlefield {*zhanchang xiandi kancha*} usually is organized by the joint operations headquarters, and the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} send organizations or personnel to participate. The armed police units {*wu jing budui*} can also organize special battlefield reconnoitering {*zhanchang kancha*} on their own, based on the missions that they have undertaken.

III. Construction of battlefield engineering projects {zhanchang gongcheng jianshe}...214

The construction of battlefield engineering projects {zhanchang gongcheng jianshe} is the national defense construction works that are undertaken on a predetermined battlefield in order to support the execution of operations, and it is a main part and focus in preparing the battlefield. The goal in constructing battlefield engineering projects {zhanchang gongcheng jianshe} is to form a system of positions that has complete early warning, reconnaissance, and command functions; that combines offense and defense; and that combines concealment with attack. It is also necessary to form a set of civil air defense and urban defense fortifications and a support system for traffic, communications, and rear area supplies. Battlefield engineering projects {zhanchang gongcheng} involve national defense engineering and the construction of major projects; they involve policy quite a bit {zhengce xing qiang}, they are very sensitive, there is a great deal of investment, and they [involve] long spans. Therefore, they should be included in the general planning arrangements {tongchou anpai} for the overall planning of the national economy, and they should be resolved in a coordinated manner. Battlefield engineering projects {zhanchang gongcheng} usually are completed prior to a battle or are hurriedly completed at the start of campaign combat; after campaign combat has begun, it is still possible to strengthen the construction of the various key factors on the battlefield, in a focused manner. The main contents in the battlefield construction of engineering projects {zhanchang gongcheng jianshe} include two aspects. The first is the construction of battlefield systems. These primarily include the construction of systems of positions and systems of operational command. The construction of battlefield systems for the armed police units {wu jing budui} primarily involves {canyu} doing a thorough job of creating air warnings and defensive systems for the places that are being defended in the rear area and the important targets that are being guarded and defended {jingwei, shouwei, shouhu}, as well as the construction of key defense points in the border regions. The second is the construction of support systems. The top priority task in the construction of support systems for the armed police units {wu jing budui} is to actively do a good job of constructing dispersed air defense systems for the senior officer's organs, command systems, and support systems, at the differing echelons. The units on duty {zhiqin budui} must actively coordinate with units at the targets {mubiao danwei} in making thorough preparations for moving and locating {zhu zhi} the targets that are in custody and being guarded, as well as other important targets.

IV. Stockpiling battlefield materials {zhanchang wuzi chubei}...215

The stockpiling of materials for operations means the stockpiling of various materials based on the needs of operations; it is a material condition that armed police units {wu jing budui} rely on for carrying out their operations. As regards armed police units' {wu jing budui} participation in joint operations, the two [hostile] sides' operations have varied means, their killing and destructive power has increased, their struggles are brutal and intense, and their consumption of materials is huge to an unprecedented extent; this places even greater demands on the stockpiling of materials for operations. The types of

materials that are stockpiled, their quantity, and their quality not only affect operational actions and the length of time that operations can continue, but they also directly affect victory or defeat in operations. Therefore, the commander of an armed police unit {*wu jing budui*} should scientifically calculate the amount of materials that will be consumed and the standards for stockpiling, based on the mission of the operations, the strengths {*liliang*} participating in the operations, the length of time that the operations could continue, the conditions of local natural resources, the transportation abilities for supporting the front, and the patterns and experiences of previous consumption of stockpiles of materials. He should make arrangements as early as possible and stockpile things level by level. The primary details in the work of stockpiling battlefield materials {*zhanchang wuzi chubei*} by armed police units {*wu jing budui*} include [the following]. First is to depend on centralized stockpiles of strategic materials {*wuzi ku*} in the theater of war. Armed police units {*wu jing budui*} should rely in a widespread manner upon the warehouses of various types of military supplies, fuels, transportation, weapons and equipment, and industrialized materials {*gong hua wuzi*} that the Liberation Army [forces] stationed locally have placed in strategic key areas along the second and third lines.¹⁰ These have stockpiled large amounts of materials and devices needed for operations, in a relatively concentrated manner. At the same time, based on the principles of joint logistics and joint supplies {*lian qin lian gong*}, equipment, materials, and devices that are used in common are directly supported by the military's logistics departments' joint logistics {*lian qin*}. Second is to rely upon the dispersed stockpiles in duty outlets {*zhiqin wangdian*} that are located in every place. Based on the needs of the operational mission, relevant units on duty {*zhiqin danwei*} in the theater of war establish points for stockpiling materials and medical treatment points, to carry out support at any time using materials that have been stored up, and to supplement supplies of ammunition and materials that were insufficient for the initial stage of fighting. At the same time, they rely upon these points during combat, in order to store up the materials that are hard to deliver from the rear area to the first line; these are delivered forward any time that they are needed, while materials that are being evacuated to the rear transit [through these points]. Materials and devices should be dispersed and stockpiled as much as possible in permanent fortifications like caves, tunnels, and shelters; for materials and devices that are easily exposed, there should be strict, integrated camouflage, along with measures to protect against fire, to protect against tides, to protect against theft, and to protect against thunder and lightning. Warehouses for materials should avoid obvious targets, to prevent destruction by enemy raids. Third is to rely upon relevant local units' fixed-point stockpiles. In wartime, armed police units {*wu jing budui*} should bring into play the advantages they have of their relatively large numbers of contacts and the close relations they have with local people's governments, relevant units, and the masses of the people to unearth the potential of local support, to rationally utilize local raw materials, and to fully rely upon such units as local hospitals, schools, industrial and mining enterprises, and commercial systems. Based on units' {*budui*} operational needs, they set up "fixed points" {*ding dian*} in these units for supplying materials; this not only benefits the

¹⁰ Translator's note: the second line probably refers to coastal and exclusive economic zones, while the third line probably refers to the hinterland, consisting of provinces like Guizhou, Shaanxi, and Sichuan.

security of the stockpiles of materials, but it also benefits supplying [things] as they are needed and supplying [things] rapidly, as it reduces armed police units' {*wu jing budui*} pressure on rear area supplies of things for operations and concentrates even more strengths {*liliang*} that [can] be deployed for operational actions.

V. Construction of battlefield data {*zhanchang ziliao jianshe*}...216

The construction of battlefield data {*zhanchang ziliao jianshe*} means the collection, arrangement, compiling and printing, and storing of various types of data about the battlefield and related areas, on the basis of the battlefield reconnoitering {*zhanchang kancha*}. Its primary details [are as follows]. First is the construction of tables of data. [These consist of] surveying and mapping, printing, and storing many types of topographic maps for operations; the use of many means of reconnaissance to obtain enemy topographic maps, electronic maps, and the newest terrain data with various scales; and the establishment of various programs of operations {*zuo zhan fang'an*}, plans of operations {*zuo zhan jihua*}, charts of the senior officer's decisions, and databases of military topography {*bing yao dizhi*}, geodesic data, and meteorological data, to be allocated when urgently needed for operations. Second is the construction of military topography {*bing yao dizhi*} data. This primarily reflects the geographical location of a given region, its area, and the size of the population and [the population's] distribution; the administrative divisions within the area under [the unit's] jurisdiction as well as its economic conditions; and its traffic and transportation, its medical treatment and rescue, as well as its history and cultural traditions. Third is the construction of hydrological data. Through collecting historical data, survey the predetermined sea area of operations and do a maritime investigation; arrange, compile, and print the terrain, water depths, sediment, tides, currents, waves, temperature of the ocean waters, their salinity, and their transparency in the sea area of operations and in sea routes, along with such hydrological data as the ocean's magnetic field and field of gravity. [We] should also reconnoiter and store various kinds of data about the enemy's offshore areas, to provide data support for actions in joint operations.

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Chapter 2

Task Organization and Missions of Armed Police Units in Joint Operations...217

Section 1: Task Organization of Strengths {*liliang biancheng*}...217

In future joint operations, the task organization of strengths {*liliang biancheng*} in the armed police units {*wuzhuang jingcha budui*} will usually be determined based on such factors as the scale of operations, the nature of operations, the mission of operations, the enemy situation that [these strengths] are facing, their operational capabilities, and the battlefield environment. Their basic requirements will be that they are matched {*shiying*} to the mission that they are undertaking; that they seek to incorporate elite troops and to raise the level of their quality; that the ratio of strengths from the various police arms {*jing zhong liliang*} be appropriate, they make it easy to have rational organizational groupings, and they fully bring into play integrated capabilities; that they have fairly strong firepower and mobility; and that they have the ability for independent operations and the ability for independent support.

In future joint operations, based on the scale of operations and on the mission that they have undertaken, armed police strengths that are involved in operations {*wu jing canzhan liliang*} usually will be composed of armed police units {*wu jing zongdui*} that are in the theater of war, mobile divisions, and reinforced armed police units {*wu jing budui*}; these will be incorporated into the rear area defense operations group in a uniform manner and will undertake missions for defense operations.

Section 2: Main Missions {*zhuyao renwu*}...217

Based on the characteristics of the armed police units' {*wu jing budui*} existing organizational structure and equipment and on their ability to carry out the mission, the missions that armed police units {*wu jing budui*} might undertake in joint operations include [the following].

I. Participate in ground defense operations {*canjia dimian fangwei zuozhan*}...217

In future joint operations, under the unified command of the joint operations command organization, armed police strengths {*wu jing liliang*} usually will be positioned in wartime in important areas that are close to important military targets that have been handed over {*jiaoyou*} to the armed police {*wu jing*} to guard and where it is easy to move, they are primarily responsible for the mission of “two defenses and three

oppositions” {*liang fang san fan*},¹¹ ensuring the security of important military targets that have been temporarily handed over {*jiaoyou*} to the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} for them to guard. Their specific missions are to prevent the enemy from carrying out air attacks against our important targets; to participate in rescues and in actions to eliminate the aftereffects of air attacks; to protect against defenders of enemy-occupied offshore islands carrying out artillery attacks against important coastal targets and to participate in rescues and in actions to eliminate the aftereffects of artillery attacks; to participate in capturing enemy pilots who have bailed out and special agent {*te qian*} personnel and in counterattacking enemy search and rescue actions; to prevent and contain reconnaissance activities that the enemy engages in against us by land, sea, and air; and to prevent and counterattack sabotage and destructive actions that small groups of enemy troop strengths {*bingli*} (which may also be airdropped) or sleeper agents {*qian te*} carry out against our important targets.

II. Defend social stability in the theater of war {*baowei zhanqu shehui wending*}...218

Armed police units {*wu jing budui*} are the main strengths {*liliang*} for maintaining social stability. Social conditions in the theater of war are complex, with a great many uncertainty factors; events happen suddenly, and it is very hard to protect against them; and maintaining social stability in the theater of war is one of the important missions that armed police units {*wu jing budui*} undertake. Their specific missions are to participate in military control of important regions, such as areas where important targets are concentrated, large and medium-sized cities, and certain regions, doing everything they can to maintain social order; to participate in handling various types of incidents that suddenly occur; to participate in handling such terrorist actions by enemy special elements as bombings, kidnappings, and sabotage; to participate in countering enemy incitements to rebellion, instigations, and “psychological warfare” {*xinzhan*} activities; and to participate in actions to counter enemy theft of secrets and to get rid of traitors and to counter agents {*te*}.

III. Protect the security of important targets {*baohu zhongyao mubiao anquan*}...218

Protecting the security of important targets is the primary mission of armed police units {*wu jing budui*} in wartime. The specific missions are to carry out effective protection of the political, economic, and military targets that they are responsible for in peacetime, and to prevent destruction; to organize a strict guard for certain important targets that they are temporarily assigned to, preventing enemy reconnaissance and harassment; and to strengthen protection of important civilian targets, keeping security for engineering

¹¹ Translator’s note: this probably refers to defending against harassment by the enemy’s armed forces and defending against internal stealth and external flight, and to opposing stealing across the border, opposing psychological warfare, and opposing incitement to rebellion.

projects [involving] the people's livelihood {*minsheng gongcheng anquan*} from affecting the normal operations of society.

IV. Support the smooth flow of traffic in the theater of war {*baozhang zhanqu jiaotong changtong*}...218

The mission of supporting the smooth flow of traffic lines {*jiaotong xian changtong*} in the theater of war is usually the responsibility of elements that guard bridges, that [belong to] the various units of the armed police traffic and hydroelectric units {*wu jing jiaotong, shuidian budui*}. When necessary, these can be reinforced and supported by armed police {*wu jing*} mobile units {*jidong budui*} (or elements). Their specific missions are to strengthen the protection of important railroads (or highways), bridges and tunnels, airfields, and terminals, and to prevent destruction by enemy special agents {*di te*}, and to organize the engineering units {*gongcheng budui*} of the armed police {*wu jing*} police arms {*jing zhong*} in protecting railroads (or highways), bridges, tunnels, airfields, and terminals, and in doing emergency repairs to these; and to keep traffic smooth and to smoothly transport things to the front and evacuate things to the rear.

V. Protecting stability in the border situation {*baowei bianjiang jushi wending*}...218

Protecting border stability in wartime is one of the important missions of armed police units {*wu jing budui*}. Their specific missions are to attack the various splittist and destructive activities organized by the East Turkestan and Tibet Independence forces;¹² to protect against and attack terrorist incidents like bombings, kidnappings, and sabotage; to protect against and suppress attacks against [Chinese Communist] Party and government organs, jamming traffic, and such disturbances and riot incidents as beatings, smashing, looting, and burning; to attack incidents where [people] storm prisons {*bao yu*} and break into jail and rescue prisoners {*jieyu*}; and to counterattack external splittist elements' armed assaults against important targets in our border regions, and when necessary coordinate with the military in carrying out border counterattack operations.

¹² Translator's note: "East Turkestan" is another term for the southern part of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Various local forces use this term as part of their name; some of these forces struggle for independence, some just for greater rights for the locals. Tibet Independence is a catch-all term the Chinese use for ethnic Tibetans, some of who want real independence for Tibet while others just want real autonomy.

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Chapter 3

The Guiding Thought and Basic Principles of Armed Police Units' Operations in Joint Operations...219

The guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} and principles of armed police units' operations {*wuzhuang jingcha budui zuozhan*} in joint operations are the criteria for the actions of armed police units {*wu jing budui*} in future joint operations. Because the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} cooperating with the [People's] Liberation Army in defensive operational actions differ from the operational actions of large troop formations, the operational missions that they carry out have their own special scope and requirements. Therefore, in joint operations, the guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} and principles for armed police units' operations {*wuzhuang jingcha budui zuozhan*} must combine the armed police units' {*wu jing budui*} own functions, missions, and operational capabilities, and clarify these.

Section 1: The Guiding Thought for Operations {*zuozhan zhidao sixiang*}...219

The guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} for armed police units' operations {*wuzhuang jingcha budui zuozhan*} in joint operations is the basic foundation for armed police units {*wu jing budui*} as they carry out their protective operations. Based on various actual conditions, the armed police units' operations {*wuzhuang jingcha budui zuozhan*} in joint operations should be based on the guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} for operations, of "serving the overall situation, overall resistance, a focus on defense, and rigorous protection" {*fucong quanju, zhengti kangji, zhongdian fangwei, yanmi fanghu*}.

Serving the overall situation {*fucong quanju*} means being firmly based on an awareness of the overall situation and on an ideology of cooperating in operations, obeying the unified commands of the joint operation's command organization, being based on the realities of the armed police units {*wu jing budui*}, cooperating with the main force's operations through active actions, and not hesitating to sacrifice themselves when necessary, in order to protect the overall situation.

Overall resistance {*zhengti kangji*} means organizing the armed police units' {*wu jing budui*} defensive operations in a uniform manner within the area of joint operations, in accordance with a unified defensive disposition and relying on the entire system of defense. On the one hand, it is necessary to firmly establish a concept of overall defense, to establish an awareness of the entire situation, and to strengthen the concept of the whole {*zhengti*}. On the other hand, it is necessary to take the initiative to coordinate actions in defensive operations.

A focus on defense {*zhongdian fangwei*} means utilizing various defensive forms and measures throughout the entire process of joint operations and over the entire area [of joint operations], to engage in defense with a focus on key targets, and to preserve the actual strengths for operations.

Rigorous protection {*yanmi fanghu*} means actively coordinating with relevant local strengths {*liliang*} and using fortifications and terrain that have already been established, in a planned manner and with key points, based on the types, nature, location, and status and role of the target, and using the advantages that the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} themselves possess. [Rigorous protection] adopts many effective forms and measures such as concealment, dispersion, camouflage, and mobility, to reduce damage as much as possible and to maintain the security of the various types of targets being defended.

In proposing the guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} for armed police units' operations {*wuzhuang jingcha budui zuozhan*} in joint operations, the first thing is to keep an eye on the strategic program of engaging in active defense. Practices in the several recent local wars have proven that it is hard to separate having a passive defense from the situation where [you] are on the defensive and come under attack. Only by adopting the method of an active defense, by combining offense and defense and comprehensively using many means of resistance and counterattack {*fan*}, and by using active offensive actions to destroy, use up, and annihilate the enemy's troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons for offensive operations, is it possible to eliminate the enemy and to better preserve [yourself]. Second is to keep an eye on bringing into play all of [your] power. Joint operations are an extremely complex and quite arduous systems engineering, and it is necessary to fully bring into play the advantages of people's warfare and the entire power of the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} and the services and service arms of the [People's] Liberation Army, and to carry out integrated resistance and to seize victory in defensive operations through employing the effectiveness of integrated operations as much as possible. Third is to keep an eye on objective needs as [you] use things that are inferior to defeat things that are superior {*yi lie sheng you*}. In defensive operations where a powerful enemy intervenes and gets involved, under conditions where the enemy is superior and we are inferior and where the enemy is strong and we are weak, the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} should base themselves on the equipment that they currently have and on their own characteristics, to carry out the missions of joint operations.

Section 2: The Basic Principles of Operations {*zuozhan jiben yuanze*}...220

The area of joint operations is broad, and missions often switch around. The battlefield environment is complex, operational missions are arduous, and the operational actions of armed police units {*wuzhuang jingcha budui*} must be based on the guiding thought {*zhidao sixiang*} that operations “serve the overall situation, have overall resistance, focus on defense, and [provide] rigorous protection” {*fucong quanju, zhengti kangji, zhongdian fangwei, yanmi fanghu*}. They [must] actively cooperate with the operations of the main forces {*zhu li*}, and maintain stability in the theater of war. Based on the status, nature, functions, and missions of the armed police units {*wuzhuang jingcha budui*} in joint operations, armed police units' operations {*wuzhuang jingcha budui zuozhan*} should abide by the following basic principles {*jiben yuanze*}.

I. Keep an eye on the overall situation, and concentrate superiorities to resist the enemy {*zhuoyan quanju, ju you kang di*}...220

In joint operations, the operational actions of armed police units {*wu jing budui*} have an important effect on the overall situation of the joint operations. Because the rear area in operations is broad and [because] there are a large number of important political, economic, and military targets [there], as soon as these come under attack this will produce unfortunate political effects inside and outside the country. Therefore, all operational actions of armed police units {*wu jing budui*} must be included in the overall situation of operations when making plans. As regards the operational effectiveness of armed police units {*wu jing budui*}, when compared with the main opponent in operations, not only is there a large gap in such areas as battlefield reconnaissance, surveillance, mobility, and precision attack capabilities with an enemy who has high-tech equipment, but [these units] also lack actual warfare experience in operations under informationized conditions. Because of this, in situations where the enemy is powerful and we are weak [as regards] weapons and equipment, only by mobilizing and concentrating the strengths of all of society; by task organizations where the military, civilians, and the police are integrated; and by bringing into play the power of people's warfare under informationized conditions, forming an overall superiority, is it possible to resist invasions by the enemy in an effective manner and ultimately smash the enemy's intentions, achieving the "four assurances" {*sige quebao*}.¹³ To do this, armed police units {*wu jing budui*} must resolutely carry out the overall intentions of the upper echelon's joint campaigns, and plan and carry out operational actions at their own level closely centered on the joint operations of the PRC military and on the goals of operations that protect things in the rear area.

II. Stress key points and direct military operations in a rational manner {*tuchu zhongdian, heli yongbing*}...221

In using armed police units' {*wu jing budui*} troop strengths {*bingli*} in joint operations, [we] should pay attention to the needs of each stage, each direction, and each mission in operations, make plans as a whole and arrangements, and stress key points {*tuchu zhongdian*}. [We should] concentrate and use [our] limited troop strengths {*bingli*} at important stages, key segments, and major directions, and try to form a local superiority and to seize and hold the main power {*zhuyao quan*} on the battlefield. It is necessary to correctly foresee developments in the battlefield situation and to place the key points of support on missions and segments that have a fairly major influence on our side's operational actions, on the overall situation of the operations, and on social order. In using troop strengths {*bingli*}, [we] should estimate the number of troops used by the enemy {*liang di yongbing*}, focusing on the nature of the target of operations and on the scale and features of the operations. [We] should do all we can to maintain the

¹³ Translator's note: these may be: to assure progress, to assure quality, to assure security, and to assure benefits.

organizational system {*jianzhi*} of the units involved in combat, in order to facilitate command and coordination of the combat actions of units {*budui*}. On the basis of the remaining mobile strengths {*jidong liliang*} that are needed, [we should] do everything possible to deploy a fairly large number of operational strengths {*zuozhan liliang*}, in order to help to quickly bring their effects into play and to ensure a quick fight and a quick resolution.

III. Have flexible command, and take the initiative to coordinate {*linghuo zhihui*, *zhudong xietong*}...221

Joint operations are the joint operational actions of all of the strengths {*gefang liliang*} of the various services and services arms. In operations under informationized conditions, the battlefield environment is complex, operations often switch around, the rhythm of operations has clearly sped up, and opportunities for battle are fleeting; these pose a grim challenge to units' {*budui*} ability to react rapidly. Commanders at each echelon of the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} must study and weigh the situation, be flexible in command {*linghuo zhihui*}, take the initiative to coordinate {*zhudong xietong*}, have a grasp at the proper time of opportunities for battle, and enhance the effectiveness of operational actions. Flexible command {*linghuo zhihui*} means changing forms of command at appropriate times, based on the characteristics of the operational actions, in order to react as quickly as possible, so that when the enemy changes, we change {*di bian wo bian*}, using speed to control speed {*yi kuai zhi kuai*}. During the process of carrying out [operations] it is necessary to be thorough in handling the relationship between unified command and dispersed command. Because an integrated military, police, and civilian task organization is employed for defensive operations in the rear area, and because the armed police units' {*wu jing budui*} own strengths {*liliang*} that participate in operations are varied and dispersed, it is necessary to coordinate actions and to exercise unified command. But when the situation is urgent, commanders at the various echelons can be decisive as the situation demands, based on the battlefield situation and in accordance with the limits of their authority. In operations, it is necessary to organically combine unified command and dispersed command, to have these supplement one another; [you] cannot exercise rigid control, thus hindering military operations, but [you] also cannot be too loose {*fen de tai san*}, thus affecting the overall operations. Taking the initiative to coordinate {*zhudong xietong*} refers to [the fact that] strengths that are involved in combat {*canzhan liliang*} take the initiative to cooperate, centered on the unified mission and goal of the operations and in accordance with coordinated planning. The various strengths involved in combat {*can zhan liliang*} should do a thorough job of coordination, based on the plan of operations and on the possible developmental trends in operations, and in accordance with coordinated plans that were drafted in advance; at the same time, it is also necessary to combine this with reality and, centered on the overall intentions of the upper echelon, to take the initiative to coordinate at any given time with friendly neighbors and fraternal units {*xiongdi danwei*}, in a timely manner, to ensure that the various strengths {*liliang*} act in a coordinated manner.

IV. Three-dimensional defense, and engaging in both defense and offense {*liti fangwei, fang da bingju*}...222

The ultimate goal of defensive operations in the rear area is to ensure the security of important targets and [to ensure] social stability; to achieve this goal, the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} must firmly hold to the principles of three-dimensional defense {*liti fangwei*} and engaging in both defense and offense {*fang da bingju*}.

In operations under modern conditions, enemy attacks and destruction in the rear area are no longer limited to ordinary air force and artillery attacks and to harassment by enemy agents {*di te*}; rather there will be firepower destruction at multiple levels and in multiple depths, there will be in-depth attacks by multiple services arms in all directions, and there will be continuous harassment in all types of weather using multiple means. Operations will be simultaneously launched along the front and in the rear area, in the air and on land, and at night and during the daytime. The various operational actions will penetrate one another and will intersect in three dimensions. Under these conditions, the traditional concepts of the front and the rear area will be diluted, the clear dividing line between the front and the rear area will be further destroyed, and the rear area will face threats coming from many areas: on the ground, in the air, at sea, and under water. Therefore, the rear area defensive operations of the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} should be based on the concept of a three-dimensional defense {*liti fangwei*} against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; against air raids; against airdrops (or air landings), against artillery, against missiles, against ground attacks, and against electronic reconnaissance and electronic jamming. [The armed police units should also] establish a three-dimensional defense system, attack the various enemy attacks in an effective manner, and ensure the security of important targets and the stability of society.

As for engaging in both defense and offense {*fang da bingju*}, defense and offense are two aspects that complement each other in the armed police units' {*wu jing budui*} rear area defensive operations, and they are tightly connected. The two cannot be biased. Practices in war prove that stringently organizing defense in the rear area is an important measure for ensuring the security of the rear area. But merely defending and not attacking [means that you will] only be able to passively suffer a beating. Therefore, it is not only necessary in operations to prevent a tendency toward passive defense where [we] only defend and do not attack, but it is also necessary to prevent the emergence of a phenomenon where [we] only attack and do not defend or where [we] pay more attention to attacking than to defense. Instead, [we should] engage in both defense and offense {*fang da bingju*}, with an emphasis on defense. At the same time that [we] stringently organize defense, it is necessary to actively attack and resist an invading enemy. [If we] only defend and do not attack, not only is it impossible to fully bring into play the effects of defense, but sometimes it will to the contrary encourage the enemy's arrogance and intensify his destruction in the rear area. Only by engaging in both defense and offense {*fang da bingju*} and by actively attacking the enemy, is it possible to create conditions for defense and to reduce the threat to our rear area.

V. Integrating the police and the people, jointly serving and jointly supporting *{jing min yiti, lian qin lian bao}*...223

Defensive operations in the rear area require carrying out effective and timely logistics and equipment support. When the commander is organizing support, he must pay very close attention to superiorities that local support has and must scientifically integrate the military's and local support strengths *{baozhang liliang}*, integrating the police and the people *{jing min yiti}*, with joint service and joint support *{lian qin lian bao}*. First, it is necessary to pay attention to deploying the various support strengths *{baozhang liliang}* in a uniform manner within the area of operations, and to using them in a uniform manner. [It is necessary] to provide in a uniform manner materials that are in general use, to repair in a uniform manner equipment that is in general use, to treat in a uniform manner personnel who have suffered ordinary wounds, to use in a uniform manner personnel who [can] serve in any aspect *{tongyong qinwu ren yuan}*, to allocate in a uniform manner traffic and transportation, and to mobilize in a uniform manner local forces that support the front. Second, it is necessary to stress the characteristics of support. [We] should have the various services and service arms of the [People's] Liberation Army and the armed police units *{wu jing budui}* separately provide supplies of specialized materials, repairs for equipment, and medical treatment for personnel who have suffered special injuries. Third, it is necessary to pay attention to the comprehensive use of various means of support, to rationally use various support strengths *{baozhang liliang}*, and to carry out support in a comprehensive and effective manner to the various directions of operations, to the various operational units *{zuo zhan danyuan}*, to the various operational actions, and to the various operational key elements. The key to integrating the police and the people *{jing min yiti}*, with joint service and joint support *{lian qin lian bao}*, is to combine the characteristics of defensive operations in the rear area and to establish a network of joint service and joint support *{lian qin lian bao wangluo}* that organizes and coordinates logistics actions *{lian dong}* in a uniform manner, and that fully brings into play the role of the support system.

Chapter 4

The Command Organizations for Armed Police Units' Operations in Joint Operations...223

Command organizations {*zhihui jigou*} are the organs and places that command operational actions. Scientifically constructing {*goujian*} a command organization {*zhihui jigou*} for operations is the primary task in the command of operations. The main goal in organizing and establishing a command organization {*zhihui jigou*} is to group and deploy the commander, his command organ, and support units {*budui*} (or elements), as well as the various command automated systems and communications devices, in accordance with the needs of the armed police units' {*wu jing budui*} needs in commanding operations. This will ensure stable and continuous command over the units {*budui*}. When armed police units {*wu jing budui*} are carrying out missions during joint operations, these must be driven by the actual needs of the operation, [they must be] scientifically organized, and [they must have] an optimized structure, as they construct a nimble and highly effective command organization {*zhihui jigou*}.

Section 1: Basic Requirements {*jiben yaoqiu*}...224

The missions that armed police units {*wu jing budui*} carry out in defensive operations in the rear area are broad-ranging, and their operations are varied. This feature has determined that armed police units {*wu jing budui*} can simultaneously execute a number of differing operations missions during their operations. When armed police units {*wu jing budui*} disperse to carry out differing defensive missions in the rear area, there possibly will be a fairly large number of units that are under direct command, and this then means that the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} will have to reduce the number of command levels and increase the spans of command. This ensures that the command organization {*zhihui jigou*} not only can exercise command in an effective manner over units {*budui*} that are simultaneously carrying out differing missions, but that it can also rapidly carry out changes in its command mission.

The establishment of a command organization {*zhihui jigou*} for armed police units' {*wu jing budui*} operations should be determined in accordance with their mission of defensive operations in the rear area, their task organization, the conditions in the rear area relevant to carrying [their mission] out, the enemy situation, and the length of time for combat. Its basic requirements are [as follows].

I. It must correspond to the needs of the joint operations {*yao fuhe lianhe zuozhan de yaoqiu*}...224

The defensive operational missions that armed police units {*wu jing budui*} carry out in the rear area are conducted under the unified command of the joint operations headquarters, and the structure of the command organization {*zhihui jigou*} for operations must correspond to the needs of the upper echelon's command organization

{*zhihui jigou*}. At the same time, the missions that armed police units {*wu jing budui*} carry out under ordinary conditions are joint operations that are jointly carried out by the [People's] Liberation Army, local armed forces {*wu zhuang*}, and local governments, and the construction {*goujian*} of a command organization {*zhihui jigou*} for operations must facilitate the organization and execution of the joint operations.

II. It must make it easy to flexibly use various forms of command {*yao youli yu gezhong zhihui fangshi de linghuo yunyong*}...224

In defensive operations in the rear area, the missions that are carried out are broad-ranging, with multiple forms of operations. Operations frequently change, and the task of command and coordination is strenuous. The construction {*goujian*} of the command organization {*zhihui jigou*} must take into consideration not only helping to carry out centralized and unified command, but also being able to carry out flexible command over lower echelons. [It must] not only be able to reliably maintain long-range contacts with the upper [echelon] and carry out the upper echelon's intentions, but it can also carry out effective control over its subordinates. [Finally, it must] not only be able to carry out fixed command, but it also can carry out reliable mobile command.

III. It must help in improving the productivity of command {*yao youli yu tigao zhihui xiaoyi*}...224

Based on the differing circumstances of missions that they would probably carry out, [the armed police units] should scientifically organize their command organization {*zhihui jigou*} for operations, fully utilizing such command means as units' {*budui*} automated systems of command and their communications systems in order to coordinate command, enhance the efficiency of command, and ensure that the command organization {*zhihui jigou*} reacts in an agile and highly effective manner.

IV. It must help with the security and defense of a command post {*yao youli yu zhihuisuo anquan fangwei*}...225

Command that is stable, secure, and reliable is a basic guarantee for victory in operations. When an armed police unit {*wu jing budui*} constructs {*goujian*} a command organization {*zhihui jigou*} for operations, it must take into consideration security issues [involving] the command post. The command post must be set up along a direction that facilitates the major defensive operations of command; that facilitates doing tasks and movements; that facilitates dispersal, concealment, and camouflage; that facilitates air defense and defense against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and that facilitates establishing communications contacts with the upper echelon and with friendly neighbors. The command post should also be transferred around at appropriate times, and the command post's transfers must be done quickly, securely, and in a concealed manner. Communications nodes must be set up in a dispersed manner, using favorable conditions in the rear area of operations as much as possible.

Section 2: Basic Concepts {jiben gouxiang}...225

In future joint operations, the armed police general headquarters' {wu jing zongbu} forward command post {qian zhi} is ordinarily set up within the joint operation's headquarters. It is composed of relevant personnel dispatched by the armed police general headquarters {wu jing zongbu} and is responsible for exercising unified command over the armed police strengths {wu jing liliang} that are involved in combat. In accordance with the principles of being "elite, highly effective, and agile" {jinggan, gao xiao, lingmin}, and sticking closely to the actual needs of defensive operations in the rear area, armed police units {wu jing budui} in future defensive operations in the rear area can set up a basic command post {jiben zhihuisuo}, a support command post {baozhang zhihuisuo}, a liaison group with the upper [echelon] {dui shang lianluo zu}, a first forward command group {qianjin zhihui yi zu}, and a second forward command group {qianjin zhihui er zu}, in accordance with the model of "two posts and three groups" {liang suo san zu}.

I. The basic command post {jiben zhihuisuo}...225

The basic command post {jiben zhihuisuo} is composed of the unit commander, a political commissar, a chief of staff, a headquarters, a political section, a logistics section, and relevant personnel from subordinate and support units {budui} (or elements); when necessary, it can have personnel from relevant local department participate. It is the basic command organization {zhihui jigou} for operations, and it is used to comprehensively coordinate and organize units' {budui} operations and their fulfilling their operational missions. The basic command post {jiben zhihuisuo} usually consists of a command center, an intelligence information center, a communications and electronic warfare center, and a support center.

II. The support command post {baozhang zhihuisuo}...225

The support command post {baozhang zhihuisuo} is composed of the logistics section chief and his logistics organ as well as relevant personnel from headquarters, the political section, and local forces that support the front, and it has necessary logistics defense strengths {houqin fangwei liliang} allocated to it. Its main mission is to exercise command over the logistics and technical support elements of the entire unit {budui} and to provide logistics and technical support and personnel support for the basic command post {jiben zhihuisuo} and for the various operations units {zuozhan budui}.

III. The liaison group with the upper [echelon] {dui shang lianluo zu}...226

The liaison group with the upper [echelon] {dui shang lianluo zu} is composed of one deputy commander leading two to three staff personnel. Its responsibilities are to understand and implement the intentions of the upper echelon command organization {zhihui jigou}, to do a thorough job of coordinating with other services and service arms, to take the initiative to report situations, to actively provide proposals, and to consciously

{*zijue*} accept the commands of the command organization {*zhihui jigou*} in joint operations.

IV. The first forward command group {*qianjin zhihui yi zu*}...226

The first forward command group {*qianjin zhihui yi zu*} consists of a deputy commander leading a certain number of staff personnel and relevant technical personnel. In wartime, it follows the actions of units {*budui*} that are responsible for the main defensive missions. It is responsible for organizing and commanding the units {*budui*} along the main direction of defense and for strengthening coordination with other defensive strengths {*fangwei liliang*}. When necessary, it takes on the duty of replacing command by the basic command post {*jiben zhihuisuo*}.

V. The second forward command group {*qianjin zhihui er zu*}...226

The second forward command group {*qianjin zhihui er zu*} is composed of a deputy commander and other relevant personnel. It is primarily responsible for commanding and coordinating the actions of other units {*budui*}, away from the main direction of defense.

The advantages of the task organization in the “two posts and three groups” {*liang suo san zu*} form of command organization {*zhihui jigou*} [are as follows]. First, it simplifies the command organization {*zhihui jigou*} and strengthens the first-line command strengths {*yi xian zhihui liliang*}. Second, it strengthens the regeneration function of the command organization {*zhihui jigou*}. The “two posts and three groups” {*liang suo san zu*} form of command organization {*zhihui jigou*} has two forward command groups {*qianjin zhihui zu*}, and it has a fairly strong ability to maneuver on the battlefield. In wartime, even if individual command posts are annihilated by opponents, the forward command groups {*qianjin zhihui zu*} can quickly take on some or all of the command mission. Third, it enhances the reaction speed of command. The liaison group with the upper [echelon] {*dui shang lianluo zu*} not only can get a grasp of relevant conditions in the overall situation at an appropriate time, providing a basis for making decisions about operations, but it also can enable the joint operations’ command organization {*zhihui jigou*} to better exercise command over the armed police units {*wu jing budui*}. Within the unit’s {*budui*} area of responsibility, each command post and group has a grasp of the overall situation at any given time; when the situation in the operations changes, and when the operational mission and form of operations changes, they can ensure that the unit’s {*budui*} first-echelon command organization {*yiji de zhihui jigou*} switches to command for the new form of operations. Fourth, it assigns the function of coordination to the forward command groups {*qianjin zhihui zu*}, ensuring coordination between the first-line units {*budui*} (or elements) and other strengths.

Chapter 5

The Main Operations of Armed Police Units in Joint Operations...227

In future joint operations, the main operational actions of the armed police units {*wuzhuang jingcha budui*} will consist of actions to repel attacks {*fan xiji de xingdong*}, actions to maintain social order in the theater of war {*weihu zhanqu shehui zhixu de xingdong*}, actions to defend the security of traffic lines in the rear area {*baowei houfang jiaotongxian anquan de xingdong*}, actions to support the security of the main force's flanks {*baozhang zhuli yice anquan de xingdong*}, and actions to cooperate with the main force {*zhuli*} in carrying out feints {*peihe zhuli shishi yangdong de xingdong*}.

Section 1: Actions to Repel Attacks {*fan xiji de xingdong*}...227

In future joint operations, important targets in the rear area, to include missile sites, military airfields, command organizations, communications nodes, terminals, bridges, and tunnels, will be key points for attacks and destruction by the enemy. As soon as these targets are attacked and destroyed by the enemy, this will have a major effect upon the overall situation of our joint operations. Based on the nature of the major targets and on the probable forms of the enemy's attacks, it is possible to differentiate actions to resist attacks {*fan xiji xingdong*} into resisting enemy attacks by land {*lushang lai xi*}, resisting enemy attacks by sea {*haishang lai xi*}, resisting enemy attacks by air {*kongzhong lai xi*}, and defending against long-range enemy firepower assaults {*yuancheng huoli tuji*}.

I. Actions to counter enemy attacks by land {*fan di lushang lai xi shi de xingdong*}...227

[The term] attacks by land {*lushang lai xi*} refers to harassment and destructive activities that enemy personnel [who are involved in] harassment carry out by land against important targets in our rear area, using such forms as secret infiltration and concealment. The following actions are the ones that are primarily taken to counter an enemy who is attacking by land {*fan di lushang li xi zhi di*}.¹⁴

(1) Blocking and controlling at many points {*duo dian feng kong*}

When organizing operations to counter an enemy attack by land {*lu shang xiji*}, the commander of an armed police unit {*wu jing budui*} must flexibly adopt the combat methods of "checking, blocking, controlling, and defense" {*ka, zu, kong, fang*}, and he [must] rigorously organize blocking, inspection, and control for important targets and key areas; [he must] detect things in advance {*tiqian zhen zhi*}; [he must] keep the enemy from getting close; and [he must] provide against possible trouble. Checking {*ka*} means

¹⁴ Translator's note: the extra "enemy" in this phrase, which literally translates as "to counter an enemy who is [making] an enemy's attack by land," is apparently a typo.

adopting methods to check entrances {*ka kou*} and control roads, to rigorously inspect personnel and vehicles that are passing through, and to use many methods, such as looking, listening, asking, and inspecting, to identify enemy special agents who are sneaking in among the masses of our people. Blocking {*zu*} means rigorously organizing guards for important targets, to prevent unauthorized people from getting close or from doing things near by these important targets, especially foreigners of unknown nationality. Set up widespread obstacles along the directions or on thoroughfares along which the enemy could attack, set up minefields in areas where an attack would be inconvenient for us {*wo bu bianyu chuji*}, and block or delay enemy assault actions. Control {*kong*} means adopting methods to defend [individual] points and control [large] areas {*shou dian kong mian*}, setting up observation posts around our important targets, and observing and monitoring people who are doing things around our important targets. Defense {*fang*} means joint defense by the police and the people, fully mobilizing the masses, relying upon the masses, adopting methods where the police and the people will jointly defend [targets], discovering and identifying in a timely manner enemy special agents who are in disguise, and waiting for an opportunity to seize and arrest these.

(2) Defense of key points {*zhongdian fangshou*}

There are a great many important targets in the rear area of our operations, and we lack sufficient troop strengths {*bingli*} to attend to every aspect of them in our defense. For this reason, the commander of an armed police unit {*wu jing budui*} must stress the defense of important targets in our rear area where defenses are relatively weak, that have major effects {*guanxi zhongda*}, and that are easily attacked by the enemy, with a focus on the nature of the important targets in the rear area of our operations and on the opportunities, forms, and scale of the enemy's possible attacks. [He must] stress defense during such opportunities [for enemy attack] as bad weather, holidays, and major celebrations. [Finally, he must] stress defense against directions where the enemy can hide and get close, quickly launch [an attack], and then quickly strike and quickly withdraw. On this basis, and based upon the mission that he has taken on, [the commander must] carefully organize and plan things, rationally deploy troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons, and firmly make plans that consider all factors, with a stress on key points and on the principle of using the troops that are near at hand {*jiujin yong bing*}. [He must] place troops on garrison duty at key points for important targets that affect the overall strategic and campaign situation and the national economy and people's livelihood, and deploy rather more [troops] and reinforce [these troops]. It is necessary to do a bit more to deploy and control things {*duodian bu kong*} for key targets and important directions where the enemy could attack, in order to ensure that we will be prepared no matter what direction the enemy attacks from.

(3) Lay ambushes in advance {*yuxian shefu*}

Because the direction, target, scale, and number of possible attacks by an attacking enemy is uncertain, the commander of an armed police unit {*wu jing budui*} should therefore have troop strengths {*bingli*} lay ambushes in advance along directions that the

enemy could attack from and close to targets that he could attack, when organizing operations to counter an attack by land {*lu shang xiji*}, based on the characteristics and patterns of the enemy's attack activities, on the number of our defensive troop strengths {*fangshou bingli*}, and on a grasp of various other circumstances, so as to attack the enemy where he does not expect it. In order to achieve the goal of an ambush, it is possible to simulate noises along directions where there is no ambush, to give the enemy misconceptions, so that he will make errors in judgment and in choices, and to lure the enemy into the area where we have set up ambushes. Flexibly use such tactical means as walling off the head {*du tou*}, blocking him at the waist {*lan fei*}, and attacking him at the tail end {*ji wei*}, and combine ambushes by firepower, ambushes by troop strengths {*bingli*}, and barriers and obstructions; first cut the enemy into a number of sections, throw the enemy's combat formations into confusion, and kill the enemy's effective strengths {*yousheng liliang*}, and then afterwards attack and annihilate the enemy from both flanks in the ambush area. When the numbers of the attacking enemy are relatively small, it is possible to completely surround him and to combine firepower attacks with seizing and arresting his [troops] on the battlefield; arrest any that you can arrest, but when you cannot seize and arrest them, it will be necessary to completely annihilate them.

(4) Countering enemy infiltration {*fan di shentou*}

In local wars under informationized conditions, infiltration is receiving more and more attention. Infiltration will be an important means by which the enemy will attack the targets in our depths.

When [we] discover enemy intentions to infiltrate [us] fairly early on and our troop strengths {*bingli*} for countering infiltration get into position in advance, it is possible to use methods that combine ambushes with mobile annihilation to destroy the enemy. When using this method of warfare, it is possible to first have part of [our] troop strengths {*bingli*} lay an ambush along a path that the enemy must follow, while having the main unit {*zhuli budui*} deploy to areas where they will wait for an opportunity. After waiting for the enemy to enter into the area where the ambush is, the troop strengths {*bingli*} doing the ambushing will first launch an attack, forcing the enemy to deploy. This will expose his weak points and slow him down, preventing him from getting close to the target he is attacking. Subsequently, a counterattack by the main unit {*zhuli budui*} will defeat the enemy's intentions to infiltrate [us], at a single blow.

When the troop strengths {*bingli*} that are countering the infiltration are fairly far from the enemy, and it is difficult to get into a position to annihilate the enemy in a timely manner and within a short period of time, it is possible to use methods that concentrate superior firepower for a rapid attack, and where firepower and troop strengths {*bingli*} annihilate the infiltrating enemy step by step {*fen bu*}. When using this method of combat, the commander should quickly concentrate firepower; when necessary, he can call on theater of war artillery troops' and aviation troops' firepower to support the combat, forming an absolute superiority, and trying to first use firepower to inflict heavy

casualties on the enemy. Units {*budui*} (or elements) that are responsible for the mission of countering infiltration use the effectiveness of firepower to suppress [the enemy], quickly draw close to the infiltrating enemy from differing directions, and deploy around [the enemy] in many directions. [Then,] on the basis of the heavy casualties inflicted by firepower, they quickly annihilate the enemy using combat methods that block him off at the head {*du tou*}, slice him up at the waist {*qie yao*}, cut him off at the tail {*duan wei*}, and divide him into pieces and surround him {*fengkui baowei*}.

When the enemy infiltrating troop strengths {*bingli*} are fairly large, and it is impossible to completely annihilate them at one time, the commander should organize units {*budui*} to utilize favorable terrain, using stubborn resistance to throw the enemy's deployments into confusion, to delay the enemy's march, and to destroy the enemy's key points and strategic points, doing their best to block the enemy's assault, to fight for time for the main unit {*zhuli budui*} to assemble, and to create [favorable] conditions.

II. Actions to resist the enemy where he attacks by sea {*fan di haishang lai xi shi de xingdong*}...229

[The term] attacks by sea {*haishang lai xi*} refers to a form of operations where [enemy] personnel [engaged in] harassment use boats, boat-rafts {*zhou fa*}, or civilian ships as transport tools to engage in harassment and destruction against us. The enemy usually carries out attacks at sea against us using the following several forms. The first is to use boats, ships, rafts, or other forms to carry out harassment and destructive activities such as surprising sentries, explosions, and distributing leaflets, going from shore to shore [targeting] individual targets {*dian zhuang mubiao*} in areas along our front, flanks, and rear area where it is easy to land, where it is easy to withdraw, and where the defenses that have been set up are weak. The second is to organize commando units that travel in mechanized tools from one shore to another {*you an zhi an*} for amphibious landings, that take separate routes and covertly draw close [to the target], and that launch assaults against key targets in the forward depths of our coastal areas that affect the overall situation of operations but whose defense is fairly weak. The third is to dispatch triphibian special teams that use the darkness of night, midnight, and bad weather like thick fog, to use such means as secret landings and surprise attacks in order to carry out such special operations as demolitions and attacks against ships in our forward depths that are waiting to load, and against assembled units {*budui*}. The fourth is to use civilian ships as shields to secretly land and arrive at the areas with targets that they will harass, in order to carry out surprise attacks against important targets in our forward depths in a way that groups pieces into a whole {*ji ling wei zheng*}. The fifth is [to go] underwater to channels that our ships must pass through or land at {*di an*} and carry out attacks and destruction against harbors, terminals, and ships in our forward depths.

Enemy attacks by sea {*haishang lai xi*}, no matter what form they take, are done from one shore to another {*you an zhi an*} or from ships (or island or shoal) to shore {*you jian (dao, jiao) zhi an*}, going by sea to get close to us. Therefore, when the commander of an armed police unit {*wu jing budui*} is organizing operations to counter an enemy attack by

sea {*haishang lai xi*}, he should concentrate troop strengths {*bingli*} along a direction and in an area where the enemy is likely to secretly land, setting up ambushes at many points, and distributing [the troops] and controlling things in a focused manner, so that the enemy “cannot land, and if he comes he cannot leave” {*shang bu lai, laile zoubuliao*}. As soon as an enemy that is attacking sneaks in and lands, [the commander] should immediately adjust his deployments; flexibly adopt the combat methods of blocking, controlling, ambushing, and attacking [the enemy]; and attack the enemy who is attacking by sea {*haishang lai xi*}.

III. Actions to resist enemy attacks by air {*fan di kongzhong lai xi de xingdong*}...230

[The term] attacks by air {*kongzhong lai xi*} refers to a form of operations where small groups of armed personnel [involved in] harassment use air landings or parachuting to carry out long-range harassment or destruction against us, riding in such air transport tools as helicopters or transport planes. Their goal is to attack or destroy strategic or campaign targets in our depths that affect the overall situation of operations. Enemy air attacks usually primarily take the form of air landings.

An enemy who [engages in] air landings and harassment usually rides in helicopters that have the ability for night navigation; they [usually] select midnight for their insertion and adopt the form of minimum-altitude flights in order to evade our radar warning areas, and secretly air land close to our targets. In accordance with a plan of action, they divide into groups and do a bit of preparations, and then secretly before dawn draw close to the target to be harassed. They concentrate superior troop strengths {*bingli*} and firepower to launch a surprise attack against a predetermined attack target. Enemy air landing harassment emphasizes a quick fight and a quick resolution; once they “reap a profit” {*lao yi ba*}, they leave, and they definitely do not want a fight {*jue bu lian zhan*}.

Parachuting harassment is where the enemy military, as needed, dispatches air landing elements that have undergone special training to ride in transport aircraft in order to carry out attacks and harassment actions against political and military targets within our depths that affect the overall situation of operations, or against tactical targets and key positions within our forward depths area that have an important influence. Their tactical means are similar to those of air landing and harassment operations; where they differ is that after the air landing and harassment missions are completed, if withdrawal is difficult, the harassment personnel either quickly switch over to waiting for an opportunity to engage in offensive operations in our rear area, or they break up into small groups, camouflage themselves, and slip away, making it harder for us to surround and annihilate them.

When the commander of an armed police unit {*wu jing budui*} is organizing operations to resist an enemy attack by air {*kongzhong lai xi*}, he should grasp favorable opportunities when enemy aircraft are overhead, are landing, or are gathering and assembling. [He should] flexibly adopt such combat methods as “moving and laying ambushes, moving first and dominating the enemy, relying upon key points, blocking attacks step by step,

penetrating [the enemy] and dividing him up, surrounding [the enemy] and annihilating him one by one, making a forced march and pressing in on [the enemy], and annihilating the enemy [through] close combat” {*jidong shefu, xianji zhi di, yituo yaodian, jiejie zu ji, chuancha fen’ge, gege weijian, qiangxing tiejin, jinzhan qiandi*}, and [he should] organize subordinate units {*budui*} to attack the enemy who is attacking by air {*kongzhong lai xi*}.

IV. Defending against long-range enemy firepower assaults {*fang di yuancheng huoli tuji*}...231

[The term] defending against long-range enemy firepower assaults {*yuancheng huoli tuji*} refers to protective actions that are taken against enemy long-range precision attacks.

Dispersing and concealment {*fensan yinbi*}. To deal with the characteristics of enemy precision attacks and the destruction that he inflicts on a regional basis {*quyu shashang*}, deploy personnel, materials, and equipment in a dispersed manner, and conceal them using terrain and land features. It is necessary to disperse troop strengths {*bingli*}, weapons, and other important targets as much as possible, [but] it is [also] necessary to make it easy to rapidly concentrate and use troop strengths {*bingli*} and firepower, so that these have optimal effectiveness.

Smoke and blindness {*yanwu mimang*}. Smoke and blindness {*yanwu mimang*} are a method that is simple and easy to do and that is also fairly effective. It is possible to screen fixed targets that have already been located by enemy reconnaissance against enemy long-range precision guided munitions and especially against cruise missiles that are guided by matching imagery with terminal targets, by releasing smoke at a suitable opportunity. This is effective in interfering with the work of the cruise missile’s guidance system that matches terminal imagery, creating a false image {*jia xiang*} and making his attack fail.

Deception and camouflage {*qipian weizhuang*}. Use manufactured and makeshift materials and the natural geographical environment to camouflage targets and lower the probability that the enemy will discover them. For large-scale fixed military installations and targets that are not easily concealed, [we] should adopt measures to camouflage these at the appropriate time, in order to make it easy to quickly camouflage them. For important electronic equipment and targets, it is necessary to enhance their integrated ability to defend against reconnaissance by setting up electronic anti-radar, anti-infrared, and anti-optoelectronic screens.

Change locations in a timely manner {*jishi bianhuan weizhi*}. Enemy precision attacks display their skill to the fullest against fixed targets, but they have little effect against mobile targets. Therefore, [we] should move things at suitable times, based on the patterns of the enemy’s reconnaissance and attacks. By reconnoitering routes and building positions in advance, [we can] use the darkness of night and bad weather to

quickly move things. The length of time [used in] moving must be short, to reduce as much as possible the length of time that [targets] are exposed, and [we must] keep on doing this, at irregular times, from one mountain to another {*zai shan yu shan*} and from one village to another {*cun yu cun*}. It is necessary to wreck the enemy's reconnaissance and positioning by moving at a suitable time, so that it will be hard for him to carry out precision attacks.

Section 2: Actions to Maintain Social Order in the Theater of War {*weihu zhanqu shehui zhixu de xingdong*}...232

In future joint operations, in order to establish and maintain a rear area that is secure and stable, armed police units {*wu jing budui*} will be responsible for maintaining social order in the theater of war and for protecting security and stability in the rear area. The goal of this is to ensure social stability in the theater of war through strengthening monitoring and control of society, cooperating with public security organs to severely attack the illegal and criminal activities of enemy special elements and various types of criminal elements. At the same time, it is necessary to thoroughly put down preparations for riots and disturbances, and to resolutely smash various conspiracies by foreign and domestic hostile forces and [minority] nationalities' splittist elements.

I. Strengthen the guarding of important targets {*jiaqiang zhongyao mubiao jingxie*}...232

Armed police units {*wu jing budui*} must fully bring into play the advantage they have of being fairly familiar with the nature, position, roles, and functions of important targets and with the natural environment. [They must] actively make proposals about the means and forms of attack that the enemy could use against our important targets, and coordinate about relevant aspects and with relevant departments about these [proposals]. [They must] actively make plans, draft programs, and adopt measures for the security and protection of the targets. They can flexibly adopt such combat methods as "concealment" {*cang*}, "deception" {*pian*}, "altering" {*bian*}, "encircling" {*wei*}, and "blocking" {*zu*}, to ensure the security of important targets.

II. Maintain social order {*weihu shehui zhi'an*}...232

In future joint operations, the commander of an armed police unit {*wu jing budui*} should adopt various means of intelligence reconnaissance, and have a timely and accurate grasp of tendencies among domestic and foreign splittist elements and reactionary armed groups. [He should] take resolute and active actions against harassment actions that the enemy could use, attacking the splittist activities of [minority] nationalities and preventing riots and disturbances that could occur. [He should] increase the intensity of armed patrols and cooperate with public security organs in attacking various types of criminal elements as these take advantage of opportunities for destruction and making trouble. [Finally, he should] cooperate with security organs to prevent and attack in a timely manner hostile elements' activities [aimed at] infiltration, incitement to rebellion,

the theft of secrets, and destruction, so that these will not interfere with the military's operations along the front lines.

III. Eliminate the aftereffects of attacks {*xiaochu xiji houguo*}...232

When the enemy attacks our important targets, the commander of an armed police unit {*wu jing budui*} should quickly organize strengths {*liliang*} and assist local air defense, traffic, and public security departments in organizing leadership organs and the masses of the people within the defense area as they dredge, conceal, avoid, or reduce damage created by enemy long-range precision attacks. When there are battle aftereffects such as personnel who have suffered casualties, buildings that have fallen down, and widespread fires, [he should] actively organize emergency rescues of wounded personnel, emergency repairs to roads and bridges, transfers and protection of important materials, and maintenance of public order.

Section 3: Actions to Protect Security of Traffic Lines in the Rear Area {*baowei houfang jiaotongxian anquan de xingdong*}...233

Military traffic and transportation lines are nodes that support the military in moving quickly and in carrying out logistics support. Experiences in warfare have shown that the two sides in operations treat destroying and cutting off each other's traffic and transportation lines as important means for achieving their strategic and campaign intentions. Therefore, when armed police units {*wu jing budui*} are responsible for defending the security of military transportation lines, they must strictly organize and deploy defensive strengths {*fangwei liliang*} in a scientific and focused manner.

I. Strictly organize emergency construction of and emergency repairs to traffic lines and traffic facilities {*yanmi zuzhi jiaotongxian he jiaotong sheshi de qiangjian, qiangxiu*}...233

Carrying out emergency construction of and emergency repairs to traffic lines and traffic facilities, and strengthening their maintenance, are important measures for keeping traffic unimpeded. Therefore, in operations, armed police units {*wu jing budui*} should thoroughly understand relevant military and local units and departments; based on the needs of operations, and using existing traffic lines as a foundation, [they should] construct emergency connecting lines, dedicated lines {*zhuanyong xian*}, and bypass lines {*yuhui xian*}, forming an intersecting, criss-crossing traffic network. It is necessary to expand or reconstruct road sections, thoroughfares, and bridges that cannot be used {*tongxing nengli cha*} as well as ports, fords, train stations, terminals, and airfields that lack loading (and unloading) facilities, in order to enhance their transportation capabilities. It is necessary to make plans for emergency repairs to important traffic nodes, defiles, ports, fords, airfields, and traffic facilities, and to thoroughly prepare the materials needed for emergency repairs. As far as conditions will permit, [they] should construct in advance branch lines, bypass lines {*yuhui xian*}, temporary bridges, and reserve harbors, terminals, fords, and airfield runways, to be prepared for use under

emergency conditions. During the process of carrying out operations, in order to strengthen emergency repairs to and maintenance of traffic lines, it is necessary to carry out forms that combine emergency repairs at fixed points and mobile emergency repairs, and it is necessary to concentrate strengths {*liliang*} for important routes and facilities, to divide up responsibilities for tasks, and to divide responsibilities for these tasks until they are completed. [In this way,] repairs will be done as soon as there are explosions, ensuring that [routes] will be smooth and unhindered.

II. Strengthen the protection of traffic lines {*jiaqiang jiaotongxian de fanghu*}...233

Maintaining the security of traffic and transportation lines is an extremely important and quite complex issue. Not only is it necessary to guard against sabotage and destruction from the air and from land, but it is also necessary to prevent and overcome air landings and parachute landings, minelaying and spreading poison {*bu du*}, throwing time bombs, and obstacle laying that the enemy does. Therefore, the commander of an armed police unit {*wu jing budui*} should dispatch guard units {*budui*} (or elements) to protect roads, based on the overall plan of defense. Based on the number of traffic lines and their distances, as well as the level of threat from enemy conditions, [he should] adopt methods that combine the control of key points, road patrols, and tracking down and exterminating [the enemy], so as to provide shielding and protection. [Finally, he should] disperse and conceal transportation tools, power {*dongli*}, and construction equipment, camouflaging them strictly, and preventing enemy reconnaissance and destruction. At the same time, he should also pay attention to preventing destruction by natural disasters such as gale-force winds, torrential rains, and floods.

Section 4: Actions to support the Security of the Main Force's Flanks {*baozhang zhuli yice anquan de xingdong*}...234

In future joint operations, supporting the security of the main force's flanks and to the rear of his flanks and creating favorable conditions for the main force to smoothly carry out movements and operational missions are one of the main missions in operations to protect the rear area that armed police units {*wu jing budui*} carry out.

I. Keeping a close watch on and guarding important targets {*zhongyao mubiao jingjie, jingwei*}...234

Keeping a close watch on and guarding important targets {*zhongyao mubiao jingjie, jingwei*} are primarily aimed at keeping a close watch on important political, military, and economic targets in the area along the flanks and to the rear of the flanks of the main unit {*zhuli budui*}. These include logistics bases, airfields, terminals, and transportation lines. The main missions are: to prevent enemy reconnaissance of the various important targets along the flanks of our main force {*zhuli*}; to smash infiltration by small groups of enemy armed forces {*wuzhuang*} or sabotage and destruction by enemy special agents; to strictly block information and to support the security of movement along the main force's {*zhuli*} flanks and the rear of its flanks; and when the enemy carries out attacks using

fairly large groups of troop strengths {*bingli*}, to find traces of enemy movements as early as possible and to adopt effective methods to delay enemy actions, creating conditions for the main force {*zhuli*} to annihilate the enemy.

II. Keeping a close watch on marches {*xingjun jingjie*}...234

Keeping a close watch on marches {*xingjun jingjie*} is a measure for guarding that keeps the main unit {*zhuli budui*} from coming under enemy attack from the ground and the air when [the main force] is marching, that prevents reconnaissance by enemy special agents, and that prevents harassment by small groups of enemies. In operations, the commander of an armed police unit {*wu jing budui*} should organize strengths {*liliang*} and set up watches along both sides of the route for our main force's {*zhuli*} march, and [he should] control important positions along the route, in order to discover and attack in a timely manner enemies who would carry out surprise attacks against our marching formations and to prevent enemy harassment along the route, so as to support the main unit {*zhuli budui*} in smoothly carrying out its movement.

III. Keeping a close watch on combat {*zhandou jingjie*}...234

Keeping a close watch on combat {*zhandou jingjie*} refers to keeping a close watch in order to shield the main force's {*zhuli*} operational actions. In operations, [armed police] should closely monitor enemy trends and prevent enemy reconnaissance, infiltration, and sabotage, ensuring the security of the main unit's {*zhuli budui*} actions.

IV. Regional management and control {*quyu guanzhi*}...235

[The term] regional management and control {*quyu guanzhi*} refers to the coercive management and control that is done over a designated area, industrial system, or unit. In operations, based on the needs of military combat, it is possible to divide these into restricted areas that unauthorized personnel are forbidden to enter or where their activities are restricted. [Armed police] should strengthen their inspection and control of important directions, key areas, and key targets, discovering suspicious signs in a timely manner, and strictly preventing harassment and other kinds of destructive activities by enemy special agent elements, small groups of [enemy] armed forces {*wuzhuang*}, and criminal elements. In accordance with their orders, [they should] carry out military management and control and traffic management and control over some areas or road sections, strictly limiting the scope of personnel and vehicular activities. [They should] firmly attack the various destructive activities by enemy special agent elements, tightly supervise and control the various activities of foreigners within the scope of the theater of war, and prevent these from stealing secrets. [They should] keep traffic smooth, and manage and control motorized roads {*jidong daolu*} within the area under their jurisdiction, at all times and along the entire journey. [Finally, they should carry out] inspections at fixed sites at traffic nodes and in important sections, keep traffic in order, and establish reserve organizations for adjusting services {*tiaozheng qinwu*}, so that when there are emergency

situations, it will be possible to quickly send out strengths that have been newly adjusted {*tiaozheng liliang*}.

Section 5: Actions that Cooperate with the Main Force in Carrying Out Feints {*peihe zhuli shishi yangdong de xingdong*}...235

Armed police units {*wu jing budui*} (primarily units {*budui*} that are mobile divisions) cooperate with the main force {*zhuli*} in carrying out feints; in accordance with the scope of the space [involved], these [feints] can be divided into frontal feints, flank feints, and in-depth feints; in accordance with the goals that need to be achieved, they can be differentiated into feints that show strength, feints that show weakness, feints that show a situation, feints that show an advance, and feints involving retreat. With the rapid development of advanced and new technology, there has been an ever-increasing number of opportunities, places, and means for using feints; in addition to the flexible use of feints [employing] troop strengths {*bingli*}, it is also possible to use such means as firepower and electronics to carry out feints.

I. Feint movements {*yangdong xing jidong*}...235

Feint movements {*yangdong xing jidong*} are false movements that armed police units {*wu jing budui*} carry out in order to shield movements by the main unit {*zhuli budui*}, using a fairly small number of troop strengths {*bingli*}. In joint operations under informationized conditions, in carrying out feint movements {*yangdong xing jidong*}, it is first necessary to flexibly select the direction and route of the feint movement {*yangdong xing jidong*}. It is necessary to flexibly select the direction and route of the feint movement {*yangdong xing jidong*}, based on the decision for the operation and the plans for deception and on the goal of the feint movement {*yangdong xing jidong*}, on the situations of the two sides in the operation, and on the characteristics of the enemy's reconnaissance and surveillance, [in order to] lure the enemy into focusing on reconnaissance and surveillance of our unit {*budui*} [that is carrying out] the feint, and switching the enemy's attention [over to this]. Second, it is necessary to rationally determine the troop strengths {*bingli*} that are responsible for the feint movement {*yangdong xing jidong*} as well as their scale and task organization. One of the main characteristics of feint movements {*yangdong xing jidong*} is to use small things to show big things {*yi xiao shi da*}. The general requirement is, under the premise of ensuring that the mission of the feint action {*yangdong xing jidong*}, to rationally determine the troop strengths {*bingli*} [that is carrying out] the feint as well as its scale and task organization. Third, it is necessary to simulate the characteristics of a unit's {*budui*} movement in a lifelike manner. When simulating the movements of a mechanized unit {*jixiehua budui*}, it is necessary to leave traces of a mechanized unit's {*jixiehua budui*} vehicle formation and movement along multiple routes, to have powerful radio stations frequently contact [each other], and to have anti-aircraft artillery troops shield against the air at fixed points. Fourth, it is necessary to match the general patterns of our military's movements. In future joint operations, feint movements {*yangdong xing jidong*} will be used in a widespread, frequent, repetitive, and clever manner, and the patterns of their movements

must be identical with the patterns of our military's movements. In order to avoid using up too many of our troop strengths {bingli} and weapons during the feint, in the process of carrying out the feint, it is possible to organically combine feint movements {yangdong xing jidong} with adjustments to deployments and the organization of other operational actions. Fifth, it is necessary to enhance the anti-reconnaissance capabilities of feint movements {yangdong xing jidong}. Feint movements {yangdong xing jidong} must be able to attract the enemy's attention, but they also cannot let the enemy clearly distinguish between what is real and what is fake; the various fake targets that they use not only must have exteriors that resemble those of real targets, but they also should have material characteristics that are similar to [those of the real targets]. Not only must they be able to deal with the enemy's visual reconnaissance, but they must also be able to deal with reconnaissance by the enemy's various high-tech detection devices. It is necessary to use many measures to prevent the enemy's close-range aerial photography and penetration, and to comprehensively enhance anti-reconnaissance capabilities.

II. Feint assemblies {yangdong xing jijie}...236

[The term] feint assemblies {yangdong xing jijie} refers to simulated assembling that uses a fairly small number of troop strengths {bingli} to simulate a large unit {da budui} that is quickly concentrating in a designated region. In carrying out a feint assembly {yangdong xing jijie}, [we] should organically combine the feint assembly {yangdong xing jijie} with real operational actions, making it hard for the enemy to distinguish what is real and what is false. It is necessary to build fake loading and unloading stations in the fake assembly area, and to carry out fake loading and unloading. [It is necessary] to create the impression that a large unit {da budui} is assembling, by using infantry and vehicle formations to simulate infantry and motorized units {motuohua budui} as they proceed to the assembly area, by using anti-tank artillery and self-propelled artillery to simulate artillery troops transferring to the assembly area, and by changing the numbers {bianhao} of artillery and vehicles' license plates. [It is necessary] to deploy large numbers of fake targets and to set up guards. [Finally, it is necessary] to use lighting devices, audio devices, smoke generators, radio equipment, and a small number of technical weapons and combat elements to simulate activity in the fake assembly area. In order to strengthen the lifelike nature of feint assemblies {yangdong xing jijie}, [we] should also build a certain number of fortifications and associated facilities in assembly areas that are feints {yangdong xing jijie diyu}.

III. Feint attacks {yangdong xing jin'gong}...236

The goal of feint attacks {yang gong} is to cause the enemy to make misjudgments, to maneuver the enemy's reconnaissance and surveillance strengths {liliang}, and to lower the effectiveness of his reconnaissance, through offensive actions that are bluff and bluster. In carrying out a feint attack {yang gong}, it is first necessary to correctly choose the place for the feint attack {yang gong}. This must be far from the area of the main force's {zhuli} main attack; the targets of the feint attack {yang gong} should be aimed at an enemy position that is relatively sensitive, forcing the enemy to transfer large numbers

of his reconnaissance and surveillance devices and his defensive strengths {*fangyu liliang*} and diverting the enemy's attention, in order to shield the intentions of the operation that our main unit {*zhuli budui*} is achieving along the real direction of attack. Second, the actions in feint attacks {*yang gong*} must correspond with the PRC military's consistent principles of operations, and the troop strengths {*bingli*} and weapons that launch [the feint attack] as well as the breadth of the rear area deployments [must] be basically the same as the deployment {*bushu*} of operations. They adopt such forms as using a few things to replace a large number of things, using things that are small to replace things that are large, and using things that are weak to replace things that are strong in order to expand the momentum [of the feint attack] and to turn practice into a real song {*jia xi zhen chang*}. Third is to flexibly change the time for the feint attack {*yang gong*}. Feint attacks {*yang gong*} can take place prior to the launch of a real action or at the same time.

IV. Feint defense {*yangdong xing fangyu*}...237

[The term] feint defense {*yangdong xing fangyu*} refers to actions during the process of organizing defense where various kinds of measures [involving] feints are adopted to conceal the intentions of operations, and where fake defensive dispositions and troop strength {*bingli*} deployments are set up to distract the enemy's attention, to absorb the enemy's reconnaissance and surveillance, and to force the enemy to make errors in judgment. In order to ensure feint defense is satisfactorily carried out, first, a certain number of fake positions are built along one or two sides of a real defensive area, and fake targets are set up along with their necessary audio and optical simulation devices, turning practice into a real song {*jia xi zhen chang*}. Second, some fake fronts are abandoned at the appropriate time, luring the enemy forward and forcing the enemy to expand the scope of his reconnaissance and surveillance, [thus] drawing away the enemy's reconnaissance and surveillance strengths {*liliang*}.

V. Withdrawals involving feints {*yangdong xing tuique*}...237

The essence of withdrawals that involve feints {*yangdong xing tuique*} is to get the enemy to leave the main battlefield, luring the enemy into tracking and reconnaissance. There are primarily two methods of withdrawals that involve feints {*yangdong xing tuique*}. The first is the method that uses an attack to cover withdrawals {*yi jin yan tui*}. That is, under conditions where [we] are confronting the enemy, in order to shake off the enemy and transfer troop strengths {*bingli*}, [we] can use the method of a feint attack {*yang gong*} to confuse the enemy and to absorb reconnaissance by the enemy's various reconnaissance and surveillance devices. After the enemy has switched his attention to defense, our unit {*budui*} then looks for an opportunity to slip away. The second is the method where you slip out of a predicament. Its feature is that it keeps the original form of the outer shape while extracting the actual contents, leaving but still showing that [you] have not left, and indicating that you have not moved whereas you have [actually] already left. [You] transfer troop strengths {*bingli*} while the enemy is not aware of this, forcing the enemy to passively carry out reconnaissance that tracks [the troop strengths].

During the process of withdrawal, it is necessary to keep the withdrawal rational and lifelike; it is necessary to show that the marching formations are chaotic and untidy, to deliberately abandon some baggage and equipment, to abandon some maps and documents that have not been completely burnt and that have false situations marked on them, and to have these fall into the hands of the enemy.

Chapter 6

Support to the Operations of Armed Police Units in Joint Operations...238

[The term] support to the operations {*zuozhan baozhang*} of armed police units {*wuzhuang jingcha budui*} in joint operations refers to the general term for the various measures and actions that are planned in a unified manner and undertaken by the joint operations command organization in order to ensure that operational actions are smoothly carried out. It is an important factor in making up units' {*budui*} abilities for operational actions. Its basic missions are to support the commander in making timely decisions and in exercising continuous command, to support the coordination of units' {*budui*} operational actions, and to make preparations and complete missions in a concealed, secure, and smooth manner.

Section 1: Basic Requirements {*jiben yaoqiu*}...238

Support to the operations {*zuozhan baozhang*} of armed police units {*wuzhuang jingcha budui*} is characterized by their prominent status and role, the many details [involved] in the support, the difficulties of their missions, the complexity of their organizational system {*tixi*}, and the great difficulty in organizing and coordinating them. Whether operational actions are smooth or not is quite crucial to whether or not it is possible to do a good job of organizing support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang*}.

I. Be prepared in advance and struggle for the initiative {*yu you zhunbei, lizheng zhudong*}...238

Cooperating with [People's] Liberation Army joint operations means that the work of support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang*} has to react to things in a very short period of time; therefore, being prepared in advance {*yu you zhunbei*} in peacetime appears to be quite important. First, it is necessary to draft many support scenarios {*nizhi duozhong baozhang yu'an*}. In drafting the scenarios, [the armed police] should draft many support scenarios {*nizhi duozhong baozhang yu'an*}, with an emphasis on hotspot regions and based on the support missions that they could be responsible for. Examples are plans for allotting organizational groupings to strengths {*liliang*}, plans for organizing command organizations, plans for support organizational systems {*tixi*}, and plans for mobilization. Second is carrying out training for war-readiness. Scenarios that combine the characteristics of joint operational actions with the principles and training for support to carrying out missions, [so that the armed police] have a firm grasp in peacetime on carrying out training for war readiness, and scenarios for organizing drills in a focused manner so that [the armed police] become very familiar with support, [all] make the mission of support clear, so that each [person] can have a firm grasp on his responsibilities {*fu qi ze zhua*} and will rush to do them as soon as the order is given, in

accordance with the respective plans. Third¹⁵ is to strengthen the establishment of support facilities in hotspot areas, in a focused manner. The intensity of warfare in future local wars under informationized conditions will be great, and a great many materials will be consumed; it will be difficult to support the needs of units {*budui*} by relying merely upon ad hoc measures. In peacetime, [the armed police] should set up an organizational system {*tixi*} for support in hotspot areas, in a focused manner.

II. Devise campaign strategies and enhance capabilities {*yuchouweiwu, tigao nengli*}...239

The first is to enhance the ability for support while moving {*dong zhong baozhang*}. In joint operations, armed police units {*wu jing budui*} should set up support organizations along the corridors that operations will move along, and in connection with local organizations that support the front, [they should] adopt various support methods. In carrying out support, armed police units {*wu jing budui*} must especially pay attention to doing a thorough job of resolving issues involving their own support while moving {*dong zhong baozhang*}, so that they can support units {*budui*} wherever [these units] act. The second is to enhance the ability to react quickly. In the future, when cooperating with the joint operational actions of the [People's] Liberation Army, it will be necessary to react quickly and to support things quickly, and it will be necessary to take the initiative in understanding the intentions of the operation and the decisions about operations that have already been made, and to clearly distinguish between what is primary and what is secondary and between what is urgent and what is not urgent, [in order] to make preparations in advance. It will be necessary to simplify command procedures and to deploy support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} close to the front, in order to enhance the ability to react rapidly in [providing] support and to support units {*budui*}. The third is to enhance the ability to organize command. [Armed police] should draft several programs for support, based on the plan of operations and the changes that could take place in the battlefield situation, so that they can respond to thousands of changes by making a single change. Each kind of support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} at each echelon should be deployed so that a single deployment can adapt to a number of situations and so that they are relatively stable but also have a certain amount of flexibility. They must have control over a sufficient number of reserve strengths {*yubei liliang*} and they must be able to adapt to situations that suddenly change. [Finally,] they must have a support command system that is smooth and highly effective, in order to ensure that command that is organized to support actions is uninterrupted. The fourth is to enhance the survival capability of support. In future wars, it will no longer be possible to ensure the security of support and its stable operations by relying merely upon the traditional, purely defensive methods of concealment and avoidance; it will be necessary to adopt various technical means in order to enhance the overall survival capabilities of support.

¹⁵ Translator's note: the Chinese text has "second" {*er*} here, which is an obvious error.

III. Close coordination and cooperating in many ways {*miqie xietong, duo fang peihe*}...239

First, strengthen cooperation among departments. Each support department should find out {*liaojie zhangwo*} in a timely manner from the command department and political department about how military actions are deployed and about the local social situation. They should also report relevant support situations and reflect [any] difficulties and major issues in support. Second, strengthen coordination between the armed police {*wu jing*} and the [People's] Liberation Army support departments, drawing close to a model of integrated joint support. In joint operations, armed police units {*wu jing budui*} are highly dispersed over the entire area of operations, and are situated in between the [People's] Liberation Army's deployments for operations and deployments for support. Therefore, the various armed police units {*wu jing zongdui*} (or divisions) should take the initiative to carefully coordinate support with the [People's] Liberation Army, in accordance with the uniform deployments of the armed police units {*wu jing zongdui*} and in accordance with the unified plan of what is required, so that they will get vigorous support and cooperation in a timely manner. Third, strengthen the coordination of support departments in between the upper and lower echelons. The overall support department of the upper echelon should report in a timely manner on relevant conditions in operations and transmit the senior officer's decisions and intentions about operations to each echelon. The lower echelons' support departments must take the initiative to report to the upper echelon about preparations for operations and about how operations are progressing; they particularly need to report on relevant conditions involving the local governments. Fourth, strengthen coordination with local strengths that support the front {*difang zhiqian liliang*}. When coordinating with local strengths that support the front {*difang zhiqian liliang*}, it is necessary for the military, the police, and local governments to cooperate in drafting joint support plans, under the unified command of the joint command {*lian zhi*} and the armed police headquarters {*wu jing zongbu*}; [it is necessary] to clarify support matters, and to fully utilize local strengths that support the front {*difang zhiqian liliang*}, in order to strengthen the time-effectiveness and effectiveness of support to operations {*zuozhan baozhang*}.

Section 2: Main Details {*zhuyao neirong*}...240

Support to the operations {*zuozhan baozhang*} of armed police units {*wuzhuang jingcha budui*} primarily includes reconnaissance intelligence support {*zhencha qingbao baozhang*}; communications support {*tongxin baozhang*}; nuclear, chemical, and biological defense {*he hua sheng fanghu*}, engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*}, and meteorological and hydrological support {*qixiang shuiwen baozhang*}.

I. Reconnaissance intelligence support {*zhencha qingbao baozhang*}...240

The main missions in reconnaissance intelligence support {*zhencha qingbao baozhang*} to armed police units {*wu jing budui*} in joint operations are: to ascertain the enemy situation facing [the armed police], the terrain within their area of responsibility, and the

conditions of society and the people. When organizing reconnaissance intelligence support {*zhencha qingbao baozhang*}, [the police] should make clear the mission of reconnaissance, its scope, its key points, and its troop strengths {*bingli*} and equipment [involved]. [They should also make clear] the methods, deadlines, and requirements for completing the mission; the methods for communications and contacts and for reporting on conditions; and anti-reconnaissance measures.

Commanders at each echelon of the armed police units {*wu jing budui*} must carefully draft reconnaissance plans, based on the intentions of the upper echelon and on the mission at their own echelon, and integrating and using various means of reconnaissance and deploying reconnaissance strengths {*zhencha liliang*} in a comprehensive and focused manner. [They must] carry out continuous reconnaissance, modify their reconnaissance plans at appropriate times, alter reconnaissance deployments, shift key points of reconnaissance, issue new reconnaissance missions to reconnaissance elements in a timely manner, and supplement troop strengths {*bingli*} and equipment, in order to ensure that intelligence is obtained in a continuous and uninterrupted manner. [They must] fully utilize intelligence provided by the upper echelon and friendly neighbors as well as clues provided by the masses of the people, collect and study things in a widespread manner, and have many types of intelligence supplement and confirm each other. [Finally,] they must establish smooth intelligence communications, transmit intelligence that is quick and accurate, and simultaneously use two or more means of communications for transmitting important intelligence, so as to strengthen support.

II. Communications support {*tongxin baozhang*}...240

The basic mission of communications support {*tongxin baozhang*} is to support the smooth transmission of such communications as operations' command, coordination, advisories, and intelligence, in a timely, accurate, secure, and unhindered manner. When organizing communications support {*tongxin baozhang*}, [the armed police] should clarify differentiations in the use and duties of communications elements, the key points of support, locations where the various stations are to be set up and the opportunities for moving these, and measures for overcoming the effects that the natural environment has on communications contacts.

When organizing communications support {*tongxin baozhang*}, it is necessary to establish a communications support network {*tongxin baozhang wang*} that is all {*zongheng*} linked together, whose functions are all in readiness, and that has varied means. [It is necessary] to organize and coordinate the various communications strengths {*tongxin liliang*} in a uniform manner; to combine military communications and civilian communications; to combine wired communications and radio; to organize communications that skip echelons and mobile communications, at the appropriate time; and to ensure that command over sensitive positions, key areas, and major directions is unimpeded. [Finally, it is necessary] to comprehensively utilize many means of protection and to have control over a certain number of reserve strengths {*yubei liliang*}, to ensure the stability and security of communications at each echelon.

III. Nuclear, chemical, and biological defense *{he hua sheng fanghu}*...241

The basic missions of nuclear, chemical, and biological defense *{he hua sheng fanghu}* are to avoid or mitigate damage from light nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; to eliminate the aftereffects of an attack; to support units *{budui}* in smoothly carrying out operational actions; and to preserve the combat capabilities of units *{budui}*. When organizing support for chemical defense, [armed police] should clarify the organization and missions of services for notifications about reconnaissance, for observations, and for alerts against enemy nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; protective measures for units *{budui}*; the organization of chemical and radiological reconnaissance and the task organization and missions of emergency rescue teams; measures for defense and for eliminating aftereffects when coming under attack from enemy nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; having a grasp on the situation of civilian nuclear and chemical industry facilities in the area of operations; and handling the aftereffects of an enemy attack in a timely manner.

When organizing support to nuclear and biological defense *{he fang sheng fanghu}*, it is necessary to carefully organize observations; using chemical defense *{fanghua}* elements at [units'] own echelons as the basis, [it is necessary] to organize an observation system and notification service that combines the upper [echelon] and the lower [echelon], that combines the masses and specialized [elements], and that combines the military, police, and local governments. It is necessary to stringently organize defense; to carefully draft defense plans; to establish and strengthen various types of defense organizations; to divide up missions in key areas and to deploy specialized strengths *{zhuanye liliang}*; to launch training prior to the start of war on a widespread basis, with an emphasis on protecting the masses; and to do a thorough job of protecting weapons and equipment and materials and devices, and especially of chemical industry production and storage targets. It is necessary to carry out strict camouflage and to keep destruction from enemy air attacks and enemy special agents *{di te}* from becoming major disasters. It is necessary to eliminate aftereffects in a timely manner; after coming under attack from enemy nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, [armed police] should quickly ascertain the scope and level of damage and contamination; [they should] report to the upper echelon in a timely manner and inform local military and civilians about relevant conditions; [they should] adjust deployments for operations at the proper time; [they should] organize emergency rescue, emergency repairs, firefighting, and disinfection; [they should] get rid of contamination; [they should] carry out health quarantines; and [they should] inspect food and water sources that might be or have been contaminated, and handle sanitation [issues].

IV. Engineering support *{gongcheng baozhang}*...241

Engineering support *{gongcheng baozhang}* to armed police units *{wu jing budui}* in joint operations is the general term that refers to all the engineering measures that are taken to support units' *{budui}* actions. Its basic missions are to support units *{budui}* in their secret, secure, and smooth movements, while restricting the movements of the

enemy; to establish and improve the defensive system of engineering projects, and ensure the stability of command and the security of major deployments; to construct and maintain roads, bridges, airfields, and terminals, in order to support the smooth movement of units {*budui*}; to establish systems of engineering obstacles in order to restrict and destroy the enemy's movements; and to carry out engineering camouflage and support of water supplies.

In organizing and carrying out engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*} [armed police] should clarify the terrain, road, channel, bridge, port, and airfield conditions in the area of operations; the existing engineering facilities, makeshift materials, and the support capabilities of local governments; the task organization, missions, and needs of engineering support strengths {*gongcheng baozhang liliang*}; the opportunities and methods of support; the methods for overcoming obstacles; the means and measures for delaying and restraining the enemy's movements; the troop strengths {*bingli*} and methods for building and maintaining command posts, roads, and bridges; the troop strengths {*bingli*}, opportunities, and places for carrying out destructive engineering operations; and measures for supporting motorized roads {*jidong daolu*}.

When organizing engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*}, it is necessary to strictly organize engineering reconnaissance (or reconnoitering) in the rear area of operations, in order to ascertain the terrain, roads, rivers, bridges, and important military (or civilian) engineering facilities in the area of responsibility, and to find out about {*liaojie zhangwo*} the manpower and materiel that local and friendly neighboring units {*budui*} can provide. [Engineers] should conscientiously study the engineering intelligence that they obtain, and on the basis of this, make plans for engineering support {*gongcheng baozhang*} and use support strengths {*baozhang liliang*} in a uniform manner. [They should also] carefully organize coordination among [the support strengths] at their own echelon, [the support strengths of] friendly neighbors, and local support strengths {*baozhang liliang*}, in order to exercise unified command for major engineering actions and over emergency repairs and emergency rescue for major targets, bringing into play the role of integrated support strengths {*baozhang liliang*}.

V. Meteorological and hydrological support {*qixiang shuiwen baozhang*}...242

Meteorological and hydrological support {*qixiang shuiwen baozhang*} to armed police units {*wu jing budui*} is a service activity that is organized and carried out by meteorological departments and units {*budui*} in order to support units' {*budui*} actions. Its basic missions are to provide weather forecasts and meteorological intelligence and data that are needed for units' {*budui*} actions, to provide proposals about getting benefits and avoiding harm as regards meteorological and hydrological conditions, and to support units' {*budui*} in correctly using meteorological and hydrological conditions in order to smoothly carry out operational actions.

In organizing and carrying out meteorological and hydrological support {*qixiang shuiwen baozhang*}, it is first necessary to establish an integrated system of meteorological and

hydrological support {*qixiang shuiwen baozhang*}. Armed police units {*wu jing budui*} should establish a meteorological and hydrological support center {*qixiang shuiwen baozhang zhongxin*} for operations, and include this in the meteorological and hydrological support system {*qixiang shuiwen baozhang tixi*} for joint operations. [They should] divide up the work with the meteorological and hydrological support departments {*qixiang shuiwen baozhang bumen*} of the upper echelon and of friendly neighbors and [should] cooperate with them, [they should] share data, and [they should] jointly do a thorough job of meteorological and hydrological support {*qixiang shuiwen baozhang*}. Second, it is necessary to formulate and issue meteorological and hydrological forecasts for the area of operations as well as meteorological and hydrological advisories about major damage. They [must] provide background meteorological and hydrological data for the area of operations, draft [information about] integrated meteorological and hydrological conditions in a unified manner, and make proposals about organizing actions that use meteorological and hydrological conditions. Third, it is necessary to support key points and strengthen coordination. [It is necessary] to concentrate main strengths {*zhuyao liliang*} to focus on obtaining meteorological and hydrological data for the main areas of action and for crucial occasion; it is especially necessary to pay attention to staying abreast of major disastrous weather and hydrology and of the effects these have on crucial actions. [It is necessary] to closely coordinate armed police's {*wu jing*} support actions with those of the [People's] Liberation Army's and local meteorological and hydrological departments. [It is necessary] to organize meteorological and hydrological monitoring, and analyze the effects that meteorology and hydrology have on units' {*budui*} actions. [Finally, it is necessary] to strengthen exchanges about meteorological and hydrological conditions and consultations about forecasts.